Tag: United States
Peace picks, October 21-25
With a sense of normalcy returned to the city after the reopening of the government, some timely events coming up this week:
1. Will India’s Economics be a Victim of its Politics?
Monday, October 21 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
The Indian economy has entered a difficult period over the past eighteen months with the rate of GDP growth having halved, inflation still stubbornly high, and deficits remaining substantial. Economists are asking whether India’s rapid growth of the last decade was more a credit-fueled aberration than a result of structural reforms. To complicate matters, economic concerns are increasingly secondary to political debate as India prepares for critical state elections this winter and parliamentary elections in spring 2014.
Jahangir Aziz and Ila Patnaik will assess the state of India’s economy in the context of India’s growing election fervor. Edward Luce will moderate.
JAHANGIR AZIZ
Jahangir Aziz is senior Asia economist and India chief economist at JP Morgan. He was previously principal economic adviser to the Indian Ministry of Finance and head of the China Division at the International Monetary Fund.
ILA PATNAIK
Ila Patnaik is a nonresident senior associate in Carnegie’s South Asia Program and a professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy in New Delhi. She writes regular columns in the Indian Express and the Financial Express and recently co-led the research team for India’s Ministry of Finance Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission.
EDWARD LUCE
Edward Luce is the Washington columnist and former Washington bureau chief of the Financial Times. Earlier he was their South Asia bureau chief based in New Delhi. He is the author of In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (2006) and Time to Start Thinking: America and the Spectre of Decline (2012).
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Wise words from an elder statesman
For 48 years, UN Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson has been a key player in global diplomacy, with previous stints as Swedish ambassador to the United States and Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. On Wednesday, Eliasson spoke about the current state of global diplomacy and the UN’s post-2015 development strategy, to a large crowd at Brookings.
Eliasson described this year’s meeting of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) as unusually productive. In the current age of “a la carte multilateralism,” there is always a new pressing issue that confronts the international community. Today, such issues as the Syrian refugee crisis, Iran’s nuclear program, and the immigration disaster off the coast of Italy are all part of a day’s work for the UN.
The major discussion at the UNGA this year revolved around Syria. The Assad regime has taken a positive step towards dismantling its chemical weapons arsenal, but “action against chemical weapons is just one step on the road to peace in Syria.” The next step to resolving the conflict lies in increased aid to the millions of people displaced inside and outside the country. In order to tackle this issue, the regime must give the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations access to the people inside Syria’s borders. With 1 million children displaced by the crisis and the cold winter months fast approaching, the time to act is now. Without a ceasefire, the international community can only do so much to help the Syrian people.
The UNGA also saw positive developments with the newly elected Iranian leadership and its nuclear program. Iranian President Rouhani has opened up to the international community since his election, making clear his willingness to negotiate with the P5+1 on the future of the nuclear program. But Eliasson hopes Rouhani’s opening to the West is tested and verified. The sanctions placed on Iran have been successful at crippling the country’s economy, and it will be vital to the negotiations to lift those sanctions only when a significant deal is reached.
Eliasson also discussed the UN Millennium Development goals, which were established in 2000 with the objective of achieving objectives in global health, poverty eradication, education, gender equality, sustainability, and development funding by 2015. With the deadline approaching, the United Nations has made significant progress—global poverty has been cut in half, education for girls in Africa has become more available, and malaria deaths have decreased substantially. But there are also areas that require more attention, such as maternal health, sanitation, and clean drinking water.
As the UN continues to make progress toward the Millennium Development goals, a new set of objectives will look to address sustainability, human rights and rule of law, climate change, and the eradication of extreme poverty. Looking ahead, prevention is going to be key to the success of the UN development agenda. Eliasson said that human rights violations are a major sign that a crisis is imminent. The UN needs to have a way to react quickly to prevent major conflicts.
Reaching into his back pocket to pull out his mini version of the UN Charter, Eliasson said he is convinced that there is unharnessed potential in chapter six of the document, “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” It highlights the use of diplomacy, in contrast to chapter seven’s possible use of military force. The military actions of the last decade have caused people to become numb to the effects of the use of force. We have forgotten about the benefits of diplomatic negotiations. Eliasson ended by sharing his four reasons why diplomacy succeeds or fails:
- The careful use of words can make or break diplomatic talks. Words are the diplomat’s most important tool.
- Timing is key. We most often do things too late.
- Everyone involved in negotiations must be culturally sensitive, by respecting the culture, history, and traditions of the groups involved.
- Personal relations are the most important aspect to diplomacy.
Trust is vital. It is crucial to create and build upon personal relationships in order to succeed. Eliasson has practiced what he preaches.
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The Syrian Coalition speaks
University of Arkansas Professor Najib Ghadbian, the Syrian Opposition Coalition representative to the United States, stopped by SAIS today for an all too rare public presentation, followed by Q and A. I moderated, though I confess both speaker and audience distinguished themselves in moderation. Revolutionaries should always be so reasonable. The event should be up on C-Span soon.
Najib outlined the main problems the Coalition faces in its effort to create an inclusive, secular and free democracy:
- The humanitarian catastrophe: 2.5 million Syrians are refugees, 5 million are internally displaced. Opposition funding has gone predominantly to meet their needs. Access is a major issue, as liberated areas are under frequent attack. But the Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit is now functioning well after some initial difficulties.
- Radicalization: Regime killing and weak support from outside Syria for moderates has strengthened extremists, who have proven effective on the battlefield. Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the former more Syrian and the latter more closely affiliated with Al Qaeda, are big and growing problems. ISIS in particular is responsible for mass atrocities attributed to the opposition.
- Governance: In liberated areas, local revolutionary councils are trying to fill the vacuum left by withdrawal of state institutions, some more successfully than others. The Coalition is expected to form and approve an interim government at its next meeting in Istanbul in early November. This will be a technocratic stopgap until the transitional government called for in the June 2012 Geneva communique is formed.
- Ending the conflict: The Coalition favors a political end to the conflict, but it must be one that leads to a democratic outcome. This is not possible with Bashar al Asad still in the presidency. The idea of his conducting elections next year is completely unacceptable. In order to go to a Geneva 2 conference next month or whenever it is scheduled, the Coalition will need the support not only of the US but also Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Coalition will also want to see the withdrawal of Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, both of which are fighting inside Syria.
The Coalition needs to meet these challenges by providing humanitarian assistance, isolating and countering extremists, delivering government services and uniting to negotiate an end to the conflict. It is unlikely any negotiation can be successful unless there is a change in the military situation on the ground. The Coalition-linked Supreme Military Council needs increased resources, training and professionalization. Funding to extremists should be blocked. The Coalition will not try to expand in their direction.
Asked about protection for minorities, in particular Alawites, after Bashar al Asad is gone, Najib suggested that international peacekeepers or some form of elite units might be required. In any event, it is clear that the Asad regime is not protecting Alawites so much as it is putting them at risk. There are prominent Alawites within the opposition. Security sector reform, including consolidation of Syria’s 16 existing security agencies into a single internal and a single external service, will be a priority. The Day After report and ongoing project will be helpful, especially on security sector reform and rule of law.
Syria is not nearly as divided ethnically (or in sectarian terms) as Bosnia at the end of its war. Most Kurds are with the opposition. Administrative decentralization will be important in the post-Asad era, but federalization of the Iraqi variety is not in the cards because the Kurdish population is not as concentrated in one geographic area.
From the United States, the Coalition is looking for strong and more consistent support. While the Coalition supports US/Russia agreement, Washington made a mistake to embark on dismantling the regime’s chemical weapons capability without also doing something about Asad’s ferocious use of the Syrian air force against liberated areas. Conventional weapons have killed many more Syrians than chemical weapons. The military training being conducted in Jordan for the opposition should not be secret. It should be taken over by the Defense Department and enlarged to a much grander scale. US leadership and coordination is needed to ensure that the disparate supporters of the Coalition are all working in the same direction, as recommended in the recent International Crisis Group report.
I spent a summer in Damascus not too many years ago studying Arabic. The desire of ordinary Syrians, and even those close the regime, for freedom and democracy was palpable. The people I talked with would be pleased to hear what the Coalition representative had to say. But they would ask how much longer the killing will last.
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The new good news from Afghanistan
I’m not talking about the old good news, which focuses on progress in Afghan society: declining infant mortality and maternal mortality, rising life expectancy, more girls in school, lots of cell phones, expanded electricity production and availability, economic growth. It has been apparent for some time that Afghanistan isn’t what it was under the Taliban and there will be serious resistance, especially in major cities and the north, to returning to that unhappy Islamist rule. Women and their rights are especially at risk.
A State Department official told me years ago that the best thing going for us in Afghanistan is that the population hates the Taliban more. Cold comfort, but comfort nonetheless.
Today I’m talking about a more recent spate of good news: near agreement on the rules governing the status of US forces after 2014, relative hardiness of the Afghan security forces, decent preparations for next April’s elections, and even a poll showing two reasonable presidential candidates in the lead.
It’s all relative of course. There is still the important issue of jurisdiction over US troops to be resolved, apparently in the loya jirga Karzai is convening (next month?) to discuss the status of forces agreement. The Afghan security forces haven’t made any real progress against the Taliban–they just haven’t lost a great deal. Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani are certainly better than many of the other candidates, but there is still a long time before April. President Karzai’s brother Qayum polls in third place. Election preparations are one thing. We’ll need to wait to see how things really work.
Of course the Taliban are planning to have their say about all these things. They oppose the status of forces agreement, the loya jirga at which it is to be discussed, and the elections. As Mullah Omar puts it:
…the invaders and their allies should understand that the strategic agreement will accompany grave consequences for them. Though they may get these documents rubberstamped by a fake Loya Jirga but it will not be acceptable to the Afghans. Throughout the history, the real representatives and Loya Jirgas of the country have never signed documents of slavery. So those who would sign this (document), could not be called a representative Loya Jirga of the country. Their decisions are not acceptable. The invaders should know that their limited bases will never be accepted. The current armed Jihad will continue against them with more momentum…
The votes of the people have no value in the elections nor will participation benefit. Therefore, the Islamic Emirate rejects these elections and urge the people to avoid participation in them because this is only a drama being played by the invaders to attain their goals.
So a lot now depends on the military balance. The Americans are continuing to reduce their presence, now down to 52,000 and slated to go to 34,000 by next February. The Afghan security forces are going to have a hard time stepping into the breach.
News of the negotiations with the Taliban has been scarce. Given the dismal record, I’d say news coverage correlates with failure, not success. I really don’t know whether no news coverage indicates that something good is happening. Certainly Mullah Omar doesn’t seem to think so. The enthusiasm he evinced in August for negotiations seems to have faded with progress on the status of forces agreement.
As cold weather sets in, the fighting season will be ending in Afghanistan. We can expect terrorist activity in major cities, with the goal of disrupting election preparations. This will weight in favor of the agreement with the US, which will be vital to training and equipping Afghan forces as well as continuing strikes against terrorist groups. President Karzi isn’t convening a loya jirga to reject the agreement but rather to spread the responsibility for approving it.
As the snow melts, the real crunch will come. Will security be sufficient to allow Afghans from all parts of the country to vote? Will there be an agreement that somehow brings at least part of the Taliban into the political process and weakens its military efforts? Will today’s frontrunners fade as candidates with more warlord backing and clearer ethnic appeals rise in popularity, as has happened in previous Afghan elections? Will financial resources stay in the country and seek investments, or will they leave Afghanistan with the foreign troops?
I don’t know whether to believe the new good news from Afghanistan. We’ll just have to wait and see.
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Smoke signals don’t count, guarantees do
The smoke signals from two days of P5 + 1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) talks with Iran are good: the Iranians proposed a solution to a crisis they claim is unnecessary, they met bilaterally with the Americans, they signed on to an optimistic statement with European Union High Representative Ashton, and new talks will convene in Geneva on November 7 and 8. The Iranians may even have given an interview to an Israeli radio station. This kind of open, cooperative and positive atmosphere marks a sharp improvement from the past.
But we need to be hardnosed. The Iranians are increasing their capacity to produce fissionable (bomb) materials rapidly, both by enriching uranium and by soon making plutonium. There is no reason to believe that they will back off recognition of what they term their “right” to enrich (and I imagine to reprocess). They are much closer to a nuclear weapons capability today than ever before.
The Americans meanwhile are under pressure not to allow in a negotiated settlement any enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium in Iran. That is almost surely not achievable. But lifting of sanctions in the U.S. Congress will require an airtight agreement that verifiably and irreversibly ensures Iran is not diverting nuclear material to a weapons project.
Common ground lies somewhere in the area of enrichment up to 5% inside Iran with shipment of higher enriched materials and plutonium out of Iran and tight, frequent and unannounced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would be significantly tighter than the arrangements Brazil, Argentina and many other potential proliferators have made with each other and the international community.
The military option, whether Israeli or American, is not attractive. It might set back the Iranian nuclear program by as much as five years, but Tehran would surely abandon its denials and redouble its efforts, precipitating a rush to nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others. Repetition of military attacks with unintended and unpredictable consequences would be required at more and more frequent intervals. This is not a formula for a peaceful world.
Nor is containment of a nuclear Iran a good alternative. It would put nuclear war on a hair trigger: Israel would need to lanuch on warning against all of Iran’s nuclear assets if it wanted to survive, which it surely does. To imagine that Jerusalem and Tehran could reach the kind of modus vivendi that prevailed between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War is delusionary.
So we are on a good path, or at least a better one than the alternatives, but one that will not be easy to complete. The same split Congress that brought us budget crises will not roll over and play dead when President Obama brings it a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. It will demand, as it should, ironclad guarantees that we haven’t been rolled and will not be tricked. But if the guarantees are good, the deal is one they should take. Smoke signals don’t count, but guarantees do.
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Berlin in the Balkans
I’ve been distracted from the Balkans for more than a week, while traveling in France and New York. I was also distracted for a week before that by events in Syria. What do I find as I turn back to my favorite trouble spot?
Precious little real trouble. President Nikolic is congratulating himself on Serbia’s courageous leadership, while receiving plaudits from the American Ambassador. The Serbian Orthodox Church and other stalwarts of the Kosovo saga are urging Serbs to vote in the upcoming local elections. Serbia is expecting to start EU accession negotiations early next year.
It’s not that there is no trouble at all. There was the murder of an EU official last month, still unsolved to my knowledge. There was the bombing today of a moderate Serb politician’s apartment in North Mitrovica. Prime Minister Dacic still thinks it unreasonable for a Serbian citizen to say he might like the same treatment Serbs are getting Kosovo.
But the needle has moved. It now points clearly towards Serbia’s future EU prospects and away from its historical claims. I don’t expect Belgrade to forget about the Serbs in Kosovo, or its strong cultural and religious ties to its former province, but it clearly no longer wants to be held hostage by them. That, in my book, is progress.
I wish I could say as much for the other remaining legacy issues in the Balkans. Athens and Skopje still seem far from resolution of the “name” issue, which prevents Macedonia from joining NATO or getting a date to start EU accession talks. This is one of those disputes that revolve around issues that look pretty small to those not involved but in fact arouse passions because they challenge identities. I’d like to see Macedonia enter NATO as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as provided by the interim accord, but that won’t suffice for European Union membership.
Bosnia is the real nub. Its first census since before the war (1991), which is supposed to end today, has seemed at times to threaten stability, and some recounting will be needed, but it is also an opportunity for Bosnians to define who they think they are. The campaigns urging people to put themselves in this or that category carry much more political weight in Bosnia than they do in many other countries. If the “other” category were to reach its advocates’ fondest dreams and beat out the least numerous of the “constituent peoples” (presumably the Croats) that could have profound political implications. By the same token, if more than 50% of the country identifies as Bosniak, that too could have a big impact. Even small adjustments from the pre-war distribution may be viewed as redefining the basis for Bosnia’s polity.
I continue to think that only a decisive European intervention, fully backed by the Americans, will resolve the Macedonia’s name problem and Bosnia’s identity problem. I wish it weren’t thus. Skopje and Athens should be able to recognize the greater good in coming to terms on an issue that is holding up Macedonia’s Euroatlantic integration and threatening to destabilize its interethnic relations, as the Albanians care a good deal less about the name issue than do Macedonians.
Likewise Bosnia should be able to resolve its own problems, if only to because there is no longer serious will or means to fight it out. But the international community is partly responsible for the mess, as it pressed the Dayton solution and made it hard to change. A bit of tough love from Germany would make a big difference in Bosnia, especially if coordinated closely with the Croatians and the Americans. Wishy washy coaxing from the EU bureaucracy is all too clearly not going to be sufficient.
The world has much bigger problems than the Balkans these days. Germany, while burdened with Europe’s financial crisis, is not playing much of a role outside the EU, unless you count its formidable exports. Chancellor Merkel worked her magic in Kosovo and Serbia, where the progress is very largely due to her vigorous intervention against the “parallel structures” in North Mitrovica. More Berlin leadership in the Balkans is not too much to ask.
PS: I wish I’d known about Bosnia’s qualification for the World Cup when I wrote this piece. Here’s Sarajevo in celebration (no it was nothing like this during the war), courtesy of @TransferSources:
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