Tag: United States
Nukes could make things worse
Today the journal Survival: Global Politics and Strategy published a paper on “Assessing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” I prepared it with two talented MEI research assistants, Aya Khan and Zuha Noor.
I have been concerned with nuclear issues since even before my professional career. My first participation in public protests was against fallout from nuclear weapons tests in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the history of radiation protection. When I joined the State Department in 1977, it was as a science and technology specialist. I spent seven years abroad as a Science Attache’ and Counselor in the US embassies in Rome and Brasilia. My main concern was Italian and Brazilian transfers to Iraq, as well as the possible military goals of the Brazilian nuclear program. I’ve visited many nuclear labs, reprocessing facilities, and power plants.
Nonproliferation in the Middle East
One of the interesting questions about the Middle East is why there has been little proliferation there in recent decades, despite the presence in the region of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Part of the answer is that Israel destroyed facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) that might have allowed those countries to develop nuclear weapons. Libya, under American pressure, abandoned its nuclear program (2003). But why haven’t the heavier weights in the region, namely Turkey and Saudi Arabia, gone the nuclear route along with Iran?
This is an especially pertinent question right now, as Tehran approaches the nuclear threshold, at which it will have enough highly enriched uranium to build one or more nuclear weapons. The answer is at least in part that until recently Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have been largely content to rely on US security guarantees. Turkiye is a NATO member and has US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Saudi Arabia has until recently regarded the US as a reliable security partner. Ankara and Riyadh complain loudly about Israeli nuclear weapons, but so far as we know they have not tried to reply with nuclear weapons programs of their own.
Things are changing
But the strategic environment is changing for both of those countries. Turkiye and the US are trapped in frictions over Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defenses, the American reaction to (and alleged role in) the 2016 attempted coup, and Turkiye’s hostility to the Kurds who are allied with the Americans in Syria. Saudi Arabia resents the American failure to react strongly to the 2019 Iranian attack on its oil production facilities. Nor did it like President Biden’s criticism of Saudi human rights abuses and American efforts to lower oil prices. Security guarantees that once seemed ironclad are now doubtful.
At the same time, Russia and China are making inroads in the Middle East. Moscow has collaborated with Saudi Arabia in maintaining oil prices the Americans think too high. China is importing a lot of Saudi oil and offering to build nuclear power reactors in the Kingdom. Beijing has also mediated an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in Turkiye. Russia and China both have good reasons to fear nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. But is not clear that they will be as exigent on that score as the Americans.
Rosatom is also building power reactors in Egypt.
Leadership matters
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan have both said that if Iran gets nuclear weapons their countries will follow suit. It is not clear whether deeds have followed those words. Saudi Arabia’s technological capabilities in that direction may be limited. It only recently started up its first research reactor and is thought to be seeking US nuclear power reactors, which come with strong nonproliferation constraints. But we really don’t know. The Kingdom is opaque in that direction. The Turks are likely farther advanced, as they have had research reactors for many years. But there is no public evidence of enrichment or reprocessing research in Turkiye.
Egypt’s President Sisi has said his country doesn’t need to have nuclear weapons to achieve great power status. But what will he do if Turkiye or Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons? And what will his successor do in that case?
Prevention is better than cure
My colleagues and I argue in our piece that prevention is better than cure. We need to be monitoring the nuclear capabilities of possible nuclear proliferators assiduously as well as building a regional security architecture that discourages nuclear weapons. We will also need to collaborate with Europe, Russia, and China in ensuring that other Middle Eastern states don’t follow Israel and Iran down the nuclear path. The Middle East is already a mess. Nuclear weapons would make things worse.
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Politics won’t wait for a court decision
Donald Trump’s indictment dominates the news today and will remain a major issue until a plea bargain or verdict. The Republicans are claiming it is politically motivated and unjustified. The Democrats are claiming it is a response to malfeasance and an assertion of the rule of law.
What we don’t know
The truth is we don’t even know what he stands accused of. The grand jury that indicted him holds its proceedings in secret. Only at his arraignment next week will we learn the charges for certain.
These might be, as the Republicans are claiming, election law violations associated with his hush money payments to a porn star in 2016. Or, as many Democrats believe, they may involve business fraud related to those same payments, which were allegedly recorded in his company books as legal fees and laundered through his personal attorney.
No one knows at this point. It might be wise to refrain from comment on the charges until they become public.
What we do know
No other American president has ever been indicted. Nixon resigned to avoid impeachment. Any number of presidents have been guilty of malfeasance, before, during, and after their time in office. But the nation’s prosecutors have not seen fit to drag them into court. This is the basis of the argument that Trump’s indictment is “unprecedented.”
But it is not. Lots of prominent people are indicted. Prosecutors go after company chief executives, members of Congress, lawyers, and yes professors. The list of indicted Federal officials is long. Unless you believe a president or former president should be above the law, you should not be objecting on grounds of “precedent” to indictment of a former president.
Indictment of presidents and prime ministers in other countries is common. Prime Minister Netanyahu is a prominent current example, but so too are former Kosovo President Thaci and former Serbian President Milosevic. The list of former heads of government later imprisoned is also long, but of course not all of them deserved what they got.
Only time will tell
We are going to have to wait a while–maybe even a year or two–to learn whether Trump’s indictment will lead to a plea bargain, acquittal, or conviction. In the meanwhile, the indictment will become a political football, with both Democrats and Republicans trying to score big before the November 2024 election. Most Americans believe an indictment should disqualify a candidate from running for president. But Republicans mostly back Trump and think the indictment is an unjustified political move.
Politics won’t wait for a court decision and the inevitable appeal if Trump is found guilty. In the meanwhile, many other investigations are ongoing. Some involve potentially far more serious violations than the current indictment, including election interference in Georgia and insurrection for the January 6 riot at The Capitol. Only time will tell how this all shakes out.
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Renewing the old may be better than new
A distinguished group of colleagues has offered “a new policy framework” for Syria to President Biden and Secretary Blinken. It advocates a more robust Western effort in Syria focused on security (including both stabilization in the northwest and northeast as well as continuing the fight against ISIS), increased humanitarian and early recovery assistance, and continued pushback against the Assad regime.
US troops would stay in northeastern Syria. Implicit is that President Assad would remain in power in Damascus, but the group opposes “normalization,” which several Arab states are pursuing.
The virtues
There is great virtue in many of the specific ideas offered. More cross-border assistance, if need be outside the UN framework, is needed. Better international coordination and cooperation with Turkiye is vital. Repatriating ISIS prisoners and their familities is important to reducing the threat of resurgence. Accountability for war crimes and missing people is indispensable.
These are not new ideas. The group is essentially recommending that the Biden Administration take more seriously its existing objectives and pursue them more aggressively. They take it to task for failing to meet its own objectives:
The Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities of great power competition, international and Middle East stability, human rights, humanitarianism, or combating food insecurity are insufficiently advanced through the current Syria policy.
The new policy framework is mostly the old framework, renewed.
The defects
That said, there are some defects as well. The group advocates a formalized ceasefire, without however specifying how it would be monitored and enforced. They also advocate renewed civilian stabilization assistance in the northeast, where conflict between Iranian proxy forces and the Americans is growing. Civilian assistance requires civilian presence, which is becoming more difficult, not less. They urge accounting for 100,000 missing Syrians, without however specifying a mechanism.
A lot of what the group suggests would require more Western focus on Syria. The more than ten years of war and chaos there as well as the requirements in Ukraine militate against Europe and the US paying greater attention. Three American presidents have decided that US interests in Syria are not a priority. The group is not asking for a major new effort. But even a marginally increased push in Syria may lie beyond what President Biden’s limits. Pressure for removal of the US troops is more likely to increase than decrease.
Alternatives
What are the possible alternatives? That is always an important question, especially when the obstacles to success are formidable. Let me offer a few, without however recommending any of them:
- Negotiated withdrawal of US troops: At some point, maybe now, US troops in northeastern Syria will reach the point of diminishing returns in the fight against ISIS. The US could negotiate with the Russians and the Syrian regime withdrawal of US troops in exchange for commitments to their Kurdish and Arab allies, promising “normalization” in exchange. Of course there would be little guarantee that the commitments would be kept once the withdrawal is complete.
- A big push for stabilization and reconstruction in the northeast: The US could pour a few billion into civilian stabilization and reconstruction directed by their Kurdish and Arab allies. This would create a de facto state in the northeast, financed on a continuing basis by revenues from the oil produced there. That parastate would attract however the enmity of both the regime and Turkiye, making its survival in the long term parlous.
- Back a Turkish takeover of the entire border area and the northeast: President Erdogan has long been threatening another invasion of segments of the northern Syria border Turkiye does not already control. Washington could back his ambition in exchange for commitments to its Kurdish and Arab allies. Such commitments would however likely prove worthless. The Turks see the Kurds as terrorists, not freedom fighters.
- Renew the civilian and military effort against the Assad regime: The US and Europe could urge Gulf partners to renew the armed rebellion against President Assad and Syrian activists to return to the streets. But neither the Arab partners nor anti-regime Syrians are anywhere near ready to do this.
It is easy to see why the group that wrote yesterday’s statement stuck with more modest proposals. All the more dramatic ones have obvious downsides.
Conclusion
It is not satisfying to propose more and better when you know that something else is needed. But under current circumstances, enewing the old may be better than new.
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Stevenson’s army, March 28
– Most national leaders aren’t very popular now.
– NYT reports on Biden pressure on Netanyahu before his delay in reform law.
– Lawfare analyzes the Herzog alternative.
– Biden sends war powers report on Syria attack. But says no more attacks for now.
– Belgian intelligence worried about Huawei.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Fantasy diplomacy is failing to appease
Chris Hill, the American Ambassador to Serbia, tweeted Friday:
I’ve dedicated my life to diplomacy – to finding diplomatic solutions to seemingly intractable problems. In the course of my career, I’ve learned that sometimes diplomacy fails. When it does, the results can be tragic. (1/4)
I offer my personal condolences to the families of those who lost their lives during the wars of the 1990s, including as a result of the NATO air campaign. I know that the Serbian people will never forget that terrible time, nor should they. (2/4)
The Serbian people will never set aside their grief, but I believe they are strong enough to set aside their grievances. The United States’ dedication to our partnership with Serbia is unwavering, as is our commitment to diplomacy. (3/4)
Together, we can build the better future the Serbian people deserve and want for future generations. (4/4)
He had previously tweeted:
The most important outcome from the Ohrid talks: Serbia has embraced its European future and a clear plan for how to get there—a decision that took wisdom, integrity, and courage. Much work remains, and the United States will be with you every step of the way.
If this last were true, his tweets Friday would have been unnecessary.
Fantasy diplomacy
This is fantasy diplomacy. There is no evidence in the Ohrid talks or elsewhere that Serbia has embraced its European future. To the contrary, Belgrade continues to refuse to align with EU foreign policy and leans heavily in the direction of Moscow and Beijing. The former provides military help and the latter investments. Here is Vucic with his favorite “European” a week after the Ohrid meeting:
Serbia no longer meets the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, if it ever did. Its “partly free” polity is moving in an authoritarian direction. Media are not free. The judicial system is not independent. And the opposition comes mainly from ethnonationalists who care not a whit about Europe. Belgrade has done nothing to apologize, or make amends, for the Milosevic regime’s brutal crackdown on Kosovo in the late 1990s.
It isn’t working
It is hard then to imagine what justifies condolences now for the action NATO took in 1999 to stop the murder and ethnic cleansing of the better part of a million Albanians from Kosovo. NATO caused around 454 civilian deaths (including more Albanians than Serbs and Montenegrins), according to the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center.
The condolences come from someone who was part of the team that initiated the bombing in response to the Serbian failure to sign the agreement negotiated at Rambouillet. American diplomats then argued that Milosevic would only respond to the use of force. If I stretch, I imagine Chris is thinking his tweets will assuage his own conscience, appease Serbia, and soften its attitude toward normalization of relations with Kosovo.
I see no sign yet that this is working. President Vucic has refused to sign the two agreements recently reached with Kosovo,. Though he has said his oral agreement is legally binding, it isn’t clear just what he verbally agreed to. He has said explicitly he will oppose UN membership for Kosovo, despite a provision in the normalization agreement that reads:
Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.
He has denied that Serbia has implicitly recognized Kosovo, even though the first agreement includes recognition of its documents and symbols, and has made it clear he will pick and choose what provisions of the agreement he implements or not. The EU will be incorporating the requirements in the agreements into its accession process, but that could mean postponing Serbia’s compliance by years if not a decade or more.
Ukraine could make the difference
Vucic is still trying to walk with Washington and ride with Moscow. That’s a difficult game these days. Rumors have it that Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine, but Belgrade denies it has sold a single bullet there. Nor has it aligned with EU sanctions against Russia, which it is obligated to do. Still, if your lobbyists can keep the American ambassador and Washington believing that you are sincere in seeking a Western future, the game can work for a while. Putin is blessedly distracted and the US committed to appeasement, which is easier than the alternative.
The question is when the State Department and White House will wake up to reality. Serbia is not choosing to come West. Only if Russia loses in Ukraine will Belgrade reassess. Until then, it would be best to forget the fantasy diplomacy. Realism dictates that the US back countries that back Ukraine. Belgrade doesn’t.
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Stevenson’s army, March 27
– Israel in turmoil. US weighs in.
– Senator blocks DOD nominations in abortion fight.
– Military Times looks at vaccine refusers.
– NPR tells of military interest in the Arctic.
– Breaking Defense says Turkey is losing interest in S-400.
– AP says China is winning friends in Utah.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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