Tag: United States
What’s the point?
The diplomatic action yesterday and today on Syria is focused on getting the Asad regime to allow the UN inspection team, already in Damascus, to visit the nearby site of Tuesday’s horrific early morning massacre to ascertain whether chemical weapons were used. Why so much effort when the regime is likely to deny access or allow it only after it has been able to clean up the site?
Let’s assume for the moment chemical weapons were in fact used, since the Syrian government would have allowed an immediate inspection had they not been.
It will seem to many that we are grasping at straws, that is insubstantial steps that really don’t have any potential for altering a situation that is going from really bad to much worse. But that’s not how I see it. Establishing some common ground between the United States and Russia is vital to ending the war in Syria. If they manage to agree that chemical weapons were used–either because the regime denies the inspectors access or because the inspectors find evidence to that effect–that would help push ahead the search for a diplomatic resolution.
If allowed to visit the site, might the inspectors actually find something? Yes, is the short answer. Cleanup is difficult and the means of chemical detection are highly sensitive. Autopsies might also produce relevant results. If anything even approaching one thousand people were killed, there will be lots of bodies available and a lot of eye witnesses to their deaths.
Even if the inspectors find evidence, how can we be certain that the regime, not the rebels, were responsible? First, there is eye-witness testimony that the rockets came from regime-controlled areas. Second, the rebels are hardly in a position to load and launch rockets with chemical weapons payloads, especially in the immediate environs of Damascus. Third, we can hope that communications intercepts will demonstrate who was responsible. The National Security Agency really does have an important role to play in cases like this one.
Most likely, the regime will stall and delay inspection of the site of the attack and the bodies until evidence has decayed beyond detection. This represents the diplomatic equivalent of pleading nolo contendere, which would be reason enough for the international community to act. The Americans have made no secret of preparations for military action. But they will prefer a diplomatic course in cooperation with Moscow, so long as it includes deposing Bashar al Asad, since his presence in power is inconsistent with ending the violence.
President Obama, who yesterday was worrying about the cost to Americans of going to college, won’t welcome interruption of his focus on domestic issues. But Syria needs decisions that only he can make. Will the United States start down what General Dempsey sees as the slippery slope of more engagement by acting militarily to punish Bashar al Asad for crossing Obama’s red line? Will it act even without UN Security Council authorization? Or will Washington succeed in convincing Moscow to cooperate in a serious diplomatic effort to end Bashar al Asad’s rule?
It is difficult to predict the decisions of a single person, whether he be Barack Obama or Bashar al Asad. Obama’s reluctance to do anything militar is palpable. Bashar al Asad’s inclination to do everything in his power to kill his enemies is likewise palpable.
The priority American interest is in ending the war in Syria as soon as possible, to diminish the likelihood of its infecting the region and further empowering extremists both inside Syria and in the neighborhood. Military action will need to be forceful if it is to compel Bashar to give up. Diplomatic action will need to be much quicker than its pace so far if it is to produce the needed result. The combination might be better than either alone.
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Leverage without a fulcrum
The International Peace Institute published this piece today on its Global Observatory under the title “With Democracy, Security at Stake in Egypt, How Should the West Respond?”:
Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the confrontation in Egypt have so far failed. The refusal of coup leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, now the defense minister, to go along with diplomatic de-escalation, and the excessive force used by security agencies signal that they do not aim at repressing only the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army is trying to frighten the general population and restore autocratic rule to an Egypt that has tasted freedom and expressed itself repeatedly at the ballot box since 2011.
The US and Europe want to get Egypt back on a more orderly democratic path. This entails restraining the Egyptian security forces, maintaining relative openness, and moving towards an inclusive polity with Islamist, and, if possible, Muslim Brotherhood, participation. It also means restoring a modicum of order and stability so that ordinary Egyptians can go about their business without fear of violence or intimidation.
The security forces are continuing their violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is pledging to continue its protests against the July 3 military takeover. Some Islamists are resisting with arms. About 1,000 people have been killed. What can the United States and the international community do to mitigate the situation?
Analysis
The civilian government the Egyptian army installed after the coup has pledged an amended constitution by the end of the year, to be approved in a referendum and elections early next year. This is a fast timeline. What can the international community do to try to ensure it is met?
The United States has already postponed delivery of F16s to Egypt and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for the fall to protest General Sisi’s crackdown. Inevitably the question of America’s $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt will now arise in Washington. It would make sense to refocus the civilian assistance of about $250 million tightly on democratic objectives. Those most concerned with getting Egypt back on a democratic path are recommending suspension of the military portion ($1.2 billion).
This will be opposed by those more concerned with security issues, including maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. A proposal in the US Senate to redirect all Egyptian aid to domestic American priorities was defeated last month by a wide margin (86-13), but that was before the worst of the crackdown. The margin would likely be much closer next month.
Even if the US Congress or the Administration acts to suspend military aid to Egypt, the financial impact will not be immediate. This year’s tranche has already been transferred. It will be the better part of another year before money can be blocked. More weapons scheduled for delivery can be delayed, but American industry will spend the year lobbying hard against a funding cut-off, as much of the money is actually spent on US contractors who supply the Egyptian military with materiel and services.
Europe provides much more assistance to Egypt than the United States. Its 5 billion euro (more than $6 billion) mainly economic package is now under review. This was intended to support the transition to democracy, which is now in doubt. Europeans concerned with their own economic problems may well see suspension of aid to Egypt as an opportunity.
The international financial institutions are another important part of the picture. Egypt has been negotiating for many months a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The US and Europe can block or delay that loan.
But both Europe and the United States need to consider the broader international context in deciding what to do about bilateral and IMF assistance. They are not the only players on the world stage. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have already pledged $12 billion, dwarfing both the American and European assistance packages. Russia will likely try to take advantage of any opening and provide military aid if the Americans suspend theirs.
Egypt clearly has alternatives to Western assistance, even if the Gulf states are notoriously slow and unreliable, and the Russians significantly less attractive to a military that has been getting advanced American weapons. If they want to see a democratic outcome in Egypt, the Americans and Europeans will need to convince the Gulf states—no paragons of democracy—to back the timeline for a return to democratic governance.
Widening the aperture farther, the Arab and Muslim worlds are watching what the international community does about Egypt. Will it insist on a return to a democratic path and an inclusive polity that allows Islamist participation on the timeline that Egypt itself has defined? Or will it settle for delay or a security solution that allows the army to remain the arbiter of Egypt’s fate? A lot depends on the skillful use of diplomatic and assistance leverage in a context where there are many players with diverse and even conflicting objectives.
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Mubarak’s last laugh
My friends at the New York Times are repeating their call to cut off military aid to Egypt in response to yesterday’s “madness” (and proposing cancellation of military exercises as well). Until now I’ve opposed cutting off aid, but the time has come. Washington should suspend both military exercises and aid, while sustaining civilian assistance, pending return to civilian rule. Doing anything less will signal approval of a murderous and unjustified attack by the Egyptian security forces as well as the military’s continuing hold on power.
I hasten to add that it won’t do much good. As Eric Trager has noted (unfortunately behind the Wall Street Journal paywall, so don’t expect a link), the Egyptian army regarded the Muslim Brotherhood challenge to the military coup as an existential one. Our $1.3 billion just does not outweigh an existential challenge. General Sissi has surely calculated that he would lose this money if he cracked down. He went ahead anyway. No one should expect him to have any regrets. He is far more likely to denounce the US for hypocrisy for not supporting his war on terror and to look for additional support from the Saudis, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, Gulf states that have already ponied up pledges of well over $10 billion. Read more
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Bad but not hopeless
News from the Arab uprisings this morning is particularly grim:
- In Egypt, the police and army are attacking pro-Morsi demonstrators, causing what appear to be well over 100 deaths;
- In an unconfirmed report, Italian Catholic priest and opposition enthusiast Paolo Dall’Oglio is said to have been killed by opposition Islamists in Syria;
- The American mission in Yemen remains closed as the US continues its heightened drone war against militants.
Add to these items the Islamist government in Tunisia finding itself unable to protect non-Islamist politicians from assassination and Libya’s continuing difficulty in gaining control over revolutionary militias and you’ve got a pretty ugly picture.
I don’t want to minimize any of this. It is all real and problematic. But it is not catastrophic. Revolutions have their bad moments (and days, months and years). Some of them end badly. There is no guarantee that won’t be the case in the Middle East, with some or all of the uprisings.
Egypt is in the most peril. It has not found a steady course but lurches between extremes: either military-backed secularists or Muslim Brotherhood/Salafist dominance. Co-habitation of the two has proven unworkable. It is hard to picture how today’s crackdown can put things right. The Islamists will find it harder to compromise. Secularists and minorities will fear even more a return of the Brotherhood to power. Read more
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Mapping Syrian civil society
My two Middle East Institute interns, Ala’ Alrababa’h and Idon Natanzon, have spent time this summer talking to civil society organizations both inside Syria and in the diaspora, especially in the US but also in Canada and Europe. The objective was to map Syrian civil society by understanding as best we could the objectives, views, constituencies, activities, shortcomings and needs of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Together they collected data on 65 organizations, which is far from the total number out there but enough to sketch a preliminary snapshot of a civil society struggling to meet urgent needs with less than adequate means and insufficient collaboration.
We won’t be publishing the data collected, as that would make life easier for those who see many of these organizations as threatening. But here is what Ala’ (with the kind assistance of Somar Abdullah of the Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria) and Idon found in broad strokes:
Inside Syria
Civil society organizations and civilian opposition in Syria are largely disorganized, overlapping, and do little coordination or even networking with similar groups. In addition to the difficulties in communicating inside Syria today, this is due to inexperience. Because of the emergency law, little formal civil society activity existed in Syria until the late 1990s, when restrictions were relaxed.
Two prominent organizations that existed prior to the revolution were the regime-sponsored Syria Trust for Development and the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies. Asma al-Asad, President Asad’s wife, started the Syria Trust in 2001. The organization’s activities included Firdos, which focused on economic development in rural areas, but the project came to a halt in 2011. The Trust now organizes small-scale service work in regime-controlled areas. The Damascus Center started in 2005 and has since published extensively on human rights inside Syria.
Since the 2011 uprising, hundreds of organizations have sprung up around Syria. Many are limited in their activities to the Internet, but others are engaged actively with their communities. They conduct relief work, political opposition, and research simultaneously, sometimes to the detriment of efficiency and objectivity.
The NGOs fall into five, not always mutually exclusive, categories: Islamist organizations, minority organizations, regime-related organizations, youth organizations, and other, unaffiliated organizations.
Most of the many Islamist organizations are unnamed and use mosques to organize relief work. In addition, two main civilian Islamist groups exist in the rebel-controlled north. Neither is moderate. The Islamic Liberation Party focuses on missionary work (Da’wa) and support for militias. The Muslim Youth Committee works mainly on providing services.
Generally speaking, organizations that deal with minority affairs are political. They represent minority interests and organize protests. Some also conduct relief work for members of their group. Others, like the Assyrian Union Party, have affiliated militias.
The Popular Front for Change and Liberation is one of the most prominent groups with ties to the regime. While the Front claims to be part of the opposition, it took part in the 2012 elections, boycotted by most of the opposition, and has joined the Syrian government established after the elections.
Youth organizations inside Syria, while small, are very promising. The Alawite Bees of the Coast uses “freedom money” to encourage Alawites to join the opposition, and tries to change the misconception that all Alawites are behind the regime. The Colors Initiative and Qur’an for revolution are two other creative campaigns created by the Syrian Non-violence Movement.
Finally, unaffiliated organizations do not fit any of the previous categories. Some are mainly political, like Building the Syrian State, while others focus on humanitarian work. Bihar Relief Organization, which works on humanitarian relief and food distribution in the north, uses an efficient and transparent system system of distribution. Other relief organizations could benefit from Bihar’s experience.
The diaspora
Since the ongoing crisis in Syria erupted in 2011, dozens of diaspora advocacy and relief organizations have been organized to help meet the overwhelming humanitarian needs of Syrians living inside the country, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the millions of refugees that this conflict has created. Prior to 2011, only a handful of Syria-focused international NGOs existed, most of whom focused solely on networking and connecting Syrian expatriates.
Three years into the crisis, the international landscape for Syrian civil society is both diverse and complicated. While the Syrian-American community is small, estimated at roughly 150,000 people, relief efforts have been organized throughout the US as well as in Canada and parts of Europe. Many of the more active groups maintain non-political and non-religious affiliations in order to provide egalitarian aid to the most at-risk communities. However, Syrian-Americans are increasingly unified in their desire to see this conflict come to an end.
Much of the work being done in support of the Syrian people is conducted without significant US government funding. The Syrian American community has shouldered the majority of financial support, while the broader American public remains distant from this cause. If these organizations intend to maintain their relief work, they must do a better job at expanding their donor bases and increasing the willingness to help among ordinary Americans.
The Syrian American organizations face common challenges, many of which they highlight themselves. These include a lack of access inside of Syria, not enough focus on long-term development, a general lack of resources, an inability to properly document human rights violations, and extreme donor fatigue. Because they operate in the same space, many groups compete for the same resources and draw from the same pool of activists. While they cooperate on humanitarian issues, many conduct identical programs and struggle to make use of best practices. Additionally, the focus on the extreme short-term need limits the organizations’ abilities to strategize about longer-term projects and planning.
The Syrian American community is becoming increasingly coordinated. Over the past year policy groups have formed the Coalition for a Democratic Syria, which coordinates government and public relations. Separately, the American Relief Coalition for Syria has brought together over a dozen of the leading humanitarian groups. Combined these new structures signal a turning point in the international landscape of Syrian civil society. There is great potential for coordination, collaboration, and expansion. But we may be reaching a point of such extreme donor fatigue that aid groups will fail to meet the ever-increasing humanitarian needs in Syria and the affected region.
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Washington’s fault
Even for someone who served abroad as an American diplomat, the Egyptian penchant for conspiracy theories about Washington’s supposed role is astonishing. So too is the crudeness of Egyptian anti-Americanism. While I was treated to a good deal of poor taste and baseless speculation about American machinations while serving as an American diplomat in Italy and Brazil, the admixture of hope for good relations with the United States was significantly greater there. Egyptians seem genuinely to dislike the US and attribute many of their ills to it.
It is difficult to understand how people as clever as the Egyptians have failed to break the code of American behavior: Washington understands that it has relatively little influence over what happens in Egypt and is prepared to accept whoever comes to power with a modicum of legitimacy and promises to steer the country towards something like a democratic outcome with as little violence as possible. That’s what happened when Mubarak fell, it is what happened when Morsi took over, and it is what happened when the demonstrations and General Sissi pushed him out.
Washington is following the Egyptian lead. If American behavior seems erratic and incomprehensible to Egyptians, that is largely because the revolutionary course the Egyptians have chosen is so unpredictable. The result is that all sides in Egypt are convinced the Americans are arrayed against them. Neither secularists nor Islamists in Egypt seem inclined to look in the mirror to see the origins of what ails their country. Both prefer to blame it all on Washington, which has been less than adroit in countering the vituperation.
This is not to say there is no basis whatsoever in the conspiracy theories. Ambassador Patterson likely did try to get General Sissi to negotiate some sort of deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Deputy Secretary of State Burns did not spend several days in Cairo recently lounging around the embassy–he surely pushed for Sissi to clarify the future roadmap for preparing a constitution and holding new elections. The Americans will be concerned to see things in Egypt move towards relatively democratic stability, with the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence restored (especially in Sinai). They may make mistakes of judgment about how that would best be accomplished, but to imagine that they want Morsi back in power, or Sissi to continue in power without elections, is just plain wrong.
I don’t begrudge Egypt its enthusiasm for its latest military rock star. General Sissi has clearly tapped some deep vein of political gold in the Egyptian body politic. But we should all recognize this cult of personality for what it is: a budding autocrat whose similarity to Gamal Abdel Nasser should raise eyebrows not only in Washington. My dean Vali Nasr predicts that the Americans will soon be back to a policy of supporting Middle Eastern autocrats against more and less radical Islamists.
I hope not. The Arab uprisings are a tremendous opportunity to encourage greater freedom in a part of the world that has seen little of it. Things are now going sour in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, not to mention poor Syria. Each circumstance is distinct, but in all of them the genie will be difficult to put back in the bottle. What is needed from the United States is consistent backing for democratic processes, which require relatively stable and orderly environments. The only thing we should want to be blamed for is support to those who seek human dignity and open societies.
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