Tag: United States
Egypt, the US and Israel
These are the (slightly amended) talking points I used today in a presentation about Egypt to a pro-Israel American group:
1. I’ll start with the bottom line: I am not optimistic about Egypt’s revolution finding its way to stability or democracy, objectives I would certainly like it to reach.
2. Egypt is a big, complicated, diverse and poor country that simply has not found a consensus on the rules of the road.
3. My colleague Marc Lynch calls this Calvinball, which is a game never played the same way twice in the comic strip Calvin and Hobbes. The rules are constantly changing.
4. I think of it a bit like Cairo traffic: everyone aggressively doing his own thing, to the detriment of the collective outcome.
5. The big divide is now between the coup—led by the army, the justice system and secularists with support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE—and the Qatari supported Muslim Brotherhood, with the Nour party Salafists somewhere in the middle.
6. If this divide is not bridged, I still anticipate the new revolution will proceed with revising the constitution and holding elections, at a pace forced in part by international pressure.
7. But that won’t fix much unless the Brotherhood rejoins the political game and agrees to play by democratic rules, which it has refused to do so far. Legitimacy depends on participation.
8. If the Brotherhood does rejoin, it may well capture a big part of electorate, which in six months or a year won’t be any happier with the economy and social conditions than it was when Morsi was in power.
9. So Egypt is damned if Brotherhood participates, and it is damned if the Brotherhood doesn’t participate.
10. I’d much prefer to see the Brotherhood inside the tent peeing out rather than outside the tent peeing in, but I can’t pretend to predict which way it will go, as most predictions prove incorrect.
11. What does this all mean for the United States and Israel?
12. Egypt is important to the United States, because it is the center of gravity of the Arab world.
13. If the revolution moves definitively in a democratic direction, that will show the way for Libya, Tunisia, Yemen and eventually Syria.
14. If it fails to move in a democratic direction, the cause in those countries will not be lost, but the odds of success will decline.
15. For Israel, the question is less about democracy and more about security. Morsi was not threatening the treaty, but his slipshod regime was nevertheless bad for security, especially in the Sinai.
16. We’ll have to see whether the present regime will do any better. The Egyptian military seems already to be destroying the tunnels into Gaza, something the judiciary ordered some time ago.
17. I assume this is welcome in Israel. The emergence in Egypt of anti-Palestinian sentiment is likely welcome there as well, though I hasten to add that anti-Israeli sentiment is also strong.
18. In any event, I see nothing to be gained at the moment by ending or suspending US aid to Egypt, which if the pledges are fulfilled will have ample cash from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
19. Influence flows in the same direction as money. You may have a one-time impact from shutting off the money flow, but then influence will rapidly decline. Relationships will be seriously damaged.
20. Better in my view to use the leverage the assistance provides to push for what the United States wants: an inclusive democratic outcome. Assistance should be conditional.
21. Will inclusive democracy in Egypt be good for Israel? That depends on which Israel you support.
22. It is clear that any truly democratic regime in Egypt, and in other Arab countries, will be more sympathetic to the Palestinians than the autocracies, which talked a good line but did little.
23. At the same time, the Arab street seems for the moment more interested in personal safety, jobs and bread than the plight of the Palestinians, so resources will flow to those higher priorities.
24. That said, the Egyptian revolution is taking a much more nationalist turn. I imagine this nationalism will include more belligerence against Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
25. I do not anticipate it will include renunciation of the Egypt/Israel peace treaty, mainly because the Egyptian military does not want the burden of the resulting security requirements.
26. For Israel the greater threat comes from instability in Egypt. If the Egyptian state continues to weaken, it may have real difficulty controlling extremists in Sinai and elsewhere.
27. Cairo’s political influence in Gaza is also likely to decline, since Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate.
28. Which brings me back to where I started: a stable and democratic outcome is unlikely. Both Israelis and Americans are going to need to learn to manage a much more fluid and uncertain situation than in the past.
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It’s Trayvon Martin’s fault
Murhaf Jouejati, a leading light of the Syrian opposition, complained on Twitter:
I watched ABC “Worldnews” tonight. Despite today’s killing of tens of Syrian civilians by the Assad regime, ABC reported nothing about Syria.
He added:
NBC also had nothing on Syria. Still wondering why American public opinion is so uninformed?
At least in the United States, the horrors of Homs and Aleppo seem to have been driven not only off the front pages but out of the press entirely, presumably because the trial of George Zimmerman for killing Trayvon Martin used up all the ink (and electrons). The exception was this morning’s New York Times, which has a good overview of the Syrian regime’s recent military successes.
I confess to my own fascination with the trial, which is like a Rohrschach test: if you see race as a factor, then the inkblot points toward conviction for something; if you don’t, you might agree with the jurors who acquitted someone who profiled, followed, quarreled with and shot an unarmed seventeen-year-old. How the prosecutors failed to anticipate the racial factor is a mystery to me. And why the press calls a self-appointed vigilante ready to use his firearm a “neighborhood watch volunteer” I cannot fathom.
Though far from our shores, the plight of Homs really is more heinous than this unsuccessful prosecution, which allowed a single sociopath to go free. Those who are watching see mass murder of a civilian population, including even those trying to mediate. In Aleppo, people are starving. Sociopath Bashar al Asad is killing upwards of one hundred Travon Martins, or his parents, every day. Asad’s mostly Alawite and Shia (including Hizbollah) collaborators are busy chasing the Sunni population north and presumably plan to fill in with Alawites and other minorities whenever conditions allow.
The shape of things in Syria is becoming all too clear. The regime is seeking to establish a robust corridor linking Damascus to the relatively concentrated populations of Alawites in the west, which is conveniently adjacent to Lebanon’s Shia population (and Hizbollah fighters). Asad seems intent on pushing north as far as he can: first to Homs, then Aleppo if possible. But his supply lines will be getting longer and help from Lebanon less convenient. At some point the confrontation lines will likely stop moving north, at which point both opposition and regime will turn to their own rear areas and try to mop up any continuing resistance and ethnically cleansing as much as they think necessary.
The result will be de facto, partly sectarianized, partition, likely with opposition-controlled areas both south and north of the regime’s main axis from Damascus to Tartous and Latakia and extending in the east to Deir Azzour. The opposition will have supply lines to Turkey in the north, Iraqi Kurdistan in the east and Jordan in the south. The regime will continue to depend on Russian and Iranian supplies shipped mainly to Tartous.
This partition could persist for a long time. It is now forgotten, but during the Bosnian war the confrontation lines moved little for 3.5 years. Only with the American bombing did the Croat and Muslim forces tip the balance of war and begin to sweep through western Bosnia. A soft partition with fairly clear confrontation lines could likewise last for years in Syria, provided both sides are able to maintain their international supply lines.
This kind of persistent stalemate would push both sides in more radical, sectarian directions. The opposition, many of whose most aggressive fighters are militant Islamists, will likely move more in that direction. Moderates do not fare well in polarized situations. The regime will continue to claim the mantle of secularism and multiethnicity, but in fact its core is increasingly Alawite and Shia, with Christians, Druze and lots of Sunnis trying to duck, or sit on the fence, or whatever you want to call what people do when fear outweighs the desire for freedom.
The American jilting of the Syrian rebels may seem the easiest way out to an Administration that is taking retrenchment seriously. But it isn’t going to be cheap. US expenses for Syria, mostly humanitarian aid, are climbing close to $1 billion. Next year could easily double that figure, especially if the other states (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) in the Levant start to collapse. You know: a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon we are talking about real money. I’d prefer we worry about the people, but if that doesn’t grab high-level attention maybe the expenditures will.
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On to the next big thing
As I am going to be impolite further on, I’ll say first that I enjoyed yesterday’s CSIS conference on rethinking civilian stabilization and reconstruction. It opened with IRD President Arthur Keys offering a shopping list of good things, among which:
- civilian/military cooperation
- quick impact
- the need to be flexible, nimble and adaptable
- monitoring and evaluation of impact
- local engagement
- capacity building
- protection of vulnerable populations
Citing David Petraeus, he made the very good point that not preparing for stabilization and reconstruction won’t make the need go away.
Bob Lamb was a bit more edgy: the need won’t go away, but our civilian institutions are weak, despite the fact that they are the primary means by which the US government reacts to international contingencies. We know development needs to be led by locals because donors don’t know the terrain. Why don’t we do it? Then he asked the question he would repeat, without getting a satisfactory answer, throughout the day: why have our institutions not adopted the lessons learned? There is something about the political economy of our own institutions that prevents it, he suggested. There are also new directions we should be pursuing: women as peacemakers, geospatial data made widely available, and private sector action that supports stabilization efforts. The American people should not lose faith, but the “S&R” community needs to do things that will justify continued support.
In David Ignatius’ view, the withdrawals of our expeditionary armies from Iraq and Afghanistan create a power vacuum. We need new, civilian ways to project power. This is one of the most important challenges of our time. AID merely contracts out, USIP is not properly an instrument of national power, CSO (the Conflict and Stabilization Ops part of the State Department) is too small, the CIA is going back to its proper intelligence role and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are having trouble operating in non-permissive environments. The military has been used to fill the gap, but that won’t work in Egypt or Syria, which is a country on the verge of breakup.
Responding to David, Jim Dobbins underlined that all 20 international interventions since 1989 show positive outcomes: 16 have had peaceful outcomes (and all are showing progress in that direction) and all show economic growth, movement towards democracy, and sharp improvements in human development. This is especially the case where the entry of foreign troops has been consensual and the country in question of modest size. Ethnic diversity and poverty do not reduce the success rate. The keys to success lie in gaining the cooperation of neighbors and in coopting local elites. It is important to keep things in perspective: we’ve had a good deal of success.
On Afghanistan, Jim asks how the US can shape the political transition there. The international community will focus quite properly on whether the 2014 elections are free and fair. But the Afghans will focus on the outcome. What is needed is a new leader who, like Karzai, manages to create a patronage network and cobble together a cross-ethnic coalition that puts forward a multi-ethnic slate of candidates.
Whatever justifiable concerns there might be about corruption in such a patronage network, it is important to remember the progress Afghanistan has made on health, education and telecommunications. On indices of democracy and corruption, Afghanistan ranks more or less in the same league with neighboring countries. It takes time for formal institutions to work against against family, tribal and ethnic relationships.
As for our own institutions, Dobbins underlines that their inadequacy has been most apparent when US military forces are losing, which is when they call for civilian help. Security is vital, so adequate stabilization forces are the first requirement. AID, he suggested, should be AIR(reconstruction and)D. State should direct an enhanced civilian capacity. Where the United States has engaged in reconstruction, it is generally appreciated, but we clearly still have a problem in Egypt, Pakistan and in much of the rest of the Muslim world.
I skipped the mid-day sessions on Colombia, Liberia and South Sudan, so I can’t tell you what happened at those. But I was back in the room for Rob Jenkins, who leads AID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which is certainly one of the stars in the US government’s firmament. Rob thought a lot had been accomplished in recent decades: a discipline has been created, even if we don’t really know what to call it. Stabilization is too low a bar and reconstruction is not really adequate. What we need now is a more data-driven process, though he was quick to admit that we can only make a contribution to preventing bad things from happening, not prove that we did.
That said, respect for local needs, engagement to encourage ownership, and local governance are clearly important. Transitions are generational (20-40 years), but Congress limits OTI’s engagement to three. The US government is more together than in the past. AID has people at all the combatant commands. Prevention is getting priority.
In response to Lamb’s constant question (why are the lessons learned not institutionalized?), Rob thought the fault lay with insufficient funding for contingencies and risk aversion. Experimentation, speed and agility are important, but everyone is worried about their next audit. Some lessons are overlearned.
CSO assistant secretary Rick Barton wrapped up this fine day with four points:
- We need a new optic: we are no longer doing post-conflict reconstruction as in Iraq and Afghanistan but rather supporting popular revolts in terribly violent conditions requiring greater speed and capacity than we’ve got. Military intervention is not where it’s at. It’s a golden moment for civilians.
- We also need organizational reform: policy and implementation need to be closer together, enabling earlier results. There needs to be a center of gravity for decisionmaking, not in the National Security Council, that takes responsibility and ensures coherence.
- Our analytical lens needs to be broader: we need to be talking with broader swathes of society, including silent majorities. Intelligence is too often driven by those with big budgets rather than the real needs.
- We need to expand local ownership, which is our only chance for success. To get out of interventions we need to pay attention to local priorities.
The big thing, Rick averred, is to appreciate the enormity of the challenges.
I do, and this event affirmed my view that no one from inside the system can answer Bob Lamb’s good question: why don’t we institutionalize the lessons? I’m afraid that the answer is the institutions we have are not learning machines. They weren’t established as such, and they have not developed in that direction. No one in them is rewarded for applying lessons learned. Unlike the military, where lessons learned get recycled to field commanders at times within 24 hours, State Department and USAID make sure the process is so slow no one will be paying attention by the time the lessons learned are formulated. On to the next big thing.
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The popular impeachment thesis
Turmoil in Egypt continues to engage analysts and policymakers. Last week, Dr. Mona Makram-Ebeid, an Egyptian academic and former member of the Shura Council, spoke about the current situation in Egypt at her “favorite think tank” in Washington D.C., the Middle East Institute. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, the president of the Middle East Institute, introduced the speaker and moderated the discussion.
For Makram-Ebeid, being in Egypt during the second revolution constituted “the most exciting but terribly dangerous days” of her political career. While she was skeptical that the Tamarod movement would in fact be able to gather 15 million signatures, she signed its petition. Resigning from the Shura Council, Makram-Ebeid joined the millions of Egyptians in Tahrir Square calling for Morsi to step down.
On June 30, Makram-Ebeid was summoned for a meeting at (former) Minister Kafrawi’s house. General Fouad Allam, former deputy chief of Egypt’s internal security, as well as journalists and representative of various movements, were present. Minister Kafrawi mentioned that they have been in touch with the army, the Coptic Pope, Sheikh al-Azhar, and General Sisi. He added that the army had requested a “written popular demand” to intervene and prevent a bloodbath. The group present then wrote a request saying: “You gave everyone one week to resolve the problems and to come to a compromise, otherwise you would step in to prevent a bloodbath. So we are asking you to fulfill your pledges, because we are on the brink of a civil war and a real bloodbath.” The army intervened.
Asking whether Morsi’s downfall was inevitable, Makram-Ebeid replied that Egyptians view their country as Um al-Dunya: the mother of the world. It is possible that no government could have solved Egypt’s economic problems in a year. Nevertheless, any wise government would have instilled a sense of karamah, or dignity, among Egyptians. This is where Morsi failed. Not only did he not deal with the problems of poverty and unemployment, he also “was whatever the opposite of charisma is.” Egyptians felt humiliated at seeing him. This sense was compounded when Morsi installed his “cronies” in government offices, instead of forming a national government. Thus, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s downfall was not inevitable from the beginning, they intervened in the military’s budget, instigated sectarian violence, and marginalized the judiciary, intellectuals, artists, women, Copts, and other groups. This resulted in their downfall.
Many wonder whether the revolution constitutes a coup. Makram-Ebeid responded by asking: “How important is this?… whether this is a coup or not a coup, it’s over.” It is not intervention, but rather inaction by the army that would have been criminal, she added. The army responded to the popular demands of Egyptians, as evidenced by the 30 million Egyptians who took to the streets and prevented a bloodbath, which would have jeopardized Morsi’s own life. Thus, Makram-Ebeid prefers to describe the event as a “popular impeachment.”
As to the US role in Egypt, Makram-Ebeid recommended that it should not support Egypt only to maintain peace with Israel. Rather, the US needs to push for a democratic and inclusive government. It should also encourage the private sector and businessmen, and should even ask them to contribute more financial assistance and help reduce youth unemployment. What made America great, Makram-Ebeid asserted, is philanthropy. Moreover, the US needs to further engage different parties in Egypt and condemn the marginalization of groups such as women and Christians. Makram-Ebeid added that perception is stronger than reality. The prevalent perception in Egypt is America’s undeniable support for the Muslim Brotherhood. The US needs to change that.
Makram-Ebeid then added three things Egyptians need to do. First, they need to stop to the incitement and demonization of the Brotherhood. Egyptians should strive for reconciliation, not further divisions. After all, they worked together to bring the Mubarak regime down. Second, while General Sisi has several advantages over former General Tantawi, as he is younger, savvy, and trained in the U.S. (rather than the USSR), the military continues to have no real interest in democracy. It thus falls upon the seculars and liberals to unify under a common leadership and program and to implement the road map to democratization. And finally, the opposition needs to ensure that the transition period, run under military control, is as short as possible.
Ambassador Chamberlin then mentioned that democracy is a ground game. The youths of Tamarod have mobilized on their computers, but a lot of democracy requires getting into the streets, knocking on doors and building a party from the ground up. Should we expect to see that as a very important election approaches? Makram-Ebeid responded by saying this is an important challenge for Egyptians. After the 2011 revolution, everyone in Tahrir became an expert on the top TV shows, and no one was left to run for elections. Makram-Ebeid hopes this does not happen again. She wants the recent protesters to grow a grassroots organization of their own, rather than join an existing one. While she has nothing against elderly people, she wants to see some “fresh blood” in politics.
Asked if recent events could set a bad precedent by deposing an elected president who had lost popularity, Makram-Ebeid responded by saying this is unlikely. “This is not the Tea Party,” she added. Most Egyptians took lessons from the past 30 months, so such a move is unlikely to occur again. Egyptians would refuse any dictatorship. “Today, we have a past president, an ousted president, and no president.” This is in a country where presidents stay until their death or assassination, so everything is new for Egyptians, she concluded.
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Supercharge the EU
As Kosovo and Serbia are proceeding with implementation of their April agreement on northern Kosovo, it is time to look at the other remaining war and peace problem in the Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is at a standstill, its institutions inadequate to qualifying for European Union membership, its people annoyed and frustrated, its economy declining, its youth departing if they can, much of its society sharply divided along ethnic lines, and the international community puzzled as to what to do.
The best that can be said is that war seems unlikely, not least because no one cares enough. The peace is not a warm one.
I’ve been inclined to think that there is nothing much that should be done about this. Bosnia has a clear prospect for EU membership. If it stews in its own juices for a while, its people should be able to figure out that the current crop of political leaders is not moving in the right direction. Certainly the enigmatically named “baby revolution,” a protest movement precipitated by the government’s inability to solve even simple problems, and the parallel Prvi Mart effort to encourage voter registration across entity lines, suggest that the country’s more or less open society has potential for pressuring the leadership in the right direction.
In the meanwhile, a weak European military force (EUFOR) pretends to maintain a safe and secure environment while the civilian international community “high representative” created by the Dayton accords, pretends to preside (but no longer rules) over a dysfunctional state and its two entities, Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation. The RS leadership alternately defies and manipulates the EU, the Federation ignores it and the state government can do little to influence either one.
The trouble with the “hands off” approach is that things might evolve in a less salutary direction, as Kurt Bassuener has amply documented. The European Commission, frustrated by the inability of the Sarajevo government to come to decisions, is dealing increasingly with the RS, the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia, ignoring the 51% (Croat and Bosniak-controlled) Federation. It is natural for bureaucrats to deal with bureaucrats who can get something done, but the net result is that the EU is de facto helping Republika Srpska qualify for EU membership independently of the rest of Bosnia. That has even been proposed as EU policy.
The EU thus risks precipitating the breakup of Bosnia. That is not what it wants to do. In its progress report at the end of last year, the EU commission made clear that it wants to negotiate membership with the government in Sarajevo:
The need for an effective coordination mechanism between various levels of government for the transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU laws remains to be addressed as a matter of priority, so that the country can speak with one voice on EU matters and make an effective use of the EU’s pre-accession assistance.
But actions speak louder than words.
What is to be done? The successful EU mediation on northern Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina shows a possible way. By insisting on elimination of Belgrade’s parallel structures in Kosovo as a condition for giving Serbia a date to begin negotiations on EU accession, Germany gave EU High Representative Catherine Ashton enormous leverage with a Serbian government whose protagonists had little domestic support for flexibility on Kosovo. Americans often complain that EU consensus decisionmaking leads to least common denominator outcomes. But in this case Berlin showed that consensus decisionmaking can lead to a tough, even uncompromising, EU stance, so long as at least one member holds firm.
The EU could apply this lesson learned in Bosnia. The best bet would be a coordinated maneuver by Berlin and Zagreb, whose July 1 entry into the EU makes it a power player vis-a-vis its southeastern neighbor. Germany has long been a strong supporter of a united, democratic and multiethnic Bosnia. Croatia’s interest in preventing Bosnia’s breakup is clear: it does not want a rump Islamic state on its borders. That is why even its nationalist first president Franjo Tudjman backed the Bosnian Federation (and wanted it confederated with Croatia). Strengthening Bosnia’s insitutions and accelerating its entrance into the EU would protect the interests of both Bosnian Croats and Croatia.
Bosnia’s problems are above all constitutional, as its constitution establishes group rights and institutional constraints that render the Sarajevo “state” government dysfunctional. The reforms needed have been known for almost a decade, at least since the Venice Commission outlined them with admirable clarity in 2005.
The EU Commission is loathe to make constitutional reform a condition for EU membership. But EU member states can do it, as their approval will be needed for Bosnia’s candidacy and eventual accession. If, in addition, Germany and Croatia insist that the state government in Bosnia must have all the authority needed to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communitaire, wholehearted implementation would solve 90% of what makes Bosnia dysfunctional.
The Europeans have been anxious to eliminate the American-invented (but always European-manned) civilian “high representative” responsible for implementation of the Dayton agreements (and armed in theory with dictatorial, aka “Bonn,” powers). The Americans have balked. They want to be certain Europe will do the right thing and not allow Bosnia to come apart.
If the Americans were certain that at least Zagreb and Berlin were unequivocally committed to constitutional reform and a sufficiently strong state government in Bosnia to negotiate and implement EU obligations, they would have far less motive to hold on to the high representative and his “Bonn” powers, who at the very least could be moved offshore and reduced to the role of ultimate guarantor rather than constant watchdog. Once the needed constitutional changes are made, there would no longer be any reason for a Dayton-focused “high representative.”
Europe has done well with Serbia and Kosovo. It can do well on Bosnia as well. But a lowest common denominator consensus at of 28 members will not work. Zagreb and Berlin, working in close consultation with Washington, could supercharge the EU and make good things happen.
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