Tag: United States
A good hearing, if the Administration were listening
The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised the alarm in a hearing yesterday about the situation in the Balkans. Member after member cited concerns. They worried about escalating ethnic tensions and instability, Russian malfeasance, Chinese inroads, failure of Serbia and Kosovo to implement agreements, failure to implement court decisions and secessionist moves in Bosnia and Herzegovina, endemic corruption, and flagging economies. They might also have cited substantial migrant outflows from the region.
There was a single witness: Gabe Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary. Despite the availability of many credible people who hold contrasting views, the Congress has unfortunately chosen in this and the previous recent Senate hearing on the Balkans to hear only from the Administration. Congressman Issa (R-CA) was at pains to lament this.
Say it fast and confidently
Gabe quickly cited EU accession as the US objective, without noting the diminished credibility of that prospect and unlikelihood that would happen any time in the foreseeable future. He averred that the “breakthrough” normalization (Ohrid) agreement reached in February and the annex added in March are critical. But he failed to note that Serbia refused to sign both and quickly violated them.
He insisted on the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM) to coordinate culture, education, and public services as the keystone. But he failed to explain why the US has not insisted on the quid pro quo also agreed in 2013. That was the extension of the Kosovo constitution to the Serb majority municipalities of the north. Belgrade has repeatedly blocked that in many different ways.
Gabe noted the supposed agreement of Kosovo and Serbia to recognize each other’s documents and national symbols. But he neglected to note that this is a problem principally in Serbia. He repeated the canard that Serbia would no longer lobby against Kosovo’s international integration. Serbian President Vucic has pledged not to fulfill that provision. Belgrade failed to observe it at the Council of Europe days after signing the agreement.
In Bosnia, Gabe cited Milorad Dodik’s anti-Dayton activities. But he was at a loss to explain how the US would get Europe to join in the sanctions against him. He cited excessive reliance in the region on Russian energy. However, he failed to note that Serbia is the prime culprit in that respect.
The questioning was good
Chair Kean (R-NJ) wanted to know whether the US will bring strong pressure to bear on President Vucic if Kosovo Prime Minister proceeds with the ASMM. Gabe said a quick and confident “absolutely” and went on to claim that the agreement requires Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This it clearly does not do. He added that Serbia has agreed to remove the protesters and participate in new elections for mayors in northern Kosovo.
I suppose that might be true in diplomatic channels, but where is the evidence in public? Would you believe it just a few months after elections held because Belgrade agreed the Serbs would participate but that they then boycotted? Gabe went on to say that those demonstrators who attacked journalists Kosovo police and NATO should be punished. Where is the public US demand that Belgrade, which ordered the rioting, turn them over to the Kosovo justice system?
Ranking Member Keating (D-MA) focused on China. Gabe rightly emphasized Beijing’s political conditions but placed his hope entirely in the EU to institute (some day) contracting procedures that would counter Beijing and keep projects open to US competitors.
Sanctions
Representative Wagner (R-MO) underlined her bipartisan “Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreements Through Sanctions” Act. Gabe pledged to support it and to prevent financing from reaching those who are trying to dismantle Bosnia (in addition to support for EUFOR and the HiRep). That sounded serious. Maybe State has finally realized that staying silent on Dodik is not a winning strategy. The Congressman made it clear she wanted Hungary bent into allowing EU sanctions on Dodik.
Congressman Titus (D-NV) focused on Russian disinformation and the free press. Gabe skipped the opportunity to focus criticism on Serbia, which has seen a long decline in press freedom and a dramatic rise of Russian disinformation.
Congressman Huizenga (R-MI) asked about Serbia buying Chinese and Russian arms. Gabe claimed Serbia had curtailed its purchases from Russia “significantly” in response to the threat of sanctions but has increased procurement from China (which is not covered by the “CAATSA” sanctions in question). Huizenga also asked about the five EU nonrecognizers. Gabe took the opportunity to claim vaguely that action on the ASMM would be helpful.
Congressman Self (R-TX) focused on President Vucic’s incitement of the election boycott and import of heavy weapons from Russia. Why don’t we have sanctions on Serbia now? Gabe squirmed out by claiming that he didn’t control CAATSA sanctions and that other sanctions had been used in the Balkans, neglecting to mention they have not been used against Serbia. Self made it clear he regards Serbia as a Russian proxy in the Balkans.
Congressman Moran (R-TX) asked about Montenegro. Sadly, Gabe was unaware of the newly contracted coastal road there that the Chinese will build and mistakenly thought it was the already built north/south highway. He also took the opportunity to emphasize that Montenegro’s new government will make Podgorica a fast-achieving candidate for EU membership and that its new president as “pro-American.” I don’t yet see any guarantee of those two propositions.
A well-briefed committee, but the Administration isn’t listening
Well-briefed, the members of Congress asked good questions. The Administration responses were less convincing. They consistently avoided any serious criticism of Serbia and continued to hold Kosovo principally, if not exclusively, responsible for the current train wreck. There was no sign that Gabe was listening to the repeated indications that a tougher approach with Serbia is needed.
Two notable omissions. Gabe did not mention Open Balkans, a Belgrade initiative that appears to have died a merited death. But bad ideas never die in the Balkans. They return like zombies to haunt the region. Just wait a few years, or maybe months. It will be back, along with partition.
Unless I missed it, Gabe also failed to mention the recently sanctioned Serbian Director of the Security Intelligence Agency. No one asked what we are going to do about Aleksandar Vulin. That was an unfortunate omission.
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The Americans are satisfied with less rather than more
The United States sanctioned Serbia’s intelligence chief last week for arms and drug dealing as well as facilitating malign Russian influence in the Balkans. I’ve applauded that move.
Vulin is a symptom
But stopping there will be less than half a loaf. Aleksandar Vulin is symptomatic of far deeper maladies. There is no way he could have engaged in drug trafficking without at least the tacit nulla osta of President Vucic. Any arms dealing he has done would have required something more than that, including the cooperation of his intel people. It would be hard to miss his loud advocacy of Russian interests in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Vulin is also Serbia’s prime exponent of “the Serbian world,” the idea that Serb populations in neighboring countries should at least all respect Belgrade’s direction. He would prefer to see them all incorporated into the Serbian state. This is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia Slobodan Milosevic sought in the Balkan wars in the 1990s.
President Vucic is his top cover
Vulin has served in government with Vucic for the past 11 years. He started with the Kosovo portfolio in 2012 and moved on to Social Affairs, Defense, and Interior before becoming the intel director last year. Though they belong to different political parties that are coalition partners, Vulin and Serbian President Vucic are like peas in a pod: politically far more similar than different. Vulin made his way during the Milosevic regime affiliated with Mira Markovic, Milosevic’s wife. Vucic was tied more to Milosevic himself.
Now Vucic is Vulin’s protector. In reaction to the sanctions, Vucic has asserted the US is really concerned with the Russia connection, not with the arms and drug dealing. This is convenient for him, as it makes the issue not one of legality and morality but rather politics. In Serbia, both the government and public opinion regard wanting good relations with Moscow as a virtue, not a vice.
No action yet
There is no sign yet of what, if anything, Vucic is going to do about Vulin. He has announced an investigation, but it would be surprising if one were really needed. Vucic has tight control of his government and no doubt has known whatever business Vulin is involved in. Vucic has publicly backed Vulin’s advocacy of the “Serbian world,” though he is careful not to mention the idea often.
The American Ambassador has been mincing his words about the sanctions, emphasizing that they target Vulin, not on Serbia’s institutions:
That presumably means Washington intends to try to preserve its intelligence liaison relationship with Belgrade. The US may want to see Vulin fired, but it won’t be seeking any more far-reaching reform.
Now what?
That is too bad. “Serbian institutions” unquestionably have known what Vulin is up and have failed to act against him. They are still failing, though of course it is only days since the sanctions announcement. Washington should be pressing for Vucic to fire not only Vulin but all his cronies. The US should also be seeking a much wider reform that frees Serbian media from state dominance, ensures independence of the judiciary, makes space for a serious opposition, and detaches the country from its strong intelligence, political, and military connections to Moscow. How about starting with alignment to the EU Ukraine-related sanctions?
There are lots of other opportunities in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro for Serbia to signal serious changes in Serbian policy that would bring Belgrade closer to the West. But the Americans seem satisfied these days with less rather than more.
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NATO reborn, but can it win?
NATO this week did itself proud. It renewed its commitment to Ukraine, painted both the Russian and Chinese threats in technicolor, and made commitments to defense expenditure and modernization that could make a real difference, if implemented in coming years. Though the specter of a Donald Trump re-election looms, for now the Alliance is in the safe and steady hands of Joe Biden.
Failure should not be an option
Even more than before the Summit, the fate of the Alliance now depends on the outcome of the Ukraine war. Failure should not be an option. If Kiev’s offensive continues to stall, Moscow will be able to claim a win. The territory Russia has seized is only 15% or so of the country it once sought to subjugate entirely. But that territory would give Moscow the capability of threatening Ukraine’s remaining seacoast and the port of Odesa. Just retaining Crimea, which it seized in 2014, would give Moscow a handsome reward for aggression.
NATO needs to view the remainder of the Ukraine war as its own. Moscow already sees it that way. For good reasons, the Alliance has chosen to fight with both hands tied behind its back. It equips and trains the Ukrainians but does not engage its own military forces. So far Russia has reciprocated that decision by not attacking a NATO member. But President Putin tells his people every day that he is fighting all of NATO.
Would that it were true. European and North American supplies have too often arrived long after the need has become evident. What sense did it make to delay the arrival of battle tanks, longer-range missiles, air defenses, and F-16s? Russia has shown no restraint in attacking Ukrainians, including daily bombardments against civilian targets. It is more than time to give the Ukrainians whatever they need to prevent that from continuing.
The war’s outcome will be decided in Moscow
That said, the war’s outcome will be decided in Moscow. President Putin will not give in. He would not survive if he did. But the Wagner rebellion showed his weakness. He will now have to buy off or repress discontent, which will grow as state resources wither and more bad news from the front comes home. There is no predicting when the regime will blow, but the fuse has been lit.
It would be preferable if the Russian people got to decide when and how. But that is unlikely. They did nothing during the Wagner rebellion. The other possibilities are the cronies, the secret services, and the military. There is little sign of their discontent, but one general has disappeared and another has been fired for complaining about lack of support for his troops in Ukraine. Prigozhin’s whereabouts aren’t known, though the Kremlin claims he met with Putin after abandoning the rebellion.
Go figure.
Patience is a virtue
While supplying Ukraine with training, materiel, and intelligence, the United States will need to exercise patience. That is difficult, especially with an election year approaching. Some Republicans have inclined toward limiting assistance to Ukraine, as do some on the left. Donald Trump has hinted that as president he would have let Putin have what he wanted. That alone should be good reason to vote against him in 2024. A reborn NATO won’t be worth much if it can’t persist into the next presidency.
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Big fish caught in Serbia, lots of questions unanswered
Yes: the US Treasury has sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency, former Defense and Interior Minister, and bestie to President Vucic. His misdeeds, according to the US, include drug and arms trafficking as well as facilitating malign Russian influence. This is a big step. I heartily welcome it.
Questions
Then come the questions. Why wasn’t this done earlier? The world has known about Vulin’s misdeeds for years. The US did not just discover that Vulin has been trafficking in drugs and arms. Maybe he trafficked in the wrong directions recently? His subservience to Russian objectives is also well known. Did he send some weapons to Russia, to compensate for the much-ballyhooed Serbian munitions going to Ukraine?
Vulin is, among other things, the leading advocate for “the Serbian world.” That is a concept hard to distinguish from Greater Serbia, Milosevic’s aim in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. It is also an analogue to “the Russian world,” the banner under which Putin is trying to carve out parts of Ukraine. President Vucic has avoided associating himself too closely with the concept, though he has pursued it in practice in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
That raises the question of whether Vucic knew about the sanctions move before they happened. Did he object? Did he welcome them as a way of dissociating himself from someone who had become a liability in dealing with the Americans and the Europeans? And how will he react now that it is done? Will he fire Vulin or keep him on? Or will he shifted elsewhere to keep him out of the way until the time comes for resurrection?
No answers yet
I can’t answer any of these questions yet. The Americans aren’t likely to comment on the timing of this move. But an enterprising journalist might get them to link a bit more derogatory information. Vucic is unlikely to fire Vulin outright, unless he has reason to believe that Vulin, like Yevgeny Prigozhin, was planning to contest his hold on power. If Vulin is kept on, it will be a clear sign of where Vucic stands: not with the West. If he is shunted off someplace, the signal may remain ambiguous.
We’ll need to wait and see how things shake out.
What if Vucic turns westward?
This moment is an opportunity for Vucic. If he really wants to turn westward and embrace Serbia’s European prospect, he could use the occasion of US sanctions on Vulin to good effect. That would mean not only firing him but expelling the extensive Russian intelligence service presence in Serbia, aligning Serbia with EU sanctions on Russia, closing Moscow’s supposedly humaniarian base near Nis, ending support for Serbia’s agents inside Kosovo and Montenegro, and disowning Milorad Dodik’s efforts to separate Republika Srpska from the authority of Sarajevo’s institutions.
Vucic could also mend democracy in Serbia. That would entail freeing the media from government domination, respecting the independence of the judiciary, restraining the police, favoring gun control, and encouraging freedom of expression and association. Not to mention moving quickly to implement the acquis communautaire requirements for EU admission.
First to applaud
I’ll be the first to applaud if anything like that happens. But it won’t. Whatever happened with Vulin, Serbia’s broader turn westward still seems far off.
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Stevenson’s army, July 11
– NYT sees Biden playing the long game to restore balance in US-China relations
– WaPo tells how Biden at al. got Erdogan to agree to admit Sweden to NATO
– US today said Turkey would get F16s [It’s curious that the Biden people aren’t — yet — claiming credit which they probably deserve.]
– SAIS Prof Mary Sarotte says German model won’t work for Ukraine in NATO
– Ed Luttwak also has an analysis of the Ukraine war.
– House Rules Committee is deciding which of 1400 amendments will be allowed for House NDAA debate. DOD weighs in with SAP [statement of administration policy] on items already in the bill.
– I was struck by Peter Beinart’s discussion of Israel’s long term options, and especially by Finance Minister Smotrich’s 2017 master plan as well as his recent comments.
– I was dismayed by the Gallup poll showing a further deep drop in US confidence in higher education.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 10
– NATO summit in Vilnius. Biden says Ukraine isn’t ready for membership.
– Jake Sullivan explains more.
– Max Boot says his heart is for admission but his head says no.
-Congress is back in town with only 12 days to get things done before August recess.
-Kremlin says Putin met with Prigozhin after mutiny attempt.
-Guardian says Sudan is on brink of civil war.
– Gzero saays South Korea is moving away from China, toward US
– Trump critic says his officials worried about nuclear war.
– Gordon Adams says Afghan withdrawal report shows State’s weaknesses.
– Former CAPE official responds to critics.
Axios says Biden has bad temper, but only in private.
My story: When I joined his Senate staff, Ted Kaufman told me, “Joe has a temper.” Having just spent 6 years working for John Culver, who was called “Big Vesuvius” for his outbursts in the HFAC, I said I could handle that. “But he really gets mad at times,” Ted replied. I said, “I know the difference between kilotons and megatons. I can handle Biden.” [And I did.]
Charlie added later:
I’ve long told my classes, “If you know how the system works, you’ll know how to work the system.” And the way Washington really works is through connections and conversations and perseverance.
The New Yorker has an excellent example this week, an article by historian Kai Bird about the effort to nullify a denial of a security clearance for the leader of the Manhattan Project that built the atom bomb, Robert Oppenheimer.
Bird and Martin Sherwin, who had co-authored a book about Oppenheimer, tried to get a DC law firm to take up the case, only to be blocked by a partner whose father had chaired the panel that punished Oppenheimer. Later they used Hill connections from long ago to try to get the Obama Administration to reconsider the matter. A legendarily effective Senate staffer, Tim Rieser, got his boss and other Senators to sign a letter to the Secretary of Energy, who has jurisdiction over the weapons labs and thus their security procedures. Unsuccessful at that time, they renewed their effort in the Biden administration, got additional letters from former officials, and finally favorable action by Secretary Granholm.
People mattered, both for and against Oppenheimer’s case. Organizations mattered: DOE officials were reluctant to revisit the issue or make legal rulings. The process mattered: connecting the advocates with people empowered to act. What a neat story, especially with a happy ending. —
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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