Tag: United States
Ineffective solutions to the wrong problem
John Kerry’s renewed advocacy of safe zones and possible arming of the Syrian opposition provokes me to repeat what I’ve said before: these are ineffective solutions to the wrong problem. If you want to protect civilians, the worst thing you can do for them is to concentrate them in one place where Bashar al Assad can be sure he will be killing his opposition. And if you want to bring Bashar down, an armed opposition is one of the slowest and least effective ways to do it.
First, safe areas, corridors, or whatever you want to call them. They will not be safe because the UN Security Council declares them safe. Remember the safe areas in Bosnia and the UN protected areas in Croatia. They were target-rich environments, because that is where the enemies are. To make areas safe, you have to destroy the Syrian army’s capability to attack them, in particular with aircraft (including helicopters), missiles, artillery and armor.
In order to do that, you have to take down the air defenses. Think Libya times five or maybe ten, because Syrian capabilities are significantly greater. Libya was impossible without the jump start the U.S. gave the operation. And there is someone out there who thinks Jordan and Turkey will do Syria on their own? The EU and the U.S. are simply not going to engage in this effort–they have too much else on their minds, and the Americans want to keep the Russians on side for the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Second, arming the opposition. This is already happening to some extent–small arms circulate widely in the Middle East. But small arms aren’t going to stop armor, artillery and aircraft, or even mass arrests and torture. An assassin could of course get lucky, but armed rebellion has little prospect for overthrowing Bashar, whose army and other security services have remained cohesive. We can of course feed an insurgency in Syria, but that is no quick solution. Insurgencies typically take decades to succeed, and they more often don’t.
These propositions are not only ineffective. They would take things in the wrong direction. Safe areas would attract mainly Sunni Syrians, thus increasing the sectarian segregation that the civil war has already begun. Arming the opposition would also drive away from its ranks the relatively few Alawites, Christians, Druze and others who have joined its ranks.
Sectarian warfare comparable to what happened in Iraq in 2006-7 is just about the worst outcome imaginable in Syria from the American perspective. Odds are it would overflow to Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan.
If you want to intervene militarily in Syria, the United States should lead the effort and target the command and control of the Syrian armed forces, including Bashar al Assad himself. Talking about half measures that won’t work but instead make things worse is not helpful.
The consequences of a serious military strike on the regime are unpredictable. Would Bashar be killed? Who would take over? Would it intensify the civil war? How will Iran react? This too is a solution that could make things worse.
The Annan plan, even not 100% effective, starts looking like a reasonable proposition when you take a good look at the alternatives. We should stop talking smack about it and do our best to support it.
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War on war
The newly established North America office of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute directed by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat yesterday hosted discussion of the statistical decline of armed conflict and whether it will continue. Moderated by Sissela Bok, presenters were Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University and Joshua Goldstein of American University, author of the recently published Winning the War on War. The presenters and audience took as undisputed the uneven statistical decline of war since 1945, with a further dip after 1989.
Wallensteen attributed this mainly to better management of conflict, especially through the UN Security Council after 1989, and increased attention to rights, minorities and human dignity. There is no increase in ethnic or one-sided conflicts that would muddy the statistical picture. With war declining, other security concerns have emerged: terrorism, state fragility and state failure. Wallensteen thought the future looks promising if major powers continue to cooperate, security concerns remain limited, welfare economics has priority and human dignity is central to international concerns. It is possible to envision zero conflicts in the future.
While not so sure about the zero conflict vision, Goldstein mostly agreed. He debunked three causes for the decline in war:
- nuclear weapons, because their number is decreasing sharply, without triggering an increase in war,
- U.S. hegemony, because it too is declining without triggering an increase, and
- democracy, because China has been peaceful but not democratic.
He supported three other causes:
- normative disapproval of war and growth of the idea that peace is good, a view also advocated by Steven Pinker;
- increases in prosperity, trade and global interdependence, which is what keeps the Chinese leadership out of war, since it derives its legitimacy from prosperity;
- UN and other conflict management capacity, including increased use of peacekeeping.
Americans, Goldstein noted, on average pay $700 per month for U.S. defense and veterans benefits but only $2 per month for the UN. Eighty per cent of Americans support the UN. Doubling its budget would clearly bring real benefits. When will politicians realize this?
The presenters were too polite to mention it, but there is a great irony for Americans in the decline of war: our armed forces have been active in conflict zones every year since 1989. While much of the rest of the world has enjoyed relative peace, we have been expending trillions of dollars on less than fully successful military enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan. This, too, is something for our politicians to ponder.
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Trouble in Balochistan
Eric Shu reports on the National Endowment on Democracy event May 2 on “Threats to Democracy in Balochistan”:
Malik Siraj Akbar, a Pakistani journalist and current Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, presented an overview of the human rights threats in his native Balochistan, the largest province in Pakistan. It was not until February 2012 that Balochistan gained attention in the United States, largely due to a Congressional briefing and a House resolution in favor of self-determination drafted by California Congressman Dana Rohrbacher. Immediate backlash from the Pakistani government ensued, but the fallout has been limited.
Akbar’s presentation focused on the background of the region, the threats to the area’s defenders of democracy, and ended with a set of recommendations for both domestic and international players.
Akbar described Balochistan as a “richly-poor” Texas-sized province in southwest Pakistan with immense but little recognized geo-political importance. Annexed in 1948, Balochistan contains one of the region’s largest reservoirs of natural gas and an abundance of gold and copper. However, it is also a region with the lowest literacy rates in Pakistan and a severe lack of human rights protections.
There are three primary threats to democracy in Balochistan: political assassinations, enforced disappearances, and limited press coverage.
Political leaders and individuals who have advocated for an independent Balochistan are the assassination victims. The Pakistani military has denied responsibility. Non-existent communication between the federal and provincial governments has exacerbated tensions in the region and led to increasing calls for independence through violent means.
The victims “enforced disappearances” are predominantly ethnic Baloch as young as 12 and as old as 80. Estimates gathered from local sources suggest they number in the hundreds. They are picked up off the street or plucked from their homes and subjected to torture, solitary confinement, and warned of retaliation if they speak out. The military has denied responsibility.
These problems are compounded by the fact that local media and press networks are severely underdeveloped in Balochistan. Coverage of the area is limited not only internationally, but also domestically. Pakistani press do not cover Balochistan well. Foreign journalists are routinely denied access, making it difficult for human rights violations to be documented and publicized abroad.
Akbar concluded his presentation with recommendations for stakeholders.
To the Pakistani government, Akbar advocated ensuring freedom of the press by providing access to international journalists. He also pushed for fair Baloch representation in the region’s security structures (army, police, frontier corps) and called for the military and intelligence services to be brought under civilian control.
Akbar’s suggestions to the United States focused on implementation of the Leahy Amendment prohibitng U.S. foreign assistance to foreign military units that commit human rights violations. Although Human Rights Watch reported violations in 2010 and 2011, there has not been an investigation into these cases and U.S. aid to Pakistan has continued.
The Congressional hearing in February 2012 on Balochistan drew short-lived attention to the region and its challenges. Continued attention on the issue of human rights in Pakistan from brave individuals such as Akbar will help keep the discussion in focus and hopefully bring badly needed change to the region.
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A bad election trifecta
There were three elections today conducted in the shadow of Europe’s austerity measures and impending recession: France, Greece and Serbia. All three saw good showings by anti-austerity, less pro-European forces. The outcomes of the first two will reduce further the role Europe plays in world affairs, at least for the next few years. The third suggested that Serbia will continue in its current policies, which are nominally pro-European but still export insecurity, in particular to Bosnia and Kosovo.
In France and Greece, opponents of German-style austerity had a good day. Francois Hollande’s victory over Nicolas Sarkozy guarantees a tug of war between Paris and Berlin. The parliamentary election outcome in Greece is not so clear yet–it will be several days before it is decided who will head the governing coalition and which parties will participate. But the good showing of smaller, anti-austerity parties of the left and right in the Greek parliamentary elections guarantees continuing uncertainty about whether Greece will implement the tough austerity required to obtain International Monetary Fund money. The bankers are worried.
The anti-austerity advocates in both Greece and France may well be correct that growth is Europe’s real need, rather than fiscal retrenchment. But Germany remains adamant about austerity, so the election results ensure continuing quarrels and painful adjustments inside the euro zone, which is already headed into recession.
So long as Europe remains focused on its own internal problems, it can play only a limited role in the rest of the world. The Americans will be fortunate if the Europeans manage to maintain any significant number of troops in Afghanistan into 2014. The prospects for enlargement beyond Croatia, which is supposed to gain membership in the European Union next year, are dim. Europe’s role in the Arab awakenings is already minimal. In Asia and the Middle East, it has condemned itself to a predominantly commercial role, though it leads the nuclear talks with Iran.
In Serbia, ethnically nationalist parties performed well. The presidential outcome will be decided in a run off two weeks hence. Moderate nationalist President Tadic did not do particularly well but seems have edged out his rival Tomislav Nikolic, who in the past has bested Tadic in the first round. Whoever wins, Belgrade seems determined to continue its quixotic effort to prepare for membership in the European Union even while laying claim to Kosovo, whose independence is recognized by 22 EU members, and supporting Serb separatism in Bosnia. The leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, campaigned openly for Tadic. These policies are incompatible, but only a few marginal figures in Serbian politics are willing to say what is obvious: Kosovo is lost and a united (but decentralized) Bosnia is in Serbia’s interest. Partition would mean the creation of a rump, radicalized Islamic state on Serbia’s border.
So what we can look forward to is a weaker Europe less willing to enlarge or play an expanded role in world affairs generally. The Balkans will be left increasingly to their own devices, which have repeatedly proved not only inadequate but also dangerous. Washington, preoccupied with other matters, will occasionally weigh in to restrain its friends–especially the Kosovars and the Bosniaks–from making big mistakes, but otherwise it will try to leave matters to a Europe that doesn’t really care if the Balkan road to the EU is a slow one.
Maybe we’ll muddle through. Maybe not. But the election trifecta means that the European Union and its attractiveness to non-members is weak and growing weaker. That’s not good.
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Glass empty
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute discussion of Hamas’s shifting political calculations, moderated by Phil Wilcox of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, was one of the more depressing events I’ve attended lately. And I attend a lot of them.
Bottom line: the shifts, though potentially real, will make no difference to the peace process with Israel. Or even to reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
Rob Malley of the International Crisis Group suggested the Arab awakening has certainly sharpened questions for Hamas about its relationship with Syria and Iran and about whether it should moderate its views, as other Muslim Brotherhood organizations have done. Hamas refused to support Bashar al Assad, but somehow that is now a byegone. Iran has renewed its financing, though at what level is unclear.
Gaith al Omari of the American Task Force on Palestine said Hamas needs Iranian financing less than in the past because it has Gaza’s revenue, which makes the Gaza leadership more independent. There is really no progress on reconciliation with Fatah, which would require more than naming a new unity government. It would require agreement on holding elections and unifying the security forces. So far, all we’ve seen is reconciliation theater, nothing more.
Mark Perry of the Jersalem Media and Communications Center anticipates generational change will be important inside Hamas. The outside (of Gaza) leadership may be ready for acceptance of the 1967 borders for a Palestinian state and for reconciliation, but the inside Gaza leadership is not. The division is not really ideological, Malley said, but based on where you happen to sit. There is a real debate happening, but the outcome is unclear.
The U.S. is a problem. The “quartet” (U.S., EU, UN and Russia) conditions (recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of violence and acceptance of past agreements) are unconditional. But Hamas sees no likelihood that Washington can really bring Israel to the negotiating table with anything interesting to offer on settlements, Jerusalem or other important issues. Hamas’ great fear is that it will get trapped like Fatah, having compromised without getting anything substantial in return. They want to know if they accept the conditions what would happen next. The U.S. has no serious response.
There is nevertheless no alternative to a U.S.-led mediation process. The Europeans and the UN have nothing substantial to offer.
This left me wondering whether George W. Bush was right when he shunned the Middle East peace process. The prospects for anything interesting happening sounded minimal to me. Then again, when the experts all agree the glass is empty, that’s when something interesting happens.
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Is Al Qaeda Inc. bankrupt?
It is hard for me to imagine adding anything original to the flood of commentary on the Letters from Abbottabad, as West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center calls them. As the New York Times put it,
The frustrations expressed by Bin Laden as he issued instructions sometimes in vain might be familiar to any chief executive trying to keep tabs on a multinational corporation that had grown beyond its modest origins.
Osama even worried about which currencies to keep ransom proceeds in. Mario Draghi will be pleased to learn that Al Qaeda’s reserves were kept in euros as well as dollars. I guess its only a matter of time before they add Chinese renminbi.
In what I’ve read so far, which is not much, Bin Laden’s advice on leadership stands out:
As you well know, the best people are the ones most agreed on by the people, and the key attributes that bring people together and preserve their staying behind their leader are his kindness, forgiveness, sense of fairness, patience, and good rapport with him, as well as showing care for them and not tax them beyond their ability.
What must always be in the forefront of our minds is: managing people at such times calls for even greater wisdom, kindness, forgiveness, patience and deliberation, and is a complex task by most any measure.
This is quoted from the last of the letters, labelled no. 19 in the translations.
Getting people to do what Al Qaeda does obviously requires much more kindness than portrayed in American movies. This is an important lesson. The evil groups of people do is almost always done for some purpose the members of the group regard as good, not evil. Leadership is what convinces them that they are acting for a good purpose, so it needs to behave well towards those it wants to rally. At other points in the letters, it is clear that Bin Laden was unhappy with Al Qaeda and affiliated attacks on Muslims. He wanted his cadres to focus on Americans, because they are the real enemy.
Americans hope to defeat Al Qaeda. Certainly it has suffered a good deal of damage, self-inflicted as well as drone and special forces-inflicted in the last few years. But it is unlikely to disappear entirely, any more than homegrown right-wing terrorism, much reduced from its heyday, has disappeared entirely from the United States. The real question the Bin Laden papers pose is how much more effort we should put into what the Bush administration called the Global War on Terror, which we are still fighting in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and other places.
Only a closer examination of the entire trove of letters and other documents could enlighten us as to the answer. I doubt the American public will ever get that privilege. The published letters have presumably been carefully chosen. They can give us only an incomplete picture of Al Qaeda. We’ll have to rely on the assessments of our (not always) intelligence community and the wisdom of our elected leaders to make the decision on whether Al Qaeda Inc. is bankrupt.
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