Tag: United States
The strait of Hormuz: go around
Tehran has been threatening this week to close the strait of Hormuz if sanctions are levied against its central bank, preventing export of Iranian crude. I’m with Simon Henderson: the right response to Iran’s threats is rapid development of alternative routes. He long ago laid out the geography and suggested some options.
It is really rather extraordinary that nothing has been done about this in the several decades since the strait of Hormuz became a key choke point for world oil supplies and a major (and expensive) preoccupation of the U.S. Navy. America spends something like $100 billion per year on military capabilities to protect oil routes. Easily a quarter of that is attributable to the strait of Hormuz. A pipeline from the UAE through Oman that circumnavigates the strait, another through Iraq to Turkey and a couple to get Saudi oil out to the Red Sea are all that is needed to devalue Iran’s geographic trump card. Put one through Yemen and the transit fees will be enough to solve that country’s economic troubles for decades.
I find it puzzling that none of this ever gets done. I was in charge of our preparations for an oil supply disruption in the State Department in the mid 1980s. We spent a small fortune accumulating the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and considerable diplomatic coin getting a few allies to do likewise. We also got them to commit to coordinated, early drawdown, a policy that has been implemented several times successfully over the last couple of decades.
But somehow we have never managed to get oil suppliers to use some of their gigantic flow of cash to circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz. I have to wonder whether we’ve got a moral hazard here: we protect the sea lanes and guarantee that the strait remains open, so Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others conclude there is no need to invest in the pipelines that would make the strait less critical. We are hard-strapped now and need to reduce many commitments. Some even propose that we withdraw entirely from the Gulf. That is a a flaky idea in my book, but it is perfectly reasonable to expect oil producers–and other consumers–to carry more of the burden of ensuring that Gulf oil continues to flow.
PS: Michael Rubin views the Iranian threat as a hollow because Tehran needs to import gasoline and American military superiority more than suffices to keep the strait open. But he neglects the economic damage that even ineffective military action in the strait (or anywhere in the Gulf) will cause worldwide. He also emphasizes Iraqi vulnerability, which would be significantly reduced if oil could be exported in larger volumes to Turkey.
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Ten places ICG neglects
I don’t entirely agree with ICG’s “Next Year’s Wars,” their choice of conflicts is idiosyncratic, and they don’t really predict anything, but it is hard to compete with an organization that has smart people on the ground in difficult places. I’ll focus on 10 places they don’t mention:
1. Russia: Putin doesn’t make it over 50% in the March 4 election but wins the second round. Demonstrations continue but he resists new parliamentary polls. Weakened, Putin lashes out at his opposition and makes things worse. Who knows where this ends, but it will probably not be in 2012.
2. Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Nayef succeeds to the throne and tries to roll back King Abdullah’s modest reforms. Demonstrations break out but are brutally repressed. Oil prices, already high due to Iran’s threats to the strait of Hormuz, skyrocket.
3. Iraq: The Sadr bloc’s call for new elections in Iraq is echoed by the Kurds and eventually Iraqiyya. Maliki tries to avoid it, but he eventually falls to a vote of no confidence in parliament and elections are held towards the end of the year. I’m not going to predict the outcome.
4. Egypt: The constitutional process is difficult and delayed, but presidential elections are held in the fall (postponed from June). Secularist candidates split their constituency, the Muslim Brotherhood blows its lead by pressing social conservatism and Abdel Fotouh, a relatively moderate Islamist, wins.
5. Libya: Continues to implement its established roadmap, elects the “National Public Conference,” prepares a constitution and succeeds in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating most militias.
6. Bahrain: The Americans continue to support the regime. Iran, stung by tightened sanctions, sponsors demonstrations against the Fifth Fleet.
7. Sudan: War, between north and south. South wins, takes back Abyei and part of South Kordofan. President Bashir is shipped off to The Hague by his generals.
8. Zimbabwe: Mugabe dies, his loyalists hang on but can’t manage the economic collapse. The opposition takes over.
9. Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
10. United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
And for extra measure:
11. China: Big real estate crash late in the year cripples Chinese banks and causes bigger problems for the world economy than the euro, which muddles through.
12. Israel/Palestine: Big but largely nonviolent demonstrations on the West Bank. Israelis say “genug ist genug” and unilaterally withdraw from Palestinian population centers.
That should give me something to write about a year from now! None of it should be mistaken for advocacy, and a good bit of it is based on feel rather than analysis.
I reviewed last year’s predictions yesterday.
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Who doomed Iraq?
Three of Iraq’s leading politicians write in the New York Times this morning:
Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government, Iraq is doomed.
Is it true? And if so, who doomed it?
I confess my strong sympathy with the plight of these Iraqiyya leaders: former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, current parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and current Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi garnered more seats in the March 2010 elections than any other coalition but for almost two years have been unable to convert that victory into meaningful power. Their complaints about Prime Minister Maliki, who dreads the prospect of a Ba’athist coup, are well founded: he does abuse the security services and manipulate the courts.
I nevertheless find myself gagging on their plea for American help. These are the same politicians who refused to speak up publicly for a continuing American troop presence in Iraq. Their colleagues–Vice President Tariq al Hashemi and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq–were among the strongest voices calling for American withdrawal. They are now hiding out in Kurdistan, having lost the protection that the American troop presence once provided.
Looking more closely at the New York Times piece, the plea sounds more like a threat. Nowhere is there any sign that Iraqiyya is prepared to go into opposition, ally with other political forces to bring down Maliki’s government in parliament, or take other political measures to solve the problem. They say they will come to an American-supported national conference aiming to resuscitate a power sharing government, but the preconditions for doing so are legion:
But first, Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.
In other words, Maliki has to disarm first, or else.
What is this “else”? Are our Iraqiyya friends threatening civil war, as the Times headline writer suggests? Or are they just suggesting that they will press for further regionalization, trying to free Iraq’s Sunni-majority provinces from Baghdad’s rule? I might wish it were the latter, but there is no sign at all in their piece that this is the case. And to be fair, Maliki has done everything he can to block regionalization efforts, in both Sunni and Shia majority areas. It was unsettling, and possibly instructive, that the warrant for Tariq al Hashemi’s arrest quickly generated an Al Qaeda in Iraq spate of bombings targeting mainly Shia in Baghdad. Are our Iraqiyya friends getting support from those committed to violence?
Vice President Biden, who once proposed that Iraq be broken up along sectarian and ethnic lines, is now scrambling to keep the country together. He has leverage over Maliki, who values American security assistance and intelligence cooperation as well as diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq as a regional power. Using that leverage is not cost-free however. At the very least, he should insist on peaceful methods from all sides, including those who say:
For years, we have sought a strategic partnership with America to help us build the Iraq of our dreams: a nationalist, liberal, secular country, with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. But the American withdrawal may leave us with the Iraq of our nightmares: a country in which a partisan military protects a sectarian, self-serving regime rather than the people or the Constitution; the judiciary kowtows to those in power; and the nation’s wealth is captured by a corrupt elite rather than invested in the development of the nation.
Hard to dissent from the preferences expressed here, and America should be prepared to help. I have spent many hours in recent years talking with Iraqi parliamentarians about national reconciliation. They need to begin doing some. The issues are difficult but not insoluble.
If Iraq is doomed, it is Iraqis who are dooming it.
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Saleh in the U.S. is not the worst of it
My gut tells me I’m with Andrew Exum, who objects forcefully to allowing Yemen’s former President Saleh into the U.S., supposedly for medical treatment. A serial human rights abuser and murderer of unarmed protesters, he merits neither our sympathy nor our safe haven. It is hard for me to imagine that an angry someone won’t find a way to drag him into a U.S. court.* But does the brain confirm the gut feeling?
I can imagine what John Brennan, the White House counter-terrorism “czar” and chief administration spokesman on Yemen, is arguing. Getting Saleh out of Yemen will remove an obstacle to the transition process there. It will also enable the U.S. to continue support for security forces that fight Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the local Al Qaeda franchise. This is Brennan’s first concern.
Unfortunately those forces are under the control of Saleh’s relatives. So continuing our support for them also helps Saleh to keep his regime in place, if not for his own return then for the ascendancy of one of his sons to power. What we are seeing is the emergence into the open of something that has clearly been true all along: the Americans don’t want too much change in Yemen, as it threatens their top priority, which is the fight against Al Qaeda. The American Ambassador’s recent denunciation of the protesters is part of this picture.
This is a big mistake, a bigger one than allowing Saleh into the U.S. The conditions that enable Al Qaeda to thrive in Yemen are not going away so long as Saleh and his family maintain their autocratic rule. It may be tactically convenient to get Saleh to the U.S., but it is strategically stupid for the United States to remain in his pocket, snookered into supporting his sons as the only bulwark against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The problems that make Yemen home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula go far beyond terrorism: sectarian and secessionist rebellions are raging north and south, water and oil are running out, qat is king, poverty is endemic and abuse of the population is reaching epic proportions.
Any serious counter-terrorism effort in Yemen should include this bigger picture, as John Brennan knows. But I fear it does not. If Saleh comes to the U.S. it will be a symptom of a much bigger problem with U.S. policy in Yemen.
*This option is outlined by William F. Schulz at Huffpost.
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The Libya analogy does not stop at Benghazi
For those tempted to consider Syrian pleas to establish a “safe area” to protect civilians, Safe Area for Syria: an Assessment of Legality, Logistics and Hazards, prepared for the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army by the London-based Strategic Research & Communication Center, is a must-read. It suggests:
At present, the most achievable option would be to establish a “safe area” in the country to provide refuge for embattled civilians from other cities and towns, a base of operations for the designated political leadership of the Syrian opposition as well as a military command centre — in other words, a Syrian Benghazi.
The pre-requisite is
…a pre-emptive aerial campaign would have to be waged to neutralize the regime’s air defence systems, particularly in Aleppo and Lattakia and in and around Damascus.
Safe areas come under attack because that is where the enemy is. The Syrian proposal is not intended to be a safe area like Sarajevo, which during the Bosnian war was declared but no military action taken to protect it until after it was attacked. Our Syrian colleagues are telling us the safe area they want would require in advance a significant air operation over much of Syria to prevent the shelling and air attacks that naturally result when a “safe area” is declared.
I won’t delve too deeply into the legal side of the paper, except to say that it dreams up some pretty far-fetched schemes because it is clear no UN Security Council resolution authorizing such a safe area can pass over Russian objections. It is hard to picture any of these schemes passing muster with Pentagon lawyers, and even less with the White House.
But if I am wrong and it turns out they are willing to bite the bullet and destroy Syrian air defenses, the military action won’t stop there. We’ll soon need to take out Syrian armor and artillery, which will be used to shell the safe area. And we’ll be doing this at the same time that the Free Syrian Army goes on the offensive. Sound familiar? The Libyan analogy does not stop at Benghazi.
What is the alternative? You see it on unfolding on the ground today in Syria. The Arab League observers are reportedly in Homs, where the Syrian security forces have wrecked a great deal of damage. I hope we are encouraging them to stay there, and to spread out to other areas that have been under siege. I also hope they can communicate directly with people outside Syria. The presence of the observers will encourage large demonstrations, and increase the risk to the regime of using violence. The Syrian security forces will play “cat and mouse,” but it is a game the mouse always loses if it goes on long enough. The Arab League just has to make sure it is a tireless and omnipresent cat.
PS: Reports today suggest that some Syrian security forces have left Homs as the observers arrived and that the protest there today is large. Here is what was going on before arrival of the observers:
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Accountability is not only for the bad guys
A Libyan e-penpal writes
As you know the Russians proposed two days ago a project at the U.N. to investigate on the Libyan victims committed by NATO according to Russia. We as Libyans are proud of the involvement of NATO and the United States who freed us with our Libyan fighters from the deposed dictator “Gaddafi”. Even if there were casualties, we as Libyans are confident that it is by pure mistake or by premeditation of the dictator’ forces, who put weapons and artilleries in civilian homes. Everyone in Libya and in the entire world knows the attitude of the Russians when the revolt against “Gaddafi” began February 17, 2011. What we can say is the total hypocrisy of the Russians. Once again, we thanks the U.S.A. and NATO.
I am grateful for the confidence this Libyan and many others place in NATO and the U.S. During my visit to Libya in September I was often stopped on the street to be told how much the intervention was appreciated. Certainly the Russians are less interested in getting to the facts of the matter and more interested in embarrassing NATO.
But I have to confess that I would like to see NATO do its own unclassified after action assessment of civilian damage, cooperatively with the new Libyan authorities. Whether or not we ever conduct an operation exactly like this one again, doing a serious assessment would provide vital information for protection of civilians in the future.
So far, NATO has apparently left the investigating to nongovernmental organizations and the press. They do an admirable job, but what they cannot do is figure out how to decrease harm to civilians in future operations. I have no doubt but that NATO intends to do that–there is just no mileage in killing civilians for the Alliance–but it also has to take the trouble to determine exactly how mistakes occur in order to correct them.
If NATO continues to resist a public inquiry, it will feed the Russian propaganda mill. Better to sit down with the Libyan authorities, the NGOs and the New York Times to figure out how a serious investigation can be conducted. Then go do it. Anyone who claims undertake military action as part of the “responsibility to protect” should be willing to do that much. And the present Libyan authorities, who no doubt fear that such an investigation will extend to the behavior of some of the anti-regime rebels, need to begin to assemble the facts that will eventually be needed to sort out who did what to whom.
Accountability cannot be limited to the bad guys.
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