Tag: United States
This week’s peace picks
Africa and India take the spotlight in this relatively quiet week:
1. Assessing Governance in Rwanda, 10:00am-11:30am, Tuesday, August 7
Venue: International Republican Institute
The International Republican Institute’s Democratic Governance Speakers Series and the Atlantic Council invite you to a discussion on governance in Rwanda with Professor Anastase Shyaka, Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board; and Dr. J. Peter Pham, the Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Professor Shyaka and Dr. Pham will discuss Rwanda’s governance model and the successes and challenges facing Rwanda in terms of democratic governance.
Speakers:
Anastase Shyaka is currently Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board. Previously, Professor Shyaka was Director of the Center for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda. Professor Shyaka is a leading expert on governance and political development in Rwanda and the great lakes region, having worked on many studies and publications focused on peace and conflict analysis, democracy, governance, and international relations. His academic accomplishments also include being named a Fulbright Scholar in Residence at George Mason University and Nothern Virginia Community College. Professor Shyaka holds a Ph.D. in Political Science.
J. Peter Pham is Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Pham was previously a tenured Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and African Studies at James Madison University, where he also served as Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs. A staunch advocate of robust American engagement with Africa, Dr. Pham has served on many of IRI’s election monitoring delegations to Africa, including Liberia (2005), Nigeria (2007, 2011) and Somaliland (2010). He is also a frequent guest lecturer on African affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the Joint Special Operations University, the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management and other U.S. government professional educational institutions.
2. An Indian Perspective on US Strategic Goals in Asia, 6:00pm-7:45pm, Thursday, August 9
Venue: School of International Studies Kenney Auditorium
Much has been talked about the U.S.-India strategic relationship in the last few months in Washington D.C., but mostly from a U.S. perspective. The Obama Administration has begun to pivot US power more toward Asia, recognizing the growing economic importance of Asia to U.S. interests and the heightened threat posed by challenges and instability in the region. While India generally has a sympathetic view of U.S. goals, there are a number of important differences as well as an Indian determination to control its own foreign policy objectives.
Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, a former senior Foreign Service officer of India, will lead a discussion of an Indian view of the growing U.S. presence in Asia and what that means for India and its interests. Ambassador Sreenivasan served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington D.C. during 1997-2000, and as India’s Ambassador to several countries including Austria and Slovenia. He also served as India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Governor for India to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
3. The Legacy of Iran’s Green Movement: Film Screening and Discussion, 6:00pm-9:00pm, Thursday, August 9
Venue: West End Cinema, 2301 M Street NW
POMED is pleased to host a public screening of the groundbreaking documentary The Green Wave (2010), which examines the 2009 protests in Iran against the fraudulent presidential elections that summer and the subsequent crackdown on pro-democracy activists, members of what became known as the Green Movement. The film – a collage of direct video footage, live interviews, Facebook and Twitter accounts, and animation – won awards in 2011 at the Hamburg Filmfest, IDFA Amsterdam, and the Sundance Film Festival, and it will be released in theaters in the U.S. on August 10th and available on Movies on Demand.
To provide context for the film, Iran experts Alireza Nader, Jamal Abdi, and Suzanne Maloney will provide remarks about the legacy of Iran’s Green Movement, what effect it has had across the region, and opportunities for international actors to constructively and peacefully support democratic change in Iran. Why is the Green Movement important now, three years after mass street protests garnered international attention? How are pro-democracy efforts in Iran viewed in the Arab world, particularly in light of the 2011 Arab uprisings? How did the emergence of Iran’s Green Movement affect U.S. interactions with Iran, and how can the U.S. relationship with the Iranian people be renewed and leveraged in a way that helps Iranians achieve their aspirations for a more representative government and freer country?
6:00-6:30pm
Drink reception, patio of the West End Cinema
6:30-7:15pm
Panel discussion featuring:
Alireza Nader
Senior International Policy Analyst, Rand Corporation
Jamal Abdi
Policy Director, National Iranian American Council
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution
Moderator: Stephen McInerney
Executive Director, POMED
7:30-9:00pm
Film Screening: The Green Wave
4. Ambassador of the Gambia to the US Discusses Food Crisis, 6:30pm-8:00pm, Thursday August 9
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Join us on August 9 for a discussion with the Ambassador of The Gambia to the United States Alieu Ngum as he addresses the bilateral U.S.-Gambia relationship in the context of regional economic, political, and social issues.
The Gambia is facing a severe food crisis due to water shortages and crop failure in the West Africa region. Ambassador Ngum’s remarks will open with his government’s response to the crisis and his diplomatic role with bilateral and multilateral policymakers in Washington, D.C. He will also touch upon prospects for economic development in the context of a food crisis, regional security concerns that arise in the short and long term, and civil society’s response to national disasters in The Gambia.
The Ambassador Series offers YPFP General Members the opportunity to have a frank and informal discussion with an important member of the Washington diplomatic community. As a premier organization committed to mutual understanding and dialogue, YPFP seeks to engage Washington’s diplomatic community on a number of issues related to U.S. foreign policy, international cooperation and public diplomacy through this highly successful series.
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The worst of all possible worlds
It is getting hard to keep score, though this graphic from Al Jazeera English may help. Today’s big news is the defection of Syria’s prime minister, who didn’t like Bashar al Asad’s “war crimes and genocide.” About time he noticed. There are reports also of more military defections, even as the battle for Aleppo continues.
Does any of this matter? Or does Bashar get to hold on to his shrinking turf despite going into hiding and losing the support of regime stalwarts?
Michael Hanna offers an important part of the answer in a Tweet this morning:
Syrian defections follow strictly sectarian pattern, likely hardening core support. 1st big Alawi defection, if it comes,will be devastating
The Asad regime is increasingly relying on a narrow base of Alawite/Shia (about 12-13% of the population) support, as Sunnis (like the prime minister) peel away and denounce Bashar’s violence against the civilian population, which is majority Sunni. Christians and Druze have also been distancing themselves, and Kurds have taken up arms against the regime (without however aligning themselves with the opposition). The opposition draws its strength from the majority population and is supported by Sunni powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. What we are witnessing is a regional sectarian war in the making, one that could last a long time and involve ever-widening circles in the Levant.
The Alawites fight tenaciously because they think they know what is coming. This is an “existential” war for them: if the lose, they believe they will be wiped out.
That, along with Russian and Iranian support, could make this go on for a long time. If it does, the consequences for Syria and the region will be devastating. Damascus has already unleashed extremist Syrian Kurds to attack inside Turkey. Jordan is absorbing more than 100,000 Syrian refugees. Iraq’s efforts to guard its border with Syria have led to a confrontation with its own Kurdish peshmerga. Fighting between Sunnis and Alawites has spread to Lebanon, which is also absorbing large numbers of Syrian refugees. The Syrian opposition claims to have captured 48 Iranians in Damascus, sent there to help the regime (Tehran unabashedly claims they were religious pilgrims).
Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of sectarian polarization is an interest broadly shared in the international community. As The Economist pointed out last week, Russian interests won’t be served if Syria descends into total chaos. Some would like to suggest that territorial separation is a solution. This is nonsense: no one will agree on the lines to be drawn, which will be decided by force of arms directed against the civilian population. That is the truth of what happened in Bosnia, however much the myth-makers delude themselves.
There are several ways the violence might end:
- a definitive victory by the opposition (it is hard now to picture a definitive victory by the regime).
- an international intervention to separate the warring forces and impose what the U.S. military likes to call a “safe and secure environment.”
- a coup from within the regime, followed by a “pacted” (negotiated) transition.
Any of these would be better than continuation of the current chaos, which is the worst of all possible worlds. But I’m afraid that is the mostly likely course of events until Moscow and Washington get together and decide to collaborate in ending the bloodshed.
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Circling the square
Joyce Karam of Al Hayat yesterday asked me some interesting questions about Iraq, Iran, Syria and the United States. Here are her questions and my answers:
Q. Where does the US relation with Nouri Maliki stand today? Is he a valuable
ally or more of a necessary one?
A. Maliki is both a valuable and a necessary partner (rather than ally). Necessary because he holds power in Iraq, which is a key country in the Middle East, one that is increasing its oil exports rapidly. That is something the Obama administration greatly appreciates. Valuable because the Americans view him as at least partly cooperative on Syria and Iran, as well as on oil production.
Q. Where does Maliki himself stand inside Iraq? How much has the Barzani-Sadr-Allawi alliance damaged him?
A. I don’t think they’ve done him much real damage. He has outmaneuvered his
political opponents, who seem unable to win a confidence vote in parliament
and more unable to construct an alternative majority.
Q. How do you read Ankara’s rapprochement with Barzani? Should it make Baghdad nervous?
A. Ankara’s rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds is in my view the natural course of things. So long as Kurdistan is willing to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK, there is no reason for Turkey not to enjoy a good relationship with relatively secular (but still Muslim) Kurdistan. There is a lot of money to be made from investment opportunities in Kurdistan, and from trade across the border, including in oil. Baghdad has a choice: it can resist the development of close Turkey/Kurdistan relations, or it can jump on that
bandwagon and enhance its own relations with Ankara. I wish they would do the latter.
Q. Has Turkey miscalculated given the increasing armed Kurdish activity on
Syrian border?
A. I don’t think so. Turkey has known that opposition to the Asad regime would bring retaliation from Damascus in the form of encouragement to extremist Kurds to attack inside Turkey. That is one of the risks Turkey decided to run when it supported the Syrian opposition. Turkey will eventually want the Syrian Kurds to do what the Iraqi Kurds have done: help restrain the more radical Kurds and open up to Turkish trade and investment. There is no reason that can’t happen in a post-Asad Syria.
Q. The US wants the Arab states to engage Maliki, would that help in making him less dependent on Iran?
A. Of course the Sunni Arab states should engage Maliki, but I don’t think they are ever going to be completely comfortable with Maliki, whom they don’t trust. The most important factor in Iraq’s international alignment is the route by which its oil is exported. If it continues to be exported through the Gulf within range of Iranian guns, Tehran will have enormous influence in Iraq. If the Iraqis wisely begin to diversify and export more oil to the north and west, via pipelines that will have to be built in the future, then
Iraq will be tied more tightly to the West.
Q. If the Syrian regime falls, how do you see that impacting politics inside Iraq?
Any new regime in Syria will be less aligned with Iran and more aligned with the Sunni Arab states. That will create initially some strains with Maliki, but there will still be a lot of common interests, including I hope the prospect of exports of oil from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean.
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Impractical, unenforceable and unwise
A Free Syrian Army (FSA) leader (the Guardian says he is Mustafa al-Sheikh, identified as head of the FSA supreme military council) says:
The fighting is like hit and run, we are not aiming to get control of any city in Syria, but we want to exhaust the regime and speed up its collapse.
This is the most sensible thing I’ve heard out of the FSA, which is still vastly outgunned and outmanned by the Syrian Army. Unfortunately, English-language press coverage seems to focus almost exclusively on the question of territorial control, which not only changes rapidly but is also irrelevant to the outcome of the civil war.
The ebb and flow of control over territory creates enormous risks for civilians who can’t escape to other areas. Collaboration–even if forced or unavoidable–with one side brings retaliation by the other, even as civilians find themselves unable to obtain adequate food and water, not to mention electricity, cooking fuel and health services. We are in the midst of a major humanitarian disaster in Aleppo and other population centers in Syria.
The international response is thoroughly insufficient. Anne-Marie Slaughter proposes a major escalation:
It is time for bold action, of the kind Mr Obama took in deciding to go after Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and to intervene in Libya. In Syria this would mean putting together a coalition of countries that would commit to providing heavy weapons (and possibly air cover) to all commanders on the ground who sign the “Declaration of Values” supporting a democratic and pluralist Syria put forward by the nine commanding generals of the military council of the FSA. To receive weapons, these commanders must show they control safe zones and admit foreign journalists, civil society activists and the UN to monitor the implementing of the declaration’s principles. They must also allow citizen journalists to upload photographs of what they witness to an official website maintained by the coalition.
The problem is this: the escalation Slaughter proposes could well make things worse rather than better.
Heavy weapons are not going to reduce the intensity or likely even the duration of an increasingly sectarian war. Nor will a “declaration of values” from revolutionaries who are already carrying out summary battlefield executions. The Asad regime will treat the “safe zones” she insists upon as target-rich environments and subject them to intense shelling. The logistics of food and other supplies in these zones will burden the rebellion with responsibilities it will find hard to discharge.
What about our relationship with Qatar and Saudi Arabia suggests that we could constrain their arms supplies in the way Slaughter suggests? They are far more likely to impose their own conditions: arms only to Sunnis, preferably religious ones.
The escalation Slaughter proposes will likely also make Russia abandon the P5+1 talks with Iran. Moscow could also make life more difficult for the U.S. by squeezing the northern distribution network for supplies into Afghanistan, though that option would be far less effective now that Pakistan has reopened its roads and border crossing points.
Some stable liberated areas may well emerge–a number of Kurdish towns along Syria’s border with Turkey seem already to fall in that category. But requiring that the rebellion give up its “hit and run” tactics is not wise. As Bashar al Asad seems to have declared in his latest statement from unknown whereabouts, Syria’s fate will be determined on the battlefield. I would have wished it otherwise, not least because the military forces are likely to dominate Syria’s post-Asad transition.
But best now to leave the military tactics to military people to decide. The highly conditioned transfer of weapons Slaughter proposes is impractical, unenforceable and unwise.
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What Romney forgot in Poland
The American press, always anxious to cover itself, is boiling over about the rudeness of a Mitt Romney press aide to the cordoned reporters during a visit to the war memorial in Poland.
Without wanting in any way to excuse the rudeness, the Romney-ites have a point on the merits: this was not the time or place for aggressive (and pretty stupid) press questions. Better for the journalists to write about how Romney is avoiding press questions during this trip than to embarrass themselves by trying to ask them at the wrong place and time.
More interesting was Romney’s “foreign policy speech” in Warsaw. The foreign policy content is minimal and by now expected: Romney once again relies on appeals to will and inspiration as the deciding factors in history. He likes our friends and despises our enemies but gives no clear idea how he would handle the latter, except through military strength. How that works with Belarus I have no idea.
The more important message is about domestic policy:
The world should pay close attention to the transformation of Poland’s economy. A march toward economic liberty and smaller government has meant a march toward higher living standards, a strong military that defends liberty at home and abroad, and an important and growing role on the international stage.
Rather than heeding the false promise of a government-dominated economy, Poland sought to stimulate innovation, attract investment, expand trade, and live within its means. Your success today is a reminder that the principles of free enterprise can propel an economy and transform a society.
At a time of such difficulty and doubt throughout Europe, Poland’s economic transformation over these past 20 years is a fitting turn in the story of your country. In the 1980s, when other nations doubted that political tyranny could ever be faced down or overcome, the answer was, “Look to Poland.” And today, as some wonder about the way forward out of economic recession and fiscal crisis, the answer once again is “Look to Poland”.
Unfortunately for Romney, the Solidarity trade union that had the inspiration and will to challenge the Polish Communist regime does not agree with Romney’s anti-union stances or its former leader’s endorsement of him.
What we’ve got here is a blatant attempt to get the United States to follow a Polish model to prosperity, ignoring the obvious differences in starting points. The United States has nowhere near the government-dominated economy that Poland had in the late 1980s. Nor would Romney like to hear, I suppose, that Poland has a national health care system:
To obtain free health services you have to be insured by a health care provider that has contracts with the regional branch of the National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia, NFZ)….Polish citizens, permanent residents in Poland as well as employees of Polish companies need to be insured with a Polish health insurance.
I don’t regard having a national health care system as an infringement on freedom, but the post-Massachusetts Romney does. Funny he didn’t mention Poland’s compulsory national insurance in his paean to the Polish model.
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Farewell Pristina
I traveled back to the U.S. yesterday, leaving behind this interview in English, published by Pristina’s Daily Express in Albanian:
Q. Finally there is a government in place in Belgrade, a few months after the elections there. What are the chances now for a dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, and the possibility of achieving eventual results?
A. It is too early to tell. The new prime minister Ivica Dacic has said some good things: he will give priority to Serbia’s economy, he is demoting the bureaucracy that is dedicated to Kosovo, and he says he will implement the agreements already reached with Pristina. But we have not only to hear what the new government says, but see what it does.
Q. On Friday there were contradictory signals in the Serbian Parliament during the government’s oath. Prime minister Ivica Dacic said that he will remain committed to keep Kosovo within the Serbian borders, but he appeared ready to continue the dialogue and to implement the agreements reached.
A. The Serbian constitution requires that Kosovo remain part of Serbia, so really Dacic has no choice about that. Serbia’s politicians created an enormous obstacle for themselves when in that the 2006 constitution. Continuation of the dialogue is not an end but a means. Let’s see if he fulfills the promise to implement the agreements already reached.
Q. What do you expect in the following phases as regards the relations Kosovo-Serbia? Can they be normalized soon?
A. I expect very little, but I do hope Serbia will recognize that its own interests are best served by normalization. Normalization means to me that Belgrade and Pristina should have representatives in each others’ capitals and accept each others’ territorial integrity. Belgrade is still far from that. I’m not sure Kosovo is quite ready for that either.
Q. How do you view the Kosovar diplomacy compared to the Serb one?
A. Serbian diplomacy is well-established and has been tactically very good: it has slowed recognitions and gained the presidency of the General Assembly. It has convinced too many countries that independent Kosovo is a threat to regional peace and security.
But I don’t really see what good any of that will do in the end. Recognitions are coming and will continue to come. The General Assembly presidency will end in a year, when I hope to see Kosovo with well over 100 recognitions.
Serbia lost its case at the International Court of Justice when it asked for an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and its policies in northern Kosovo have created serious problems with organized crime and political violence that have already delayed the opening of Serbia’s negotiations for EU membership.
Slowing things down really doesn’t help Belgrade if it hurts Serbia’s EU prospects and the eventual outcome in Kosovo is the same.
Q. There was criticism that Kosovo diplomacy has not functioned properly. How do you see this?
A. You are up against a tough and experienced opponent with longstanding ties around the world and backing from Moscow. Kosovo’s diplomatic apparatus is still young and under construction–you are little known in many parts of the world. The European Union has split on Kosovo, with five members not recognizing. You have often had to rely a good deal on the Americans, especially in Latin America and Asia. You have made good progress in Africa lately. You are not going to win every battle. But ultimately Kosovo will be a UN member and well accepted in the international community. It already is in many places.
Q. Should Kosovo change something as regards diplomacy, in order to increase the number of recognitions, as well as improve the image of the country?
A. Kosovo needs to use every resource available to project its reality abroad. Its women are proving a particularly strong asset. Arta Dobroshin and Majlinda Kelmendi are helping you tell the world that Kosovo is a creative and talented country. Vlora Citaku is providing leadership in preparation for the European Union. The “Empowering Women” conference that President Jahjaga will sponsor in Pristina in early October is another good example.
My own family is surprised when I tell them how peaceful, safe and normal my visits to Pristina are. The end of international supervision gives you an excellent opportunity to tell the world that this is a country that meets its international obligations and will continue to do so even after formal international supervision comes to an end.
One of the most important things you need to do is project Kosovo’s reality to people in Serbia, where the press never ceases to portray circumstances here as chaotic, violent and unfriendly to Serbs. That image is also harmful to you in other countries.
Reaching out to ordinary Serbs and showing them that Kosovo knows how to treat people of all ethnic backgrounds fairly is a patriotic thing to do.
All countries in the democratic world are judged in part by how they treat their most disadvantaged minorities. America handicapped itself for many years on the world stage by not treating minorities correctly at home.
The human rights of Serbs, Roma and other citizens of Kosovo have to be fully protected if Kosovo is to be seen as a serious democracy worthy of international recognition. Implementation of the Ahtisaari plan has helped you a great deal. Continuing efforts in this direction will also pay off.
Q. You are in contact with Kosovo officials. Do you think that there are competent people in the Kosovo diplomacy?
A. Yes, I do believe your diplomatic officials are a wonderful, talented group of well-trained and highly committed people working under the strong leadership of Enver Hoxhaj. I am pleased to collaborate with them. The resources they have to work with are necessarily very limited, so they need to be clever and creative in generating opportunities to showcase Kosovo abroad and pursue its interests effectively. You are never going to have embassies like the American one I ran in Rome 20 years ago, which had 800 employees. But a few good Kosovars can work wonders if they are willing to work together and apply their limited resources in well-focused ways.
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