Tag: United States
Presidential clarity in video
I try hard to keep an open mind and to understand opposing perspectives. But there are moments when doing so denies reality. This is one of those moments in the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. If Pristina had done anything like what Belgrade has done, you can be sure I would be just as tough with Kosovo.
The attempted Serbian uprising in northern Kosovo weekend before last was just that. Belgrade trained and equipped 30 or so paramilitary cadres, who murdered a Kosovo policeman before losing three of their own men. Likely they intended to spark much more violence and a crackdown, with a view to justifying a Serbian military intervention. Serbia mobilized its forces and sent them to the border/boundary, which suggests an invasion was planned.
Two dozen or so perpetrators escaped to Serbia, where they still harbor. They include he ringleader, Milan Radoicic. He is a close political partner of Serbia’s President Vucic, supposedly now under house arrest. I haven’t seen anything on the whereabouts of the others.
Verbal reactions aren’t enough
So far, the US and EU public reactions have been exclusively verbal. Both Washington and Brussels know that the Serbian state was responsible for an attempted violent insurrection with political purposes, aka terrorism. Kosovo President Osmani in the above video is right to be calling for sanctions. If Serbia gets off scot free in public, it will only incentivize similar behavior, perhaps not only by Belgrade. There are lots of capitals that might like to foment rebellion in neighboring democracies.
This attempted insurrection is only the latest in a long series of Serbian efforts to destabilize the situation in Kosovo. It is high time to impose serious sanctions. What might that mean? Here are a few thoughts about items that should be on the options menu:
- Suspend Air Serbia flights to the US and EU.
- Freeze World Bank and EBRD projects in Serbia.
- Suspend EU and US official financing for economic (not democracy) projects in Serbia.
- Freeze Serbia’s negotiations for EU accession.
- Suspend military cooperation between the Serbian Army and the Ohio National Guard.
- Impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals who ordered and supervised the training of the paramilitaries.
Expectations should be clear
Just as important as sanctions are the expectations they are intended to support and what Serbia would need to do to end them. Here are a few suggestions for those:
- An official, public apology by the President of Serbia to the President of Kosovo.
- Delivery to the Kosovo authorities for trial of all of the alleged perpetrators harbored in Serbia.
- Disbanding of the Srpska List political party.
- A documented end to all arming and equipping of insurrectionary forces inside Kosovo.
- Documented withdrawal of all covert Serbian security forces from Kosovo territory.
These aren’t much more than random thoughts. There are many other things that could be done, either by way of sanctions or demands. The point is that verbal denunciations alone will not suffice. The EU and US should be aiming to permanently weaken Serbia’s hold on northern Kosovo.
Right the balance
Kosovo is currently suffering substantial EU “consequences”, for its failure to comply with Brussels demands for removal of elected mayors from municipal buildings and reduction of Kosovo police presence in the Serb communities of Kosovo’s north. I don’t know how the mayors are doing, but it was presumably the police presence that enabled a quick, effective, and professional reaction to the attempted insurrection. The EU should lift its sanctions on Kosovo. The circumstances that led to their imposition have evaporated.
The time has come to recognize that “consequences” for Serbia are far more important and entirely justified. The moment has come to right the balance in EU and US policy, which parliamentarians in both have declared unfairly weighted in favor of Serbia and against Kosovo.
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It’s not only about Kosovo
Serbia’s effort to destabilize Kosovo so that it can claim control of its Serb-majority north should today be apparent to all. The license plate brouhaha of last year, the boycott of municipal elections in the spring, the subsequent rioting against the elected non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO peacekeepers in May, the kidnapping of Kosovo police–these were all prelude to the foiled insurrection last weekend.
Hear and see no evil
But the US and EU have so far failed to draw the necessary conclusions. They continue to call for dialogue without any consequences levied against Belgrade. The American Ambassador in Belgrade has even seen fit to suggest Serbia should join NATO. The overwhelming majority of Serbs reject that prospect. Their government’s recent behavior makes it not just illogical but nonsensical.
Within the EU, holding Serbia accountable is difficult because it requires unanimity. Viktor Orban’s pro-Russian Hungary is the usual spoiler. The outcome of yesterday’s election in Slovakia will make Bratislava Moscow’s next best friend.
In the US, it is the Biden Administration’s dogged and fruitless offer of goodies to turn Serbia towards the West that blocks any serious reevaluation of Balkans policy. The officials concerned simply do not want to accept failure. They continue to pursue appeasement, blind to Belgrade’s malfeasance.
It’s not only Kosovo
This blindness will have consequences. Serbia, like Russia, sees the West as divided and weak. Belgrade may back off temporarily in Kosovo in order not to provoke a serious reaction. But Serbia will continue to pursue irredentist aims in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Montenegro, government formation is blocked. The new president there wants pro-Russian parties in the coalition. The prime minister-designate is resisting, under pressure from Washington and Brussels. But he also rejects cooperation with the Western-oriented former ruling party. The country is in a dangerous limbo. Belgrade, working with the Serbian Orthodox Church, could well create chaos there, as it has repeatedly in recent years.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community High Representative has taken a series of unwise decisions that have damaged his own standing. He can no longer freely enter the 49% of the country’s territory known as Republika Srpska (RS). Its leader has taken the entity to within a few short steps of secession. He awaits only Moscow and Belgrade approval to declare de jure independence. He has already separated the RS from the country’s judicial and executive authority.
What’s next?
The Ukraine war will be an important factor in what happens next in the Balkans. The omens are not favorable in any of the possible scenarios.
If Russia were to lose in Ukraine, Moscow might well try to get compensation in the Balkans. The method would be destabilization, not naked aggression. Serbia could be given the green light and covert assistance to create chaos in northern Kosovo, force installation of a pro-Russian government in NATO member Montenegro, and allow RS to declare full autonomy if not independence.
If Russia wins in Ukraine by holding on to Crimea and at least part of Donbas, the precedent will reinforce Serbia’s push for at least de facto if not de jure control of Serb populations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
If the war in Ukraine continues for another year, Moscow could decide to refocus on the Balkans and set a precedent there for what it wants in Ukraine.
All these scenarios would entail major losses for the the US and EU. They can be prevented. But only if current policies are reevaluated now and a much tougher approach taken to counter Serbian irredentism.
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Stiffening the approach to Serbia
Kosovo police and NATO forces in the Serb-majority north of the country over the weekend foiled an armed uprising. One Kosovo policeman and three terrorists were killed and others arrested. But most seem to have escaped. Serbia and its Srpska Lista political proxies in Kosovo have declared a day of mourning. That confirms their support for the insurrection. The little green men appear to have found safe haven inside Serbia.
Serbian President Vucic met subsequently with the Russian Ambassador. Vucic complained about “brutal ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, for which there is no evidence. We have no confirmation that Vucic ordered the armed uprising. But one of his mainstays in northern Kosovo was involved. Such things don’t happen without Belgrade’s knowledge. Vucic could have stopped it in advance or denounced it after the fact. He did not do either.
What this incident tells us
This incident is confirmation that Vucic does not intend to normalize relations with Kosovo. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue with that objective is a cover for his real goal. He wants separation of the four northern Serb-majority municipalities. He would prefer de jure partition and hopes that Russian success in annexing parts of Ukraine will validate that objective. But he would settle, for now, for de facto separate governance, in the form of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
Pristina has demonstrated that its police can handle, with NATO backing, a heavily armed group of several dozen determined militants. But it is just as clear that Serbian armor could move into Kosovo with ease. It is less than 25 miles, maybe an hour’s tank drive, from the nearest Serbian border crossing to north Mitrovica. NATO has recently beefed up its forces in Kosovo. But it is not clear whether they are equipped or trained for anti-armor warfare.
American and European diplomats think Serbia will not attempt such a move because of the political consequences. But Vucic knows better. He is trying to convince the world that Serbs are being ethnically cleansed from Kosovo. That could validate a claim his tanks protect civilians. That is why he repeatedly claims, without evidence, that such ethnic cleansing is ongoing, as he did yesterday in a meeting with the Russian Ambassador.
The American and European response
The Western response has been weak so far. Brussels and Washington have appealed to “both sides” to prevent further violence and escalation. This implicitly equates the sterling performance of the Kosovo police with an illegal armed uprising that could have caused instability throughout the Balkans. Those responsible for Balkans policy in both capitals are unwilling to admit failure of their efforts to lure Serbia westward. Instead, they are urging a quick return to “the dialogue.”
An alternative approach would denounce Belgrade’s support for the armed uprising, labeling it a terrorist act and levying sanctions against Vucic and his defense and national security officials. NATO would prepare its forces in northern Kosovo for defense against an armored invasion. The West would praise the Kosovo police and urge a fair and speedy trial for the perpetrators in Kosovo courts. Ambassadors to Belgrade would be withdrawn for consultations.
A new policy is needed
They could be sent back quickly with a single message: the era of appeasement is over. If Belgrade wants EU membership, Serbia needs to quickly:
- arrest and turn over the terrorists to the Kosovo authorities.
- drop its insistence on separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo.
- align with Ukraine sanctions on Russia.
- support Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the United Nations.
If Belgrade refuses, the EU should announce it is freezing accession talks. The US should suspend military cooperation with Serbia, including cooperation with the Ohio National Guard.
Washington and Brussels should also prepare to spur Pristina to reach out to northern Serbs to find alternatives to Srpska Lista. In addition, Pristina should seek to ensure that there are no anti-Serb incidents throughout Kosovo, in order to invalidate Vucic’s claims of ethnic cleansing. Pristina should promptly investigate any incidents that do occur. The courts should promptly try perpetrators.
It is time to reconfigure Western policy on Serbia and Kosovo. Renewal of the current approach will bring new failures. A firmer approach with Belgrade is the necessary first step.
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Cold comfort is better than none at all
“Above all,” he says (at 18:49), “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat.” This is Prime Minister Netanyahu implicitly acknowledging, whether intentionally or not, Israel’s own nuclear weapons and stating against whom they are targeted. At the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is making it clear that he intends to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities:
Turkish President Erdogan has made a similar pledge.
This raises the disturbing question: are we at the brink of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? I had a look at this question last spring with two Middle East Institute interns. Our conclusion then was that the situation needs monitoring. I can say a bit more now.
Can a Saudi nuclear capability be blocked?
While it is rarely mentioned in public, an amped-up Saudi non-proliferation commitment is likely a key part of the Biden Administration’s current negotiations with Riyadh for a bilateral security agreement. That wouldn’t be a popular proposition on its own in the U.S. Congress. But if it comes with a Saudi commitment not to develop sensitive nuclear technology (especially enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization), it might be more attractive on both sides of the aisle. American security relations with both Japan and South Korea, on which the press reports the Administration is modeling a possible agreement with the Kingdom, include de facto commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. West Germany’s entry into NATO included such a commitment as well.
But the US/Saudi negotiations aim primarily at formal normalization of Saudi relations with Israel, for which in exchange the Saudis want concessions to the Palestinians. The Crown Prince is sounding soft on that score. He wants improvement in the life of the Palestinians. Netanyahu is not going to find it easy to get his ultra-nationalist coalition partners to offer even that. Nor is it clear he wants to. A substantial non-proliferation commitment from Saudi Arabia could however sweeten the deal from Netanyahu’s perspective. He won’t want some future, less friendly, Crown Prince to wield nukes.
The Saudis have indicated they intend to upgrade their non-proliferation safeguards agreement with the IAEA. That is a good step in the right direction, but it falls short of the strictest arrangement known as an Additional Protocol. That is where the U.S. should want the Kingdom to arrive.
What about Turkey?
Erdogan already has American nuclear weapons in Turkey. Were he to push for Turkey’s own nukes, those might be withdrawn, as they really don’t serve much military purpose. But Ankara is taking risks these days in many directions, exercising its right to a far more independent foreign policy than in the past:
- Participation with Iran and Russia in managing the conflict in Syria.
- Purchase of Russian air defenses, even if now mothballed due to the American reaction.
- Mediation of the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine.
- Opposition to Finland’s and (still) to Sweden’s membership in NATO.
- Support for Azerbaijan’s military operation to take back Nagorno-Karabakh.
It would not be surprising if Erdogan concluded that nuclear weapons would be an appropriate bulwark for this more independent course.
Could Egypt be far behind?
Likely yes, as things stand today. President Sisi has stated that he wants Egypt to be like Germany: a great power without nuclear weapons. Neither Egypt’s economy nor its army are currently in a position to resist American and Israeli pressure against Egypt acquiring nuclear weapons. But if Riyadh and Ankara were to get them, Cairo would want to follow suit. When would then be the question.
Iran sets the pace, but might stop short
Israel’s nuclear weapons, which have existed for more than 50 years, did not ignite an arms race. Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which have been advancing rapidly, could well do so. Israel kept its nuclear program behind a (sometimes thin) veil of secrecy. Iran is unable to hide its progress, as even hindered IAEA inspections provide a good deal of transparency. If Tehran decides to build a nuclear weapons, the world is going to know it, sooner rather than later. Ignoring that development would be difficult for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the Middle East, Iran is the nuclear pace setter.
But Tehran might stop short of full weaponization. Its own national security is the reason. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the slightest doubt in Israel about whether a missile is being prepared for launch with a nuclear warhead could lead to Armageddon. It would be far wiser for Tehran to make it clear that it has stopped short of weaponization. Being a few weeks from becoming a nuclear power would give Iran most of the benefits of becoming one without all of the risks.
That is cold comfort. But cold comfort is better than none at all.
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Stevenson’s army, September 20
– New Pew poll shows how unhappy Americans are with US politics
– GOP Senators are unhappy with the new dress code
– Semafor, linking to paywalled Bloomberg, say US may ease some Cuba sanctions:
Washington is set to ease restrictions on Cuba’s private sector in a bid to revive the island nation’s moribund economy that has forced thousands to flee to the United States. The move — a rarity in Washington for having won the backing of both parties — will allow Cuban entrepreneurs to open U.S. bank accounts. Cuba is suffering its worst economic recession since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago, with exports down more than 35% compared to last year. Food shortages, power blackouts, and soaring inflation, coupled with a violent crackdown on dissent, have forced record numbers of Cubans to emigrate.
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A fruitless approach that will continue
- It is a great pleasure to be able to participate in this launch of the New Lines Western Balkans Observatory. I am an admirer of New Lines, which has brought fresh thinking to Washington, especially but not only on Middle East issues.
- I hope to see the same devotion to new perspectives, deep analysis, and trenchant critiques from the Balkans New Lines.
- However I am an old Balkans hand. I fear I will not live up to my own expectations.
- I see in the Balkans today more of the same ethnic nationalist ambitions that haunted the region in the 1990s. The homicidal will and capacity have declined.
- But the effort to channel politics towards enabling autocrats to exploit the region’s ethnic polarization is all too familiar.
Belgrade’s ambitions
- The most ambitious effort of this sort is headquartered in Belgrade. Backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian security services allied with Russia, Alexandar Vucic is aiming to make himself an elected autocrat and the godfather of Serbs throughout the region.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, he does this by seeking full control of Milorad Dodik, who is struggling to maintain his autonomy. But Dodik needs Serbia’s financial and ideological backing.
- In Montenegro, Vucic does it through recently victorious and willing electoral proxies. These include both President Milatovic and Prime Minister-designate Spajic.
In Kosovo, Vucic’s focus is on the north
- I have been asked to focus on Kosovo. There Belgrade has continued to control the Serbs of the four municipalities north of the Ibar since the end of the war in 1999.
- Belgrade decides their cooperation and noncooperation with Pristina. North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvecan and Leposavic have little say.
- The refusal to accept Kosovo license plates, the boycott of the last municipal elections, the rioting against non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO soldiers, the kidnapping of Kosovo police in the north, and the refusal to guarantee participation in new elections have all been decided in Belgrade.
- The message is that Serbia will not allow the Serbs of the north to be governed within Kosovo’s constitutional framework unless they get—through the Association for Serb Majority Municipalities—virtual autonomy that removes them from that framework.
Russia likes it, but what about the EU and US?
- Either way, Pristina loses, de facto or de jure.
- It is clear why Russia would want this. Ethnic partition of Kosovo offers a precedent that could be useful for Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.
- It also undermines a Western achievement, the state-building project in Kosovo.
- Despite its many imperfections, Kosovo is the most successful of the democratic enterprises in the Balkans since 1995, and perhaps worldwide.
- It is less clear why the EU and US are backing this ethnonationalist ambition for separate governance in Kosovo.
- Of course, Brussels and Washington deny they support ethnic partition.
The facts belie the denials
- But have you heard a peep out of them about return of the Albanians and other non-Serbs to North Mitrovica, which was plurality but not majority Serb before 1999?
- Have they insisted Belgrade offer the same accommodations to Albanians in southern Serbia that they want for Belgrade in northern Kosovo?
- The Americans write op/eds about guaranteeing that the Association will not be allowed to become a second Republika Srpska. But are they prepared to commit the U.S. government in writing to precisely what that means?
- They cite arrangements similar to the Association that exist within the EU. But all those arrangements are between states that recognize each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- So why shouldn’t Serbia and the five non-recognizing EU states recognize Kosovo first, before creation of the Association ?
The EU is understandable
- The position of Brussels is, I fear, all too understandable.
- It is in the hands of a High Representative who has never been willing to see Kosovo recognized or enter the UN.
- With the UK gone, Germany distracted, Hungary and Croatia backing him, and five non-recognizers, Borell feels he has adequate support from the member states.
- I expect better of Miroslav Lajcak, who played a key role in the independence of Montenegro.
- However, he also promised when he first became Slovak Foreign Minister that Bratislava would recognize Kosovo. But he failed to deliver.
Washington is more mysterious
- The position of Washington is more mysterious. It seems to derive in part from people who have spent too much time listening to Serbs moaning about how the United States is unkind to Serbia.
- Some diplomats believe all Belgrade wants is a better deal for Serbs in the neighboring countries.
- It also reflects the ambition for a “Europe whole and free,” with Serbia in the West. With no evidence at all, American diplomats are claiming that Belgrade has embraced the West, even as it increases alignment with Moscow and Beijing.
- I have little doubt that whatever Serbian ammunition ends up in Ukraine more goes to Russia.
- Vucic’s summertime visit to President Zelensky aimed not to support Ukraine but to prevent Kyiv recognition of Kosovo.
The result is Kosovo isolation
- Kosovo is more isolated than ever. That is a problem.
- However much you oppose Serbia’s ethnonationalist ambitions, Pristina has lost traction with Brussels and Washington.
- It gets no credit, even when putting forward at last week’s dialogue with Belgrade a step in the direction of forming the Association. Albeit in accordance with Kosovo’s own requirements.
- I confess I do not know how to solve this problem. I thought the August letter from the American and European legislators urging a rebalancing of EU and US policy toward more evenhandedness was correct.
- But so long as current personnel are in place, I expect the biased, counterproductive, and wrong policies to continue.
Reset is needed
- The Biden Administration needs a policy reevaluation and reset. But that would require courage and tenacity. Someone would have to tell the Secretary of State that current policy is not working.
- That someone would also need to develop a new, more even-handed, and more effective approach.
- I am not expecting that kind of courage and tenacity in the leadup to a national election.
- I would however argue it could garner more Bosnian and Albanian votes in 2024 than it would lose among Serbs and Croats.
Ukraine is the best hope
- The best hope for the moment is Ukraine’s victory. That would end Russian territorial ambitions, take the wind out of ethnonationalist sails worldwide, and give Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo a leg up in contesting Serbia’s regional ambitions.
- But Ukrainian victory is not imminent.
- I conclude, sadly: we are going to have to continue to put up with a fruitless approach to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.
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