Tag: United States
The Kosovo Serbs need a hug
Kosovo is a young country, born from repression of Albanian peaceful protest and subsequent/consequent armed rebellion against Serbia. American-led NATO intervention made its travails shorter and less deadly than those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also made Kosovo perhaps the most pro-American, pro-EU country on earth.
But it is suffering a period of estrangement from both the US and EU. I first met its current prime minister, Albin Kurti, when he was a university student. He was working with Adem Demaci, who did not advocate Kosovo independence but rather a Balkan confederation. That would have included Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Albin in the past has advocated union with Albania. Day dreams of the past.
Today Albin is a vigorous advocate of Kosovo independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. I would even describe him as a “sovereigntist,” meaning that he prioritizes Kosovo behaving like a sovereign state, despite its lack of universal recognition and UN membership. He often seems unconcerned with the consequences.
What Albin wants
Many Kosovo Serbs still regard themselves as citizens of Serbia and do not want to acknowledge the Kosovo state, especially those who live in its northern municipalities. Those four are contiguous with Serbia and have Serb majorities. Albin insists the Kosovo Serbs use Kosovo license plates and pay their Kosovo electricity bills. He contests Serbia’s still dominant institutions in the north, the presence of Serb security forces there, the organized crime networks that Belgrade exploits, and Belgrade’s control there of education and health services.
He also wants to see transparency and accountability for the resources that flow from Belgrade to Serb majority municipalities throughout Kosovo. That is one reason the Central Bank is saying it will enforce the law requiring transactions in Kosovo in the legal currency (the euro). The police have confiscated cash and records of Serbian government shipments to Serbs in Kosovo.
Frictions
All this puts Albin at odds not only with many Kosovo Serbs but also with the Europeans and Americans. They worry about keeping Belgrade on side and stability in Kosovo. That means preferring the ad hoc arrangements that have allowed Serbs there, especially in the north, to live as if they are in Serbia. Albin’s inclination to act without consulting Brussels and Washington aggravates the situation. The Americans and Europeans aren’t used to a Kosovo leader who acts as if his country really is sovereign. They may or may not doubt the wisdom of insisting on euros for transactions, but in any event they want to be consulted and discuss the issues before implementation.
That may sound reasonable. But from Albin’s perspective, it is just as much an infringement on Kosovo sovereignty as the transactions in euros. A sovereigntist won’t want to comply, especially if his unilateralism garners popular support. That it does in Kosovo, which is far more democratic than Serbia has ever been. American diplomats can be certain that if they displace Albin again, as they did during the Trump Administration, that he will be back after the next elections with an even stronger mandate.
Winning hearts and minds
All this argues for a much better understanding of why the Kosovo Serbs are important to Kosovo and what can be done to win over those who are still resisting. Modern statehood in a democracy depends on popular support. The American constitution’s first three words say it well: “we the people.” There are not a lot of Serbs left in Kosovo–perhaps less than 6% of the population, as Kurti claims. But they are a key factor in Kosovo statehood.
They and their church and culture are a distinct characteristic of Kosovo that distinguishes it from Albania. Their attachment to Belgrade is a clear threat to Kosovo security. The Serbs have an outsized impact on Kosovo’s sovereignty and potentially its territorial integrity. Without their loyalty, Kosovo statehood will always be under threat.
Winning them over sounds like an impossible task, but it is not. The euro is a far better currency than the Serbian dinar, even if the latter is pegged to the former. Any reasonable person would much rather be using and receiving a currency managed from Brussels and accepted throughout the EU.
The Belgrade-inspired mass resignation of Serb judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff from their jobs and continuing boycott has seriously damaged the judicial system in northern Kosovo, to the detriment of the Serbs and others who live there. The Belgrade-instigated boycott of municipal elections in April 2023 was likewise damaging to Serbs, not Albanians.
Serbia’s security officials and organized crime gangs Belgrade directs impose indignities on Serbs in the north every day. Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force face intimidation and violence, not just targeted against themselves but also of their families.
Making peace
Much of the Serb population south of the Ibar River has made its peace with Pristina. They don’t love it. But many tolerate it and some are coming to appreciate at least its largesse if not its sovereignty.
Protection of the Serb church and private property is particularly important. Most of the important religious sites are in the south. The refusal so far of the Pristina authorities to implement a 2016 decision on the Decan/i monastery property has damaged their credibility in the Serb community. A unilateral decision to proceed would give Pristina an important patch of moral high ground to stand on.
But Kurti needs to go further. His government should work as closely as possible with the northern communities to win their acceptance and eventual loyalty. He has good cards to play. The Kosvo Serbs need a hug. Give it to them.
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Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
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How to counter the Serbian world
Last week I said Europe will not be whole and free anytime soon. Serbia has chosen to be on the eastern side of a line that will be drawn through the Balkans. The question then is how keep the other Balkan countries on the western side of the line.
This is in part a question of what they should do about the ethnic Serb populations within their borders. Serbia is pursuing a “Serbian world” strategy intended to gain as much leverage on the neighbors as possible. Belgrade is also positioning itself so that it could demand secession of neighboring Serbs if geopolitical conditions in the region and the rest of the world would permit it.
Bosnia on the spot
This puts Bosnia and Herzegovina in a difficult spot. Forty-nine per cent of its territory constitutes “Republika Sprska” (RS). Serbs make up perhaps 37% of Bosnia’s population, most of them in the RS. Many of their political leaders since the 1992-5 war have promised to separate, either de facto or de jure, from the other 51% of the territory. Milorad Dodik, who currently holds the presidency of the RS, has dominated the entity’s politics for more than 15 years. He has salami-sliced RS to within a centimeter of independence. He has also stolen a lot of its revenue and sought to cooperate with Belgrade in making the “Serbian world” a reality.
Dodik also cooperates with ethnic nationalist Bosnian Croats, in particular Dragan Covic, in his anti-constitutional political, and corrupt economic, enterprises. The Bosnian Croat political leadership seeks to echo the RS. It wants a “Third Entity” that would provide to Croats whatever de facto or de jure separation the RS achieves. This would split the Bosniak-Croat “Federation,” which occupies 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. It would also leave a rump Muslim entity that would create serious problems for its neighbors, Europe, and the US.
The risk is clear: if either Dodik or Covic secedes, the Bosnian state would be fragmented in three. Instabiliity and likely war would decide the lines between them. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Europe, Jim O’Brien, has made it crystal clear that the US opposes these secession ambitions. He hopes the latest European Union cash will prevent it and promote meaningly reform. But there is a long history of ethnic nationalists in the Balkans pocketing the money and doing the opposite of what the EU would like. We’ll have to wait and see whether future implementation can match O’Brien’s clarity and forcefulness on the main issue. Bosnia must remain a single, multiethnic, democratic state.
Montenegro is already in Serbia’s maw
Close to 30% of Montenegro’s population regards itself as Serb. Belgrade has successfully parlayed recent elections there into formation of pro-Serbia national governments. This has happened despite the country’s entry into NATO in 2017. The trick was to use avowedly pro-EU politicians against a dominant political party and politician, former President Djukanovic, who had governed for too many decades, with support from ethnic minority allies. The Serbian Orthodox Church and Russia’s security agencies pitched in to help. They have reaped handsome rewards, the former church property and the latter influence.
Though much-criticized for supposed corruption, President Djukanovic presided with dignity over the alternation in power. His successors have not proven their corruption accusations against him. It remains to be seen whether the more liberal democratic coalition that he formed can revive and regain power. Its pro-EU credentials were stronger than those who are now participating in a coalition that includes explicitly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian politicians, who improbably claim also to be pro-EU. Their failure to deliver what Jim O’Brien terms “benefits to citizens” could lead to another alternation in power.
Kosovo needs its Serbs
In Kosovo, the Serb population is the largest minority, but only constitutes at most 6% of the population. The Kosovo constitution provides the Serb minority with extensive protection and powersharing arrangements. But most Kosovo Serbs remain separate from the majority Albanians. Their languages (unlike the dominant languages in Bosnia and Montenegro) are incompatible. The Serbs south of the Ibar River live mostly in Serb-majority enclaves. But they appear to have made their peace, at least for now, with the Albanian-dominated institutions in Pristina. Like Albanian-majority municipalities, Serb-majority ones have extensive powers over local governance.
The northern four Serb-majority municipalites contiguous with Serbia are far less integrated than those south of the Ibar. Using its military, economic, and political leverage, including intimidation by its secret services and their organized crime partners, Belgrade has successfully ensured that they refuse to accept Pristina’s authority. The northern Serbs have boycotted municipal elections and withdrawn from Kosovo institutions.
Serbia wants the Serb-majority municipalities to form an Association. That would enable them to govern jointly and separately from Pristina, as in the RS. In the right geopolitical environment, the Association might also act as a vehicle for the four northern municipalities to secede from a state Belgrade still does not recognize. It was a similar association of provincial authorities that led to the formation of the RS before its attempted secession in 1992 from Bosnia.
What to do about Kosovo
Countering this requires a difficult maneuver from Pristina. It needs to convince the northern Serbs that they will be better off as Kosovo citizens (even if they retain their Serbian citizenship as well). Some are moving in that direction, as suggested by their increased willingness to get Kosovo license plates, identity papers, and passports. But many of the Serbs in the north have been among the most belligerent, and sometimes violent, opponents of Pristina. Belgrade has succeeded in making outreach to the northern Serbs far harder than outreach to Serbs in the municipalities not contiguous with Serbia.
Prime Minister Kurti is making a point of speaking more in his fluent Serbian. All Pristina authorities should be more careful than they have been in the past to display the country’s ethnically neutral flag, rather than the ethnic Albanian flag (also the flag of Albania) many of them prefer. Implementing the many power-sharing arrangements in the constitution is not easy, but still necessary. So too is financial support for the Serb communities and implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the Decan/i monastery, which Pristina has refused so far.
While I don’t know the merits of the specific issues cited here, it certainly sounds like the police action described is counterproductive:
What to do in Montenegro
In Montenegro, only the constitutional political process can decide whether to allow Serbia to continue to dominate political outcomes. But NATO will need to protect itself if Russian penetration of Podgorica’s security establishment continues. With war still raging in Ukraine, the US and EU need to be far more attentive than in the past to Moscow’s use of Montenegro to compromise NATO security. The West should redouble support to truly independent civil society in Montenegro, ensuring that it exercises the same vigilance over the current government that it did over the previous one.
What to do in Bosnia in Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no substitute for ridding the political leadership of those who oppose the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The EU and US have waited too long for the Bosnians to do it on their own. They need help. No more international funding should go the RS while Dodik is in charge. The High Represenatative should be ready to remove him from office if he continues illegal RS moves. Brussels and Washington should be pressuring Zagreb to facilitate bringing Dragan Covic to justice for corruption. Strengthening EUFOR’s troop presence in the northeastern town of Brcko is also vital. No Serb secession can occur without Brcko.
Bolder and better are the right directions for the international judges in Bosnia and the High Representative. While maintaining the Dayton peace settlement is vital, it will not suffice for EU accession. A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights is where Bosnia should aim to go: towards a civic state rather than ethnonationalist powersharing. Moving it in that direction should be the EU and US objective.
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Stevenson’s army, February 1
– Americans trust nurses the most, members of Congress the least.
– John Bolton doesn’t trust Donald Trump
– Ukraine can trust EU, given aid deal
– Shippers can’t trust freedom of the seas
– Retired 2 star says US learned wrong lessons from recent wars
– Paul Pillar says US is repeating mistakes about Iran
-Journalist interviews Houthis
– Reuters says US uses exercises to prepare for defense of Taiwan
-Politico has story about Sullivan China speech
– Axios lists likely Trump advisers on China
– HFAC considers changes in arms sales rules
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 29
– WSJ says the drone attack at Tower 22 succeeded because it was confused with a returning US drone.
– NYT reports on possible retaliatory options.
– Politico sees GOP split.
– Eliot Cohen says go to war with Iran. [FYI, I strongly disagree]
Best list I’ve seen is from MEI’s Lister, as in the ever-valuable D Brief:
What are some options for a U.S. response that are not inside Iran? One target might include the “general cargo” (and likely surveillance) ship Behshad, which has been hanging around the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden during virtually every Houthi naval attack off the Yemeni coast.
MEI’s Lister had four suggestions:
- The “Glasshouse” at the airport in Damascus;
- The Imam Ali Base in eastern Syria, which features “hardened missile tunnels,” according to Lister;
- The Dimas Airbase, which is a “major drone facility” west of Damascus;
- And the Mayadin special forces training camp in eastern Syria.
– Keep an eye on Ecuador — will be part of week 4 exercise. FT today.
– CFR’s Steve Biddle analyzes Russia’s defensive strategy
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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These two look happy, don’t they?
That of course is EU envoy Miroslav Lajcak on the left and Serbian President Vucic on the right. Accompanying this photo, Lajcak wrote:
Arriving in Belgrade this morning, I met with @predsednikrs @avucic. In our discussion, we focused on the strategic outlook for 2024, took stock on the state of play in the Dialogue and spoke about the next steps in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo.
Despite Lajcak’s effort to portray the meeting in neutral terms, there are good reasons for the grim looks.
The tilt is definitively eastward
Vucic is increasingly alienated from the West the Europeans want him to embrace. Just in the last few months, he has
- Sponsored a terrorist attack inside Kosovo intended to spark a response that would allow him to move his military into his neighbor’s north.
- Mobilized the Serbian army for that purpose.
- Conducted a fraudulent election in Belgrade, importing thousands of voters from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Aligned Serbia increasingly with the strongmen not only of Russia and China but also Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Hungary.
- Increasingly supported the secessionist ambitions of Milorad Dodik, the strongman of the Serb-majority 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So far as I am aware, the only tidbits Vucic has offered the West are acceptance of Kosovo documents and license plates in Serbia and steps towards payment by Serbs in Kosovo of their electricity bills. I doubt however many Kosovo Albanians will risking their windshields to drive into Serbia with Kosovo plates. We’ll surely need to wait a while before the bills are paid.
What Lajcak should be saying
So what should Lajcak be saying to Vucic once the cameras are out of the room? @ivanastradner gives us part of the answer with this tweet about the UK specialy envoy for the Balkans:
Special envoy to the Western Balkans sent crystal clear messages: 1. Serbia should impose sanctions on Russia. 2. Serbia should investigate elections irregularities. 3. Republika Srpska cannot be an independent state.
telegram channels are so upset…
But that would not suffice. The Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia will have little impact. I would stop asking for them. Belgrade hardly needs to investigate the election irregularities. It needs to rerun the elections. The EU needs to make it clear that Brussels will suspend accession negotiations with Belgrade in response to any future mobilization of the Serbian Army against Kosovo. Belgrade should surrender the avowed ring leader of the September 24 attack to the Kosovo authorities for trial. Brussels require that Vucic publicly renounce the Russian-sponsored, irredentist “Serbian world” program that has endangered the sovereignty and territoriality of Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia.
https://twitter.com/ivanastradner/status/1751450967504039968/photo/1
The Americans should be chiming in
Washington is in part responsible for the appeasement the EU has undertaken in respone to Belgrade’s defection. It needs to change its tune, in public as well as in private. In addition to pushing on the points above, the US should put its money where its mouth is. There should be no more World Bank money or other multilateral financial assistance for Serbia until it accepts in both word and deed the February and March agreements that both the EU and US claim are legally binding.
The Americans should also revivify their own relations with Pristina and try to bend the EU back into a friendlier relationship with Pristina. The “consequences” Brussels levied on Kosovo last year because of lack of progress in the dialogue with Belgrade were always unjustiably one-sided. Now they look ridiculous. The police the EU wanted withdrawn from Kosovo prevented a disastrous outcome last September 24 when they responded effectively and professionally to the terrorist attack Belgrade sponsored. The non-Serb mayors elected in polls Belgrade got the Serb majorities in the four northern municipalities of Kosovo to boycott have likewise behaved professionally while awaiting a new election.
Smiles all around?
The Balkans are a minor theater of conflict in today’s world. The wars in the Ukraine and the Middle East as well as the Chinese threat against Taiwan are far more important. But even minor instability in the Balkans could greatly complicate those other issues. Irredentism is a major factor in all of them. The Balkan region has a sad history of aggravating larger issues. The US and EU should aim to end any possibility of that happening again. Then maybe Vucic and Lajcak could smile not only at each other but also at Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti.
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