Tag: United States
Stevenson’s army, November 22
I thought this an interesting discussion of post-war “reconstruction” issues in Gaza, from Larry Garber and David Harden. It was originally posted on Americans for Peace Now.
– The Israeli government and Hamas have agreed to a limited truce and hostage exchange, and US officials appear to have given extensive background briefings. The Hill has a literal ticktock of the negotiations. NYT stresses political pressure on Biden.Politico reports the “secret cell” of planners. David Ignatius weighs in.
– Politico reports US provided data to try to prevent attacks on humanitarian sites.
– FT has poll showing US support for Israel much stronger than in other countries.
– Breaking Defense sees benefits in shift of Israel from EUCOM to CENTCOM.
– NYT tells of international efforts to limit autonomous drones.
– Poll shows declining US support for aid to Ukraine
On this 60th anniversary of the assassination of President Kennedy, WaPo remembers how people got the news.
And Happy Thanksgiving to all!
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 9
–Hamas leaders –in Doha — tell NYT their plans for the war.
– SecState Blinken explains US requirements for a peace. See also WSJ. And NYT critique.
– DOD explains US military role. [Note: still no US AUMF for Israel]
– Politico reports on State dissent memo on Israel.
– Andrew Exum has lessons from Lebanon.
– Dan Drezner questions Israel’s ability to restore deterrence.
– Don’t forget: there’s also a tragic war in Sudan.
– Notice: there’s nothing on the plans to fund the government after Nov 17 because too many people have too many plans
-House GOP sets 2024 calendar. Printout here.
– Intelligence analyst argues Putin decided on war before US Afghan debacle
– Politico has good backgrounder on next week’s APEC summit
– NYT magazine answers: What does Space Force do?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The day after should not be Iran’s
While Americans have opined, Israel has so far said little about the “day after” in Gaza. This interview with retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi provides a hint of at least some of the thinking near the Israeli government. He says essentially that Israeli security the day after will require two things: closing off Gaza from arms supplies shipped through Egypt and allowing Israel to raid as it wants inside Gaza.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has also suggested that Israel will need to provide security for a long time to come, which would mean in essence reoccupation of Gaza (or some portion of it). The Americans are opposing that.
The open air prison
The Israeli proposition amounts to a heightened version of the outdoor prison approach that failed on October 7 to protect Israeli security. It is not clear whether the Israelis are thinking the Egyptians will agree to tighten security at Gaza’s southern border or if they have something else in mind. Nor is it clear why the Israelis think their raiding would be any more effective after the war than it was before October 7. Israeli ground incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank have not been successful in curbing militancy there.
There are other problems with this option. Reconstruction in Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. Why would any Gulf country ante up if Israel is reserving to itself the privilege of destroying whatever is rebuilt? If the rebuilding doesn’t occur, Gaza’s inhabitants will be living in even greater misery than before the war. Why would that not lead to more resentment and extremism rather than less?
An international intervention
Another option would be an international intervention. This could be like the ones executed with a measure of success (at least in re-establishing security) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Gaza, with a population of about 2 million, is small enough to be comparable, even if the conflict there is far more intense.
Using RAND’s data for “heavy peace enforcement,” a similar operation in Gaza would require about 23,000 international troops and 3000 international police. This would be on top of 6000 local troops and 4500 local police. Annual costs would run over $6 billion. You can quarrel with these numbers. But given the dire situation in Gaza they are more likely too low than too high.
Troops and police will not be readily available
The Gulfies could ante up the money, but the troops and police are a serious problem for them. Peacekeeping troops might be available from the more usual UN suspects, but it would be the biggest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan are now the main UN troop contributing countries. India, now more than ever allied with Israel, might be a problem for the Gazans, but the others are possible.
The international police however would have to be Arab speakers. Which Arab countries have thousands of excess police they would be willing to contribute? Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria can be counted out due to their own civil wars. Egypt will resist, as it has spent decades trying to avoid responsibility for Gaza or Gazans. Jordan will likewise hesitate. The King has his hands full at home. The Gulf countries may be willing to foot the bill, but they won’t provide the personnel.
Even the local troops and police are an issue. All the readily available Gazans will have served in the Hamas brigades and police. Israel won’t want them re-empowered. The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has only 10,000 police of its own. Neither Israel nor the PA will want half of them transferred to Gaza. The Gazans might not welcome them given the long contention between the PA and Hamas.
The local option
This forces us to consider the local option. Perhaps we can do without troops on the assumption that the Israelis won’t allow re-armament, even of people not previously affiliated with Hamas. UNRWA, the PLO, and nongovernmental organizations they cooperate with in Gaza should have a pretty good idea of who is who and what they are capable of. At least in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, they could provide relief and begin the process of rebuilding education and health care. They could also start to reconstitute a Gazan police force.
The Israelis will be suspicious of UNRWA, the PLO, and their colllaborators. This issue might be alleviated if a good deal of the humanitarian supplies were provided by Israeli nongovernmental organizations committed to coexistence and ready to collaborate with legitimate, non-Hamas, Gazan counterparts. That would complement the usual flow of humaniarian goods from Egypt through the Rafah crossing. Gazans would understandably be hesitant at first about humanitarian supplies from Israel. But the idea would be to flood the zone with clean water (much of Gaza’s water already comes from Israel), food, medical and sanitary supplies, temporary shelters and other vital commodities. That would be hard to resist.
None of this can happen, until…
None of this will happen soon. The war is still raging. There is no sign of the mutually hurting stalemate or the mutually enticing way out that are the classic conflict management conditions for a successful negotiation, starting presumably with a ceasefire.
Israeli goals are clear: to obliterate Hamas’ capacity to attack Israel and compel Hamas to give up the more than 200 hostages it still holds. Some Israeli officials cite even broader objectives: to destroy Hamas’ governing capacity and to eliminate its ideology. But I doubt Israel is willing to lose its own citizens in pursuit of those broader objecdtives.
Hamas’ objectives are less clear. Some of its leaders are telling the New York Times that it wants to create a permanent state of war with Israel. If that is true, we won’t have to worry about the day after for a long time. Others believe the near-term objective is release of all Palestinians in prison in Israel. A hostage/prisoner exchange is certainly within the realm of possibility within months, if not weeks.
Consider the alternative
None of this is edifying. But consider the alternative. If the war ends with no clear plan for reconstruction, the Iranians and Russians will be glad to pitch in. Their resources are limited. But Iran will be glad to let loose the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to help resuscitate something much like Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Houthis. The Wagner remnants would be glad to help arm and train them.
Far better than that would be a Gaza that could join the West Bank in negotiating statehood with Israel. Reconstruction should proceed with that goal in mind. Netanyahu aimed to split the Palestinans between the West Bank and Gaza. That strategy to postpone the Palestinian state is at the end of its useful life. It is time for those who support the Jewish state to welcome Palestinian aspirations for one of their own.
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Stevenson’s army, November 6
– Blinken and CIA Director Burns are in the Middle East.
– WSJ notes threats to US forces in the region
– NYT says State concerned assault rifles may be given to Israeli settlers
– New IC budget numbers declassified. ODNI table
– Will US need a draft? [This issue will come up in mock conference exercise]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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До свидания [Dasvidaniya] Vulin!
Iva Gajić of Radio Free Europe asked some questions about the resignation of Serbian Security Information Agency head Aleksandar Vulin. He was put on the US sanctions list in July. I answered:
Q: What do you think, why did Vulin resign?
A: He resigned under pressure from the Europeans and Americans. But the fact that it took 3 months rather than 3 days tells you that there was real resistance from President Vucic, who shares Vulin’s view of the world and Serbia’s ambition for political control of Serb populations in neighboring countries.
No shift in Serbian policy
Q: He said that the USA and the EU asked for his resignation in order not to impose sanctions on Serbia. How do you comment on his statement about sanctions against Serbia?
A: I think he is telling the truth. His resignation does not signal a shift in Serbian policy away from support for Russia but rather a defensive effort to avoid more sanctions.
Q: What new demands, after Vulin’s resignation, could be placed on Serbia?
A: Serbia attempted an insurrection in Kosovo on September 24 that was intended to create conditions for a Serbian military intervention. In my view, it should take public responsibility for this plot, apologize for it, and pledge that it will never happen in the future. It should also turn the perpetrators over to the Kosovo authorities for prosecution.
Serbia has also rejected the February and March agreements on normalization with Kosovo. Washington and Brussels should be requiring President Vucic to sign them, but of course he won’t do that before the December 17 election (and probably not afterwards either).
Vulin is not the only problem
Q: Do you think Serbia would fulfill them now, after Vulin’s resignation?
A: No. Vulin is not the only problem in Serbia or in its intelligence services. And President Vucic has shown no sign of regretting the September 24 plot.
The simple fact is that Serbia has embraced not the West but the East. Moscow and Beijing support Belgrade’s refusal to normalize with Kosovo and also the turn towards autocracy inside Serbia. Serbia is lost to the West for now.
Q: How much damage was done by putting him in charge of the Security Information Agency?
A: I don’t think we should assign to him personally the damage done. My understanding is that the Agency is deeply penetrated by the Russians. He allowed and cultivated the Moscow connection, but so too did others in the Agency who are still there.
Washington will be happy, but Russia has other assets
Q: In your opinion, how will Vulin’s resignation be received in Washington, and how in Moscow?
A: Washington will welcome the resignation. Moscow will be unhappy. But the Russians and Americans both know that Vulin was not the only Russian proxy in the Agency.
Q: Did Vulin’s resignation eliminate the possible Russian influence on the secret service in Serbia?
A: No, obviously not.
I should have added this:
Of course Vulin will remain a figure in Serbian politics and do his best to steer Belgrade in Moscow’s direction. I expect him to continue to be successful.
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A difficult choice and an easy one
The questions of a “humanitarian pause” and an Israeli invasion of Gaza are often discussed separately. They are related.
No invasion means more bombing
We have to assume that Israel will not let Hamas off the hook. At a minimum, Israel is trying to destroy Hamas’ military capability. That can only be done by military means. If you want to see a “humanitarian pause,” the bombing will stop, but that increases from the Israeli perspective the need to go into Gaza to hunt Hamasniks. If you want Israel to stay out of Gaza, the bombing will have to continue and even intensify.
My own preference would be for the Israelis to stay out of Gaza. Urban warfare is difficult and deadly even without an extensive network of tunnels. Once in, the Israelis will likely find they will need to stay, unless they are prepared to see something like Hamas (or worse) return. The invasion, plus an occupation of a decade or more, will kill a lot more Israelis and Palestinians than the bombing.
An Israeli invasion of Gaza is also likely to trigger a wider regional war. Hizbollah in Lebanon, various Iranian proxies in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen are capable of launching thousands of missiles at Israel. If the Israelis can’t handle that, they will turn to the United States to help out. Intense American attacks on Iranian proxies could trigger war with Iran. That scenario is a nightmare to be avoided, even if some hawks in the US might welcome it.
Of course there is an option for no bombing and no invasion. But that won’t satisfy popular opinion inside Israel. Nor would it help Prime Minister Netanyahu stay in power. He is responsible for the intelligence and preparedness failures that allows Hamas to do what it did. As soon as the military action stops, political accountability will begin. He will try to postpone that day.
Stop the abuse
The easy choice is on the West Bank. There the Israeli army and ultra-religious settlers have been harassing and killing Palestinians with impunity, not only since October 7. That behavior infuriates Palestinians and Arabs everywhere. From Israel’s own perspective, this is counterproductive. It could also be dangerous. The dog that hasn’t barked is Israel’s own Arab Palestinian population.
Here too Netanyahu is the fly in the ointment. He has been unwilling to reign in the extremists of his own coalition. Nor has the broadening of that coalition with a few opposition politicians compelled him to do so. The Americans are speaking up against Israeli behavior on the West Bank, but so far with little effect. They need to make it stick.
Get ahead of the political curve
At the moment, the Israelis are both intensifying the bombing and entering Gaza at will, without however yet trying to hold territory there. But humanitarian conditions are deteriorating rapidly and clearly require at least a bombing pause. Israel should combine that with a clear statement of restraint in the West Bank and a promise to deal with legitimate Palestinian aspirations once the fighting is over. But of course that would not help Netanyahu, so it is unlikely to happen.
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