Tag: United States
Peace picks, October 14-18
Today is officially a holiday and the government is still “shut down,” but there are good war and peace events this week in DC:
1. U.S. Policy in the Arab: World Perspectives from Civil Society
In collaboration with the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND)
Monday, October 14, 2013 – 11:15am – 12:45pm
New America Foundation
The United States has long shaped developments in the Arab world, but the 2011 popular uprisings and subsequent period of unrest have diminished U.S. influence and credibility in the region. More recently, Washington’s reluctance to militarily intervene in Syria and passive reaction to political changes in Egypt have further damaged its image in the eyes of Arab populations. While media coverage of regional events focuses on governments and street protests, the voices of civil society organizations are often marginalized or unheard.
On October 14, the New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force and the Arab NGO Network for Development will host a distinguished panel of researchers, academics, and activists from Arab civil society organizations. The panelists will present civil society priorities and perspectives on U.S. policies in the region, and will specifically debate whether these policies advance popular aspirations for democracy and sustainable development.
PARTICIPANTS
Kinda Mohamadieh
Policy Advisor, Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND).
Mahinour El-Badrawi
Researcher, Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR)
Mohamad Loutfy
Campaign Coordinator, The Campaign on World Bank Safeguards and Disability
Senior Advisor, The Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union (LPHU)
Rana Khalaf
Activist, Syrian League for Citizenship
Moderator:
Research Associate, Middle East Task Force, New America Foundation
RSVP: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/us_policy_in_the_arab_world Read more
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One-state, two-states
The Middle East Policy Council (MEPC) hosted a conference Wednesday discussing a question not usually asked in polite company: “Two States or One?” Challenging the usual presumption that a two-state solution is necessary and sufficient, Thomas Mattair, Executive Director of MEPC, described the Israel/Palestine conflict as one that has severely affected both sides, with countless lives destroyed for the sake of “a pile of rocks called the Holy Land. Call it idolatry.” The panel included four speakers, with two advocates for each solution.
Ian Lustick, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and author of “Two State Illusion,” believes that a two state outcome is possible but will not happen as a result of negotiations, which only perpetuate divisions that already exist. The odds are against the two-state solution because of the increasing Islamization of the region and the influence of the Israeli lobby on US foreign policy. The route to a two-state solution is not through negotiations, but through “rough politics.” History has shown that civil wars and revolutions, rather than negotiations, have led to the formation of democratic states. They also produce a result that no one would have expected. Lustick does not advocate a one-state solution but sees one already in place. There are slim prospects for a two-state solution in the absence of a huge political shift.
Also arguing for a one-state solution was Yousef Munayyer, Executive Director of the Jerusalem Fund and the Palestine Center. He believes the negotiations have never been further from a two-state solution than they are now – it is a one-state reality. The one-state advocates are mostly concerned with ensuring the rights of Israelis and Palestinians are afforded to all equally. He sees and debunks 3 myths in the ongoing negotiation rhetoric:
- Middle East peace is a vital US security interest, or the US will be at a greater risk of attack if Israel is not protected. He explains that a vital security interest means that the US would get involved militarily, which is not necessarily the case.
- It is in Israel’s interest to end the occupation. In reality, Israel reaps many benefits from the occupation, including many resources from the West Bank.
- The status quo is unsustainable. On the contrary, Israeli occupation is sustainable and profitable. The US is supporting the status quo diplomatically and financially.
He does not see the negotiations yielding a just solution; rather, Israel will continue to impose its will as the stronger power with the backing of the US. Thus, Munayyer concludes that Israel has no reason to change this one-state reality because there is no outside pressure to do so.
On the other hand, President of J-Street Jeremy Ben-Ami argues for a two-state solution. He sees a necessity for a Jewish homeland and the justice of its existence. There will only be justice, peace and security for the Jewish people if there is justice, peace and security for the Palestinians as well. This has been a conflict between two groups who have legitimate, yet conflicting, rights to the same piece of land. The only viable option: division of the land between the two groups. The one-state “nightmare” would not give both groups equal rights. The two-state solution would allow both groups to have national self-determination, security and independence from one another. He sees real hope for the two-state solution with Secretary Kerry’s renewed energy for negotiations.
Finally, Ahmad Samih Khalidi, Senior Associate Member of St. Anthony’s College at Oxford University, sees the Palestinian conflict as the convergence of many conflicts, including ethnic tensions and national conflicts with a global resonance because of the historicity of its location as well as Israel’s international support. The two-state solution is nothing new. It was adopted by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1988 and was rejected by Israel and the US for decades after. However, now it is the only common ground among the US, PLO and Israel. There can be no other negotiated solution. However, it will be difficult to create a just and sustainable solution that factors all the issues such as the division of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Khalidi does not see a one-state or two-state dichotomy. There could eventually be a union in one-state, after the establishment of two separate states.
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Cross-strait optimism 2, with a twist
Jonas Brown continues his report on an all day conference last week at the Carnegie Endowment:
The third panel discussed cross-strait relations in a regional context. Yann-Huei Song, a research fellow at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, highlighted the complexity of Taiwan’s position in the region. Taipei must negotiate tense multilateral conflicts in the East and South China Seas while simultaneously maintaining a pro-U.S. orientation and developing delicate cross-strait ties with Beijing. He suggested that President Ma’s East China Sea peace initiative could be applied in the South China Sea and that Taiwan’s role in ICAO and other international organizations provide a precedent for Taipei’s participation in devising a South China Sea code of conduct.
Chyungly Lee, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations and professor at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, observed that American “rebalancing” had succeeded in strengthening regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific, leading to more action-oriented coordination between states, with a particular increase in functional security cooperation. This trend has benefitted the entire region as well as the US, suggesting that greater participation by Taiwan in regional organizations and agreements would only enhance these benefits.
Michael Auslin, director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, said that a paradigm-shift has occurred in cross-strait relations since the end of the Cold War. Cross-strait relations were initially the focus of US interests in the region and a key rationale for the “Asia pivot,” but cross-strait rapprochement has brought Taipei into the mainstream of regional politics. Ma’s approach to Beijing resembles that of other regional leaders: defusing tensions while also attempting to maintain a balance of power. Regional dynamics—not the US role—are now the central factor influencing cross-strait relations.
Renmin University professor Canrong Jin emphasized Beijing’s satisfaction and optimism regarding both cross-strait relations and China’s role in the region. With the exception of China’s dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, a sense of calm and promise pervades in Beijing, despite a widely held, anxious perception that right-wing nationalism is on the rise in Japan. Anxiety about American “rebalancing” has eased because U.S.-Russia relations and the struggling U.S. economy are both viewed as checks on American assertiveness in Asia.
Commentator Michael Swaine, senior associate at CEIP, questioned the tendency by many observers to view cross-strait relations as an indicator of Chinese and American positions on other issues. He noted in particular the—in his view—unsubstantiated talk about risk to US credibility in the region should the US shift its position on cross-strait relations or the East/South China Sea territorial disputes. This line of reasoning reminds him of Vietnam War-era domino thinking. More highly nuanced, contextualized scholarship is needed in this area, Swaine said.
The fourth panel covered “Domestic Developments in Mainland China.” Chih-Chieh Chou, a professor at National Cheng Kung University, outlined the dilemmas faced by the current government as it tries to maintain stability while enacting the political reforms necessary to transition to an innovation-based economy. Chou expressed cautious optimism about China’s macroeconomic growth and political reform. He noted areas of progress, such as the growing space for civil society activity, but also acknowledged daunting challenges, including the urban-rural gap, high income inequality, lack of government transparency, and tight government control over resources.
Chung-Min Tsai, a political science professor at National Chengchi University, said it is still too early to assess Xi’s leadership. He questioned the usefulness of Xi’s “Chinese Dream:” Will it lead to concrete, widespread improvement in quality of life, or to is it an empty government fantasy that will simply highlight the chasm between the Chinese people and their government? In an analysis of China’s political and economic trajectory much less optimistic than Chou’s, George Washington University professor David Shambaugh described a sclerotic political system, with no evidence of meaningful political reform and little sign of a successful transition toward an innovation-based economy. He agreed with Tsai that the “Chinese Dream” is an “empty vessel” but suggested that its open-endedness could be positive, allowing for a bottom-up interpretation by China’s intellectual community.
Fan Li, director of the World and China Institute in Beijing, observed steps toward economic liberalization under Xi—including the creation of the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone and greater freedom for private businesses—but contrasted this economic progress with the absence of political reform cited by Shambaugh.
Commentator Kenneth Lieberthal, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, reemphasized the fundamental contradiction between recent attempts to both strengthen the private sector and centralize political power. Recognizing the complexity of his domestic challenges, Xi has made de-escalation of tensions with the U.S. the touchstone of his foreign policy, so that he can concentrate on consolidating his personal control and revivifying the Communist Party.
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Cross-strait optimism 1
Jonas Brown, who will be getting his third masters’ degree at SAIS in December, reports:
The government shutdown last week led President Obama to cancel his long-planned Asia trip, prompting media speculation about the negative implications for his “rebalancing” to Asia and a potential boost to China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Against this backdrop, Taiwanese, Chinese and American experts met at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) last Thursday and Friday for a conference entitled “Cross-Strait Developments in 2013: New Trends and Prospects.” The event included four panel discussions and a keynote speech by Kin Moy, deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Each panel featured four presenters and a commentator, tasked with synthesizing the panelists’ observations and offering concluding remarks.
Arthur Shuh-Fan Ding, a research fellow at National Chengchi University in Taipei, led off the first panel discussion “The Washington-Tapei-Beijing Triangle.” Focusing on Washington-Beijing relations, he predicted a continued mix of moderate cooperation and managed competition. China assumed a more coercive role in the region after the 2008 global financial crisis weakened the US economy. Absent a more complete economic rejuvenation, the US will be unable to regain the credibility necessary to curb Beijing’s assertiveness. Kwei-Bo Huang, a professor at National Chengchi University, emphasized increased participation in international organizations and agreements—such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement—as the key to Taiwan’s “survival.” US support will be vital in this effort.
George Washington University international affairs professor Robert Sutter used the Taiwanese debate over nuclear power as a case study to highlight the intensely partisan nature of its domestic politics. This hyper-politicization of issues has caused fatigue among the Taiwanese and concern among American leaders—the irony here was noted—that partisan rivalries will prevent Taiwan from pursuing a coherent approach to critical economic and security issues.
Peng Li, a University of Maryland Fulbright scholar visiting from Xiamen University in China, outlined Beijing’s gradualist approach to unification. Beijing aims to establish a constructive political environment that will permit pragmatic solutions to specific problems in the short term and pave the way for a formal agreement on Taiwan’s status in the future. He expressed concern that a return to power by Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) might derail this plan and urged the US to support Beijing’s efforts to develop a sustainable political dialogue with Taipei.
Commentator Cynthia Watson, a professor at the National Defense University, underlined the incongruity between Beijing’s hope for slow, consistent progress toward unification and the Taiwan government’s inherently unpredictable democratic process. She expressed doubt that even a full US economic recovery would result in a large injection of resources into American “rebalancing,” due to the current lack of domestic support for expanding foreign policy investment.
In his keynote speech, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kin Moy affirmed the US’s “enduring friendship” with Taiwan and sought to dispel any notions that the relationship has deteriorated. He cited close, ongoing U.S.-Taiwan cooperation on economic, security, and environmental issues. Moy expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, noting that the US had backed Taiwan’s membership in the WTO, as well as its attendance at the WHO’s 2009 World Health Assembly and the 2013 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) congress. He said that enlarging the Trans Pacific Partnership requires consensus among existing members. Taiwan will need to commit to further economic liberalization. Moy emphasized that American “rebalancing” entails increased cooperation with both the Beijing and Taipei. There is nothing inconsistent in strengthening ties with both governments.
To begin the second panel discussion, entitled “Opportunities and Challenges in Cross-Strait Relations,” Chinese Culture University professor Chien-Min Chao outlined President Xi Jinping’s “pragmatic” approach to relations with Taiwan. Xi is concentrating on consolidating and developing existing modes of economic and diplomatic cooperation. Taiwan’s guest status at the ICAO congress is evidence of his flexibility. Xi’s stance provides an opportunity for both trust-building and concrete progress on trade talks that should be embraced by Taiwan. The Mainland could help deescalate tensions by easing its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait.
Returning the discussion to Taiwan’s domestic politics, Taipei University professor Samuel Shiouh-Guang Wu said that the Mainland has adopted a more flexible attitude toward Taiwan in part because by demonstrating the economic benefits of closer cross-strait relations, Beijing hopes to short-circuit public support for the DPP. DPP ascendance in Taiwan’s 2014 local elections or 2016 presidential election would introduce new uncertainty into cross-strait relations to the detriment of Taiwan’s interests, because Beijing might become more assertive if faced with a resistant DPP leadership. It is therefore in Taiwan’s interest to maintain the status-quo through a “no surprises” approach to cross-strait diplomacy.
Stimson Center fellow Alan Romberg acknowledged that Taiwan’s tumultuous domestic politics will continue, but both he and Tsinghua University professor Shulong Chu predicted a continuation of Beijing’s tough, patient (“economic first, political later, easy first, difficult later”) approach to Taiwan. Like Peng Li, both forecast stable cross-strait relations focused on steadily developing Track II dialogue in preparation for future Track I talks. Romberg noted an outside chance for a peace accord before 2016 if Beijing explicitly decouples such an agreement from the issue of Taiwan’s political status.
Commentator Bernard Cole, a professor at National Defense University, closed by emphasizing the positive trends in cross-strait relations. The increasing number of direct flights across the Taiwan Strait and the growing number of Taiwanese citizens on the Mainland indicate the degree to which economic and cultural ties have been strengthened, presaging gradual progress toward an eventual peaceful agreement on Taiwan’s status.
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Peace picks, October 7-11
A wide array of interesting events this week (be aware of possible event cancellations due to the government shutdown):
1. A New Look at American Foreign Policy: The Third in a Series of Discussions
Monday October 7 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm
The Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NW
For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.
Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.
For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.
Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.
More About the Speakers
Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D.
Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
Randy E. Barnett
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center
Marion Smith
Visiting Fellow, B. Kenneth Simon Center for Principles and Politics, The Heritage Foundation
Hosted By
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Why Ken Pollack is wrong
Ken Pollack has written a highly readable but serious and in-depth book claiming that–contrary to US government policy, Congressional sentiment and popular preference–we can live with the “unthinkable”: an Iranian nuclear bomb. Containment, he claims, is not only possible but desirable when compared to war, which would have uncertain and unintended consequences.
He is wrong on two counts: these are not the only options and containment is the least desirable of them. Here’s why.
Ken looks at containment from the American perspective. He worries about whether the Iranian regime is rational and produces ample evidence for Karim Sadjadpour’s judgment that it is homicidal but not suicidal. Deterrence then can work, with only some small and tolerable probability that it might fail, as during the Cold War.
He is lacking two vital perspectives: Israeli and Iranian.
If Iran somehow gets nuclear weapons, Israel faces what it considers an existential threat. What will it do in response to any indication that Tehran is preparing a nuclear attack? Ken cites a Cold War example–the 1983 Able Archer incident–that brought the US and Soviet Union close to nuclear war when the Soviets misinterpreted an American exercise as preparation for a nuclear attack. But the US and Soviet Union had good communications and significant transit time for their intercontinental ballistic missiles. Launch on warning during the Cold War meant launch after the enemy’s launch but before the missiles struck their targets.
Israel, while it has a second strike capability aboard its submarines, cannot wait that long. A second strike after your country has been obliterated is little satisfaction and even less deterrent. Launch on warning for Israel will mean launch before Iran is able to launch. The targeting would have to be comprehensive, against any installation from which Iran might retaliate. With virtually zero communications between the two countries and a lot of mutual distrust, this makes a world in which Iran has nuclear weapons frighteningly close to Armageddon, for the region if not for the world. Iran faces the risk of assured destruction at Israel’s initiative, with nothing mutual about it.
This is not however as apocalyptic as it sounds. It gives Tehran, which has no second strike capability, a very good reason for stopping its nuclear program short of nuclear weapons and doing so in a way that is transparent, verifiable and irreversible. Iranian President Rouhani has said clearly but generically that
Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense doctrine…
Why not? I’d guess that this is because Iran will be less secure if it develops nuclear weapons, which could lead to an Israeli nuclear strike that would destroy not only the nuclear program but the entire country.
There is another reason for hope that diplomacy can stop Iran’s nuclear program short of making weapons. Rouhani knows that sanctions relief, which he needs urgently to fulfill his electoral promises of improving Iran’s economy, will require US Congressional action. The Congress will not lift sanctions unless it is certain that Iran cannot and will not develop nuclear weapons. If Rouhani is serious about getting sanctions lifted, he must also understand what this entails for transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.
Of course there is a possibility that the Iranians aren’t serious at all but are just conducting a charm offensive to buy time while they proceed apace to develop nuclear weapons and even use them. This possibility argues for a deadline for nuclear negotiations with Iran. The problem with a deadline is that it is a species of red line. We would have to specify what comes if the deadline isn’t met.
I would suggest adding to Administration policy a soft deadline: an expectation, publicly expressed, that we get a satisfactory agreement on Iran’s nuclear program within 2014. What happens after that is all too clear from voting and discussions in the US Congress. Restating it publicly only raises the ire and strength of anti-Rouhani forces in Iran. The end of 2014 is about when Israeli patience is likely to run out anyway, raising the specter of a less than 100% effective conventional military attack that causes the Iranians to recommit and accelerate their effort to develop nuclear weapons.
But the key point is this: if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the risk of a nuclear war in which it will suffer the worst consequences rises, not only because of Tehran’s decisions but because of Israel’s calculations. It would be foolish to doubt Israel’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear weapons state in order to ensure the Jewish state’s survival. The Israelis are surely no less committed to survival than the Americans were when they faced the Soviets and were prepared to use nuclear weapons first. It is still US policy to assure “no first use” only against non-nuclear states in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, nuclear war can happen not only because of a real threat from Tehran but also from a misunderstanding (genuine or willful) in Washington or Jerusalem (Tel Aviv for those who prefer).
Containment is not a stable outcome, as it was in a situation where destruction was mutually assured. For Tehran, it is perilous and to be avoided, preferably by diplomacy based on calculations of Iran’s real interests. Israel will be justifiably hard to satisfy with a diplomatic outcome, but it would be far better and less precarious than containment.
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