Tag: United States
No laughing matter
Ilona Gerbakher reports:
Monday, as Egypt’s elections results were being broadcast to the world, Freedom House and the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies met to discuss “Revolution under siege: is there hope for Egypt’s democratic transition?” Two of the speakers were unable to say the phrase “President Morsi” with a straight face, which is perhaps a good indicator of the future of his presidency.
Anwar Sadat, Chairman of Egypt’s Reform and Development Party, believes that it doesn’t matter who is president of Egypt, but the fact that the election took place at all proves that there is hope for a democratic transition. He urges America not to worry about the Muslim Brotherhood or further unrest in Egypt: now that a president for “all Egyptians” has been declared, he believes things in Egypt will settle down. Egyptians need to look forward, not backwards–they must reconcile themselves to a united future and continue the democratic transition.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will inevitably hand over power. But even in this united, newly democratic Egypt, old economic and political challenges will prevail, particularly the Sudanese border, Libya and the “traditional” Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He warned the revolution will not bring magic. Without unity in the post-revolutionary period there will be no security, no stability and no safety.
Mohammed Elmenshawy, Director of the Languages and Regional Studies Program at the Middle East Institute, disagreed with the idea that the identity of the president does not matter: if Egypt had elected Ahmed Shafiq, torch-bearer of the ancien regime, it would have marked the end of the revolution. We are in a symbolic moment: the election of a man outside of the elite circle who have ruled Egypt for the last 60 years. He is also the first freely elected head of an Arab State. Morsi is truly a man of the people. He is a typical middle class Egyptian. His wife looks and dresses like an ordinary Egyptian woman. The fact that he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is also very important: they are the only organized people on the street. Neither the liberal/secularist Egyptians nor the military elite are “on the streets, getting their hands dirty” as effectively and consistently as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Elmenshawy cautions, however, that the majority of Egyptians did not vote for President Morsi, but rather against his opposition. Morsi does not have the solid majority political mandate that he needs in order to effectively counter the SCAF and the Egyptian “deep state.” The strong man presidency so typical of the Mubarak era is a thing of the past. Morsi will be hampered by a weakened executive role in an Egypt that is more polarized than ever before. What is the role of the United States in this new post-revolutionary Egypt? “You had better stay out, you better shut up.”
Nancy Okail, Director of Freedom House Egypt and recent guest of the Egyptian penitentiary system, asks whether this election is truly a new situation for Egypt, or merely a perpetuation of the past? She agrees with Elmenshawy’s assertion that the vote was not for Morsi but against Shafiq and the SCAF. She notes that over the sixteen months since Mubarak was forced out of office, SCAF has taken several steps to significantly curtail the power of the executive branch: it decreed that military intelligence can search and arrest civilians without due process, dissolved parliament and limited the power of the constituent assembly. An article in the new constitution gives veto power over the constitution to SCAF, allowing it to cancel any part of the constitution they see as “inappropriate.”
All of these actions limit the power of the incoming president and shore up SCAF’s power. In addition, SCAF is playing up to wide-spread populist and xenophobic sentiment in Egypt, branding Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as pro-American, splintering Morsi’s already fragile majority. The message from SCAF to Morsi is that he is not going to be sitting on a very stable seat.
In what was perhaps a symbolic moment, she asked, “How will President Morsi…,” stopped herself mid-phrase, and told the audience “I’m trying to get used to it.” She laughed, and the audience chuckled with her. Elmenshawy in a subsequent discussion was also unable to say the phrase “President Morsi” without chuckling to himself, laughter rippling through his audience.
But the weakness of newly-elected President Morsi is no laughing matter. Will Morsi be the person to bring Egypt together? Sadat’s optimism aside, the laughter in the audience suggests not.
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Pakistani media highs and lows
Ilona Gerbakher wasn’t entirely happy with the earlier draft of her piece, which I posted prematurely. So I am posting a rewrite:
Pakistan’s lively but undisciplined media sector was the focus of a Tuesday panel at the United States Institute of Peace on “Pakistani Media: Getting Beyond the Hype.”
Steve Inskeep, the moderator and a host on NPR’s Morning Edition opened the discussion by asking the panelists how they would describe the Pakistani media today. Asma Shirazi, a protégé of Imran Aslam and a senior anchor/producer of SAMAA TV (a Pakistani satellite news channel), used the word “maturing” to describe the emergence of an independent media corps in Pakistan over the last two decades:
Our media is not very mature, but…our journalists are working day and night. They get threats from the…Taliban, and it’s a very different and difficult society…I think it will take some time, but I think we should be hopeful.
She referenced her experience of death threats and being followed by the ISI as one of the first female anchors to work during the Musharraf era and called for a media lobbying group or press council to help protect journalists.
She also underlined the ability of the independent Pakistani media to speak “truth to power,” particularly where women’s rights are concerned. When Shirazi started working on public Pakistani television, nobody was willing to talk to her, in part because of gender. Now women’s attitudes about their own rights are changing. They want to live like human beings in a society where girls are not being killed just because of something said in the media.
Wendy Chamberlain, President of the Middle East Institute and former US Ambassador to Pakistan, shifted the discussion to a comparison between the American and Pakistani media, describing both as “info-tainment, driven by audience ratings, profit and the bottom line.” This has led to immaturity in the American media, making it more like the media in Pakistan today, as in both countries the emphasis is on giving the audience what they want to hear rather than what they need to hear. Ambassador Chamberlain urged both to take a close look at themselves and to remember that accuracy and educating the public are serious responsibilities. Imran Aslam agreed, noting that “commercialism is as great a censor of free thought in Pakistan” as the army.
Cyril Almeida, assistant editor at DAWN (Pakistan’s oldest English language newspaper), characterized Pakistani media as open. He claimed that there is nothing in Pakistan that you cannot discuss in media or print anymore and asked if that might be too much. Imran Aslam, president and chief content officer of GEO TV (one of Pakistan’s leading independent media outlets) replied with the words “maddening, vibrant, diversified.” He was ambivalent about the current multiplicity of narratives available to media consumers in Pakistan. Official state television once had the important function of creating a uniform public narrative and a (possibly false) sense of nationhood, where dissenting voices were not heard. Now electronic media have fallen into the trap of commercialization, fracturing the unity of the national narrative.
Cyril Almeida and Imran Aslam described the 2009 lawyers’ movement as the apex of electronic media power. Today the Pakistani media is coming to terms with its own limitations after getting a taste of real power for a few years at the end of the last decade. Aslam added, “the 2009 lawyers’ movement really went to the media’s head, like cocaine—the anchors became rock stars…” He suggested that the word “cocaine” be added to the list of words describing the Pakistani media.
Imran Aslam emphasized that the Pakistani media is not anti-America but opposes American policies. He noted that the greatest ambition of the average Pakistani child is an American education. Despite objections to American policies in the region, America’s cultural capital in Pakistan is still strong.
This rather rosy picture was immediately belied by a disagreement between Ambassador Chamberlain and Asma Shirazi, who said that Pakistanis feel abandoned by America. She remarked with some heat, “You had one 9/11. We are having daily 9/11’s just because of the US.” Ambassador Chamberlain quickly denied responsibility. As the argument about 9/11 became more heated, what emerged from the panel was a sense of what Imran Aslam called “mutual incomprehension:” even a panel of experts in Pakistani-American relations could not seem to come to an accord.
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Bearly civil
Russia is not America’s “number one geopolitical foe,” as Governor Romney suggested in March, but newly reelected President Putin is definitely a pain.
His meeting with President Obama yesterday produced little or nothing on the two main issues for the United States: Syria and the Iranian nuclear program. Meanwhile, the Brits stopped a shipment of refurbished Russian attack helicopters headed for Syria, while the Iranians thumbed their noses at the U.S.-backed nuclear offer. It’s a good thing the nuclear talks, which are continuing today, are being held in Moscow, since that gives the Russians an incentive to float new ideas and prevent a collapse. The Russians will do what they can to pass the hot potato on to the next meeting, reportedly to be held in Beijing.
The problem isn’t so much that Russia is a geopolitical foe with the capacity to do America serious harm, which is what it was during the Cold War. The problem is that Moscow controls some things Washington needs, like the northern supply route to Afghanistan and the Security Council consensus on blocking Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. can manage without these things, but it can manage much better with them.
Presidents Obama and Putin looked none too pleased with each other yesterday at their meeting in Mexico, during a G-20 summit. Putin, who is trying to re-establish Russia’s great power status, figures sticking it to Obama will help him demonstrate that Russia is indispensible. Obama has both hands tied behind his back, because–contrary to what one of my Twitter followers suggested yesterday–he needs Putin’s help on Afghanistan and Iran, even if Russia is today a middling power.
This makes for an uncivil relationship, one that could end with tragedy in Syria and catastrophe in Iran. The Russian bear hasn’t got the capacity to project power that the Soviet one had, but it is leveraging its weakened position effectively. I share President Obama’s preference for multilateralism, which has virtues in particular for dealing with Iran and Syria. But it is important to keep open other options, if only to counter a middling power seeking to leverage its assets.
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Impotent superpowers
The significance of today’s joint Obama/Putin call for democratic transition in Syria is, as usual, in what is not mentioned. Neither the Russian arms shipments to the regime nor the Saudi and Qatari arms flowing to the opposition are mentioned. Ditto the suspended UN monitoring mission. There is no hint of intervention other than through the Annan plan and the UN Security Council. The Americans are essentially accepting the Russian emphasis on dialogue and peaceful means, while reiterating their hope for eventually democratic ends.
Hope is not a policy. The question is whether something else lurks behind these words. I doubt it. Note the emphasis in the statement on the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. Note also the emphasis on supplying Afghanistan from the north. Russia is vital to both. Bucking Putin in Syria would not be smart if the higher priority is blocking Iran’s nuclear program from achieving “break out.” So long as Pakistan is blocking the usual land routes into Afghanistan, Russia is vital to NATO supply lines.
The statement is silent on Egypt. It appeals for North Korean implementation of a 2005 (sic) agreement. The Middle East peace process statements it references are more recent, but no more effective.
There is very little else in the statement that would excite my interest. I can’t imagine why Jackson-Vanik, legislation whose premises (non-market economy and restrictions on emigration) became obsolete years ago, is still in effect. Russia in the World Trade Organization is clearly going to be better for the United States than Russia outside. But I’ve got to give Putin and Obama extra credit for this:
This year we together celebrate the 200th anniversary of Fort Ross in California, which was founded by Russian settlers and underscores the historic ties between our countries.
Anodyne is not a policy either, unless you want to convey how impotent the former superpowers have become.
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Shifting sands
Uncertainty is breaking out all over the Greater Middle East.
With Crown Prince Nayef’s death in Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud will soon have to look past its octogenarian leadership to the next generation, with all the uncertainties that implies. Will the next generation be as attached to religious and social Wahhabi conservatism as the current one? Will it open an era of serious reform?
The suspension of the UN monitoring effort in Syria presages an increase in violent conflict with a highly uncertain outcome. Russia seems determined to keep Bashar al Assad in power, though its Foreign Minister denies it. Iran will certainly exert itself in that direction. I doubt the armed rebellion can beat the Syrian security forces any time soon, but we could see a lengthy insurgency fed by Saudi and Qatari arms shipments through Turkey.
The only real certainty in Egypt is that the military is trying to hold on to power. Whether it can and what the consequences will be is highly uncertain, as are the results of today’s presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has arrogated to itself legislative power, which means it now has to deal with Egypt’s economy and social problems along security and law and order. I don’t know any military establishments equal to that task, but the risk of new parliamentary elections may be greater than the SCAF wants to run. It could end up forced to rule Egypt, likely badly, for some time to come.
Iraq‘s Prime Minister Maliki has faced down a parliamentary rebellion but Al Qaeda has renewed its murderous attacks against the country’s Shia. If they succeed in reigniting Iraq’s sectarian warfare, the promise of a relatively democratic society that produces a lot of oil will evaporate, leaving a bitter residue.
Iran‘s Supreme Leader Khamenei has concentrated power as rarely before in the Islamic republic’s history, but American and Israeli threats of military attack against it nuclear program make prediction even a year out difficult.
After ten years of rule by Hamid Karzai, even Afghanistan faces the uncertainty of an election (to be held no one knows when in 2013 or 2014) in which he will not be running and an end to the NATO combat role shortly thereafter.
I needn’t mention next month’s elections in Libya or the aging leadership in Algeria, where military success in repressing Al Qaeda in the Maghreb seems to have pushed the militants into the Sahel, where they are destabilizing several other countries.
A region that enjoyed decades of stability–some would say stagnation, much of it autocratically imposed–now registers high volatility. Of course volatility can move in either direction: there are possible positive developments as well as negative ones. Tunisia has pushed the envelope in the positive direction. Yemen seems to be making progress against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates, though some think the government offensive and U.S. drone attacks are creating more extremists than they are killing. Morocco and Jordan have attempted some modest reforms that seem unlikely to suffice, but they may stave off open rebellion.
It is not easy to deal with uncertainty. Most experts would recommend triage and prioritization. Triage happens naturally. There are only a few Middle East problems that will make it to the President’s desk: Iran and Egypt most frequently, Afghanistan because of the American troops, and we can hope Syria when Obama meets with Putin this week at the G-20 in Moscow.
Prioritization of issues is harder. Even those who recommend it muddle exactly what they mean. Colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment recommend in a recent overview of the situation in the Middle East:
international actors should focus on a few, very specific issues for special emphasis, such as international human rights standards, the maintenance of existing treaty relationships, and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.
But then they go on to recommend economic cooperation aimed at job creation, a non sequitur virtually guaranteed to disappoint expectations given limited U.S. resources and a track record of failure. Not to mention the difficulty of meeting human rights standards, since these require equal gender treatment not readily available in the workplace in many of the countries in question.
Shifting sands will make navigation in the Middle East difficult for a long time to come. I recommend to all my international affairs students that they learn Arabic, or another of the regional languages (Farsi most of all). Even if American oil production continues to reduce already low U.S. dependence on the Middle East, the global oil market and the extremist movements the region has spawned will ensure we remain engaged there for a long time to come, triage and prioritization notwithstanding.
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New wine into old bottles
USIP yesterday morning hosted a meeting on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). I heard a lot of good things in the first hour or so. Breaking down stovepipes, a concept of national security that requires peaceful and prosperous democratic partners abroad, a commitment to elevate development and civilian capacities generally as a means (equal in importance to military means) towards that end, a shift in emphasis to conflict prevention. These are all good things.
Unfortunately they are also things we’ve been hearing about for some time. The QDDR is now more than one and a half years old. Secretary Clinton has only recently created an office to monitor its implementation. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives and Bureau of Humanitarian Response have not received the increased resources hoped for. The State Department Bureau of Civilian Stabilization Operations, proud offspring of the QDDR, is cutting back its Civilian Response Corps because of budget pressures.
Let me be clear: I have no doubt about the sincerity and determination of the people pushing for stronger civilian foreign policy instruments. They are desperately needed. The Arab Spring has demonstrated the limited utility of military instruments and the vital importance of American civilian capabilities to help with democratic transitions. Only in Libya, and only in the early stages of the revolution, have conventional military instruments been decisive. Preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons is requiring a large dose of diplomacy just to get to the point of considering seriously the use of military instruments. Our understanding of the Iranian domestic political scene is clearly not as comprehensive as it should be.
Civilian requirements are clear enough to me. But America’s political system is not responding by providing the resources required. To the contrary, State and AID are facing potentially large cuts to their budgets, cuts far bigger than those being contemplated for the U.S. military.
But I would not suggest that we weaken the military to strengthen the civilian side of our foreign policy. The first thing that needs to be done is for State and AID to look within themselves for the resources. State is configured more for the past than for the future. It has overgrown embassies in places (I’ll mention Rome, since I was deputy chief of mission there) that don’t need them. AID, shrunken from its Vietnam heyday, still runs most of its programs from headquarters rather than the field. The division of labor between the two organizations is often unclear. Rivalry rather than cooperation the norm.
What the QDDR did was to pour new wine into old bottles, something the New Testament discourages:
else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved.
I won’t go farther than that, as this is the punch line of my book manuscript. But even the not very perspicacious among you will understand that I’m suggesting we need new institutions, not only good intentions, more staff and new procedures, in order to fulfill the promise of the QDDR. That though is for another day.
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