Tag: United States
Shocked, shocked
I’m surprised so many are surprised that the National Security Agency (NSA) is collecting data on your use of the phone and the internet. What did you think all those folks out at Fort Meade (and around the country) were doing? Tapping individual phone lines? In fact, my guess–and it is only a guess–is that they are storing not only your phone records but also your phone calls, though they only listen to them when the super-secret (and therefore unaccountable to the public) court, created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, gives permission. “Collection” is a tricky word. Is the data collected when it goes into a computer, or only when it is examined?
The notion that they are discriminating in this data storage is not credible. The frequency and volume of material argue for capturing it all so that it can be mined in due course, depending on which bits seem to be most relevant to protecting national security, especially against terrorists. That there are abuses I have no doubt, but that should not blind us to the extraordinary power–I almost said virtue–of a system that can archive and later examine many billions of messages of all types. It would be surprising if a system of this sort had not produced material of value in preventing terrorist acts. Read more
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Energy interdependence is increasing
As the political and social dynamics in the Middle East continue to evolve as a result of the Arab Spring, attention has been devoted to China’s growing economic role in the region. China now imports nearly 1.5 million barrels of Iraqi oil each day. On Tuesday, NDN, a DC-based think tank, hosted a discussion with Dr. Gawdat Bahgat and I-wei Jennifer Chang to explore shifting energy realities and how they will affect the political landscape of the Middle East.
Bahgat, a professor at the National Defense University and an expert on Middle East energy policy, set out to debunk several prevalent myths concerning US policy in the Middle East. He rejected the “oil for security” tradeoff between the US and its Middle Eastern allies. As the argument goes, Middle Eastern exporters provide the US with oil at reasonable prices and in return the US provides military assistance and aids in those countries’ stability. Taking a more realist approach, Bahgat instead believes that each actor is simply acting in their own best interest. A decrease of Middle Eastern oil will not cause the US to recede from its other commitments in the region. Instead, the US presence in the Middle East will not significantly change in the foreseeable future. Read more
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Power, Power and Rice
While some are predicting (or hoping for) big changes in American foreign policy in the liberal interventionist/human rights first direction with the appointments of Susan Rice as national security adviser and Samantha Power as UN ambassador, I doubt it.
Both have already left marks on US foreign policy, Samantha through the Atrocities Prevention Board and Susan in the Libya intervention and many other efforts at the UN, including the successful use of its Human Rights Commission to report on atrocities in Syria. I wouldn’t suggest these are enormous departures from the past, but they certainly reflect the view that saving foreigners from mass atrocity has its place in US p0licy and needs to be given due consideration along with more traditional national interests of the military, political and economic varieties.
The main “to intervene or not” issue today is Syria. Susan and Samantha have both already been involved in internal debates on Syria, where President Obama ignored the advice of Hillary Clinton, David Petraeus and Leon Panetta. They all advised a more interventionist stance. It is the president, not the advisers, who is choosing not to try to stop the Syrian civil war, largely because of issues unrelated to Syria: Russian support on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, not to mention the American public’s war weariness and the parlous budget situation. No doubt someone at the Pentagon is also telling him that allowing extremist Sunnis and Shia to continue killing each other in Syria is in the US interest. Read more
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Livni lifts spirits
Too often the discourse surrounding the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict focuses on divergent narratives. Complex ideas loaded with emotional and historical baggage are rarely unpacked but often used as rhetorical crutches to score political points. Among the most common, casual observers often hear about Greater Israel, the naqba, the right of return, terrorism, and even victimhood. While these narratives stem from legitimate sources, their (mis)use often merely serves to complicate attempts at ending conflict.
Moving away from such common narratives, US Secretary of State John Kerry is attempting to restart negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. With numerous trips to the region since January, Secretary Kerry has renewed enthusiasm in the international community, raised expectations, and will attempt to succeed where so many before him have failed. Both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership have yet to show any sustained confidence in the renewed process and no new rounds of negotiations are currently scheduled. Read more
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Not promising
With the strategically placed town of Qusayr about to fall to Syrian army and Lebanese Hizbollah forces, the Syrian opposition coalition (SOC) is saying it won’t attend “Geneva II” peace talks without an end to the siege of Qusayr and a guarantee that any political settlement will ensure Bashar al Asad steps down. Even if those things were to happen magically, it is unclear who would represent the opposition at peace talks, as the SOC has been meeting in Istanbul and struggling painfully to broaden its base even as revolutionaries inside Syria complain loudly about its ineffectiveness.
The regime, emboldened by success on the battlefield and Russia’s decision to provide advanced air defenses, will not agree to either SOC condition.
Where does this leave the US?
We are left holding the diplomatic bag, trying to deliver a political solution in conditions that are not ripe for a settlement. Moscow and Tehran, while claiming to want a political solution and criticizing the West and its Gulf allies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) for support to the revolutionaries, have been busily bolstering the Asad regime on the battlefield. President Obama is said to have ordered up plans for a no-fly zone, but there is no sign he is serious about implementing them in the face of continued Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN Security Council.
There is also no sign as yet that the regime can reassert its authority over all of Syria. Large parts of both the north and the south are in revolutionary hands. But the regime has a good chance of securing the route from Damascus to the Alawite heartland in the west and the port at Tartus. Homs is likely the next big battlefield. Government forces there have been making slow progress against rebels in the city center. It may well fall with a whimper rather than a bang.
Meanwhile sectarian conflict is spreading to Lebanon and Iraq, even as both those countries export fighters into Syria. The involvement of Lebanese Hizbollah has important military implications not only within Syria but also in Lebanon and vis-a-vis Israel. Turkey has long harbored the Syrian opposition forces and has suffered a number of military and terrorist attacks from Syria. The sad fact is that only a quick (and unlikely) end to the civil war in Syria will save its neighbors from refugee flows, terrorist bombs, sectarian conflict,and the risk that they too may end up embroiled in a regional Levantine war.
So what is to be done?
If, like me, you are of the school that says diplomacy is getting other people to do what you want them to do, you’ve got to have doubts whether convening peace talks at this point is going to produce a settlement, however much you might like that to happen. They could be useful in clarifying positions, unifying the opposition, establishing some principles, making some contacts and defining better what is at issue, but it is highly unlikely that you are going to get a settlement when both sides think, however unrealistically, they may gain from more fighting and worry that an agreement to lay down arms could lead to slaughter when the other side fails to abide.
There is no trust at this point between the Asad regime and the revolutionaries. Neither side believes the other is serious about negotiating or about implementing a negotiated agreement. Unless one side or the other manages a military breakout that today seems unlikely, we are a long way from the end in Syria, which means the region will be under serious strain for a long time to come.
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Schizoeurope
Britain and France have collaborated in getting the European Union to lift its arms embargo on Syria, opening the possibility of shipping arms to the opposition starting in July. But key European thinktanks are very much opposed to the idea: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) wants de-escalation and Christopher Phillips of Chatham House criticizes what he regards as Britain’s flawed logic.
I have a hard time understanding their objections. Why would Syria’s arms suppliers (Russia and Iran principally) reduce the flow unless they see the real possibility that escalation will favor the opposition? Opening the possibility of future arms shipments will do more to give the Asad regime something to worry about than it will do to harden the opposition’s resistance to negotiation. It is far more likely that offering weapons conditional on their unified participation in negotiations (and being prepared to shut off the flow if they fail to participate seriously) will work.
Nor am I all that worried about weapons ending up in the wrong hands, so long as they are used to counter the regime. The neat distinction between jihadists and moderates is at least in part a figment of Western imaginations. However hard we try, some weapons will end up in the wrong places. Given the current political atmosphere in the US, better that happen to the Europeans than to us. We don’t need “fast and furious” on steroids.
Then there is the question of the Russia’s decision to export a new generation of air defenses to Syria, apparently decided in response to the European Union ending the embargo. If the Russians go ahead and if the Israelis fail to attack them before they are operational, they would presumably make it more difficult to impose a no-fly zone, if that were President Obama’s intention. But despite news reports, there is no real indication that the Americans are willing to patrol a no-fly zone, and the Israelis have good reasons to prevent the new air defenses from becoming operational, something that would take months if not years in the best of conditions. It is amusing to see people who oppose a no-fly zone worrying about the Russian move and premature to worry too much about an Israeli-Russian war, though the Israelis should certainly be concerned about how far Russia is prepared to go in arming Syria and Iran.
While in my view wrong about the impact of arming the revolutionaries, or more accurately opening up the future possibility of arming them, the ECFR offers a “strategy for de-escalation” worth looking at:
- a set of guiding principles
- a wide enough coalition committed to de-escalation, and
- a diplomatic strategy to get Geneva II off the ground.
The principles they draw from the Geneva I communique:
- All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence
- No further further militarization of the conflict
- The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected
- The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing bodyexercising full executive powers. It could include membersof the present Government and the opposition and othergroups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent
- The Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting
The most controversial is that fourth point, as it implies to the opposition and its supporters that Bashar al Asad will step aside while the regime and its supporters oppose that. Squaring that circle will be worth a Nobel Prize. But the Geneva I communique was not agreed by either the opposition or the regime, so getting them to sign up to something like these five points would be an important step forward.
The ECFR description of a possible de-escalation coalition is reasonable. The diplomatic strategy beyond that is brief and vague, basically proposing that Russia and the US bring the rest of the P5 on board for a non-Chapter 7 UN Security Council resolution.
The ECFR paper offers one particularly interesting idea on cessation of armed violence: this might be done in specific geographic areas, “rolling and expanding pockets in which ceasefires hold.” This of course would enable both sides to concentrate their forces in areas where there are no such ceasefires, intensifying the conflict in some areas even while de-escalating in others. The idea could have the great virtue of opening up more of the country to humanitarian relief and beginning the re-introduction of international monitors, assuming there is someone out there ready to take on that role.
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