Tag: United States
Cautious optimism on Iran
There was a lot of buzz after President Obama and President Rouhani spoke on the phone Friday afternoon. Some were excited while others were cautiously optimistic. The Stimson Center and Heinrich Boll Foundation held a timely event Monday morning on “Reform Under Rouhani: Assessing Positive Change in Iran.” Geneive Abdo, fellow at the Stimson Center and moderator of the event, began by expressing her optimism regarding the phone conversation. She sees history in the making.
Ramin Asgard, former US diplomat, explained Rouhani’s desire to improve relations with foreign powers, particularly Washington, as an economic necessity for Iran. His main promises during the June campaign were to improve economic growth, enhance civil rights and improve Iran’s relationship with the international community. Iran’s economy has contracted by an estimated one to two percent in the past year as a result of sanctions. Tehran needs to garner support for an improvement in its relations with the international community in order to achieve a breakthrough on sanctions. Tehran would like to see all the sanctions lifted in a deal with the P5+1 to give up non-civilian use of nuclear capabilities. However, total removal of sanctions would be difficult to accomplish and unlikely to occur.
Asgard pointed to four factors that favor a deal with Iran: Read more
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Fatwa diplomacy
President Obama mentioned Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons in his speech last week at the United Nations General Assembly:
Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and President Rouhani has just recently reiterated that the Islamic Republic will never develop a nuclear weapon.
This naturally brought joy to Iranian hardliners and disdain from American hardliners. Mike Doran tweeted:
US intel uncovered a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Therefore, the fatwa is baloney.
What are the merits and demerits of this fatwa, which is a legal opinion or ruling by an Islamic scholar?
It seems clear that a written text of the original fatwa has never been published. The most authoritative early reference to it appears to be an Iranian statement at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005:
The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the fatwa that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.
Thus the fatwa has meaning for the Iranian government, but there is no reason for the American government to regard it as any better than a unilateral statement of Iran’s intentions, albeit at a high level. It is not an internationally binding commitment. Nor is it a commitment that can be verified by international inspection.
Someone in Iran was working on nuclear weapons when the effort was suspended in 2003. But the fatwa, whatever it says or doesn’t say, was issued after that, so Mike’s argument is illogical. The fatwa would be baloney only if it had been issued before the program was uncovered, not afterwards. All the blather about taqiyya, the Islamic doctrine of dissembling is really irrelevant.* Sure the Supreme Leader might be lying, and then again he might have made a serious commitment that he intends to keep. We really don’t know.
The Administration is not relying on the fatwa. What it is trying to do is use the fatwa as a bridge to a more solid and verifiable commitment. This is good negotiating technique, not gullibility. If my enemy is willing to say out loud what I would like him to say, I’d be a fool not to start with that and see if I can get it in writing with the kind of inspections that would give me confidence the commitment is being kept.
Of course those who are convinced the Iranians will never keep such a commitment no matter how tight the verification and don’t want the Administration even to start down this road, for fear the negotiation will provide time and cover for Iran to proceed with its nefarious intent. Some prefer a military solution. Others are prepared to live with containment, if negotiation fails.
Neither one meets my criterion for a satisfactory outcome: a more peaceful world than the one we live in now. I don’t want to live in a world where Iran is a nuclear power, or bombed back to the stone age. The former is a very dangerous world, because Israel would not only target a nuclear Iran but would launch on warning. With a very short transit time (10 minutes?) and no reliable communications between Tehran and Jerusalem, the odds of nuclear war would be higher than any of us would find comfortable. Bombing Iran back to the stone age is pretty much what you’d have to do to prevent them from reconstituting their nuclear program and redoubling their efforts after an initial military attack, even if it were successful.
The fatwa has no value in and of itself. It only has value if the Iranians will put it in writing and make a serious, irreversible and verifiable commitment. That’s what fatwa diplomacy should aim to do.
*I’ve decided an earlier version of this post with a reference to Kol Nidre was erroneous and disputable. So I’ve removed it. Credit to @JeffreyGoldberg for calling me out on this.
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What the phone call signifies
I hope you’ll excuse me for not getting too excited about President Obama’s call to President Rouhani yesterday. I find it hard to work up enthusiasm for Rouhani, who is clearly trying his best to preserve and prolong the theocratic regime in Iran, not reform it. But the phone call was a fitting climax to four days of Iranian charm offensive and significant in one important respect: it demonstrated that Washington is prepared to accept the Islamic Republic as the legitimate government of Iran and is not supporting regime change there, as Obama stated clearly in his United Nations General Assembly speech.
That is an important concession to the Iranians, who have good reason to believe that previous American governments have sought to unseat the ayatollahs in favor of something more closely resembling a democratic regime. But it is a necessary concession. There is no way to end Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions without treating its current government as legitimate and sovereign, even if diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors remain in the distance.
Obama and Rouhani agreed to accelerate the nuclear talks, which are slated to reconvene next month. Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif has wanted to “jump start” them, finishing in six months. This presumably means Tehran will put forward a big package in October without responding to the more modest step-by-step proposal that the P5+1 (that’s US, UK, France, China and Russia + German) have already tabled. The Iranian aim is relief from all sanctions while maintaining the “right” to enrichment and presumably reprocessing technology. The P5+1 want a verifiable and definitive end to any and all Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Those are in principle compatible aims, but the zone of possible agreement is narrow. There are serious sequencing problems: the Iranians will want sanctions relief early while the P5+1 will want it late.
So we are on a diplomatic path for the next six months to a year, one that now has a degree of presidential commitment on both sides that has been lacking. The problem is that neither president has complete control of his own side in the negotiation. While Rouhani claims to have all the authority he needs to strike a nuclear deal, the Supreme Leader could intervene at any moment to make agreement impossible. On the American side, Congress is the uncertain factor, especially as Israel wields a good deal of influence there. An agreement on the nuclear program may not require formal Congressional approval, but implementing it by lifting sanctions does. President Obama will need to present to Congress a truly air tight agreement that leaves Iran no wiggle room to develop nuclear weapons, even in secret.
Syria is the unmentioned factor in the US/Iranian rapprochement. Tehran has to be pleased that President Obama is focusing attention on destroying Syria’s chemical weapons capability and not on ending Bashar al Asad’s rule. The Americans are backing away from serious support for the Syrian opposition, which they see as ineffectual at best and compromised by jihadist fighters at worst. While Geneva 2 remains a hope, and might even convene in October, there is little sign of progress in convening a negotiation that the opposition says must begin with Bashar al Asad stepping down from power. Nothing about the situation on the ground suggests the regime is near its natural end. Fighting has broken out between the more moderate Syrian Free Army and the Islamic State of Iraq. Some fighters have abandoned the Syrian Opposition Coaliton (Etilaf).
So is Syria being sacrificed in order to get a nuclear deal with Iran? I am not privy to the Administration’s thinking on this tradeoff and they would never admit it in public. The circumstances may be fortuitous. Etilaf is in no position to offer assurances that extremists will not be able to take power if Bashar al Asad is deposed. Nor can the Coalition speak in Geneva for the bulk of the fighters waging war against Asad. So it looks very much as if the nuclear deal with Iran will take precedence while a political solution in Syria languishes. That is consistent with what President Obama said at the UN General Assembly. The phone call confirms this, too.
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Not the charm blitz
Rather than burdening you with more words about Iran President Rouhani’s four-day charm blitz, I prefer offering three minutes with Tehran’s men and women in the street:
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Speech diplomacy
Many will be disappointed that President Obama and Iran’s President Rouhani did not meet yesterday. Even their presence in the same room would have made headlines, never mind a handshake or a few words in the corner.
But they both gave speeches. What can we learn from what they said?
It is clear enough from Rouhani’s speech why he ducked any meeting with the President Obama. While not naming its target, he took aim at the United States: militarism, coercion, hegemony, Cold War mentality, universalization of Western values, “violent discourses, practices and actions,” arming of Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons (for use against Iran), supporting Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The speech lists particulars against what the Iranian regime used to call “the Great Satan.”
Failing to name it should not make us deaf to what Rouhani is saying. He is saying the United States is responsible for most of the bad things that happen in the world, from Palestine to Afghanistan, to Syria and many other places. He is worried that the Americans will seek to topple the Islamic Republic. Iran is America’s enemy and determined to reshape the region, perhaps even the world, to its own preferences. Read more
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Moscow can deliver Damascus
Edward P. Joseph, my colleague here at SAIS and in the Center for Transatlantic Relations, offers:
US policy towards Syria rests on the premise that Russia can deliver the Assad regime to surrendering its chemical stockpile and to hoped-for talks in Geneva for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While much has been said about Russia’s willingness to press Damascus, Moscow’s ability to bring its influence to bear has received less scrutiny.
While the subject is clouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe — based on the dynamics of patron-client relationships — that Moscow does, in fact, command substantial, even decisive influence in Damascus.
Consider America’s own relationship with a Middle East client: Egypt. As was abundantly clear during the military’s ouster of then-President Morsi, Washington danced an awkward line, refraining from labeling the military action a “coup” because this would trigger a mandatory cut in substantial US foreign assistance to Egypt. Instead, Washington expressed its concern over Cairo’s anti-democratic direction in gingerly fashion, by delaying the delivery of four F-16. This was a symbolic step, but hardly one that inflicted serious hardship on the military-led government. Egypt faces serious internal security issues, especially in the Sinai, none of which are amenable to attack by the latest fighter aircraft.
There was no mystery why Washington didn’t take a harder line. Had it cut foreign assistance, Cairo could plausibly have turned to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. The Saudis — animated by the departure of the despised Muslim Brotherhood — pledged to make up any cuts to Egypt by both the US and EU. Riyadh proved to be as good as its word, putting together a total aid package with other Gulf States topping $12 billion. In other words, the client, Egypt, held an (oil) barrel over the head of its American patron, thanks to the availability of an alternative, namely, Gulf states flush with cash.
Who can Damascus turn to if Moscow decides to amp up the pressure or ramp down support? Answer: no one, including Iran. Tehran is itself attempting to emerge from international isolation and internal weakness. Besides, it does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council. Iran can continue to supply cash, personnel, materiel and regional support (directly through Hezbollah and indirectly through Baghdad), but in no way, shape or form can Tehran substitute for the support that Russia can provide. Russia provided Syria this spring with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, designed to complicate potential Western military action such as a no-fly zone. Russia is the ‘sole source protector’ of Syria at the strategic level; Iran operates mostly at the regional level.
Cautious China has shown no willingness to overstep Moscow’s high-profile role on Syria, preferring to follow its lead in the Security Council. Beijing shares Moscow’s allergy to military intervention, particularly where democratic uprisings are involved. But Beijing does not share the array of compelling interests that make Syria a significant Russian client.
Therefore the regime in Damascus, which is locked in a fight for its life, must listen carefully to the directions of its Russian patron. Does that necessarily translate into absolute, instant remote control from Moscow? Of course not. Perhaps like President Karzai in Afghanistan, Assad understands that his patron’s interests are tethered to his or at least his regime’s survival. But unlike either Cairo or Kabul, Assad has in Moscow a patron far less encumbered than Washington. Vladimir Putin does not need to worry about congressional oversight or even public opinion in his dealings with a petty foreign client like Syria. Indeed, Putin has shown utter ruthlessness dealing with domestic opponents, so why would he suddenly find scruples in dealing with Assad?
Syria is a long-standing client of Russia’s. This means that Putin, who hails from the KGB, has penetrating insight into the dynamics within the regime and what they mean for Assad’s own internal vulnerabilities, facilitating the exercise of Russian influence. Moscow can avoid clumsy threats in favor of a more precise pressure points. If we believe that Moscow has, in certain instances, been demonstrably unable to get the Assad regime to do what it wants, we should ask if and how it pressured him to do so.
To believe that Moscow cannot, in the end, have its way in Damascus is to call into question the whole rationale of partnering with the Russians in the first place. If Russia cannot deliver the Syrians, then we are engaged in a colossal waste of time and effort. Empirical evidence tells us that this is not so. Assad himself in the span of 24 hours went from evading the question of chemical weapons with Charlie Rose to accepting (nominally, at least) international control of his stockpile after an apparent snap Russian decision.
While we must remain ever vigilant about Russian intentions, we should presume — remaining open to well-founded evidence to the contrary — that Russia does indeed hold sway in Damascus. When it comes to Syria, the general rule should be that what counts is Russia’s will, not its ability, to direct its Syrian clients.
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