Tag: United States
Righting the civilian/military balance
Someone might imagine that I would be unhappy with the President’s strategic guidance for the Defense Department, released last week. It reiterates many of the U.S. military’s more traditional roles: counter-terrorism and irregular warfare, deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power, countering weapons of mass destruction, maintaining nuclear deterrence. It also re-emphasizes some relatively new areas: outer space and cyber space as well as support to homeland defense. Its implications in many of these areas are unclear, maybe even still undetermined. Certainly who watch the Defense budget more than I do aren’t sure yet.
But it includes a clear and unequivocal step back from stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan (and before in Bosnia and Kosovo), the design and implementation of which preoccupied me for at least 15 years. This is the President’s guidance on stability and counterinsurgency operations:
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless
be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required,operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
In another section of the document, the guidance also suggests that U.S. forces will be:
...able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a
transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing
forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.
Surprise: I find all of this eminently reasonable, provided the civilian and reserve capacities are built up in a serious way. It is a mistake to use active duty fighting forces in roles that might be carried out at least as effectively by civilians, whether government officials or contractors. Our non-military means are however still lacking. Despite Hillary Clinton’s well-intended Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we are still far from having in the State Department and USAID the capabilities required.
This matters. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability and governance in Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to regroup and regenerate. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability in Iraq that turned a quick victory into an eight-year nightmare. If ever we need to deal with a post-war or post-revolution Iran or Pakistan (whether the war involves the U.S. as a belligerent or not), or even post-Assad Syria, we will clearly lack adequate civilian capacity, and the military’s reservists won’t suffice either.
So yes, let’s get the military out of the peacebuilding/statebuilding/nationbuilding/postconflict stabilization/reconstruction business as much as possible. Let’s use reservists when possible, as we have for years in Kosovo and Bosnia. As civilians in uniform, they have talents and experience that active duty forces often lack. But let’s not forget that we might still have to do these things, despite the best intention of the Administration to avoid it. If even 10 per cent of what the military saves in following the President’s strategic guidance were to be spent on civilian capacity, it might be enough. But there is no sign of anything like that happening yet.
So yes, I am happy with the strategic guidance, but it has to be backed up with budgetary allocations to the civilian side of our foreign policy apparatus to make it practical. Righting the balance requires not just words but money and people.
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A stage for a lying murderer?
Burhan Ghalioun, head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), suggests “an international conference on Syria to stop the atrocities and the killings,” in the likely event that the SNC plea for a “safe area” goes unheeded. I’d be the first to admit that the record of international conferences in stopping anything is mixed at best. Certainly the international conference on Yugoslavia in the 1990s was not 100% effective, though some of its spinoffs like the Badinter commission played an important role in clarifying the rules of the game.
I wonder whether this is an idea worth exploring, admittedly out of desperation. So far, the Russians and Chinese have stymied the UN Security Council. It is much harder for them to stymie an international conference, where there is no formal veto and a good deal of pressure to come up with a consensus statement. The Iranians may even be tiring of what Bashar al Assad is costing them. If the Syrian government refuses to attend, as well it might, that would enable the SNC to speak for the Syrian people.
The Americans would want to go to such a conference knowing exactly what they could hope for by way of results. It seems to me a conference statement denouncing violence on all sides (yes I know that the regime is by far the bigger offender), endorsing the mission of the Arab League human rights monitors and noting the failure of the Syrian government to cooperate fully with them is not out of reach. I don’t know that it would help much, but anything that undermines the legitimacy of the Assad regime is at this point useful.
Could a conference give Bashar al Assad a bully pulpit that would be useful to him in reaffirming his legitimacy on the world stage? Yes, but that’s what we’ve got diplomats for: to stage manage this so he comes off as the lying murderer he is.
Tomorrow is Friday. Let’s hope the demonstrators turn out in numbers, building on last week’s extraordinary showing. Here are Arab League monitors documenting violations by the Syrian Army near Deraa yesterday:
Or if you prefer, here is first-hand testimony of a former Defense Ministry official:
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The evangelical/Likudnik dead end
The more I watch this poor-quality video, the more I realize the poor quality of the intellect speaking:
This is Rick Santorum unaware that his premise–that there are no Palestinians and therefore everyone who lives in the West Bank must be Israeli–not only excludes the two-state solution but also eliminates the possibility of Israel being a Jewish state.
But my purpose is not mockery: there is nothing funny about this campaign to deny the existence of the Palestinians and their right to a state. Let’s be clear: if there is no Palestinian state, there will be no Jewish state either, or the Jewish state will have to deny democratic rights to a large portion of its population. Danny Danon–a Likud member of the Knesset–has put forward that proposition:
These Palestinians [who continue to live in the West Bank after Israel’s annexation of it] would not have the option to become Israeli citizens, therefore averting the threat to the Jewish and democratic status of Israel by a growing Palestinian population.
This makes comparisons to apartheid South Africa more reality than fantasy.
What we are seeing in Santorum–and in Gingrich–is a very dangerous effort to deny Palestinians not only their rights but their existence. Israel cannot survive as a democratic and Jewish state if this line wins out. I haven’t seen this yet with Romney, who is at pains to “reaffirm as a vital national interest Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.” Will he, too, take a turn down the evangelical/Likudnik dead end?
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How important is a Taliban office?
Today’s news that the Taliban have agreed to open an office in Doha, where they have been meeting for months with Americans and Germans, has generated a good deal of chatter about the prospects for a negotiated end to the Afghanistan war. That seems overblown to me.
But it is also indicative: the Americans are suing for peace. Vice President Biden’s statement that the Taliban are not our enemy was not a gaffe but a signal, as we said here right away. The Taliban have now indicated that the signal was received and appreciated. There are also indications that they expect release of some prisoners from Guantanamo.
It will be interesting to see if that happens–it is not an easy move for President Obama in the lead-up to an election campaign in which his presumptive opponents are more likely to criticize him for failing to make a maximal effort in Afghanistan than for staying too long. He may try to portray the move, if it comes, as a transfer of prisoners to the control of the Karzai government, as an expected aspect of the U.S. withdrawal and turnover of security responsibility to a fully sovereign government.
The opening of the office is important not so much for establishing a clear channel for communications–that has likely already been done–but also because it begins to establish some clarity about the leadership structure on the Taliban side. The Americans are not going to want to negotiate with more than one or two insurgent forces in Afghanistan. It appears that the Doha office will be one that claims to speak for Mullah Omar, who led the Taliban government in 1996-2001. It is less clear to me whether it can speak for the Haqqani network or other Taliban forces. We may well be expected the Pakistanis to deal directly with the Haqqani network, which at times has appeared to be an adjunct of the Pakistani inter-services intelligence directorate (ISI).
What does this portend for a peace settlement? Hard to tell of course, but I’d put a small amount of coin on the proposition that a role in governing parts of Afghanistan is on offer to the Taliban, with consequences for women and human rights more generally that can only be described as odious. Even if all the words on paper call for protection of women’s rights, getting implementation will be nigh on impossible. When you sue for peace, you don’t get everything you want. Secretary of State Clinton had better be ready to gather whatever women’s rights crumbs she can as the men slice and dice Afghanistan.
Here is Hassina Sherjan, Founder of Aid Afghanistan for Education and co-author of “Toughing It Out in Afghanistan” at Harvard Law School, telling her audience that wearing a burqa made her take six Advils a day:
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War with Iran in 2012?
Is 2012 the year of war with Iran? Some would say the war has already begun: assassinations, explosions, and cyberattacks occur daily. Tehran has said it will regard imminent sanctions targeted against its central bank as an act of war causing it to close the strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy promises to keep it open. Miscalculation and escalation could become inevitable. Attacks on the Iranian mainland could follow quickly. Once that starts, bombing of the Iranian nuclear sites becomes the logical next step.
Tom Pickering and Bill Luers argue that we should recommit ourselves unconditionally to the diplomatic track:
The United States must set out on a relentless search for a better way to get at this seemingly unknowable regional power.
Trita Parsi argues that negotiations are still possible but require dropping pressure on Iran. The evidence points in the other direction: it is precisely when pressure on Iran builds that Tehran looks to diplomacy for a way out. Or more likely, for a way to buy more time. There would really be no reason at all for Tehran to come to the negotiating table, or to answer the tough questions the International Atomic Energy Agency is posing, if the pressure were not there.
But pressure is not an end but a means. As Walter Russell Mead notes, talk of red lines and willingness to use force paints the Administration into a corner. Eventually, we may have to do what we threaten, with highly uncertain results.
What, realistically, can diplomacy achieve at this point? I fear the best we can hope for at this point is for Iran to stop its nuclear program at the virtual stage: it would gain little from testing a nuclear weapon and nothing from arming its missiles with them. So long as it has all the technology required–high explosive as well as nuclear–it can gain the prestige benefits nuclear capacity provides without the downside of being targeted for “launch on warning” by the Israelis.
The theocratic regime can also hope that a virtual nuclear weapon will forestall any American plans for invasion or for covert action to bring about regime change. American anxiety that the North Korean succession proceed in an orderly fashion, and that Pakistan not come flying apart, would be enough to convince anyone that nuclear capacity gets you respect that would not otherwise be available. Qaddafi’s fate confirms that view.
This is a Faustian bargain: we agree that people who oppress the vast majority of Iranians can remain in power in Tehran, they agree they won’t go that last mile to weaponize their nuclear capacity. There are many countries around the world that are in this virtual nuclear power position–I suspect Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and many others maintain a level of nuclear knowledge required to reestablish a serious nuclear weapons program quickly if circumstances were to require it. The difference is that they are not sworn enemies of the United States.
It is hard for me to picture things coming out much better than this, but it is important to remember that the Iranian population is not part of the bargain. They may well return to the streets, demanding the freedoms that Tunisians, Libyans, Egyptians, Yemenis and Syrians hope for. If they do, we need to be ready to live with uncertainty as they struggle for freedom. There is no guarantee that a successful Green Revolution will foreswear nuclear weapons, but a democratic Iran might well be less threatening from the American perspective.
PS: Patrick Clawson’s very interesting and comprehensive discussion of methods to slow Iran’s progress toward “nuclear breakout” unfortunately treats diplomatic efforts as aimed principally at convincing allies that the United States is being reasonable and not at actually reaching an agreement. He never really defines “nuclear breakout” or discusses whether Iran stopping somewhere short of it should be acceptable to the U.S.
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Happy new year, Balkans!
I seem to have developed the habit of doing a piece for Kosova Sot‘s New Year’s edition. Here is what I sent Magarita Kadriu on December 20:
Friends in Kosovo and the Balkans often ask me what I think about events there. The truth, if I care to tell it, is that people in Washington don’t think much about the Balkans these days. The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a list of 30 conflict prevention challenges for the United States in 2012. None involved the Balkans. I follow events there—mainly from B92’s coverage and many Balkans visitors—but only with peripheral vision. I am far more focused on the Arab spring, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. And this week North Korea.
I am well aware that there are still war and peace issues in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and in Kosovo. But they are relatively small ones subject to a lot of international monitoring: Milorad Dodik is not going to be able to take Republika Srpska in the direction of independence without a lot pressure being brought to bear against the idea, and Belgrade is not going to be able to formally annex northern Kosovo without suffering substantial consequences.
That does not mean however that the underlying problems can be resolved. Resolution really depends on the Europeans, who have often shown little stomach for using their leverage to good effect. I say that, and yet just yesterday German Chancellor Merkel made it clear, once again, that the European Union will not accept partition of Kosovo (or the persistence of the parallel structures in the north) and expects Belgrade and Pristina to collaborate in finding solutions. Her steadfastness is a great contribution.
I only wish we were seeing the same strong European voice in Bosnia, where Catherine Ashton has been far more tolerant of Dodik’s antics than I would like. This is partly because the Europeans don’t take him seriously. They know he knows there will be no recognition if Republika Srpska makes the mistake of declaring independence. But they underestimate the frustration and annoyance on the Bosniak side of the equation. Bosnia is stagnating, a condition that is not good for peace and security.
That said, I don’t expect dramatic developments in 2012. Pristina and Belgrade need to continue their dialogue and the search for mutually acceptable solutions, which can be found in implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. Bosnia is reaching the end of its financial rope, which may encourage at least formation of the new state government, so long overdue. Much of the rest of the Balkans is enjoying a relatively good holiday season: Croatia is entering the EU, Macedonia won its case in the International Court of Justice against Greece, Montenegro is moving faster than most thought possible towards the EU and NATO.
Serbian President Tadic yesterday acknowledged that neither partition nor restoration of Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo is possible. Now he is talking “dual sovereignty.” I’ll be glad to hear what he means by this—certainly dual citizenship is not only possible but desirable. But I don’t know of any places that enjoy peace and stability without clarity about sovereignty.
Kosovo’s citizens have every right to be frustrated that their sovereignty and independence has not been recognized at the United Nations or by Belgrade. But the best revenge is simply this: govern well, improve the lot of all of Kosovo’s citizens, and enjoy freedom each and every day in 2012.
Ten days later, I don’t have much to add, but my message would be the same to Belgrade and Sarajevo: govern well, improve the lot of your citizens and enjoy freedom each and every day in 2012. The Bosnians have apparently reached agreement in principle on forming their government. So far as I know, everything else is more or less where it was before Christmas. Things move slowly in the Balkans, except when they move fast.
Slow is probably safer right now, but I do hope Serbia will make a decisive turn in 2012 in favor of a European future. Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić gives me some hope this morning with this from B92:
We are going to the EU because of Serbia and only if it is in our interest. Serbia will not be destroyed if it loses Kosovo. That happened in the Serbian history before, that fanaticism about being in love with Europe or masochism that we cannot live without Kosovo or the Republic of Srpska.
Then he dashes my optimism with talk about “demarcation.” Hard to know what that means, but it presumably refers to his partition ambitions. Giving up on partition, both of Kosovo and Bosnia, is absolutely essential if Serbia and the rest of the Balkans is going to thrive.
I’ll be in Belgrade in mid-January and hope to get a feel for how likely that is. Stay tuned to peacefare.net for reports on what I find.
With very best wishes for the New Year to friends of all flavors in the Balkans,
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