Tag: United States
How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
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Syria is coming to a head
The Arab League has suspended its human rights monitoring mission. The UN Security Council is discussing seriously a resolution on Syria. The anti-regime Syrian National Council is looking for international intervention to establish a safe zone. The Assad regime has amped up its violent repression, and the Free Syria Army is amping up its response. Civil war is in the air. This is a truly dangerous situation, but also one that could turn in a good direction.
The danger lies in further escalation of violence: the regime still holds the advantage in firepower and manpower. Increased violence will solidify support among regime loyalists and reduce the numbers of protesters in the streets. Frightened Alawite, Christian and other minorities will rally around the regime, dreading the consequences of a Sunni majority victory, especially one in which the Muslim Brotherhood plays a strong role.
Opportunity lies in the UN Security Council resolution. It needs to define a clear transition path away from the Assad regime that has the support of Moscow and no objection from Beijing. The Arab League is proposing a handover of power to Bashar al Assad’s vice president and formation of an inclusive government, followed by elections. This is vaguely similar to the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for Yemen, where its effectiveness has been less than 100%. The devil is in the details: how inclusive the government is determines whether it has real legitimacy, but broad inclusiveness is difficult to achieve (neither regime nor protesters will want to sit in the same room with their antagonists) and will likely limit its ability to make decisions.
The key to the UNSC resolution is Russian support, which depends on convincing Moscow that it stands to lose more by backing the Assad regime rather than abandoning it. Above all, Russia will want guarantees of continued access to port facilities in Syria. It is distasteful no doubt to the Syrian opposition to provide any guarantees to Russia, which has backed Assad shamelessly. But that is the price of the UNSC resolution, which takes priority right now.
It is not easy to follow the evolution of a UNSC resolution, but the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect is trying. It looks as if the European/Arab initiative will only come to a head next week, likely not before Wednesday. If they can get a resolution passed that defines a clear political path forward, along the lines of the Arab League proposal to be presented on Tuesday, that would be a tremendous step forward.
In the meanwhile, we can expect further escalation of violence in Syria, with the regime taking advantage of the suspension of the monitoring mission to do its dirtiest work and the Free Syria Army responding with the limited means at its disposal. I see no sign yet of an appetite for an international intervention like the one in Libya. While NATO may be doing some quiet preparations, the Alliance is not buzzing the way it normally does before taking action. The Russians will ensure that any UNSC resolution cannot be interpreted to authorize military intervention.
I continue to believe that nonviolent action is the best course of action for the anti-regime forces. A further slide to civil war is not to their advantage, both because they lack firepower and because it will discourage passage of a satisfactory Security Council resolution, defined as one that outlines a political way forward. I understand perfectly well the impulse (and justification) for self-defense and even for offensive maneuvers. But violence will lengthen the process of bringing Bashar down and reduce the odds of a peaceful and democratic outcome. For those who doubt this, consult Chenoweth and Stefan.
Some readers may ask, why should the U.S. care? The short answer is that sectarian civil war in Syria could create real difficulties in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and elsewhere, destabilizing a part of the world that is already requiring an inordinate amount of American attention. And just about any imaginable post-Assad regime is likely to be less friendly to Iran. The fall of Assad could be a big plus for American diplomatic efforts to weaken Hizbollah and Hamas as well as block Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Next week could be crucial. Neither the regime nor its opponents can endure much more. Syria is coming to a head.
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Unworthy would be a kind word
Last night’s CNN-sponsored Republican candidates’ debate is still ringing in my ears. It is certainly not a surprise that the overwhelming focus was on domestic issues, except for a few international issues with domestic resonance. In Florida, this above all means Cuba and, for Rick Santorum, the threat of Muslim extremism installing itself in socialist countries in Latin America. It also means immigration and of course Israel (and Palestine).
So what did they say? Except for Ron Paul, they endorsed a strong embargo policy on Cuba. This is the policy we have kept in place until very recently. For more than 50 years, it has produced no results. Newt Gingrich went a step farther and endorsed bringing down the Castro regime (I guess we can still call it that). I’m for that too. But he gave no hint how he would do it. Arguably increasing person-to-person contacts, which is what the Administration is doing, will move things in that direction.
Santorum’s concern with Latin American jihadis is laughable, even if it is impossible to exclude that a suicide bomber may some day make his way from Mexico or Venezuela into the U.S. Santorum’s fix is even funnier: he advocates more trade with Latin America, which is pretty much what Obama has pushed by making free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama.
On immigration, there was a strong consensus in favor of enforcing current laws, without the government deporting anyone. This is a significant weakening of current policy–Obama has deported a lot of people. But the candidates claim enforcing existing laws could provide an incentive for undocumented immigrants to go home because they would not be able to work. The trouble of course is that repeated efforts to enforce the ban on undocumented immigrants working have not been successful. So the bottom line is no deportations and no effective incentives for people to “self-deport.” The candidates have managed to offend many Hispanic (and non-Hispanic) voters without getting any credit at all for suggesting a major weakening of immigration policy.
A Palestinian questioner–on Twitter someone suggested he was the only Republican Palestinian in existence–got it between the eyes from Newt, who claimed “Palestinian” was an identity invented in the 1970s. This is worse than inaccurate: before the founding of the state of Israel, all residents of Palestine were known as Palestinians, including Jews. I know this in part from a visit to the Irgun museum in Tel Aviv, which is hardly the place to find perspectives sympathetic to the Palestinian narrative. Newt’s line about the non-existence of Palestinians is a common line among right-wing Jews both in Israel and the U.S. No self-respecting history professor would repeat it unless there were a few $5 million checks in the bargain.
Romney was hot last night, effectively wiping the floor with Gingrich, who at times seemed uncharacteristically at a loss for words. But Mitt was also disingenuous. His defense of Romneycare, the Massachusetts health care scheme he put in place, applies word for word to Obamacare, which he said he would repeal. But the only part he disapproved of was the Obama part, not the scheme itself. Romney also claimed that Obama had thrown Israel under the bus and that only the Palestinians are standing in the way of a two-state solution. I can’t buy either of those propositions.
Wolf Blitzer, who used to be a serious guy, was spotty at best. Asking candidates why their wives would make good First Ladies is unworthy of him. But in a funny kind of way that was consistent with the tone of the whole evening: unworthy would be a kind word.
Gingrich’s poor showing last night should enable Romney to exploit his advantages in money and organization to win the nomination. It would be ironic if the most polarized political atmosphere in many years leads to a contest between Romney and Obama, both of whom are regarded as excessively moderate in their own political camps. If that happens, it won’t be the worst result the American political system has generated.
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Ambiguities in Egypt and Syria
It’s only two days since I attempted a summary of where things stand in the Arab world. Already things are changing. As one of my colleagues notes, that’s just the point: politics are going to be dynamic in the Arab world in the future. The decades of stasis are over.
In Egypt, large crowds are turning out today (the first anniversary of the revolution) to insist on transfer of power to the newly installed parliament. It looks as if the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is going to have trouble holding on to as much power as it would like. Will the SCAF make the mistake of forcibly dispersing the demonstrators, or has it begun to understand that it needs to reduce its own visibility and delegate more authority to the popularly elected representatives of the people? The soldiers would be wise to let them take the rap for the lousy economy and political strife.
In Syria, developments are also ambiguous. Led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have yanked their human rights observers from the Arab League team, which is likely to eviscerate that effort, or at least de-fang it. The Syrian Foreign Minister is welcoming the observers back, which is not a good sign for their likely effectiveness without the GCC participants. That is a great irony: the GCC as the guardian of human rights?
At the same time, the Arab League is asking for the UN Security Council to act. The Assad regime, having rejected the Arab League plan for a peaceful transition, is buying lots of Russian trainer aircraft, a sale that directly contradicts Moscow’s indications that Syria has reached the end of its rope. While those aircraft will presumably not be delivered for some time, their sale would certainly be a political signal of Moscow’s support for Damascus.
It will be interesting to see how the Americans react if Syria begins to use its existing aircraft against the demonstrators. President Obama in last night’s State of the Union address paired Bashar al Assad with Muammar Qaddafi. Will their ends be similar? I have generally discounted the possibility of military action to protect the protesters, but if Assad starts using aircraft that could change the equation quickly.
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This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
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The diplomatic screw turns
While Americans are distracted today by Newt Gingrich’s South Carolina primary victory over Mitt Romney and the entry of the New York Giants and New England Patriots into football’s “Superbowl,” the big international news is the European Union agreement to halt imports of Iranian oil within six months. Yawn. No wonder it hardly gets a headline.
This may not be the final turn of the diplomatic screw, but it is an important one. Iran’s economy and currency are in a tailspin. The stage is now set for P5 (that’s U.S., UK, France, Russia and China) + 1 (Germany) talks with Iran on its nuclear program. Turkey wants to host, but a date has not been announced.
If this next stage of the diplomatic efforts fails, as the effort a year ago did, the slide towards war will accelerate. Iran is rattling its saber, which is long enough to try to close the strait of Hormuz to outward-flowing traffic, thus denying the world oil market about 20% of its supplies and causing a sharp price spike. They will also make trouble for Americans in Iraq and possibly elsewhere. The Americans and Europeans, whose warships traversed the strait today in a show of force, will then draw their oil stocks to dampen the price and use military force to keep the strait open, and possibly to deny its use to the Iranians (who need it to import oil products).
While talking about military action less than at times in the past, the Americans and Israelis are conducting a “stealth” war against the Iranian nuclear program, blocking supplies of vital materiel, infecting software with at least one computer worm and assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists. None of this effort can stop the Iranians in their tracks if they are committed to nuclear weapons. Even bombing of their nuclear facilities won’t do that–they will almost surely react by redoubling their efforts. In the absence of an agreement, the best we can hope for is to slow Iran down.
Today’s turning of the diplomatic screw is intended promote a negotiated solution. It is unrealistic to imagine that Iran will cease and desist from trying to obtain all the technology it needs to build nuclear weapons. But it is still possible they will agree to abide by the terms of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) they have signed and ratified. Many other countries have stopped on the threshold of nuclear weapons–the ones I know best are Brazil, which acquired the necessary technology but reached an agreement with Argentina for a mutual standdown, and Italy, which opted for a dual key arrangement for control of American weapons deployed on Italian territory.
Arrangements of these sorts are not possible with Iran. No matter how much my idealist friends press the idea of a Middle East nuclear free zone, it is impossible to imagine the Israelis going for it, especially under the current Netanyahu government. And if the Americans, who asked Israel decades ago not to build nuclear weapons in the first place, can’t even get the Israelis to stop building settlements, what are the odds of success in getting Israel to give up nuclear weapons? “Never again” is not only a slogan–it is an objective that all Israeli governments will adhere to. Nuclear weapons are an important means to that end.
So is there no hope? On the contrary, I think there is. Iran gains little and losses a lot if it actually deploys nuclear weapons: it gets targeted by both Israel and the United States, with the former likely to launch on warning. The United States is committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Against nuclear weapons states, first use is not prohibited in American doctrine.
What does Iran hope to gain by developing nuclear weapons? Prestige, to be sure, and a more secure and powerful role in the Middle East. But most important is that the Iranians believe that nuclear weapons will guarantee no American invasion and thus survival of the theocratic regime. This is a perception problem: even if we resort to bombing, there isn’t going to be an American invasion of Iran, which is far too large and populous a country for the Americans to imagine that things would come out better than in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the price of blocking Iran from developing nuclear weapons is a pledge that the United States will not invade, it is not too much to pay.
We need however to be cautious. We should not sell out Iran’s Green Movement, or the rebellion against Bashar al Assad in Syria. Nor should we do anything that will help Hamas and Hizbollah to continue their trouble-making. We should not be guaranteeing regime survival in Tehran, only saying what we all know to be true: America hasn’t got the resources or the desire to take on another major ground war in the Middle East.
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