Tag: United States
When all you have is a hammer…
Both right and left (not to mention the middle) have so unanimously condemned Mitt Romney’s “A New Course for the Middle East” that it is unseemly to pile on, but I’ll do it anyway. He blamed President Obama for everything that has happened in the region, reiterated current U.S. policy goals and offered no idea of what he would do differently. Rumor has it that Karl Rove had a hand in this. I certainly can’t believe that Romney’s foreign policy advisors, some of whom sit within yards of where I am writing, would fail to recognize Romney’s lack of attention to ways and means.
But there is a deep reason for the lack of attention to ways and means: the only instruments the Romney/Ryan budget provides for are military ones, but the goals the candidate lays out require diplomacy, development assistance, state-building, law enforcement cooperation–in a word the whole panoply of civilian foreign policy instruments that they propose to slice well into the bone. This is a serious mistake, as is the impulse to retreat to fortress embassies and pull up the drawbridge.
What America needs now is more civilian outreach in the Middle East and the Muslim world generally. Romney and Ryan will not provide anything like the means required. Instead, they will provide military instruments. When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. This fallacy is playing out already in the Sahel, where the U.S. is contemplating the use of drones instead of thinking about strengthening local community resistance to the Muslim extremists who have taken over parts of northern Mali, Niger and Nigeria.
I have no doubt about the importance of military strength and economic vitality in determining what burdens the United States can carry. Mitt Romney wants to emphasize the former. Barack Obama wants to emphasize the latter. I’d like to see someone standing up for what Ambassador Chris Stevens and his colleagues represented: an approach to the world that seeks to match American interests with the interests of others, enabling the cooperative sharing of burdens and concerted action to reach common goals. Military action is always going to be an expensive option available only in the most challenging circumstances.
Diplomacy and its concomitants are not expensive. Foreign affairs amounts even today to less than 1% of the U.S. government budget (and less than 10% of the Pentagon’s). But diplomacy is difficult, time-consuming and all too often confusing. Americans simply don’t know what their diplomats do and why it is important. Nor has there been an effective effort at explanation. An enterprise that citizens don’t understand is not going to find the resources it needs to be effective, which of course leads to a further downward spiral of inadequate funding and disappointed expectations.
I dream of a day when two candidates like Romney and Obama will together declare that in addition to military strength and economic vitality, America needs diplomatic outreach. Maybe one of our fellow citizens will ask what role they see for diplomacy at the town meeting debate October 16. Or maybe Bob Schieffer will press the point at the third debate October 22.
The president is not only our commander-in-chief. He is also our diplomat-in-chief. I’d like to hear the candidates tell us what they plan to do in that role, and what resources they will require to do it well.
PS: I missed the semi-official response to Romney.
PPS: On the issue of our embassy posture, Wendy Chamberlin makes good sense.
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The Federation revisited
As some readers will know, I was known during the Bosnian war as Gospodin Federacije, because I was in charge of U.S. support to the Federation that had ended the 1992-4 Bosniak/Croat war and was supposed to govern on territory controlled by the Bosnian Republic Army and the Croat Defense Force. So when the Bosnian version of the Croatian daily Večernji list asked some questions (mildly edited here for English grammar and spelling), I replied:
1. How would you describe current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) having in mind that there’s no stable coalition on the state or entity level and everyone is trying to remove the other party from power?
DPS: I’d describe as you have: no stable coalition at the state or entity level and everyone trying to get rid of everyone else. That’s called politics in a sharply divided polity. At least it’s peaceful.
2. How much is BiH important to US and is it a major focus right now, and how would you coment on a more powerful engagement in this country?
DPS: Bosnia is way down the list of U.S. priorities today. I don’t think you can expect a more powerful U.S. engagement, unless things get really bad. Even then I’m not certain.
3. Is it time to shut down and relocate Office of the High Representative outside BiH and strengthen the role of Mr. Peter Sorensen and the European Union Special Representative in BiH?
DPS: I don’t see much purpose in relocating the OHR and it is clearly premature to shut him down. Peter Sorensen’s role is quite distinct from the OHR’s. And it has a narrower constituency.
4. A lot of Croat and Serb politicians reproach that U.S. administration for letting Turkey have broader political infulence in the BiH. Do You consider that approach productive or harmful?
DPS: I think Turkey has played a very positive role in many ways in the Balkans: peacekeeping, investment, trade, even politics. It is their backyard and they have every reason to try to make sure it evolves in a peaceful and European direction.
5. Many European diplomats to whom I’ve spoken consider that the Dayton experiment has shown its limits and weaknesses. Some of them told me as a matter of fact it’s failure. Would you like to take comment on that? Is it time for radical change?
DPS: European mouths are sometimes more active than their brains. I’d like to see their plan for radical change before commenting on it.
6. The Dayton political system gave key powers to three constituent national groups: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Key Croatian and Serb politicians consider that the imposition of national representatives in the previous two election cycles have caused the most serious crisis in this country. How is it possible to establish a system that would guarantee equal rights to all constituent national groups and from the other hand citizens having in mind also verdict in case Sejdic – Finci?
DPS: My view is that equal rights should be established on an individual basis and protected by the rule of law, not by group rights protected by thuggish political leaders. I don’t think there should be any ethnic criteria for the presidency of a country of which I am a citizen. But the perspective among many Bosnians is different, and I respect that.
7. How do you comment demands of the Croats in Bosnia, who are the most vulnerable ethnic group in Bosnia, for restructuring of the country in order to have equal rights with two other people. There’s always mentioning of the third entity!?
DPS: The Croats got a very good deal at Dayton: half the Federation and one-third of the state. That’s because they then held a stranglehold on the Federation and Croatia’s military power was vital. Now the military balance is irrelevant, Croatia is entering the European Union and therefore no longer a major factor inside Bosnia, and there are far fewer Croats in Bosnia than at the time of Dayton. Why would they get a better deal now than in 1995? If I were a nationalist Croat, I’d be cautious about reopening an agreement that was highly favorable to Croat nationalists.
8. Do you consider that development in Catalonia would have impact on BiH, maybe some new Dodik initiative?
DPS: No. Whatever happens in Catalonia, it is not based on the ethnic cleansing of more than half the population on its territory.
9. The US administration is lobbying for constitutional changes in the Federation of BiH. They have in mind to change the internal organization of the Federation. What is your view on this initiative?
DPS: I don’t understand it well enough to comment, but see my response to 7 above.
10. What would Croatian accession to the EU mean for BiH and the region?
DPS: I hope it will be inspiration to BiH, Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Kosovo to get their act together, as Croatia did, and meet the criteria for membership. At the same time, it may disrupt some trading and travel patterns and create some stresses in the rest of the Balkans. The important thing is to recognize that all of the Balkans should soon be members, but only if they make the necessary reforms.
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This week’s peace picks
There are good choices this week including the kickoff presidential debate.
1. How Should the Next American President Engage the World?, Monday October 1, 6:30 PM – 8:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: David Rothkopf, Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Thomas Friedman, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan
Foreign Policy’s David Rothkopf will moderate a debate with Thomas Friedman, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan, and Jessica T. Mathews. This debate, the second in a three-part series sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment, will focus on one of the key issues in this year’s election—How should the next American president engage the world?
Register for this event here.
2. Building Inclusive Societies: Transatlantic Perspectives on Multiculturalism and Integration, Tuesday October 2, 8:30 AM – 12:30 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: Francois Rivasseau, Rokhaya Diallo, Kubra Gumusay, Nasar Meer, Michael Privot, Emmanuel Kattan, Sonya Aziz, Eduardo Lopez Busquets, Justin Gest
Emerging European and American experts from the spheres of academia, policy making and the media will discuss their experiences and perspectives on this critical issue, including what Europe and the U.S. can learn from each other’s models of multiculturalism and integration. They will consider the challenges that both sides face in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment and improving levels of civic engagement among youth, particularly within emerging demographic groups.
RSVP for this event to Delegation-USA-EU-Events@eeas.europa.eu.
3. Women After the Arab Awakening, Tuesday October 2, 8:45 AM – 1:00 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Fifth Floor
Speakers: Dalia Ziada, Omezzine Khélifa, Rihab Elhaj, Fahmia Al Fotih, Hala Al Dosari, Honey Al Sayed, Gabool Almutawakel, Hanin Ghaddar, Yassmine ElSayed Hani, Haleh Esfandiari, Rangita de Silva de Alwis
9:00 – 11:00am PANEL 1: Today’s View from the Ground; Dalia Ziada – Egypt, Executive Director, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies; Omezzine Khélifa – Tunisia, Politician and Advisor, Ministry of Tourism; Rihab Elhaj – Libya, Co-founder and Executive Director, New Libya Foundation; Fahmia Al Fotih – Yemen, Communication analyst and youth focal point analyst, United Nations Population Fund; Hala Al Dosari – Saudi Arabia, Ph.D. candidate in health services research; Moderator: Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center
11:15 – 1:00pm PANEL 2: Tomorrow’s Prospects for Women in the Region; Honey Al Sayed – Syria, Director, Syria Program, Nonviolence International; Gabool Almutawakel – Yemen, Co-Founder, Youth Leadership Development Foundation; Hanin Ghaddar – Lebanon, Managing Editor, NOW News; Yassmine ElSayed Hani – Egypt, Independent Journalist, Foreign Desk, Al Akhbar daily newspaper; Moderator: Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Director, Global Women’s Leadership Initiative, Woodrow Wilson Center
4. The Missing Link: How Can the Pakistani Diaspora Improve U.S.-Pakistan Ties?, Tuesday October 2, 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Sixth Floor
Speaker: Irfan Malik, Aakif Ahmad
According to research produced by the Asian American Center for Advancing Justice, Pakistani-Americans are the second-fastest-growing Asian-American ethnic group. They are represented in a variety of professional fields, from medicine and accounting to construction and transport, and are known for their affluence and philanthropy. How can they help improve U.S.-Pakistan relations? What can they offer, and how can their resources and expertise be better tapped? This briefing marks the release of a series of recommendations, formulated by a working group of diaspora members convened by the Wilson Center.
5. Iraq Energy Outlook, Wednesday October 3, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Fatih Birol
The CSIS Energy and National Security Program is pleased to host Dr. Fatih Birol, Chief Economist and Director of Global Energy Economics at the IEA, to present highlights from the IEA’s recent World Energy Outlook Special Report, the Iraq Energy Outlook.
Iraq is already the world’s third-largest oil exporter. It has the resources and intention to increase its oil production vastly. Contracts are already in place.Will Iraq’s ambitions be realised? And what would the implications be for Iraq’s economy and for world oil markets? The obstacles are formidable: political, logistical, legal, regulatory, financial, lack of security and sufficient skilled labour. One example: in 2011, grid electricity could meet only 55% of demand.
The International Energy Agency has studied these issues with the support and close co-operation of the government of Iraq and many other leading officials, commentators, industry representatives and international experts. The report examines the role of the energy sector in the Iraqi economy today and in the future, assesses oil and gas revenues and investment needs, provides a detailed analysis of oil, gas and electricity supply through to 2035, highlighting the challenges of infrastructure development and water availability, and spells out the associated opportunities and risks, both for world oil markets and for Iraq’s economy and energy sector.
RSVP for this event to energy@csis.org.
6. Iran: Economic Troubles and International Sanctions, Wednesday October 3, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Fifth Floor
Speakers: Bijan Khajehpour, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Suzanne Maloney
By talking about such complexities (existence of a large grey economy, regional interdependencies, deep-rooted merchant tradition, existence of semi-state economic institution etc.), the speakers will address the issue why sanctions do not have the intended result in Iran. Lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
7. Post-Referendum South Sudan: Political Violence, New Sudan and Democratic Nation-Building, Wednesday October 3, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC, 20036, Room 736
Speaker: Christopher Zambakari
Christopher Zambakari, doctoral student in the Law and Policy Program at Northeastern University, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to itolber1@jhu.edu.
8. Breeding the Phoenix: An Analysis of the Military’s Role in Peacebuilding, Wednesday October 3, 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, Truland Building, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Room 555
Speaker: George F. Oliver, Ho Won Jeong, Solon Simmons, Dennis Sandole
There are numerous professional groups and individuals working for world peace. The reality is, however, that wars between nations or within nations still cause untold human deaths and casualties. World peace, a condition where war no longer affects human societies, is a long way off. This research focuses on how to end wars and restore a sustainable, positive peace to those who have experienced the horrors of war.
More specifically, this study focuses on the military’s role in peacebuilding. In the last twenty years, post-war peacebuilding has emerged as a powerful method that helps nations recover from war. Soldiers, whether they are part of an international intervention attempting to end the war or a member of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, have an important role to play. Today, soldiers do more than win their nation’s wars; they also help other nations and their citizens recover from war. In the last few decades, civilians from organizations like the United Nations, other intergovernmental organizations, other governments and nongovernmental organizations have responded to help nations recover from war or a violent conflict. There is no argument that civilians are better at peacebuilding than the military, yet the military is moving into this realm more and more.
So what are the roles of the military and civilians? This research project answers these questions. The critical factor in determining what the military does and what civilians do is based on security. If security is good, civilians can perform all the aspects of peacebuilding. Conversely, if security is lacking, then the military must step in and take on the various parts of peacebuilding. Security, however, is not like a light switch, on or off, good or bad. It is more like a rheostat with varying degrees of security. This research defines five levels of security and then seeks to find the fine lines where civilians can replace the military in peacebuilding functions.
Current peacebuilding ideas have evolved from practice, but behind that practice are some relevant conflict and conflict resolution theories. These theories are explored and ideas for future peacebuilders are identified. Analysis of real world peacebuilding has led to the creation of various functions that help peacebuilders restore a society after a war. These functional areas are: security, humanitarian assistance, governance, rule of law, infrastructure restoration, economic development and reconciliation. Who performs each of these functional areas is directly related to the security conditions.
This research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how security impacts the role of the military in peacebuilding. Qualitatively, two case studies are explored, post-World War II Germany and Kosovo. Quantitatively, this research explored the issue through a questionnaire that was taken by 579 soldiers, civilians and experts in peacebuilding. In the end, the hypothesis was proven that the military’s role in peacebuilding is inversely linked to the level of security. If security is sufficient, civilians do the work; and if security is deficient, then the military’s role is larger.
9. Aiding the Arab Transitions: US Economic Engagement with Egypt, Wednesday October 3, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Stimson Center
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Twelfth Floor
Speakers: Caroline Atkinson, Amb. William Taylor, James Harmon, Mona Yacoubian
With the Middle East still reeling from a spate of anti-American violence, US relations with Egypt, perhaps the most important Arab country in transition, hang in the balance. Just prior to the outbreak of unrest in Cairo, the largest American trade delegation ever to the Middle East completed its historic visit to Egypt. The trade group’s trip came on the heels of a senior US delegation to Cairo to negotiate a $1 billion debt relief deal. In addition, the US government has assembled a package of financing and loan guarantees for American investors and recently established a $60 million US-Egypt Enterprise Fund. With persistent unemployment, low economic growth and anemic foreign investment, the Egyptian economy is struggling as Egypt attempts to meet the challenges of its historic transition. Meanwhile, the recent unrest has spurred calls inside the United States to withdraw its economic support from countries such as Egypt.
A distinguished panel will discuss the role of US economic engagement with Egypt, how this engagement fits into a broader US strategy on the Arab transitions, and the role US economic engagement can play in ensuring a more positive future for Egypt.
Register for this event here.
10. Afghanistan and the Politics of Regional Economic Integration in Central and South Asia, Wednesday October 3, 5:30 PM – 7:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium
Speakers: Jawed Ludin
Jawed Ludin, deputy foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, will discuss this topic. A reception will precede the event at 5:00 PM.
RSVP for this event to saiscaciforums@jhu.edu.
11. Syria After Assad: Managing the Challenges of Transition, Thursday October 4, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Jim Marshall, Amr al-Azm, Afra Jalabi, Murhaf Jouejati, Rafif Jouejati, Rami Nakhla
The Syrian revolution has taken a terrible toll. Tens of thousands of Syrians have been killed and hundreds of thousands wounded. Millions have been forced from their homes. Urban centers have been destroyed, villages bombed, and communities subjected to horrific brutality at the hands of regime forces and Assad’s loyalist militias. The fabric of Syrian society is fraying under the pressure of escalating sectarian tensions. The militarization of the revolution and the proliferation of armed opposition units pose long term challenges for rule of law and security. Damage to infrastructure and to the Syrian economy will require tens of billions of dollars to repair.
How much longer the Assad regime will survive is uncertain. When it falls, a new government will face daunting challenges. How will the Syrian opposition respond? Will a new government be able to address the urgent needs of Syrians for humanitarian relief, economic and social reconstruction, and provide basic rule of law and security? Even today, in liberated areas of Syria where a post-Assad transition is already underway, the opposition must demonstrate its capacity to address these challenges.
Over the past year, a group of opposition activists collaborated to develop recommendations and strategies for managing the challenges of a post-Assad transition. Join us for the first presentation in the United States of the document they produced: “The Day After: Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria.”
Register for this event here.
12. U.S.-Egyptian Relations: Where is the Bilateral Relationship Headed?, Thursday October 4, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Center for National Policy, One Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, Suite 333
Speakers: Perry Cammack, Stephen McInerney, Shibley Telhami, Gregory Aftandilian
The slow and initial tepid response of the new Egyptian leadership to the attack on the U.S. embassy in Cairo has led many observers to question the efficacy of the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship and caused some members of Congress to advocate for a cut in U.S. assistance. On the other hand, both Egyptian and U.S. officials have indicated that they want the bilateral relationship to be maintained, as each side has equities it wants to protect. Please join CNP Senior Fellow for the Middle East, Gregory Aftandilian, and a panel of experts to analyze this situation and give their assessments on where the bilateral relationship is headed. A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
13. Systematic Approaches to Conflict Mapping, Friday October 5, 10:00 AM – 1:00 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, Truland Building, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Rome 555
Speakers: Sara Cobb, Alison Castel
Conflict-affected societies are complex adaptive environments that often present peacebuilders and policy makers with difficult or “wicked problems.” One movement in the field is to take more holistic or integrated approaches to working with societal conflict.
Systems mapping of conflicts is one tool that is being used to enable peacebuilders to grapple effectively with the complexity these environments present. Dr. Robert Ricigliano will introduce participants to the technique of systems mapping of conflicts as a tool for assessment and planning for peacebuilding operations.
14. Paul Collier – “Making Natural Resources Work for Development,” Friday October 5, 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: Paul Collier
Professor Collier has been the Director of the Research Development Department of the World Bank for 5 years from 1998 to 2003. His research covers fragile states, democratization, and the management of natural-resources in low-income societies. Professor Collier is the author of The Bottom Billion, which in 2008 won the Lionel Gelber, Arthur Ross and Corine Prizes and in May 2009 was the joint winner of the Estoril Global Issues Distinguished Book Prize. His second book, Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places was published in March 2009; and his latest book, The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature, in May 2010. He is currently advisor to the Strategy and Policy Department of the International Monetary Fund, and advisor to the Africa Region of the World Bank. In 2008, he was appointed Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) ‘for services to scholarship and development’. In 2011 he was elected to the Council of the Royal Economic Society.
Register for this event here.
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An eloquent day
The day has overflowed with high-minded eloquence: Obama at the General Assembly and the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) and Romney at the CGI All solid, well-thought-through presentations. Obama focused on universal values and aspirations at the UNGA, then on human trafficking at the CGI. Romney focused on improving the way in which we provide assistance internationally.
I can’t really fault much of what either said. I agree with Obama that the violence we’ve seen in the past two weeks is inexcusable, that the video precipitating the demonstrations that killed American diplomats as well as dozens of Muslims is reprehensible, that our values nevertheless prevent it from being suppressed and also require an end to human trafficking. I also agree with his support for the Arab awakening and in particular for an end to Bashar al Assad’s reign of terror in Syria. I agree with Romney that we need to reshape foreign assistance so that it creates conditions for private initiative and growth, which too often it does not.
The real significance is, as usual, in what they did not say. Obama offered no new ideas or action on Syria. He did not mention North Korea and touched only once on Pakistan. I imagine Pyongyang got off easy because there are growing signs of economic reform there, and less bellicosity. It is hard to say anything nice about the People’s Republic, so better not to say anything. That’s more or less the case with reprobate Pakistan as well: the billions poured into its coffers seem to have bought neither economic development nor friendship. I’d like to see Romney’s approach to foreign aid applied in Pakistan. It is unlikely to be less fruitful than what we’ve done in the past, under both Democratic and Republican administrations.
There was no easing of the President’s rhetoric or substantive position on the Iranian nuclear program. He rules out containment and makes it clear the United States will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Romney may doubt his credibility, but I don’t. I think the United States is sliding inexorably towards being locked into military action against Iran if diplomacy fails, which it well might. Both political parties have staked out strong positions that will push any president in the direction of war if Iran moves definitively to build a nuclear weapon. That is a very good reason to make the diplomatic push as strong as possible, since war with Iran is not going to be a simple matter.
As for Romney, he may have a grand new vision of American foreign assistance, but little or no financing for it if Paul Ryan’s budget plans come to fruition. Unlike his grand critique of Obama, Romney’s aid ideas are well-crafted. Too bad none of it would be likely to happen if he were to become president. If Obama is smart–and there is every indication he is that–he’ll poach a bit from the Romney ideas in his second term. It won’t be plagiarism–these are ideas floating around already and in part adopted over the past four years. But Obama could and should be a lot bolder in demanding from aid recipients the kinds of serious reform that Romney alludes to.
So there is little new ground broken in today’s eloquence, but a good deal to suggest that a bipartisan foreign policy is not so far out of reach, even in our highly polarized times. That would be refreshing.
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Obama’s second term international priorities
I admit to being cheered last weekend looking at the TPM Electoral Scoreboard. It has President Obama over the 270 electoral votes needed to win, counting only the states that strongly favor, favor or lean in his direction. All the toss-up states save North Carolina are showing thin margins in favor of the President. Key Senate races in Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Virginia are likewise showing small margins for the Democratic contenders. It is still a long time (and three nationally televised debates) to election day, but the drift for the moment is clear.
The President is also getting over 50 per cent approval for his handling of foreign policy. Far be it from me to want to rain on his parade, but I think he should do more and better on international issues in the future.
The President hasn’t had much to say about what he would do on foreign policy in a second term, apart from completing the U.S. turnover of security responsibility to the Afghans (as well as withdrawing more troops) and preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, preferably by diplomatic means but if necessary using force. He hasn’t said much on the Middle East peace process (such as it isn’t), maintained silence on Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s re-concentration of power, showed reluctance to do anything about Syria, hesitated to challenge China, and lacks new ideas on Pakistan and Russia.
I don’t say all this is wrong. Hesitation with China definitely beats Romney’s bellicosity, which will create the animosity we need to avoid. China has already revalued its currency significantly, something the President might want to take more credit for. It is not at all clear to me what he can do about Pakistan or Russia at this point. Maybe let them stew in its own juices for a while, until they soften up. The choices in Syria are difficult ones. Doing anything more will have real costs.
America needs, as the President never fails to say, to put its own house in order. Nation-building at home he calls it. But I would still like to know what his foreign policy priorities will be in 2013-17. The fact that Mitt Romney has failed to force Obama to specify more clearly his future foreign policy priorities is just one of the many shortcomings in a Republican campaign that will be remembered for its many unforced errors and lapses in good judgment.
But there are a few things even a convinced Obamista like me would like to see the President do or say. With no need to worry about re-election after November 6, I hope he’ll get tough with both Israelis and Palestinians. Admittedly he tried during the first term, insisting on a complete settlement freeze. But this was an ill-conceived formulation that led to intransigence on both sides rather than progress. The situation in Syria has deteriorated so badly that it may be worth another run in the Security Council at a no-fly zone. Once the Americans are down to whatever minimum numbers are required in Afghanistan, I hope Obama will find ways to toughen his stance with Pakistan. Iraq, too, needs a bit tougher love.
But none of these things comes close to the big one: avoiding a nuclear Iran and the proliferation of nuclear weapons it will precipitate. This is the overwhelming first priority, as it threatens a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East and a sharp increase in the risks of war, even nuclear war, there. Israel lacks the means to do serious and permanent damage to Iran’s nuclear program with conventional weapons, but it has all it needs to obliterate Iran with nuclear weapons.
If we fail to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the prospects are grim. What do you think Israel is likely to do if it perceives that Iran is getting ready to launch a nuclear weapon targeted on Tel Aviv? Will it wait and see whether the Iranians are, as many people think, “rational actors”? Or will it try to ensure that none of Iran’s missiles will ever get to launch? Launch on warning, which is what the Israelis will most likely do, is inherently unstable.
Lots of my colleagues are having second looks at containment, because the prospects for conventional military action against the Iranian nuclear program look so limited. Admittedly, containment is the fallback position.
But containment with two convincing rational actors who have the better part of an hour to make decisions, the best conceivable communications with each other and no serious threat to regime survival other than a single adversary is one thing. Containment with two actors who each believe the other is irrational (both could even be right), one of whom has less than full confidence in regime survivability even without a war, maybe 10 minutes to make decisions, and no reliable communications is something else. Yes, India and Pakistan have survived almost 15 years without using nuclear weapons on each other, and the increasing trade between the two creates disincentives to war. But a nuclear exchange between the two is still far more likely than war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And we are a long way from trade between Iran and Israel as a barrier to conflict.
Andrew Sullivan, in a fit of hopefulness, comments:
To date, Obama’s response has been like Reagan’s: provide unprecedented military defense systems for Israel, deploy our best technology against Iran, inflict crippling sanctions, and yet stay prepared, as Reagan did, to deal with the first signs of sanity from Tehran. Could Obama find an Iranian Gorbachev? Unlikely. But no one expected the Soviet Union to collapse as Reagan went into his second campaign either, and it had not experienced a mass revolt in his first term, as Iran did in Obama’s. And yet by isolation, patience, allied unity, and then compromise, the unthinkable happened. I cannot say I am optimistic—but who saw the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1984?
Hope however is not a policy. What should Obama do to try to resolve the Iran nuclear issue in a second term?
The Administration has been understandably reluctant to put a serious package of incentives for Iran to forgo a nuclear weapon on the table before the U.S. election. Negotiating a deal with Iran is not going to help on November 6. But I hope after November 6 the Administration will make a direct and convincing offer to Tehran: temporary suspension of enrichment, a full accounting of past activities, tight and unfettered safeguards, no enrichment ever above 20%, no stockpiles of enriched uranium in a form that can be further enriched, and a permanent commitment not to seek nuclear weapons in exchange for full sanctions relief. That would be a policy, not a hope.
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The unlikely parade
According to Serbia’s constitution, all citizens have the right to a peaceful demonstration. Homosexuals appear to be exempt from the rule. Even though LGBT activists announced several months in advance their plan to stage the Gay Pride events, including the parade, September 30-October 7. Serbian prime and interior minister Ivica Dačić recently stressed that the demonstration could be banned if the police assess the security risks as too high. Dačić added that he basically supports human rights of all people, including homosexuals, but is not going to risk the lives and safety of his policemen and potential participants of the parade.
Last year the Pride Parade was banned at the eleventh hour. The official explanation was that far right extremists were planning terrorist actions. No further information has been released since, nor has anyone been arrested in connection with these allegations. Organizers now fear the government will use the security risks as an excuse to ban Pride once again.
The issue is weightier than a few demonstrators in Belgrade. Now a candidate for EU membership, Serbia is hoping to get a date to start accession talks, which brings with it substantial financing. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Reeker was among the first foreign diplomats to state public support to the Pride organizers. Several EU officials – including Jelko Kacin, the European parliament rapporteur for Serbia – have confirmed their attendance. While this year’s Gay Pride may not be crucial for Serbia’s further progress toward EU membership – at least not to the extent that improvement in relations with Kosovo is – the Europeans will certainly take it into account when deliberating on whether the country merits the date.
The first attempt by LGBT organizations to hold the parade was in 2001. The event ended in chaos, with participants brutally battered by football hooligans and militant ultranationalists. The organizers accused the police of deliberately failing to protect them. Scenes from television reports suggest they may well have been right.
Frightened of violence, LGBT activists were not even thinking of organizing the parade again until 2009, but the government eventually decided to disallow it. The decision has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court only recently, which gives the LGBT community some hope that this year the tide might be turned.
In 2010, hundreds of Serbian lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transexuals were finally allowed to occupy a strictly enclosed area of the capital for about an hour, completely surrounded by cordons of police. Whether the demonstration was a success is debatable however. While the participants suffered no attack during the rally thanks to the immense security presence, the rest of the town saw a series of clashes between hooligans and riot police, who were ordered to show as much restraint toward rioters as possible. Belgrade was trashed. Of about 200 injured, a large majority were policemen. The government was believed to have allowed the demonstration only to improve its chances of getting EU candidate status.
Serbia is a conservative society and people generally oppose the gay parade. Although most of them disapprove violence against the LGBT population, they also believe that homosexuals should not express their sexual identity in public places. Homophobia is mainly present among younger generations. Teenagers are the most violent members of extreme nationalist and football hooligan groups.
In addition to the issue of human rights in general and gay rights in particular, the government’s hesitancy raises the question of Serbia’s institutional capability to guarantee its citizens an elementary level of safety. There is a widespread belief that the militant far right groups consist entirely of “kids” from the margins of society who use violence merely as a way to express frustration. While that may be true for some of the low-level operatives, the bulk of their leaders – especially of football hooligan groups – are well situated individuals with criminal records that involve serious offenses such as armed robberies, drug trade, extortion, murder attempts and so on.
Despite their criminal activities, most of these extremists have rarely, if ever, been brought to justice. The support they enjoy from the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), which is the most popular and influential institution in the country, helps them gain legitimacy among ordinary people and portray themselves as the “ultimate guardians of the Serb Orthodoxy and heroic tradition.” Outgoing Russian ambassador Aleksandr Konuzin – who is almost as popular here as SPC – was photographed with members of far right groups on several occasions, including his visit to the Serbs from northern Kosovo.
Militant ultranationalists were most privileged during the prime ministry of former conservative nationalist prime minister Vojislav Koštunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which ended in 2008 after an attack on the U.S. embassy building in Belgrade amid riots against Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The order for security forces to withdraw could not have been issued except by a top police or government official, but even four years later it still remains a mystery who was in command that day.
Several other cases have also clearly illustrated the strength of Serbian far right militants. During the 2010 gay parade, they demonstrated not only surprisingly high organizational capabilities, but also considerable knowledge of guerrilla tactics in their battle with police. Last year evidence appeared in some media of young Serbs attending Russian camps to learn military skills. Perhaps the most notable example was a few years ago, when leaders of a football hooligan group managed to wiretap police communications prior to a derby match and thus learn about police plans to prevent them from fighting with rival fans.
The overal number of militant extremists in Serbia is estimated to be between ten and fifteen thousand. Most, if not all, of them are well known to the police and intelligence agencies. Professor Zoran Dragišić, a prominent security expert, has asserted that it would have taken the Gendarmerie no more than seventeen minutes to arrest the vast majority of violent militants. So far there has been no indication of political will to order such a nationwide police operation. It’s high time.
PS from Daniel Serwer 2 October: Milan is not the only Serbian citizen who sees possible cancellation of the parade as reflecting badly on the security services.
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