peacefare.net

The right direction for Balkans policy

Labor Day weekend is over, so everyone in the US is back at work. It’s a good moment to reflect on EU and US policy in the Balkans.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is pointing in the right direction. It has decided, subject to confirmation, that the Bosnian constitution, agreed at the Dayton peace talks in 1995, violates the individual rights of its citizens. They cannot all vote for their choice as president, due to geographic and ethnic restrictions, which also dominate in the election of other officials.

This power-sharing arrangement was essential at the end of the Bosnian war. It reassured the warring parties that they could hold on to power. Other ethnic groups would not be dominant. Twenty-eight years of peace have ensued.

That is nothing to sniff at. The Dayton scheme seemed a house of cards when it was signed in December 1995. The Americans made the constitution difficult to amend because they realized how fragile the arrangement would likely be. But the constitution they imposed was precisely what the then warring ethnic nationalists wanted. They have used its bizarre concatention of group rights to protect their own hold on power. They have also prevented citizens who don’t identify with a particular group from gaining power.

This is not the first time the ECHR has intervened in favor of individual rights regardless of ethnicity. Bosnian politicians have mostly ignored its previous decisions. This one will likely suffer the same fate, unless something is done to counter the inertia.

Kosovo

Kosovo is different, arguably more successful. Its minority communities are much smaller relative to the majority than those in Bosnia. Still, Kosovo has strong constituitonal arrangements to protect minorities, including a veto on constitional changes. There are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as the government, minority vetoes, and an advisory Council of Communities linked directly to the President. But there are no ethnic restrictions on voting rights comparable to Bosnia’s.

Belgrade, Washington, and Brussels have been pressing Pristina hard to implement a 10-year-old agreement that calls for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM). Belgrade wants it to have executive powers. That would make it a level of governance intermediary between Pristina and the country’s municipalities, which have ample powers of their own.

The ASMM could thus become analogous to Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Advocates of the ASMM say that such arrangements for minority governance exist in more than a dozen European Union member states. But in all those instances the neighoring countries recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors. That is not the case with Kosovo, as Serbia has steadfastly refused recognition and its officials now assert it will never happen.

What is to be done?

Washington and Brussels should be pressing Bosnian politicians this fall to implement the most recent as well as previous ECHR decisions. The Europeans and Americans should also back off pressing Pristina for the ASMM, explaining to Serbia that its formation will have to await Belgrade’s recognition as well as recognition by the five non-recognizing EU members. Washington and Brussels should also be prepared to guarantee that the ASMM will be consistent with the Kosovo constitution. They have said as much in op/eds. They should say it in a formal international agreement.

Along with these diplomatic moves should come a vigorous effort to upgrade the judicial systems in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Unfortunately, the Bosnian ruling parties are gutting serious reform. Bosnia needs to make its prosecutors and judges far more independent of politics. Extending the existing international OSCE judicial monitoring to prosecutors would be a major step in the right direction. In Kosovo, it is vital that Belgrade encourage the Serb judges and police to return to the country’s institutions, which they exited last spring at Belgrade’s behest. Belgrade also needs to refrain from influencing their decisions.

Group rights–including the ASMM in Kosovo as well as Bosnia’s existing constitutional provisions–are the wrong direction. The right direction for EU and US policy in the Balkans is greater support for individual rights under the rule of law. This is still at least a decade-long project, despite the many well-intentioned efforts that have preceded it. The sooner Pristina and Sarajevo start, the sooner they’ll finish.

Appeasement without limits

This interview, which I did Tuesday for Anja Ivanović at Podgorica daily Pobjeda, has attracted some attention, so I am posting here the original English version:

Q: The Minister of Serbian defense, Miloš Vučević, stated that the recognition of Kosovo will come back to haunt Montenegro and North Macedonia, much like it has for Ukraine and to all those who promoted Kosovo as an independent state. US ambassador in Serbia Christopher Hill did not make any criticism on this statement but said that he does not see the statements of Serbian officials as an attempt to destabilize the region. What kind of policy do you think Hill is demonstrating with such an attitude toward Belgrade’s propaganda? Why do you think Hill didn’t criticize Serbia at all?

A: US policy now favors Belgrade. Washington is silent on many things: corruption at high levels in Serbia, Serbian threats of the use of force, a Belgrade-sponsored attack on NATO troops, Vucic’s refusal to commit to implementing agreements reached recently in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. You will have to ask Ambassador Hill and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar why. My impression is that they have convinced themselves they can bring Serbia towards the West, despite a good deal of clear and compelling evidence to the contrary. They also appear to be prioritizing Serbia’s allowing arms supplies to get to Ukraine.

Q: Do you believe that the absence of a critical attitude of the American ambassador is proof of a “soft policy” towards Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić? What do you believe needs to happen to change Hill’s approach?

A: Yes, US policy towards Serbia is now all about appeasement. I don’t see this changing while present personnel are in place.

Q: Is it possible that Hill, who openly supported the “Open Balkan” initiative, abstains from reacting to the disputed statements of Serbian officials because of possible privileges in the Initiative “Open Balkan”?

A: So far as I am aware, Open Balkans is a dead letter. Nor do I think it offered much to the US. American support for it was part of the appeasement policy.

Q: This month, US and EU officials sent a letter in which they called for a change of soft policy towards Serbia and Aleksandar Vučić in relation to Kosovo. Do you think that this approach by Hill confirms their request? Is Hill opposing US officials with this statement?

A: The “officials” you mention were legislators. They would like a dramatic change in the current approach. I see no sign yet that US and EU executive branch officials will give it to them. Much more pressure will be required.

Q: The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro and the first Montenegrin ambassador in Washington, Miodrag Vlahović, assessed in an Open Letter (published by Pobjeda) to the US Ambassador in Belgrade, Christopher Hill, that the “Pax Americana” policy promoted by His Excellency Hill through concessions and pandering to the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, was “deeply wrong and compromises decades of positive and effective US engagement in the Balkans.” Do you have comment about Vlahović letter?

Q: I think Ambassador Vlahovic is correct.