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Make partition unacceptable to the Serbs in northern Kosovo

Yesterday I wrote about what Serbia should be doing to atone for its unsuccessful insurrection in Kosovo. Today is I am writing about what Pristina should do to ensure that such a plot will never succeed. The Kosovo police should not be the only institution committed to preventing more terrorist attacks.

The secret sauce is budget and budget execution

The key for Pristina is gaining the acceptance, if not the affection, of Kosovo Serbs. To be fair, Pristina has already done a great deal to achieve this in communities south of the Ibar river. According to the Prime Minister himself:

Ten Serb-majority municipalities in have received on average 62% more budget (as a whole) per capita, as well as 89% more in capital expenditures per capita than the other 28 municipalities, 27 of which are Albanian-majority.

This is shown by Ministry of Finance Budget Dept. data from the last 14 yrs (’08-’22). When it comes to budget utilization, the 6 relatively well-integrated Serb-majority municip. in the south of have consistently performed better than the 4 in the north.

Tweeted February 7

Serbs, mainly from south of the Ibar, participate in Kosovo’s government and benefit visibly from doing so, even if they remain unsatisfied.

Last time I was in the four northern municipalities, admittedly a few years ago, the difference was apparent. The north was decrepit. Belgrade had mercilessly exploited it while Pristina largely ignored it. That needs to change: more budget execution and less interference from Belgrade are key. The EU and US need to do much more to convince Belgrade to withdraw its security forces and end their cooperation with local crime bosses.

Money won’t be enough

But more than cash and restraints on Belgrade are needed. Pristina should “reach out” to the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But what does this mean?

First and foremost it means establishing the rule of law there. The 2013 Brussels agreement between Belgrade and Pristina ensured it would be under the authority of Pristina’s police and courts, suitably integrated with Serbs. Belgrade has withdrawn the Serb personnel. Those who meet objective criteria for professionalism should be reintegrated and new hires recruited. Intimidation of Serbs who work for the Pristina institutions needs to be prosecuted, with help from EULEX.

Second, it means enabling free and pluralistic political discourse in the north. Pristina should aim to end the Srpska Lista political monopoly. The US and EU should provide assistance to other organizations of Serbs and others in the north to organize and campaign effectively. No new elections should be held before pluralism is ensured. It will do no good if the people who organized the insurrection win. In the meanwhile, Pristina should provide the non-Serb mayors with strong financial and political support to improve living conditions in their municipalities.

Third, Pristina should welcome dissent in the Serb communities, not only in the north. Opposition Albanian parties in Pristina should reach out to Serbs in the north to form coalitions. That would introduce a refreshing change in Kosovo politics.

Serbs are essential to Kosovo’s identity and independence

Most Kosovo Serbs do not like Kosovo’s independence. But so long as they remain in Kosovo–I hope forever–they are a vital piece of it. Without the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most live and most Serb religious sites are located, Kosovo as a separate state would lose an important reason for its separate existence. The Serbs are, in addition to a distinct history of the Albanian populations, one of the important factors that distinguish Kosovo from Albania. A Kosovo patriot today will want all Serbs and other minorities protected and even cherished.

I have the sense that Kosovars increasingly appreciate that point. Belgrade does not. President Vucic shows little concern for the welfare of the Serbs in Kosovo, especially those who live south of the Ibar. He uses their falsely portrayed plight to pump up war fever in Serbia. Belgrade is committed to partition. It wants the north, de facto if not de jure. Pristina should aim to make that something the northern Serbs reject.

Presidential clarity in video

I try hard to keep an open mind and to understand opposing perspectives. But there are moments when doing so denies reality. This is one of those moments in the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. If Pristina had done anything like what Belgrade has done, you can be sure I would be just as tough with Kosovo.

The attempted Serbian uprising in northern Kosovo weekend before last was just that. Belgrade trained and equipped 30 or so paramilitary cadres, who murdered a Kosovo policeman before losing three of their own men. Likely they intended to spark much more violence and a crackdown, with a view to justifying a Serbian military intervention. Serbia mobilized its forces and sent them to the border/boundary, which suggests an invasion was planned.

Two dozen or so perpetrators escaped to Serbia, where they still harbor. They include he ringleader, Milan Radoicic. He is a close political partner of Serbia’s President Vucic, supposedly now under house arrest. I haven’t seen anything on the whereabouts of the others.

Verbal reactions aren’t enough

So far, the US and EU public reactions have been exclusively verbal. Both Washington and Brussels know that the Serbian state was responsible for an attempted violent insurrection with political purposes, aka terrorism. Kosovo President Osmani in the above video is right to be calling for sanctions. If Serbia gets off scot free in public, it will only incentivize similar behavior, perhaps not only by Belgrade. There are lots of capitals that might like to foment rebellion in neighboring democracies.

This attempted insurrection is only the latest in a long series of Serbian efforts to destabilize the situation in Kosovo. It is high time to impose serious sanctions. What might that mean? Here are a few thoughts about items that should be on the options menu:

1. Suspend Air Serbia flights to the US and EU.
2. Freeze World Bank and EBRD projects in Serbia.
3. Suspend EU and US official financing for economic (not democracy) projects in Serbia.
4. Freeze Serbia’s negotiations for EU accession.
5. Suspend military cooperation between the Serbian Army and the Ohio National Guard.
6. Impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals who ordered and supervised the training of the paramilitaries.

Expectations should be clear

Just as important as sanctions are the expectations they are intended to support and what Serbia would need to do to end them. Here are a few suggestions for those:

1. An official, public apology by the President of Serbia to the President of Kosovo.
2. Delivery to the Kosovo authorities for trial of all of the alleged perpetrators harbored in Serbia.
3. Disbanding of the Srpska List political party.
4. A documented end to all arming and equipping of insurrectionary forces inside Kosovo.
5. Documented withdrawal of all covert Serbian security forces from Kosovo territory.

These aren’t much more than random thoughts. There are many other things that could be done, either by way of sanctions or demands. The point is that verbal denunciations alone will not suffice. The EU and US should be aiming to permanently weaken Serbia’s hold on northern Kosovo.

Right the balance

Kosovo is currently suffering substantial EU “consequences”, for its failure to comply with Brussels demands for removal of elected mayors from municipal buildings and reduction of Kosovo police presence in the Serb communities of Kosovo’s north. I don’t know how the mayors are doing, but it was presumably the police presence that enabled a quick, effective, and professional reaction to the attempted insurrection. The EU should lift its sanctions on Kosovo. The circumstances that led to their imposition have evaporated.

The time has come to recognize that “consequences” for Serbia are far more important and entirely justified. The moment has come to right the balance in EU and US policy, which parliamentarians in both have declared unfairly weighted in favor of Serbia and against Kosovo.