Tag: United States
When too much is not enough
Now that the initial exchange of prisoners appears to have succeeded, it is time to re-evaluate the situation in Gaza.
The Israelis have gotten themselves in a fix. Pursuing their war objective of wiping out Hamas is ending too many lives and wrecking too much property. If they continue, the odds of achieving stability after the war are small. They may not, as they claim, be targetting civilians, but they are hitting a lot of them. Their military efforts do not look either necessary or proportional to the objective. Those are important conditions for lawful behavior.
Stop and try something else
Even the Israelis have no idea how Gaza will be governed after the fighting stops. Prime Minister Netanyahu says Israel will take miitary responsibility for Gaza security. He says nothing coherent beyond “deradicalization” about civilian governance. We know what that means: a new version of the open-air prison with high walls. No one should believe that will work well. President Biden has explicitly rejected that option. He wants some sort of international administration as a transition to a Palestinian Authority takeover of responsibility. That is only slightly more promising.
The time has more than come for the Israelis to stop what they are doing and try something else. This could mean an extension of the current pause, but it may not mean a formal bilateral ceasefire agreed with Hamas. It could also mean a unilateral Israeli move intended to provide an opportunity to flood Gaza with humanitarian assistance. Israeli raids against identified concentrations of Hamas fighters might continue, but without the destruction of civilians and civilian infrastructure that remains.
The alternative
There is an alternative. The Israelis waited a long time to get Adolf Eichmann. They then wisely tried him publicly and convicted him in a court of law. They need to show similar strategic patience in dealing with Hamas. It will take years to identify and track down the Hamas commanders responsible for October 7. If they are terrorists, as Netanyahu claims, the right place for them is in court. A trial would have a more salutary effect on deradicalization than the extra-judicial killing the Israelis exercised against the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorists.
Continuing the hunt for Hamas fighters in current conditions in Gaza is madness. But it helps to keep Prime Minister Netanyahu in power. Once there is a prolonged pause in the fighting, the Israeli public will have an opportunity to demand his resignation. Israelis need to hold him accountable for the intelligence and military failures of October 7, as well as the conduct of the subsequent prisoner exchange negotiations and of the war. Not until Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition allies are defrocked will it be possible for the Israeli government to begin to restore its credibility both at home and abroad.
Tone it down at home too
Meanwhile, here in the United States we also need to lower the temperature. I have participated in two events at Johns Hopkins SAIS that were peaceful and thoughtful, if occasionally spirited, discussions of Gaza. But they were open only to our international affairs students, who quite rightly adopt analytical frames even when anger and other passions motivate them. And those discussions were a couple of weeks ago, before the Israeli move on Al Shifa Hospital that appears to have produced little evidence of Israeli allegations.
In the meanwhile, things have heated up on other US campuses, including even Johns Hopkins Medicine in Baltimore. The administration there has suspended a prominent physician for inappropriate remarks on social media. That is distressing. It used to be that most of us could encourage violence only in a limited circle of acquaintances. Now it can be done to thousands with a click on Twitter (the social media platform whose owner wants it called X and retweets anti-Semitic material).
We can hope things will cool off in the US Monday, after the Thanksiving holiday when most Americans try to be with close family and friends. It would be entirely out of keeping with the occasion to encourage hard feelings. We have a lot to be grateful for and good reason to recall those in both Israel and Palestine who have less.
Those who are saying they will never vote again for Joe Biden because of his support for Israel’s military action I hope will reconsider. Trump would take a much harder line. And for him “humanitarian” is a dirty word.
Stevenson’s army, November 23
– Fred Kaplan sees a big shift in US-Israel relations
-NYT sees Biden role in hostage deal
– NYT notes divisions in Israeli cabinet
– WSJ says no smoking gun in tunnel videos
– CNN reports attempted Houthi attacks on US ships
– Right wing win in Dutch elections
– The story behind “Day After” film
– FP has great graphic on US-Chinese competition for world trade
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, November 22
I thought this an interesting discussion of post-war “reconstruction” issues in Gaza, from Larry Garber and David Harden. It was originally posted on Americans for Peace Now.
– The Israeli government and Hamas have agreed to a limited truce and hostage exchange, and US officials appear to have given extensive background briefings. The Hill has a literal ticktock of the negotiations. NYT stresses political pressure on Biden.Politico reports the “secret cell” of planners. David Ignatius weighs in.
– Politico reports US provided data to try to prevent attacks on humanitarian sites.
– FT has poll showing US support for Israel much stronger than in other countries.
– Breaking Defense sees benefits in shift of Israel from EUCOM to CENTCOM.
– NYT tells of international efforts to limit autonomous drones.
– Poll shows declining US support for aid to Ukraine
On this 60th anniversary of the assassination of President Kennedy, WaPo remembers how people got the news.
And Happy Thanksgiving to all!
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, November 9
–Hamas leaders –in Doha — tell NYT their plans for the war.
– SecState Blinken explains US requirements for a peace. See also WSJ. And NYT critique.
– DOD explains US military role. [Note: still no US AUMF for Israel]
– Politico reports on State dissent memo on Israel.
– Andrew Exum has lessons from Lebanon.
– Dan Drezner questions Israel’s ability to restore deterrence.
– Don’t forget: there’s also a tragic war in Sudan.
– Notice: there’s nothing on the plans to fund the government after Nov 17 because too many people have too many plans
-House GOP sets 2024 calendar. Printout here.
– Intelligence analyst argues Putin decided on war before US Afghan debacle
– Politico has good backgrounder on next week’s APEC summit
– NYT magazine answers: What does Space Force do?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
The day after should not be Iran’s
While Americans have opined, Israel has so far said little about the “day after” in Gaza. This interview with retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi provides a hint of at least some of the thinking near the Israeli government. He says essentially that Israeli security the day after will require two things: closing off Gaza from arms supplies shipped through Egypt and allowing Israel to raid as it wants inside Gaza.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has also suggested that Israel will need to provide security for a long time to come, which would mean in essence reoccupation of Gaza (or some portion of it). The Americans are opposing that.
The open air prison
The Israeli proposition amounts to a heightened version of the outdoor prison approach that failed on October 7 to protect Israeli security. It is not clear whether the Israelis are thinking the Egyptians will agree to tighten security at Gaza’s southern border or if they have something else in mind. Nor is it clear why the Israelis think their raiding would be any more effective after the war than it was before October 7. Israeli ground incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank have not been successful in curbing militancy there.
There are other problems with this option. Reconstruction in Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. Why would any Gulf country ante up if Israel is reserving to itself the privilege of destroying whatever is rebuilt? If the rebuilding doesn’t occur, Gaza’s inhabitants will be living in even greater misery than before the war. Why would that not lead to more resentment and extremism rather than less?
An international intervention
Another option would be an international intervention. This could be like the ones executed with a measure of success (at least in re-establishing security) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Gaza, with a population of about 2 million, is small enough to be comparable, even if the conflict there is far more intense.
Using RAND’s data for “heavy peace enforcement,” a similar operation in Gaza would require about 23,000 international troops and 3000 international police. This would be on top of 6000 local troops and 4500 local police. Annual costs would run over $6 billion. You can quarrel with these numbers. But given the dire situation in Gaza they are more likely too low than too high.
Troops and police will not be readily available
The Gulfies could ante up the money, but the troops and police are a serious problem for them. Peacekeeping troops might be available from the more usual UN suspects, but it would be the biggest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan are now the main UN troop contributing countries. India, now more than ever allied with Israel, might be a problem for the Gazans, but the others are possible.
The international police however would have to be Arab speakers. Which Arab countries have thousands of excess police they would be willing to contribute? Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria can be counted out due to their own civil wars. Egypt will resist, as it has spent decades trying to avoid responsibility for Gaza or Gazans. Jordan will likewise hesitate. The King has his hands full at home. The Gulf countries may be willing to foot the bill, but they won’t provide the personnel.
Even the local troops and police are an issue. All the readily available Gazans will have served in the Hamas brigades and police. Israel won’t want them re-empowered. The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has only 10,000 police of its own. Neither Israel nor the PA will want half of them transferred to Gaza. The Gazans might not welcome them given the long contention between the PA and Hamas.
The local option
This forces us to consider the local option. Perhaps we can do without troops on the assumption that the Israelis won’t allow re-armament, even of people not previously affiliated with Hamas. UNRWA, the PLO, and nongovernmental organizations they cooperate with in Gaza should have a pretty good idea of who is who and what they are capable of. At least in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, they could provide relief and begin the process of rebuilding education and health care. They could also start to reconstitute a Gazan police force.
The Israelis will be suspicious of UNRWA, the PLO, and their colllaborators. This issue might be alleviated if a good deal of the humanitarian supplies were provided by Israeli nongovernmental organizations committed to coexistence and ready to collaborate with legitimate, non-Hamas, Gazan counterparts. That would complement the usual flow of humaniarian goods from Egypt through the Rafah crossing. Gazans would understandably be hesitant at first about humanitarian supplies from Israel. But the idea would be to flood the zone with clean water (much of Gaza’s water already comes from Israel), food, medical and sanitary supplies, temporary shelters and other vital commodities. That would be hard to resist.
None of this can happen, until…
None of this will happen soon. The war is still raging. There is no sign of the mutually hurting stalemate or the mutually enticing way out that are the classic conflict management conditions for a successful negotiation, starting presumably with a ceasefire.
Israeli goals are clear: to obliterate Hamas’ capacity to attack Israel and compel Hamas to give up the more than 200 hostages it still holds. Some Israeli officials cite even broader objectives: to destroy Hamas’ governing capacity and to eliminate its ideology. But I doubt Israel is willing to lose its own citizens in pursuit of those broader objecdtives.
Hamas’ objectives are less clear. Some of its leaders are telling the New York Times that it wants to create a permanent state of war with Israel. If that is true, we won’t have to worry about the day after for a long time. Others believe the near-term objective is release of all Palestinians in prison in Israel. A hostage/prisoner exchange is certainly within the realm of possibility within months, if not weeks.
Consider the alternative
None of this is edifying. But consider the alternative. If the war ends with no clear plan for reconstruction, the Iranians and Russians will be glad to pitch in. Their resources are limited. But Iran will be glad to let loose the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to help resuscitate something much like Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Houthis. The Wagner remnants would be glad to help arm and train them.
Far better than that would be a Gaza that could join the West Bank in negotiating statehood with Israel. Reconstruction should proceed with that goal in mind. Netanyahu aimed to split the Palestinans between the West Bank and Gaza. That strategy to postpone the Palestinian state is at the end of its useful life. It is time for those who support the Jewish state to welcome Palestinian aspirations for one of their own.
Stevenson’s army, November 6
– Blinken and CIA Director Burns are in the Middle East.
– WSJ notes threats to US forces in the region
– NYT says State concerned assault rifles may be given to Israeli settlers
– New IC budget numbers declassified. ODNI table
– Will US need a draft? [This issue will come up in mock conference exercise]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).