Tag: United States
Off course
I’m no friend of Mohammed Morsi. I once even advocated voting for Mubarak crony Ahmed Shafiq, in order to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from monopolizing Egypt’s elected institutions (that was before the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces* dissolved the MB-dominated lower house of parliament). But the notion that Egypt would be better off if street demonstrators overthrow him now is unconvincing. The Egyptian revolution is already off course. What it needs is a steady hand at the tiller, pointing in the right direction.
Admittedly it is hard to picture Morsi being the right guy to skipper the Egyptian ship of state. He is no George Washington, refusing to be crowned king. He is much more likely to point Egypt in the direction of renewed autocracy (of the Islamist variety) than to get it back on course toward democracy. That’s where the street demonstrations are vital: they need to be nonviolent and disciplined efforts to correct Morsi’s navigation. Their aim should not be to overthrow Morsi but to ensure that Egypt gets a decent constitution and goes to elections as soon as possbile in a climate that is democratic and pluralist.
Morsi assumed more autocratic powers this week mainly to counter the risk that the judiciary would block his interest in making Egypt a more Islamist state than it has been in the past. The performance of the judiciary has been so erratic and unreliable that its threat is uncertain, but it is still an important counterweight to Morsi’s exercise of power lies (and he knows it). Egypt has lots of smart lawyers. They need to work overtime in the next few months to ensure that Morsi is unable to put in place a political system that makes the MB a permanent fixture in power. One of the many ironies of the current situation is that the draft constitution under preparation is, as Nathan Brown puts it, not all that “problematic.” It will be a struggle to keep it that way now that Morsi has unlimited power.
While I ran into a bit of criticism on Twitter yesterday for suggesting it, the internationals (including the United States) also have a role to play. They should play it behind the scenes, making clear to anyone who will listen that correct treatment of women and minorities in the new Egypt is a sine qua non of international assistance. The notion that outsiders have nothing to say in the matter because they so long supported Hosni Mubarak is unconvincing to me. American and European influence may be marginal, but important decisions are made at the margin. Support for moderates who share American ideals should not be optional. It may be a long-term investment, but one worth making.
While no doubt Morsi has gained political weight internationally with his successful mediation of the latest Hamas/Israel conflagration, he remains vulnerable in many ways. Egypt’s economy is in serious trouble. Its people are poor and restive. Extremists in Sinai are challenging not only Israel’s security but also Egypt’s authority. The Egyptian army is a threat to no one. Iran and Turkey are becoming the main regional powers, leaving Egypt out of the equation while they fight a proxy war in Syria.
While my blogging colleagues never tire of announcing that American influence in the Middle East is coming to an end, that is not how I see it. Any leader of Egypt needs the United States to continue to provide military assistance, to help restore Egypt to its regional role and to ensure it gets the money it needs from the international financial institutions. There is a price for this kind of help: first and foremost in maintaining the peace agreement with Israel, but also in keeping Egypt to a democratic course. Egyptians will play the primary role, but internationals can help.
*PS: This was an error. It was the judiciary that dissolved the lower house, during the period of SCAF domination of the revolution.
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Pharaonic Islam
A day after cooperating with the United States in achieving a shaky ceasefire in Gaza, Egypt’s President Morsi arrogated to himself essentially absolute authority. You have to wonder: did he mention this in his several phone calls with President Obama in recent days, or in his conversations with Secretary of State Clinton? His new constitutional decrees do many things that amount to one big thing: the president is omnipotent. The courts cannot challenge him or the remaining legislative bodies (the Shura council and the constituent assembly), which are under Muslim Brotherhood domination. Morsi had already given himself the legislative powers of the lower house of Parliament, dissolved by military decree.
There is a good deal of “I told you so” tweeting back and forth in my feed. None of that matters much. The question is whether Morsi’s assumption of dictatorial powers really matters to the United States and if so what should we do about it?
We lived with an allied but autocratic Egypt for more or less 40 years, first under Anwar Sadat and later under Hosni Mubarak. The difference is that Morsi will be an Islamist autocrat, not a secularist one. And he has hijacked a revolution that appeared at least at times headed in the direction the United States would certainly have preferred: a modern, pluralist democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood from which Morsi emerged is neither modernist nor democratic (nor pluralist).
Morsi’s assumption of autocratic powers puts the Obama administration in an awkward situation. It needs Egypt not only to help with the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel but also to maintain the peace treaty with Israel and fight growing extremism on the border of Israel in the Sinai Peninsula. Trying to condition U.S. aid to Egypt on internal political liberalization could put at risk Egypt’s cooperation on international priorities concerning not just Israel but also Iran, Syria and other Middle East challenges.
Egypt however is not in a strong position. On economic questions, it has been falling into line with International Monetary Fund and World Bank requirements, because it needs their money to survive the economic downturn that has accompanied the revolution and is likely to persist for some time, especially in light of Europe’s recession. Aid does not flow readily from international financial institutions without American support.
Washington should use what leverage it has to push Morsi in the right direction, in particular in formulating Egypt’s new constitution. This is the vital issue: if it protects individual rights, including for women and minorities, there is some hope that the “spirit” of Egypt’s revolution (as understood by the youthful secularists who precipitated it) can be preserved, if only through painstaking efforts in court. If however the constitution installs Sharia and provides only limited opportunities for individuals to protect their rights through the courts, we are in for a long, dark period of Pharaonic Islam. That won’t be good for the United States, Israel or Egypt’s own people.
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Wisdom, not resolve
I’m in Atlanta this week for Thanksgiving, which Americans will mark tomorrow with parades, running races, a giant meal, lots of football (watching and playing) and much debate on the issues of our day, from cranberry sauce recipes to the state of world affairs. Some will go to church, but most will mark the day entirely at home–or in a relative’s home–with marathon culinary preparations, a lengthy and leisurely afternoon meal and a long denouement of talk, napping and TV, in my family followed in the late evening by a giant turkey sandwich, on white toast.
I mention these things because close to 50% of my readers are non-Americans, only some of whom will have enjoyed the Thanksgiving experience first hand. To my knowledge, the holiday is entirely a New World phenomenon. Canada has its own version, celebrated last month. Of course lots of cultures express thanks in both religious and non-religious ways, but I wonder if any have made it quite the major event that the North Americans have. Readers should feel free to enlighten me.
Americans certainly have a great deal to be thankful for. We are slowly climbing out of a lingering recession, we’ve gotten through the difficult quadrennial drama of presidential elections without the uncertainties that have sometimes plagued the process, our troops are out of Iraq and moving out of Afghanistan, and there is no existential threat on the horizon, even if there are many less dramatic challenges. We are the solution to our own worst problems, which focus on the relatively mundane questions of what the government should spend money on and where it should find the revenue needed.
The world is not in such good shape. While statistics show that the overall frequency of war is down, the catalogue is full of long lasting conflicts and their devastating impacts on people: the revolution and civil war in Syria are getting on to marking two years, Israel and Palestine have been in conflict one way or another for 65 years, the Afghanistan/Pakistan war is dragging into its 12th year, and I don’t know how to determine when the war against al Qaeda in Yemen, the war against its affiliates in Somalia or the war in Eastern Congo began. Then there are the more recent conflicts: northern Mali and the all but defeated revolution in Bahrain. And there are the wars that might come: perhaps against Iran, in the South or East China Seas, on the Korean peninsula or between South Sudan and Sudan.
I can’t claim that most Americans will be thinking about these disasters as they give thanks for their own blessings. They are more likely to be thinking about Breezy Point and Hoboken, two communities that hurricane Sandy devastated early this month. We’ve still got tens of thousands homeless and some without power weeks later. Those who turn to America for help–and many do–are going to find us preoccupied these days with our own needs. I suspect this will not be just a short-term phenomenon, but a longer-term effort to put our own house in order, limiting commitments abroad and prioritizing them in accordance with America’s own interests.
This will sound ungenerous to non-Americans, who may bemoan American interference but also look to the U.S. to step in to help stop the Gaza fighting and turn to Washington when other disasters strike. We will continue to do what we can where vital American interests are at stake, but it will be healthy if we are a bit less committed and rely on others rather more than we have in the past. Our withdrawal–retrenchment is what some call it–will not be absolute. It has to be calculated and calibrated. Good judgment, not ideology, should be its guide.
That is one of the many reasons I am grateful to the American people for re-electing President Obama. I don’t always agree with his judgment–I’d rather he did more on Syria, for example–but he is thoughtful and cautious in ways that fit our current circumstances. Managing the relative decline in American power and constructing a global architecture that will limit conflict and provide space for those who choose to live in free societies to prosper are the great challenges of the coming generations. Wisdom, not resolve, is the essential ingredient to meet them.
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Easier said than done
Hillary Clinton is on her way from Cambodia to Jerusalem. This is precisely the opposite direction from the one President Obama intends for American foreign policy: his announced intention is to pivot American attention from the Middle East to Asia. His visit to Asia just a few days after re-election was meant to underline that message.
The current Middle East crisis is over Gaza, where rocket launches against Israeli targets have precipitated a ferocious response, so far mainly from the air (though there have also been sea and land artillery barrages). Israel has mobilized ground forces, which appear ready for a land incursion into Gaza. Hamas, which governs Gaza (but does not necessarily launch all the rockets), has attracted support from Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, which is seeking to mediate a ceasefire.
This is a pretty clear cut case of the urgent taking priority over the important. Even in the Middle East, there are things going on that are more important to vital U.S. interests than the highly regrettable Hamas/Israel conflagration. The civil war in Syria above all requires more attention than it has gotten, even if Obama’s hesitancy to get more deeply involved is understandable when you look at the array of unappealing options available. Iran’s nuclear program continues to produce 20% enriched uranium. If diplomacy does not produce an end to its nuclear weapons ambitions in the next few months, military action by both the U.S. and Israel becomes likely. The fight against al Qaeda in Yemen isn’t working well–the drone war seems to produce more terrorists than it kills. Let’s not even mention the sometimes faltering revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, or the apparent extremist takeover of northern Mali.
Whatever. For the moment Gaza is at the top of America’s to do list. The immediate problem is a ceasefire, but Ehud Yaari argues that a broader arrangement is really what is needed. This would entail high-level political agreements between Egypt and Israel on blocking arms smuggling to Hamas, clamping down on extremists in Sinai and opening the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza to both trade and people.
The problem with these ideas is that they tie Hamas-governed Gaza more closely to Egypt and loosen its already attenuated ties to the West Bank, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) governs. If there is any sense at all in Israel’s right-wing efforts to block Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution the rest of the world favors, it lies precisely in a scheme to separate Gaza and the West Bank, returning the former to Egypt’s suzerainity and the West Bank to Jordan.
But that does not mean Yaari’s ideas are bad, only that what I take to be their unintended consequences should not be allowed to block Palestinian unity. It is an added irony that the main obstacle at the moment is the Palestinians themselves, who have not managed to reconstitute a united polity despite many efforts to do so. It will be interesting to see if the Israeli air attacks sharpen the differences between Gaza and the West Bank or narrow them. Palestinian unity, like the pivot to Asia, is easier said than done.
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Normalization
Two recent meetings between prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo have opened a political-level dialogue aimed at “normalization.” What does that mean?
We know it does not mean what is really needed: mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors. That is the “normal” relationship between sovereign states. Virtually all the problems between Kosovo and Serbia would be easier to solve if they accepted each other as such. But neither Belgrade nor Pristina would recognize the other tomorrow, Belgrade because it objects to what it terms Kosovo’s “unilaterally declared” (but in fact thoroughly coordinated) independence and Kosovo because Belgrade has designs on its territory, in particular the Serb-controlled north.
Diplomats deal with issues like this by starting a process, in this case a sui generis one called “normalization.” But it is not obvious what that really means. Where does it begin? What stages does it proceed through? How does it end? Here is my personal idea of what normalization might entail:
1. Belgrade and Pristina should resolve left-over issues from the war they fought in the late 1990s. Foremost among these is missing people. Neither side has given a full account of what it knows about people who were killed during and after the war. The latest figure I’ve seen is 1775 people unaccounted for. This is far too many 13 years later.
But there are other issues as well, including the difficult question of pensions Belgrade cut off in 1999, when the United Nations took over administration of Kosovo. The European Court of Human Rights has now ordered Serbia to pay these pensions, with interest. The total owed could be substantial. There are other property issues as well: state property and privately owned property for which owners have not received proper compensation.
2. Pristina and Belgrade should implement the agreements they have already reached. The most important of these is supposed to be implemented next month, with the start of “integrated border management” procedures on the boundary/border between Kosovo and Serbia, in accordance with EU standards. This is an important step, both because it will cut down on smuggling and because it will require serious cooperation between Kosovar and Serbian officials. Also largely unimplemented is the agreement for Belgrade to provide Pristina with copies of property (cadastral) records, taken from Kosovo at the end of the war to reinforce Belgrade’s claim to be the sovereign power even though its officials are no longer present on most of its territory.
If further agreements are reached on electricity and telecommunications, as is rumored, they should be implemented without the lengthy delays that characterized the earlier agreements. Normal relations means quick and cooperative implementation.
3. With the prime ministers meeting, it is time for others to meet as well. The political-level dialogue reached an agreement in principle to extend the Albania/Kosovo highway completed this year to its intended terminus near Nis. This won’t happen without Transport Ministers, Environment Ministers and Interior Ministers concerting their efforts to make it a reality. The road has tremendous potential to increase commerce and provide Serbia with an additional and possibly preferable outlet to the sea (the road to Thessaloniki is longer and lower quality).
With European integration the common goal of the two countries, there is every reason for the people responsible for preparing for EU accession to meet and compare notes. And there is good reason for ordinary citizens to meet and discuss mutual interests: commerce, professional cooperation, anti-corruption efforts, health and environmental standards–there is no lack of grist for the mill. The best way to ensure this kind of dialogue would be liaison offices in each others’ capitals. I am hearing that the plan is liaison offices in Brussels. That would at best be a step in the right direction, but insufficient to ensure the kind of continuous communication needed.
4. Belgrade should end its diplomatic campaign against Kosovo. Serbia has conducted a concerted campaign to prevent Kosovo from entering international organizations and block other states from recognizing it. This is unseemly at best, self-defeating at worst. More or less half the UN General Assembly now recognizes Kosovo. More will gradually do so. The five non-recognizers in the European Union are beginning to understand that non-recognition encourages partition proposals that are anathema to them. Some are accepting Kosovo passports and developing strong bilateral relations with Pristina. Serbia lost its battle Friday to prevent Kosovo entry into the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Does it really want to lose many more battles, or would it be preferable to accept the inevitable?
Still, the Serbian campaign, which Belgrade has conducted with unwarranted intelligence and vigor, has prevented Kosovo from participating in the Olympics (one of its athletes also had an Albanian passport and joined its team), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association and the Eurovision Song Contest. This is inat, which is best defined by a joke all Balkans ethnicities tell about others. A farmer, offered three wishes by a genie, says his first is that his neighbor’s cow should die. “What good will that do you,” the genie asks? None, the farmer says, but it will make my neighbor really unhappy. Kosovo’s participation in international fora of all sorts should be an important part of normalization. It cannot be constructed on a foundation of inat, which has a way of becoming mutual.
5. Northern Kosovo needs to be reintegrated with the rest. At the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999, Serbian security forces were supposed to be removed from all of Kosovo. They remained in the territory north of the Ibar river, where the population is majority Serb. It is difficult to say who really controls that territory now: certainly not Pristina or the internationals, but even the Serbian police and secret services are not in full control of an area that is tainted with smuggling and organized crime (with the police and secret services implicated but not necessarily in full control).
Belgrade and Pristina will need to cooperate intensively on reintegrating this territory back into Kosovo, with a large measure of self-governance provided by the internationally sanctioned Ahtisaari plan. This will involve some movement of former non-Serb residents of the north back to their homes. Some Serbs will be unlikely to want to stay in the north, even under the Ahtisaari plan provisions. Where they go and how they are accommodated are important issues on which Belgrade’s cooperation will be vital. Whatever happens with the north will be taken as a precedent for Serbs south of the Ibar and for Albanians in the Presevo area of southern Serbia. It will take wisdom and care to ensure that the reintegration conditions do not destabilize these areas.
6. Defense ministers and chiefs of staff should meet to consider how they can maintain the kind of transparency and mutual confidence that will ensure peace and stability. NATO-led (KFOR) forces have protected Kosovo since the 1999 war. It is unlikely they will still stick around in another five years. Both the U.S. and Europe want to move their troops to higher priorities. Kosovo will begin to arm its still largely unarmed “security forces” beginning in July.
Neither Kosovo nor Serbia should want to get into an arms race, which would be costly to their budgets and destabilizing to the neighborhood. But no democratically elected politician can hope to stay in office if he or she is unable to defend the population and territorial integrity of the state. If an arms race is to be avoided, Belgrade and Pristina have to give each other mutual assurances. The EU has asked that Serbia accept Kosovo’s territorial integrity. If Belgrade fails to do that, Pristina will have to find ways to protect itself from the threat of a Serbian armored incursion. NATO may also need to provide guarantees.
Bottom line: This is already a big agenda, and I’m sure I’ve missed some things. It would all be far easier if recognition and exchange of ambassadors came first. I trust that will become apparent as Pristina and Belgrade make their way through it. But if they prefer to do it ass backwards, “normalizing” a relationship between two capitals that do not accept each others’ sovereign authority, so be it. There is a lot of hard work ahead.
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This week’s peace picks
A very light holiday week comes as a break after the flurry of post-election events.
1. America and China in the Aftermath of Election and Succession: Paths and Pitfalls, Monday November 19, 9:15 AM – 12:00 PM, Brookings
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Jonathon D. Pollack, Cheng Li, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, J. Stapleton Roy, Alan Romberg, Jeffrey A. Bader, Michael Swaine
The reelection of President Barack Obama and the convening of China’s 18th National Congress only days later highlight converging political calendars that may set the contours of U.S.-China relations and East Asian politics for years to come. However, uncertainties remain, with China’s political, economic and strategic trajectories subject to major internal and external pressures. At the same time, the United States confronts a daunting, long deferred set of fiscal challenges that could reshape U.S. foreign and security policy options.
Register for this event here.
2. Militancy and the Arab Spring, Monday November 19, 12:15 PM – 1:45 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: Peter Bergen, Leila Hilal, Souad Mekhennet
The deaths of four American diplomats in Benghazi, Libya in September, along with the reports of militant jihadists’ participation in the Syrian conflict, have given rise to serious concerns about the role of Islamist extremists in the various theaters of the “Arab Uprising.” Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups have suffered severe blows since 9/11, but the chaos and confusion surrounding the revolutions that have roiled the Arab world could provide such organizations with fertile ground for recruiting new members.
Register for this event here.
3. U.S.-India Military Engagement, Tuesday November 20, 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Karl F. Inderfurth, S. Amer Latif, Walter Doran
Bilateral military cooperation has deepened substantially between the U.S. and India over the past decade. The next challenge is to see whether military relations can transition to engagement that is more normal, routine, expected. Join the CSIS U.S.-India Chair and guest panelist Admiral (ret.) Walter Doran — who is featured in our October newsletter — for a discussion of the findings, recommendations, and conclusions of our latest report, entitled “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady as They Go.”
Register for this event here.
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