Tag: United States
Iran options
As the complexity of the attack on Saudi oil facilities becomes apparent, the odds that it was state-sponsored go up. Iran is the prime suspect. So if convincing evidence is provided, what would an appropriate response be? Here are some options:
- Military
An attack on Iranian oil-producing facilities would be the obvious, proportional response. But Iran already is unable to export all the oil is producing, so the immediate additional damage to Tehran’s finances would be minimal. A US attack would increase the price for what oil it is able to sell, helping Iran’s finances rather than hurting them while alienating oil importing countries.
The US could skip the niceities and proceed directly to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. That would give Iran an incentive to move as quickly as possible to build a nuclear weapon, requiring repeated American attacks to prevent the crash program from achieving success. In the meanwhile, Iran would certainly retaliate against US assets in the Middle East and perhaps also in the US, where Hizbollah is thought to maintain a network of sleeper cells. Iran would also retaliate against Israel, perhaps using the same sophisticated cruise missiles used against the Saudi oil facilities.
Neither of these options is appealing. There are others: the US could attack, overtly or covertly, Iranians in Syria or Iranian proxies in many countries, it could mount a massive cyber attack, and it could combine those options with the above. All these lead in the direction of long-term instability in the Middle East.
2. Diplomatic
The US could take its evidence of Iranian origins of the attack to the Security Council to seek a condemnation of Iran and renewed multilateral sanctions. The condemnation Washington should be able to get if the evidence is good. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to go along with multilateral sanctions in the absence of a US move back to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka nuclear deal) and loosening of American unilateral sanctions.
President Trump, while begging for Iran to come back to the negotiating table, has been unwilling to loosen or suspend unilateral sanctions that are causing serious damage to the Iranian economy. Doing so would be a major concession. We know how he would feel about that. If ever Iran is to get weakening of the sanctions, it will need to provide Trump with a TV moment, which the Supreme Leader has been loathe to do.
3. Political
Washington could resort to regime change efforts, likely clandestine, to try to collapse the Islamic Republic from within. This would entail extensive efforts to promote alternatives other than the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the exile group that John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani favor. The MEK is entirely lacking in support inside Iran. In addition to padding Bolton and Giuliani’s bank accounts, it may be useful for economic sabotage and assassinations but does not have the traction with the Iranian people (not least due to its terrorist history) that would be required to topple the Supreme Leader.
The US could also promote minority political movements within Iran willing to challenge Tehran’s authority. There are Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and others who would be useful in such an effort. A bare majority of Iranians are Persians. But ethnic civil war risks causing even more instability in the region than currently exists, which is saying something.
4. Economic
There are basically two ways to go on sanctions: tighten up the unilateral ones, or loosen them in an effort to get others to impose multilateral sanctions. Iran is feeling the pain of unilateral sanctions, but their response is clear: escalate to cause damage to the world economy so long as Iran is suffering. I suppose it is possible they will throw in the towel one day, but there is no telling when that day might come.
Getting others to go along with multilateral sanctions will be a hard sell for an Administration that pulled the plug on the JCPOA, which the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others liked. While it is conceivable that if they are convinced the attacks were Iranian that they would go along with multilateral sanctions without the US back in the JCPOA, it isn’t likely.
Bottom line: If the US wants multilateral sanctions, which look like the best option, and return of Iran to the negotiating table, President Trump is going to have to swallow a bitter pill: get the US back into the JCPOA. Otherwise, we can expect continued escalation from the Iranians. Better to reverse course now rather than after the next round of attacks. But it is unlikely Trump will do that.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, September 16
– WSJ says North Korea is making billions of dollars by its cyber activities.
– Joshua Rovner says cyber conflict should be viewed as an intelligence contest, not a military one.
– WaPo says risks of Venezuela-Colombia war is growing because of aid to FARC fighters and discussions about invoking Rio Treaty.
– WSJ reports numerous efforts to revise trade section 232 allowing national security tariffs. [Note: this will be an issue in next week’s exercise.]
– Heather Hurlburt says Bolton left the NSC system in tatters.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Confrontation intensifies
On September 12, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion entitled, “As Maximum Pressure and Maximum Resistance Max Out, Where’s the Confrontation with Iran Headed?”. The panel consisted of Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow at AGSIW, Dina Esfandiary, International Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Kirsten Fontenrose, Director for Regional Security, Middle East at the Atlantic Council. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar at AGSIW.
Since President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Washington has pursued a strategy of “maximum pressure,” largely through intensifying economic sanctions. Iran has responded with “maximum resistance,” mostly with low-intensity, and sometimes deniable, military provocations. Signs are growing that both strategies have maxed out and further escalation could lead to consequences unwanted by either side. Where do both parties go from here and can these strategies work?
Fontenrose argued that theoretically, the US policy of maximum pressure can work. The rationale beyond this is that every country has a finite amount of resources to dedicate to defense and domestic needs. The use of sanctions squeezes Iran and forces them to make difficult decisions. The US has a limited number of coercive tools. By maxing out sanctions, the Washington avoids using kinetic activities that could escalate potential conflict. Alfoneh and Esfandiary agreed that the US has not set clear goals for their use of sanctions. If the US established clear goals, Iran might respond in kind.
President Trump will benefit electorally if he is able to have a summit with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Alfoneh predicted that Trump will use increased tensions with Tehran to negotiate a deal that mirrors the JCPOA. By doing so, Trump would signal to his supporters that he can resolve global conflict. Esfandiary responded that Iran has no reason to trust the US. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was abiding by the JCPOA, but the Trump Administration tore it up. Fontenrose agreed that trust building will be required before acceptable concessions can be made by either side.
Iran has few choices aside from continuing its low-level provocations. Alfoneh brought up an article published in an Iranian economic newspaper a month after the US left the JCPOA. The Supreme National Security Council outlined its strategy to counteract US sanctions. First, the impact of the sanctions will not be palpable because of trade deals with European countries and China. Second, Iran will limit the level of their obligations in the JCPOA. Third, if nothing works and Iran’s economy continues to fail, Tehran will provoke a crisis in the Persian Gulf. Iran clearly and publicly announced its plans and has followed through with the strategy.
The panel discussed the significance of John Bolton’s dismissal as the national security adviser. Fontenrose said that the Republicans will not allow Trump to choose someone who will threaten the election. Bolton’s hawkish tendencies could scare off voters. Brian Hook, the State Department’s point man on Iran, is on the short list of potential replacements. Hook is a known as a hawk in the international community and his appointment would signal to Iran that the US will continue to squeeze its economy.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Restraint and its challenges
Last night’s debate among Democratic presidential candidates spent relatively little time on foreign policy, maybe 10-12 minutes out of the two hours. But on some issues there appeared to a wide consensus:
- Bring the troops home, in particular from Afghanistan, sooner rather than later.
- Avoid using military instruments whenever possible and obtain Congressional authorization when it is necessary.
- Give more emphasis to civilian instruments of foreign policy, especially diplomacy and development.
- Enhance cooperation with other countries to deal with places like Venezuela and global issues like climate change and terrorism.
- Refocus attention on domestic welfare, including support for veterans.
This amounts to a policy of military restraint and diplomatic lead. The military restraint might appear close to what Donald Trump promised in his campaign, but it was always clear he would favor big increases in the Defense Department’s budget, little emphasis on diplomacy, and even less on development.
That is where the Democrats differ from Trump. The question is not whether they are sincere but rather whether it is practical. The US has led with its military in foreign policy for so long it is difficult for American diplomats to imagine anything else. And we are so thoroughly exposed militarily in so many places that it is difficult even to know where to start.
American withdrawal can create real problems, especially in the Middle East. Iraq is a classic case in point, but not the only one. Military withdrawal requires major diplomatic efforts to ensure that US interests are served and adversaries blocked from taking advantage. After 2.5 years of President Trump, the State Department is in terrible shape: many experienced officers have left, and those who remain are demoralized. While Secretary Pompeo has influence with the President, the organization is weaker than ever, which is saying something.
So restraint is the name of the game, but the ways and means of achieving it are not so clear.
Here is the bulk of the debate transcript on foreign policy.
PS: I realized after hitting the “publish” button that I ignored what the candidates said about China. None of it was enlightening. They mostly support the Administration–without every saying as much–on getting the Chinese to yield on trade. Some even said they would keep the Trump tariffs in place initially to help make that happen. Mostly they oppose Trump’s tariffs on our allies, which is good to hear, but still they aren’t far off his thinking on squeezing the Chinese.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, September 12
– I agree with Thomas Wright of Brookings that Bolton’s ouster presages a pivot to diplomacy for the elections. I wonder how Democratic presidential candidates will respond.
-SecDef Esper has approved active duty border deployments through 2020.
-Israelis accused of planting spy devices near White House
– Congress mobilizes to fight Trump’s denial of military aid to Ukraine.
– Broken norms. A lot of legislative business depends on civility and cooperation and following normal practices. This North Carolina action is just too outrageous to overlook.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Bolton and Trump unleashed
John Bolton and Donald Trump were always an odd couple: the one a consistent hawkish interventionist and bureaucratic operator in mustachioed professorial guise, the other an erratic big-talking little-stick narcissistic braggart. They found common cause on withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) maximum pressure against Iran, thus trading the 10-year delay in Tehran’s ability to build a nuclear weapons for less than one year, but as soon as the President started looking for negotiated settlements with Tehran, Pyongyang, and the Taliban, Bolton resorted to undermining Trump’s efforts. Ironically, Bolton was fired only a few days after he won his battle against the Afghanistan agreement.
Zal Khalilzad was trying to do the right thing: exchange the withdrawal of US troops Trump wants before the November 2020 election in exchange for Taliban promises
a) to negotiate a political settlement with the Kabul government and
b) not to harbor international terrorists.
The reported deal involved withdrawal only to the number of Americans in Afghanistan at the end of the Obama Administration, and the Taliban promises would have been hard to enforce. But it was a start.
Bolton didn’t want the withdrawal at all. But that’s not what blew up the agreement. It was Trump: he apparently decided he wanted a meeting with the Taliban at Camp David, with the president himself trying for a better deal in the role of closer. This was a terrible idea, in particular a few days before 9/11. The Taliban however never agreed to come to the US, so Trump cancelled the non-existent meeting, supposedly because of the death of an American soldier. That isn’t credible, since more than a dozen Americans died during Zal’s negotiations without any dramatic American reaction. Negotiating in the absence of a ceasefire is always a dubious proposition.
Poor Zal is left holding the bag. We’ll know when he abandons hope: he’ll resign. In the meanwhile, Afghan President Ghani, who is competing in a presidential election September 27, is breathing a sigh of relief–he wants the US troops to stay–and Bolton has the satisfaction of watching the US re-escalate the air war, even as he looks for a tell-all book deal and a cushy spot in the private sector. Unleashed, he will also no doubt become a cheer leader for military action against Iran and support for Israel’s annexations.
The President is also unleashed. He is desperate for some sort of international triumph before the election only 14 months hence. The Chinese are holding their own in the tariff war, the Middle East “deal of the century” has evaporated, the North Koreans are thumbing their noses, and Iran is demanding sanctions relief in exchange for deigning to talk with Washington. Trump is left with little alternative in Afghanistan but escalation and unilateral withdrawal, unless Zal succeeds in putting Humpty Dumpty back together again.
Everyone wants to know how US foreign policy will change as a result of Bolton’s firing. I focus mainly on the Balkans and the Middle East. On the latter, it is clear enough that Trump will back the Jewish state to the hilt, no matter who the next national security adviser is. He will also likely try to complete the US withdrawal from Syria, over Pentagon objections. He’ll continue to support the war in Yemen, unless the UAE and Saudi Arabia fall out so catastrophically that there is nothing left to support.
The Balkans is a bit harder to predict, as the Administration has been less than clear about its approach. Bolton was open to a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would have destabilized the entire region, likely killing two Clinton birds with one stone: rump Kosovo might have become the eastern province of Albania and Bosnia might have descended into chaos as Republika Srpska tried to secede. But there is no guarantee Bolton’s successor won’t take a similar approach. Ethnonationalists of a feather flock together. An American serving a white nationalist president is always going to give Balkan nationalists a hearing.
Here is the podcast I did with Mark Goldberg shortly after writing this piece.
RSS - Posts
