Tag: United States
What now?
Bashar al Assad and his opponents have now both rejected Kofi Annan’s mission impossible. On behalf of the UN and the Arab League, he sought a ceasefire, followed by humanitarian aid and dialogue on a political solution.
This failure was not surprising. His was always a low-probability proposition. But the rejection came faster than I anticipated. I’d have guessed that Bashar would see some benefit in stringing Annan along.
Instead he slapped Annan’s proposition down without hesitation, grabbing some World Health Organization support for a Syrian Red Crescent mission to assess health needs in conflict areas. Not bad: wage war against your own population, then get the internationals to pay for your own cronies to assess the damage.
Bashar is feeling his cheerios. Russian support is holding. Arab threats to arm his opponents seem not much more than hot air at this point. Lots of small arms are getting in to Syria, but they won’t do much against Bashar’s armor and artillery. Defections are growing, but the numbers are small and they still have not reached into the inner circle.
It is a bit harder to explain the attitude of the opposition, which is feeling abandoned by the West and not much supported in the East. They’d have gained more from supporting Annan’s initiative, and then having Bashar reject it, than by opposing it from the first. They want Bashar out before dialogue can take place, which I understand perfectly well. But they just don’t have the horsepower at the moment to make it happen.
Many, though not all, in the opposition want arms for the Free Syrian Army, the network of defectors who have refused to fire on demonstrators and taken up the cudgels against Bashar. The problem is that arming the opposition will prolong the civil war and make it ever more sectarian, which is precisely what the West does not want.
The opposition’s main hope is international military intervention against Bashar, which still seems to me a distant prospect. An American military attack on Syria without Security Council approval and in the midst of a high-stakes diplomatic duel with Iran over its nuclear program is unlikely. Washington will want to keep its powder dry for the main battle. Europe is absorbed in its defense of the Euro.
A combined Turkish/Arab attack on Syria is theoretically possible. But without Security Council approval and extensive U.S. support, it risks political and military failure. There are already far too many hints of a broad and prolonged Sunni/Shia war in the Middle East. Do we really want to throw fuel on that fire?
This leaves us with few alternatives other than continuing to support the opposition, to isolate the Syrian regime and to press the Russians and Chinese to stop shielding Bashar from even a mild UNSC resolution. The only big question is whether the support should include whatever the opposition needs to take up arms. This includes not only the arms themselves but also intelligence support and training. The opposition lacks real-time information on the disposition of the army and its checkpoints, a deficiency that is too often deadly to militants trying to move around Syria.
I’ve opposed arming the opposition, on grounds that doing so militarizes the fight and shifts it to means that favor the regime. The same argument does not work for intelligence support, which is vital to protecting the opposition whether it takes up arms or not. Our overhead capabilities are stunning. If the opposition can organize itself to make effective use of real-time intelligence data to protect its adherents, we should be providing it.
I am at a loss as to what to recommend beyond that. This is one of those situations where there are bad options and worse ones. I don’t see a route out of the current impasse, other than the one Annan failed to sell to both sides.
What is happening in Syria is extraordinarily cruel and ugly. Bashar is mowing down people who are asking for no more than the freedom to decide their own fates. His moment of accountability will arrive, but for the moment we don’t seem to have a way of making it arrive sooner rather than later.
PS: Annan declared himself optimistic after a second meeting with Bashar al Assad today (Sunday). Hard to know what to make of that. The Arab League seems to have softened its demand that Bashar step aside, leading the Russians to sound a bit more helpful. The opposition should be getting ready to have its arm twisted to talk with the regime before Bashar is removed. Meetings at the UN Security Council this afternoon and tomorrow are likely to lead in that “optimistic” direction.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Iraq needs a shopping list
A couple of birdies have flown into Washington from Iraq recently. They had interesting, but very different, things to say.
One thinks Iraq is doing all right but the United States is missing big opportunities, due to its failure to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement that now governs bilateral relations. This has lots of potential for tying Baghdad more closely to the West, as does the export of more oil to the north and west rather than through the Gulf. Washington, this birdie thought, is worrying too much about Iraq’s sometimes tense internal political situation. It is only natural that the political forces that make up the current parliament are testing each other to see where the limits lie. Erbil/Baghdad problems are solvable. Things are settling down, problems are finding solutions and Washington should take a hint from the Iranians, who are actively projecting soft power. That is unavoidable, given their proximity, the long common border and the many Iranian pilgrims who visit Shia shrines in Iraq.
The other birdie thinks Iraq is severely handicapped in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Despite dramatic improvements in the Iraqi security forces (more jointness, a stronger non-commissioned officer corps, and decentralization of authority), its many intelligence agencies are no longer sharing information, partly due to sectarian and ethnic divisions that the U.S. presence used to bridge. Absent a clear national security strategy, Prime Minister Maliki is centralizing decisionmaking in ways that reward loyalty over professionalism and open the door to corruption, especially in military procurement. Iraq lacks a strong national identity. A return to sectarian war is unlikely, but the Sunni-majority provinces will insist on more decentralization. Iran has influence on some politicians but not on the army. Iraq would however oppose any U.S. raid on Iran and is unconcerned with Tehran getting nuclear weapons, since they won’t be targeted against Iraq. As things stand today, Iraq lacks the capability to prevent Israel (or the U.S.) from overflying Iraq to attack Iran.
I suspect there is a lot of truth in both these perspectives, which makes it ironic that they should be carried to Washington separately. The message from both–that Iraq still needs the United States to play a strong role–would make a deeper impression if carried jointly. The Iraqis need to understand that the initiative is now theirs, not ours. They need to create conditions in which Americans can train Iraqis, cooperate with them across a broad spectrum of activities, and invest in Iraq. If it is too risky or unwelcome, the Americans will turn their efforts elsewhere.
At the policy level, the Americans have moved on to other issues, Iran and Syria for the moment but also North Korea and the Afghanistan withdrawal. If Iraq wants U.S. help, it is going to need to plot out clearly what it needs and come shopping for it.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Negotiation time
With all the jabber the last few days about the use of force against both Syria and Iran, media attention is not focused on the prospects for negotiated settlements. But there are such prospects still, even if the odds are getting longer by the day.
Syria
International Crisis Group is out yesterday with a “now or never” manifesto rightly focused on prospects for UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s efforts:
Annan’s best hope lies in enlisting international and notably Russian support for a plan that:
Arming the Syrian opposition, which is happening already, is not likely to improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement along these lines. To the contrary, Western contemplation of safe areas and humanitarian corridors, loose Arab talk about armed the Syria Free Army, the occasional Al Qaeda suicide bombing and a Russian blank check for the regime to crack down are combining to plunge Syria into chaos. Someone may think that deprives Iran of an important ally, but it also spells lasting (as in decades-long) trouble in a part of the world where we can ill afford it.
The Americans have been mumbling about how arms will inevitably get to the Syrian opposition. This is true enough. But some visible support for Annan, and a behind the scenes diplomatic game with the Russians, would be more helpful to the cause of preventing Syria from becoming a chronic source of instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
Iran
Netanyahu came but this time did not conquer. He needed President Obama to be forthcoming on an eventual military action against Iran as much as Obama needed him to refrain from aligning with Republican critics. It fell to Senator Mitch McConnell to crystallize the emerging U.S. position: if Iran enriches uranium to bomb grade (at or above 90%) or shows signs of having decided to build a nuclear weapon (design and ignition work), then the U.S. would respond with overwhelming force. This is the proposed “red line.”
We should not be fooled by McConnell’s belligerent tone. Even assuming very strict verification procedures, the line he proposes is a relatively expansive one that leaves Iran with enrichment technology and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which is what the Islamic Republic claims is its red line.
While the press was focused on belligerent statements, the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) have apparently responded to Iran’s offer of renewed negotiations. Iran has also told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it can visit a previously off-limits nuclear site believed to be engaged in weapons research, but procedures have not yet been worked out.
Bottom line
I wouldn’t get excited about the prospects for negotiated solutions in either Syria or Iran. But if ever there was a time to negotiate, this is it. By fall, both situations will likely be too far gone, with serious consequences for the United States, the Middle East and the rest of the world.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Counter-revolution lives, but not forever
The past few days have seen ample signs that counter-revolution is alive and well:
- Syrian troops have retaken Baba Amr in Homs after weeks of shelling and the Free Syria Army’s tactical retreat.
- Vladimir Putin won his unfree and unfair election for President in Russia, routing the few candidates allowed to run.
- Iran’s President Ahmedinejad suffered losses to allies of Supreme Leader Khamenei in parliamentary elections that were no more free or fair than Russia’s.
The Syrians have fought their regime tooth and nail. The regime will exact terrifying revenge. The Russian protesters will demonstrate against Putin’s high-handedness. Bravo to Tony Picula, an election observer from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who said:
There was no real competition, and abuse of government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of the election was never in doubt.
The Iranian protesters will roll over and play dead, exhausted by a regime that is constantly narrowing the space for political expression even as sanctions point it in the direction of an economic abyss. Facebook and Twitter are proving no match for determined autocrats willing to spill blood and fix elections.
That said, autocrats have their problems too. Bashar al Assad is broke and faces continuing high expenses as he tries to reduce Syria’s rebellious cities and neighborhoods one by one. Putin sits atop a system so corrupt and discredited that many are predicting his electoral victory will be Pyrrhic: the beginning of the end. Iran’s elites are at each other’s throats even as the President Obama assures Israel’s supporters that the United States will use military force if necessary to prevent Tehran from getting a nuclear weapon.
This last is the top priority for the United States. President Obama has clearly decided not to focus American military might againt Bashar al Assad but rather to husband resources for the main event, if it proves necessary: an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations that will have to encompass its air defenses and likely command and control systems as well. Hillary Clinton’s “reset” of relations with Russia is in trouble, but Russia is more an obstacle–something you trip over rather than something that really blocks the way–than a threat to American vital interests. Syria is a proxy war, one that is absorbing vast Iranian resources that Tehran can ill afford to divert from other priorities.
Sanctions and other diplomatic means do not produce results on a predictable timeline. Cuba has endured an American embargo for many decades. Military action has unpredictable consequences and does not always bring the intended results. Strategic patience is vital, but in short supply during an American electoral campaign. Counter-revolution lives, but it won’t last forever.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Partial success or eventual failure?
Noah Pollak of the Emergency Committee for Israel tweeted today:
Obama policy = preventing Iran from getting nuke. Israel policy = preventing capability to build nuke. There’s the rub.
That is indeed the rub, but there is vast ambiguity hiding behind both equations. What does “getting” a nuke really mean? What does “preventing capability” really mean?
In short, building a nuclear weapons requires two of three things:
- Enrichment technology, or
- Plutonium production capability, and
- Specific design and ignition capabilities for nuclear weapons
Enrichment and plutonium production are “dual use,” that is they can be used for both peaceful and weapons purposes. Iran already has enrichment technology enabling it to enrich to 20%. That program is more advanced than its plutonium efforts. Moving beyond 20% enrichment is not a big technological step. What would it mean to take away this capability?
I suppose there is someone who thinks it means killing whichever Iranian nuclear scientists provide this capability. But realistically speaking that won’t be possible. The centrifuge enrichment technology that Iran has acquired is not a big mystery. There must be dozens if not hundreds of Iranians now capable of carrying the effort forward. To my knowledge, no state that has acquired enrichment technology has every surrendered it, though Libya may have come close. But Libya is not Iran, and what happened to Qaddafi would not encourage Supreme Leader Khamenei to go down the same road.
The only realistic approach to denying Iran nuclear weapons capability is to put its entire nuclear program under strict safeguards, with verifiable guarantees that it won’t enrich beyond current levels. Iran would also have to give up working on specific design and ignition capabilities. That is the direction President Obama is pointing when he says there is still a diplomatic solution.
The real question is whether Israel and its supporters in the United States could accept such a diplomatic solution as denying Iran nuclear capability. There was no sign of that at the AIPAC meeting today, where the President was applauded only when he talked about the military option and not when he mentioned diplomacy.
The problem with the military option is that it only delays and does not resolve. Iran would unquestionably redouble its efforts if its nuclear facilities are attacked. That is the correct lesson of the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981, as Colin Kahl points out. Any attack would have to be repeated at shorter and shorter intervals, without any guarantee that they would prevent Iran from eventually getting nuclear weapons.
So which do you prefer? Diplomacy that leaves some capability in Iranian hands, and has to be constantly monitored to ensure compliance, or the military option, which is doomed to eventual failure in preventing Iran from “getting” nuclear weapons?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The choice is a deal or many attacks on Iran
Jeffrey Goldberg’s interview with President Obama has attracted lots of attention, mainly for his threat to use military force to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, about which the President said he is not bluffing. But what does it tell us about the prospects for a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program? Not much, except for this key bit:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
This is important because the President here is outlining the diplomatic solution he thinks possible, albeit in the vaguest terms.
What does he mean? Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s. So far as I am aware, no country has agreed to give up enrichment or reprocessing technology–it isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
The trouble with Iran is that it has already signed and ratified the NPT, and apparently violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime, according to the IAEA. So President Obama will be looking for additional commitments reflecting a genuine decision by Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, presumably based on the calculation that they would be better off without them.
How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates several security dilemmas for Tehran: the United States will target Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons. Acquiring enrichment technology but giving up the nuclear option would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems.
U.S. intelligence leaks this past week claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, thus leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President seems to be suggesting. Iran would have to agree to rigorous and comprehensive IAEA inspections as well as a limit on the degree of enrichment it would undertake well below weapons grade, which is 90 per cent and above.
The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
If war is to be avoided, someone has to break this cycle, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force, especially when he appears before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) tomorrow and then meets with Netanyahu Monday.
This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that the parliamentary elections have been held. They are likely to mark a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program in recent months. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons are necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks is rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
I have no doubt President Obama is not bluffing, even if he is also trying to leave the door open to a diplomatic denouement. But of course Khamenei could come to the opposite conclusion. Even a successful bombing of its nuclear program will increase Iran’s commitment to getting nuclear weapons, without setting it back more than a year or so from the goal. Let’s hope one or the other–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
RSS - Posts
