Tag: United States
Appeasement is as appeasement does
It is difficult to write about the Balkans when something far more serious is happening in the Middle East, not to mention Ukraine. But Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina still merit some attention. The European Union and the US have de facto reversed their positions and now are favoring de facto ethnic partition of both entities.
Clearer in Kosovo
This is clearer in Kosovo. The EU is insisting that Kosovo reduce its overwhelmingly Albanian police presence in the north, which on September 24 responded professionally and effectively to a terrorist attack. The threat of a repeat performance is clear and present. The EU is explicitly ignoring the attempted insurrection on September 24:
This insistence on ignoring the September 24 terrorist insurrection is difficult to fathom. But it jibes with EU insistence on the immediate formation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which Belgrade explicitly proposes be a vehicle for separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo. Hungary and the five member states that have not recognized Kosovo have become the bottom line of Europe’s position on Kosovo: no recognition and ethnic partition.
Same story in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia, the situation is almost as bad. The West is supporting governments at both the state and entity levels that are under the control of ethnic separatists. Serb nationlist Milorad Dodik and Croat nationalist Dragan Covic are busy plotting the takeover of the Central Electoral Commission as well as the Constitutional Court. While they generally oppose the authority of the High Represenative, they naturally supported his post-electoral decisions that favored ethnic nationalists.
Dodik and Covic of course oppose implementation of several European Court of Human Rights decisions that would reverse the ethnic nationalist stranglehold on governance in Bosnia. The EU is ignoring those decisions and proceeding as if they don’t exist. The US has done nothing for years to encourage their implementation.
No priority has consequences
Why are the US and EU supporting, or at least not opposing, efforts to ethnically segregate populations in Bosnia and Kosovo? In part, the explanation is lack of horsepower. The Balkans have fallen off the priority list in Washington. It is hard to get any attention for the region. Secretary Blinken is not interested in doing any heavy lifting on Balkan issues while war rages in Ukraine as well as Israel and Gaza.
In Brussels, the main responsible officials come from Spain, Slovakia, and Hungary. Madrid and Bratislava have not recognized Kosovo. Budapest has, but its current leadership is explicitly ethnic nationalist. Prime Minister Orban is besties with Dodik and Serbian President Vucic, who can rely on his support. The EU higher ups are leaving the Balkans to people who have their own interests.
Appeasement is the policy
But there is more to it than that. Key officials in both Washington and Brussels have deluded themselves that they can attract Serbia into the West. President Vucic, they allege, is only concerned with getting a good deal for Serbs in neighboring countries. He is not serious about partitioning Kosovo or Bosnia. Buttering him up is easier and will work better than the alternative, tough love.
Labeling their current approach “appeasement” offends my colleagues at the State Department. But the US has done nothing more than a few talking points in response to Vucic’s sponsorship of the September 24 terrorist insurrection. The EU has done likewise. They are hoping the incident will give them leverage on Vucic in private but all blow over in public.
Of course that is not possible for Kosovo Albanians or for supporters to liberal democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the former lack an international backer willing to press the case for serious sanctions against Vucic. The latter lack not only international backing but also political traction in their own country.
The West has abandoned its friends. It is supporting opponents of liberal democracy in both Kosovo and Bosnia. Appeasement is as appeasement does.
#Serbia’s 33 acquis chapters, level of preparedness for membership, as assessed by the European Commission since 2015. https://esiweb.org/publications/scoreboard-true-state-accession-what-commission-assessments-reveal…

That was tweeted in response to this, from the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement:
Open discussion w/ Serbian Minister of European Integration Tanja Miscevic I encourage #Serbia to continue show its dedication to deliver on outstanding rule of law issues & to ensure implementation of recent laws Our meeting confirms that Reform agenda is a top priority for Serbia.

Stevenson’s army, October 10 and 11
I was traveling yesterday, so here is a double edition:
October 11:
– WaPo explains what a siege in Gaza looks like and how Hamas breached the wall
– NYT assesses Israel’s failures
– WSJ says Hamas got money through crypto financing
– Atlantic reminds what Hamas believes
-Kenya force to Haiti blocked
– Polish generals resign over politicization
– US may send another carrier toward Israel
– Analyst summarizes US failures in Afghanistan
-Op-ed writer says Space Force needs own lobbyist on Hill
October 10:
– At the Atlantic Andrew Exum questions the quality of the IDF conscript soldiers.
– NSC calls for Israel to make “proportionate” response.
– Politico sees a “high tech failure”
– US now calls Niger coup a coup
– DOD seems to run the best schools in US
– Susan Glasser examines Jake Sullivan’s actions on Ukraine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, October 6
– Politico surveys expert opinions on what’s wrong with US politics
– Theda Skocpol sees the end of the Tea Party dynamic
-Former CRS analyst explains power of Speaker Pro Tem
– Democrats on Rules have their views
– FP lays out schools of thought in US foreign policy
In the news, Trump allegedly told nuclear sub secrets to friends
– Max Boot says ex-generals need to denounce Trump
– WaPo says Biden & XI will meet in November
– WSJ says Army plans cuts in special operations forces
-Academic analyzes which countries support Russia
– Biden backtracks on border wall and Venezuela
– The political reaction
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Make partition unacceptable to the Serbs in northern Kosovo
Yesterday I wrote about what Serbia should be doing to atone for its unsuccessful insurrection in Kosovo. Today is I am writing about what Pristina should do to ensure that such a plot will never succeed. The Kosovo police should not be the only institution committed to preventing more terrorist attacks.
The secret sauce is budget and budget execution
The key for Pristina is gaining the acceptance, if not the affection, of Kosovo Serbs. To be fair, Pristina has already done a great deal to achieve this in communities south of the Ibar river. According to the Prime Minister himself:
Ten Serb-majority municipalities in have received on average 62% more budget (as a whole) per capita, as well as 89% more in capital expenditures per capita than the other 28 municipalities, 27 of which are Albanian-majority.
This is shown by Ministry of Finance Budget Dept. data from the last 14 yrs (’08-’22). When it comes to budget utilization, the 6 relatively well-integrated Serb-majority municip. in the south of have consistently performed better than the 4 in the north.
Tweeted February 7
Serbs, mainly from south of the Ibar, participate in Kosovo’s government and benefit visibly from doing so, even if they remain unsatisfied.
Last time I was in the four northern municipalities, admittedly a few years ago, the difference was apparent. The north was decrepit. Belgrade had mercilessly exploited it while Pristina largely ignored it. That needs to change: more budget execution and less interference from Belgrade are key. The EU and US need to do much more to convince Belgrade to withdraw its security forces and end their cooperation with local crime bosses.
Money won’t be enough
But more than cash and restraints on Belgrade are needed. Pristina should “reach out” to the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But what does this mean?
First and foremost it means establishing the rule of law there. The 2013 Brussels agreement between Belgrade and Pristina ensured it would be under the authority of Pristina’s police and courts, suitably integrated with Serbs. Belgrade has withdrawn the Serb personnel. Those who meet objective criteria for professionalism should be reintegrated and new hires recruited. Intimidation of Serbs who work for the Pristina institutions needs to be prosecuted, with help from EULEX.
Second, it means enabling free and pluralistic political discourse in the north. Pristina should aim to end the Srpska Lista political monopoly. The US and EU should provide assistance to other organizations of Serbs and others in the north to organize and campaign effectively. No new elections should be held before pluralism is ensured. It will do no good if the people who organized the insurrection win. In the meanwhile, Pristina should provide the non-Serb mayors with strong financial and political support to improve living conditions in their municipalities.
Third, Pristina should welcome dissent in the Serb communities, not only in the north. Opposition Albanian parties in Pristina should reach out to Serbs in the north to form coalitions. That would introduce a refreshing change in Kosovo politics.
Serbs are essential to Kosovo’s identity and independence
Most Kosovo Serbs do not like Kosovo’s independence. But so long as they remain in Kosovo–I hope forever–they are a vital piece of it. Without the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most live and most Serb religious sites are located, Kosovo as a separate state would lose an important reason for its separate existence. The Serbs are, in addition to a distinct history of the Albanian populations, one of the important factors that distinguish Kosovo from Albania. A Kosovo patriot today will want all Serbs and other minorities protected and even cherished.
I have the sense that Kosovars increasingly appreciate that point. Belgrade does not. President Vucic shows little concern for the welfare of the Serbs in Kosovo, especially those who live south of the Ibar. He uses their falsely portrayed plight to pump up war fever in Serbia. Belgrade is committed to partition. It wants the north, de facto if not de jure. Pristina should aim to make that something the northern Serbs reject.
Presidential clarity in video
I try hard to keep an open mind and to understand opposing perspectives. But there are moments when doing so denies reality. This is one of those moments in the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. If Pristina had done anything like what Belgrade has done, you can be sure I would be just as tough with Kosovo.
The attempted Serbian uprising in northern Kosovo weekend before last was just that. Belgrade trained and equipped 30 or so paramilitary cadres, who murdered a Kosovo policeman before losing three of their own men. Likely they intended to spark much more violence and a crackdown, with a view to justifying a Serbian military intervention. Serbia mobilized its forces and sent them to the border/boundary, which suggests an invasion was planned.
Two dozen or so perpetrators escaped to Serbia, where they still harbor. They include he ringleader, Milan Radoicic. He is a close political partner of Serbia’s President Vucic, supposedly now under house arrest. I haven’t seen anything on the whereabouts of the others.
Verbal reactions aren’t enough
So far, the US and EU public reactions have been exclusively verbal. Both Washington and Brussels know that the Serbian state was responsible for an attempted violent insurrection with political purposes, aka terrorism. Kosovo President Osmani in the above video is right to be calling for sanctions. If Serbia gets off scot free in public, it will only incentivize similar behavior, perhaps not only by Belgrade. There are lots of capitals that might like to foment rebellion in neighboring democracies.
This attempted insurrection is only the latest in a long series of Serbian efforts to destabilize the situation in Kosovo. It is high time to impose serious sanctions. What might that mean? Here are a few thoughts about items that should be on the options menu:
- Suspend Air Serbia flights to the US and EU.
- Freeze World Bank and EBRD projects in Serbia.
- Suspend EU and US official financing for economic (not democracy) projects in Serbia.
- Freeze Serbia’s negotiations for EU accession.
- Suspend military cooperation between the Serbian Army and the Ohio National Guard.
- Impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals who ordered and supervised the training of the paramilitaries.
Expectations should be clear
Just as important as sanctions are the expectations they are intended to support and what Serbia would need to do to end them. Here are a few suggestions for those:
- An official, public apology by the President of Serbia to the President of Kosovo.
- Delivery to the Kosovo authorities for trial of all of the alleged perpetrators harbored in Serbia.
- Disbanding of the Srpska List political party.
- A documented end to all arming and equipping of insurrectionary forces inside Kosovo.
- Documented withdrawal of all covert Serbian security forces from Kosovo territory.
These aren’t much more than random thoughts. There are many other things that could be done, either by way of sanctions or demands. The point is that verbal denunciations alone will not suffice. The EU and US should be aiming to permanently weaken Serbia’s hold on northern Kosovo.
Right the balance
Kosovo is currently suffering substantial EU “consequences”, for its failure to comply with Brussels demands for removal of elected mayors from municipal buildings and reduction of Kosovo police presence in the Serb communities of Kosovo’s north. I don’t know how the mayors are doing, but it was presumably the police presence that enabled a quick, effective, and professional reaction to the attempted insurrection. The EU should lift its sanctions on Kosovo. The circumstances that led to their imposition have evaporated.
The time has come to recognize that “consequences” for Serbia are far more important and entirely justified. The moment has come to right the balance in EU and US policy, which parliamentarians in both have declared unfairly weighted in favor of Serbia and against Kosovo.
It’s not only about Kosovo
Serbia’s effort to destabilize Kosovo so that it can claim control of its Serb-majority north should today be apparent to all. The license plate brouhaha of last year, the boycott of municipal elections in the spring, the subsequent rioting against the elected non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO peacekeepers in May, the kidnapping of Kosovo police–these were all prelude to the foiled insurrection last weekend.
Hear and see no evil
But the US and EU have so far failed to draw the necessary conclusions. They continue to call for dialogue without any consequences levied against Belgrade. The American Ambassador in Belgrade has even seen fit to suggest Serbia should join NATO. The overwhelming majority of Serbs reject that prospect. Their government’s recent behavior makes it not just illogical but nonsensical.
Within the EU, holding Serbia accountable is difficult because it requires unanimity. Viktor Orban’s pro-Russian Hungary is the usual spoiler. The outcome of yesterday’s election in Slovakia will make Bratislava Moscow’s next best friend.
In the US, it is the Biden Administration’s dogged and fruitless offer of goodies to turn Serbia towards the West that blocks any serious reevaluation of Balkans policy. The officials concerned simply do not want to accept failure. They continue to pursue appeasement, blind to Belgrade’s malfeasance.
It’s not only Kosovo
This blindness will have consequences. Serbia, like Russia, sees the West as divided and weak. Belgrade may back off temporarily in Kosovo in order not to provoke a serious reaction. But Serbia will continue to pursue irredentist aims in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Montenegro, government formation is blocked. The new president there wants pro-Russian parties in the coalition. The prime minister-designate is resisting, under pressure from Washington and Brussels. But he also rejects cooperation with the Western-oriented former ruling party. The country is in a dangerous limbo. Belgrade, working with the Serbian Orthodox Church, could well create chaos there, as it has repeatedly in recent years.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community High Representative has taken a series of unwise decisions that have damaged his own standing. He can no longer freely enter the 49% of the country’s territory known as Republika Srpska (RS). Its leader has taken the entity to within a few short steps of secession. He awaits only Moscow and Belgrade approval to declare de jure independence. He has already separated the RS from the country’s judicial and executive authority.
What’s next?
The Ukraine war will be an important factor in what happens next in the Balkans. The omens are not favorable in any of the possible scenarios.
If Russia were to lose in Ukraine, Moscow might well try to get compensation in the Balkans. The method would be destabilization, not naked aggression. Serbia could be given the green light and covert assistance to create chaos in northern Kosovo, force installation of a pro-Russian government in NATO member Montenegro, and allow RS to declare full autonomy if not independence.
If Russia wins in Ukraine by holding on to Crimea and at least part of Donbas, the precedent will reinforce Serbia’s push for at least de facto if not de jure control of Serb populations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
If the war in Ukraine continues for another year, Moscow could decide to refocus on the Balkans and set a precedent there for what it wants in Ukraine.
All these scenarios would entail major losses for the the US and EU. They can be prevented. But only if current policies are reevaluated now and a much tougher approach taken to counter Serbian irredentism.