Tag: United States
Half the world
The goal of this National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security is as simple as it is profound: to empower half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security.
Those are the opening lines of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security unveiled yesterday at Georgetown University by Secretary of State Clinton. My friends at Inclusive Security asked me if I would blog on it–I hope they won’t be too disappointed in the results.
The plan is impeccably right-minded: it makes engagement and protection of women central to U.S. policy, complements existing efforts, establishes inclusion as the norm, emphasizes coordination and declares U.S. agencies accountable for implementing the plan. Nothing wrong with any of that.
The problem is that women are not often the problem. Only in rare instances do they join armed groups, chase civilians from their homes, rape and pillage or commit other war crimes. Men do most of these things, and men generally order these things done. When the time comes to make peace, the people you need at the negotiating table are the ones who control the ones with the guns.
The people you should want at the negotiating table are the ones without guns: victims, male or female, who have a stake in ending war and building peace. But only rarely are they brought in, mainly because the guys with guns don’t want them there. In my time working on the Bosnian Federation in the 1990s, I can’t recall an occasion on which a woman was in the room during a negotiation as a representative of one of the “formerly warring parties.” But neither was there ever a man in the room who hadn’t been a belligerent, who just wanted a normal life, who thought the safety and security of his family was more important than ethnic identity. Constituents for peace are a threat to belligerents, who want all the cards in their own hands, not in someone else’s.
This does not explain why women aren’t used as mediators. Of the current State Department special envoys and representatives who report directly to Hillary Clinton, only four of twenty-one are women, if I am counting correctly. Seven of the ten who do not report directly to the Secretary are women. Certainly these are higher numbers of women than at times in the past, but that 4/21 is not exactly smashing the glass ceiling. The UN, which naturally reflects not only American values, has never used a woman as a chief mediator, according to the report.
While I would be the last to quarrel with the need to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence during and after conflict, as well as their right to resources during recovery from violence, it is in the conflict prevention section that I think the report says some really interesting things. Let me quote at some length:
…gender-specific migration patterns or precipitous changes in the status or treatment of women and girls may serve as signals of broader vulnerability to the onset or escalation of conflict or atrocities. This focus will help to ensure that conflict prevention efforts are responsive to sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of violence affecting women and girls, and that our approaches are informed by differences in the experiences of men and women, girls and boys. Further, we will seek to better leverage women’s networks and organizations in activities aimed at arresting armed conflict or preventing spirals of violence.
Finally, the United States understands that successful conflict prevention efforts must rest on key investments in women’s economic empowerment, education, and health. A growing body of evidence shows that empowering women and reducing gender gaps in health, education, labor markets, and other areas is associated with lower poverty, higher economic growth, greater agricultural productivity, better nutrition and education of children, and other outcomes vital to the success of communities.
I’m not sure I am completely comfortable with the notion that women and girls are the canaries in the coal mine, but the notion that women’s employment, health and education, often viewed as the softer side of peacebuilding, are in fact central to the enterprise is one that I think has real validity. If Afghanistan has any chance at all of coming out all right from the last decade of hellish conflict, it is because of what has been done on health and education, two of the relative success stories in an otherwise bleak picture. Education is one of the failed sectors in Bosnia, where its segregation has helped to sustain ethnic nationalists in power. The role of women in North Korea, where they are increasingly responsible for providing livelihoods from small gardens, is likely to be fundamental.
We won’t really know if this “action plan” is effective for another year, or perhaps two or three. It is probably too much to hope that the forcefulness and clarity of purpose with which it was prepared will blow away the barriers that have stood for so long. But if it enables America to tap more of its own talent as well as draw on constituencies for peace in conflict-prone countries, it will have served a useful purpose.
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North Korean winter: stability or discontent?
As regular readers will know, North Korea is not my thing, even if I have a good deal of experience on nuclear nonproliferation issues. The last time I posted a piece devoted to it was more than a year ago, though I’ve mentioned it more often as an American priority. In the wake of Kim Jong-il’s death, the best I can do is offer a summary of what I think obvious.
North Korea is a priority for the U.S. because of the risks its nuclear weapons program poses, both for proliferation and for targeting America and its allies in South Korea and Japan. Kim Jong-il’s regime managed to test something like nuclear weapons twice (in 2006 and 2009), was developing longer-range missiles and is thought to be on the verge of acquiring substantial quantities of enriched uranium. North Korea has already been involved in murky missile and nuclear technology trade with Pakistan and Iran.
The first American concern will be short-term stability. The Obama Administration is quite rightly indicating that it is watching the situation and consulting with Seoul and Tokyo, but it would be a mistake to say or do anything that could provoke military action by Pyongyang, which readily perceives threats and uses attacks on the South both to rally internal support and to extract assistance from the international community.
This will put Washington for the moment on the same wavelength with Beijing and Moscow, which fear instability. China in particular is concerned about millions of refugees crossing its border. It will also worry that the Americans intend to take advantage of Kim Jong-il’s death to liberate North Korea and reunify it with the South. That is something Seoul says it wants and the Americans would be hard put not to support, but the process by which it happens could be dramatically problematic as well as costly. China does not want a reunified, Western-oriented, strong Korea on its border.
A great deal now depends on what happens inside North Korea. The New York Times quotes an unnamed American military source:
Anyone who tells you they understand what is going to happen is either lying or deceiving himself.
I would be deceiving myself. So I won’t try to tell you I understand what is going to happen. Things to watch for? Whether calm prevails for the next week or so, whether the funeral comes off on December 28 without signs of tension in or with the army, whether the succession to Kim Jong-un is orderly, whether food prices remain more or less stable, whether there are military maneuvers against the South. So far, the announcements out of the North suggest things are under control.
Past the next few weeks, Washington will need to decide what to do. In a remarkable but little remarked shift of policy, the Americans–who had said they would not meet with North Korea bilaterally unless it gave up its nuclear weapons programs–began meeting bilaterally with the North Koreans in 2006 as soon as they tested a nuclear weapon. Now they say they won’t return to the six-party talks (involving China, Russia, Japan, and the Koreas) unless than the talks are substantial (which means progress can be made on nuclear issues).
My guess is that we’ll see talks, but with a few months delay. North Korea is not as desperate as once it was. It will not want to rush into international talks before settling its domestic situation. The regime will want to reconsolidate itself and bargain with the five other parties from a position of strength, which likely means continuation of the nuclear and missile programs in the interim.
The wild card could be the North Koreans themselves. If protests start, the regime will crack down hard. There are signs the security forces are deploying to prevent trouble. Markets are closed. North Korea is a brutal dictatorship far beyond the imagination of Tunisia or Egypt, where protests have felled long-ruling presidents. Could this be the winter of discontents?
PS: Written before Kim Jong-un became the designated successor, but still of interest: Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea – Council on Foreign Relations.
PPS: Just imagine what these people will do the day they are free to do as they like:
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Let’s not lose Iraq now
No, Iraq has not been “worth it.” Even a majority of its veterans don’t believe that. President Bush launched the war believing that there were weapons of mass destruction. That in any event was the only argument that really held water. Neither Saddam Hussein’s marginal role in supporting international terrorism nor his gross mistreatment of the Iraqi people would have garnered the broad support that the Bush Administration managed to assemble for the invasion.
The Iraqi toll is huge: more than 100,000 killed seems to be the consensus. The American toll, though much smaller, is deeply felt: almost 4500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded, not counting civilians. In a decade of financial collapse the economic costs, projected to reach trillions, cannot be ignored.
That said, the right thing to do now is to make the best of a bad thing. The Bush Administration put in place both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that expires at the end of this month and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which will now govern the Iraq/U.S. relationship, including the substantial office of security cooperation that will provide training to the Iraqi army and police. While Republicans are complaining that President Obama did not do whatever was necessary to extend the SOFA and enable a small (10,000?) U.S. contingent to remain in Iraq, they certainly would not be patting him on the back if he had caved to Iraqi demands that American forces give up de facto immunity from prosecution, which is what the current SOFA provides. Both Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki decided it was politically more palatable to allow the SOFA to expire and use the SFA for the future defense relationship.
The SFA is more than adequate for that and broader purposes, if it is implemented energetically. It covers not only defense and security but economy and energy, education and culture, health and environment, information and communications technology, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation. I keep hearing of meetings happening and efforts being made, but so far as I can tell no one has prepared a comprehensive review of what has been accomplished and what is planned under the SFA. That makes me suspicious that it is little more than whatever the stovepiped agencies of the U.S. government happen to want to do in Iraq, rather than the strategic effort its label suggests.
What would be strategic in Iraq today? First and foremost in my view is pipelines. Yes, pipelines. Most Iraqi oil, especially of the cheaply produced kind, is in the south, and for decades Iraq has exported it via the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz, where it runs a gauntlet of Iranian guns. Iraqi exports are now reaching the limit of the existing export capacity and there are plans to expand it. More leverage to Iran.
Far better, or more likely in addition, Iraq should be expanding export capacity to the north. This requires repair of its aptly named “strategic” pipeline, a two-direction pipeline that links oil facilities in the south to those farther north. It would also require construction of a major new pipeline to get oil to Turkey, where it can be sold into European markets more economically than through the Gulf route. Tying Iraq to European oil and eventually gas markets would do more to ensure Baghdad’s future political and diplomatic orientation than dozens of persuasive diplomats. Maybe more than 10,000 American troops would have done.
The SFA also invites the United States to “work with and through the democratically elected government of Iraq” to strengthen democratic institutions. This is important, as it opens the door to assistance to the court system, the parliament, provincial and local governments that are vital counterweights executive power. The SFA also welcomes American diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq’s international and particularly regional role. This is something the Iraqis highly value–they haven’t got a lot of other pals to lend a helping hand–and it would help to preserve American influence in Baghdad.
I won’t attempt a comprehensive review of the SFA here, though it is something I hope someone will undertake, but maybe there is room for one more item: educational and cultural cooperation. Getting more Iraqis to the U.S., especially for educational purposes, would help enormously in the long term to ensure a more modern and Western oriented Iraq. Our current visa regime needs some loosening to allow it to happen. But just as important is getting Americans to Iraq without wearing BDUs (Battle Dress Uniforms). Most Iraqis have had contact with few American civilians–it is high time they saw more of America than military might. Apart from the very real security issues, the Iraqi visa regime, at least in Washington DC, is prohibitive–I know the ambassador and haven’t been able to get a visa for more than a year (most of my dozen or so trips into Iraq have been on Pentagon ID, but that presumably will no longer work after the end of this year).
You don’t have to be a Bush voter to recognize that Iraq is an important country in the Middle East: its geographic position, its long border with Iran, and its vast oil resources (on the order of those in Saudi Arabia) give it real weight in how the region will evolve. It is disturbing that the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations hasn’t held a hearing on it (except for confirmation of new ambassadors) in three years.
The Americans need to do something now that doesn’t come naturally: pursue a mutually respectful relationship with Iraq through civilian means even as its troops complete their withdrawal. Nothing about the giant and expensive embassy convinces me that we are doing it effectively and efficiently. Give me a comprehensive report on the implementation of the SFA–I’m wonk enough to look forward to reading it.
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What does Kosovo’s president represent?
Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga’s speech today at SAIS was what I had hoped. She was forward-looking, even while reviewing the sad history of oppression from 1989 until the NATO intervention in 1999. She was clear about Kosovo’s status as a sovereign and independent state, even if it has not achieved universal recognition and membership in international organizations. She was hopeful about Kosovo’s European aspirations, while recognizing the many challenges that have to be faced, including normalization of relations with Serbia through the EU-sponsored dialogue. She was forceful about Kosovo’s territorial integrity, while emphasizing the rights of the Serbian community under the Ahtisaari plan. She underlined the importance of reintegration of the northern muncipalities, but called for an economic development plan encompassing south Mitrovica as well.
Plucked from a successful career in the Kosovo police, President Jahjaga is quickly establishing herself as a symbol of Kosovo’s youthful aspirations. She is trying hard to represent all of Kosovo’s ethnic communities, not just the majority Albanians, and to stay above the political fray. She embodies commitment to rule of law–her entire career prior to becoming president was spent in law school and the much-respected police service. And though she did not mention it today, she symbolizes the aspirations of Kosovo’s women for a stronger role in a society in which male politicians dominate.
What more could I have asked for? In response to my opening question about pursuing criminals responsible for crime against Serbs south of the Ibar, she emphasized mainly Pristina’s inability to get the full benefit of cooperation with international police organizations, of which Kosovo is not yet a member. I might have liked to hear something more about encouraging all citizens to protect their neighbors and support the authorities in maintaining law and order.
She was clear about protection of minority communities, but a colleague noted that he would have liked to hear more about how all the ethnic groups of Kosovo share a common history and culture. The beautiful Serb monasteries of Kosovo should be a source of pride to Albanians as well as to Serbs. The maintenance of separate, and conflicting, historical narratives is a serious obstacle to reconciliation in Kosovo, as it is elsewhere in the Balkans.
Asked whether she would come to Belgrade to meet President Tadic, she responded she would go anywhere to meet anyone so long as it was clearly understood that she is the president of a sovereign and independent state. That is not likely to happen soon, since Serbia will have elections next spring. But the time will come. If Jahjaga is still president when it does, Kosovo will be well represented.
A few minutes in the “green” room before the talk with President Atifete Jahjaga and Minister for European Integration Vlora Çitaku (that’s Ambassador Avni Spahiu hiding behind me):
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Syria options: quick failure or slow success
While I was enjoying a good discussion yesterday of mainly diplomatic Syria options over at Brookings (co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute), military experts at the Washington Institute were publishing an assessment of options for military intervention.
My bottom line: the “harder” military options, whether by the dissident-manned Free Syrian Army (FSA) or by external powers, are unlikely to be effective. Nonviolent options–multilateral diplomacy combined with continuing protests–have a much better chance for success, but they may take a long time. Where I come from, if the choice is between failing quickly and succeeding slowly, wisdom chooses slow success. But that also means sustaining the protesters for longer than they can last without help.
The Brookings/MEI event feature three of the very best on Syria: Murhaf Jouejati, who is now in the Syrian National Council (SNC), Ömer Taşpınar of Brookings and SAIS, and Andrew Tabler of the Washington Institute.
Murhaf Jouejati set a good pace: the Barbara Walters interview showed Bashar al Assad for what he is: a liar. There is no disconnection from reality. He is determined to stay in power and use any means to do so. The U.S. sanctions have had a psychological effect but the European Union sanctions are far more important, especially the ban on importing Syrian oil. The big blows were the Turkish sanctions and the Arab League decision, which is to be implemented beginning December 27. This deprived Bashar of his claim to be an Arab champion.
The impact is substantial. Oil revenue is down, tourism is disappearing, the dinar has lost value, heating oil is scarce. The revolutionaries are shifting from street protests to strikes and boycotts, which are less dangerous. The SNC is coordinating with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which says it is committed to defensive actions. There are differences between the SNC and the National Coordinating Committee, a group inside Syria that is opposed to international intervention and prepared to talk with the regime, while the SNC would like international intervention to protect civilians and hasten collapse (and wants talks only on transition once Bashar has agreed to step down). Without outside intervention, regime implosion could take a long time. The Arab League proposal for international monitors has potential, but we need to get them in as quickly as possible, something Bashar is unlikely to agree to.
Ömer Taşpınar thinks two factors drive Turkish behavior on Syria: the damage Bashar has done to its “zero problems with neighbors policy” and a growing sentiment of Sunni solidarity, fed by disgust with Bashar’s continuation of the crackdown during Ramadan. Turkey does not want to be seen as supporting Western initiatives on Syria or following a U.S. lead. Ankara wants to see multilateral, especially UN Security Council, backing for whatever is done. It will not likely take unilateral action. The U.S. needs to be more effective diplomatically with Russia and China. The SNC needs to prepare and publish its vision for post-Assad Syria.
Andrew Tabler sees the U.S. as having been slow to react correctly to events in Syria, but it has now come around and is reaching out to the opposition, which is both grandiose in its ambitions and depressed in its mood. It is at a crossroads and needs to decide whether to use violence. The de facto contact group (U.S., France, Germany, UK, and Turkey, which should be augmented with Arab countries) needs to consider humanitarian corridors or buffer zones. The protests should remain nonviolent to preserve political and moral advantage. Sanctions have to be targeted to “break off” key regime pillars. The most likely to fall are the Sunni businessmen, who are already hedging their bets.
The military options published by the Washington Institute range from the silly to the unpromising. Humanitarian corridors into Syria’s cities? Apart from the fact that they don’t appear to be needed, they would impossible to sustain if the regime decided it did not want them. Buffer zones or enclaves along the Turkish border? That requires suppression of a substantial Syrian air defense system and constant vigilance thereafter, in the air and on the ground. Without it, the buffer zones just become unprotected targets, like the Safe Areas during the Bosnian war. That’s where you are sure to find your enemies, so that is where you aim. No-fly zone? It’s a bad joke, since the regime is not using aircraft to repress demonstrations. It would just be the top of the slippery slope to broader intervention.
In the end, the Washington Institute resorts to that next to last refuge of scoundrels, covert action:
…even covert intervention would buoy the opposition’s morale, while signaling to Damascus that events are moving against it, that external powers are willing to run risks to aid the population, and that the opposition has important allies. Taken together, these developments could significantly alter the dynamic of the Syrian struggle.
I’m all for doing whatever we can to get the Syrian opposition the money, cell phones, fuel and other supplies they need to sustain nonviolent protest, but “covert action” has a serious record of compromising whoever accepts it and failing to produce good results.
My conclusion: the Arab League proposal for human rights monitors is the best idea out there. If Bashar rejects them, it is one more nail in his coffin. If he accepts them, they are likely to report on atrocities and help to end his regime. I just hope the Arab League has 500 of them ready and willing if he does accept. A UN Security Council resolution calling for their deployment would be a giant step in the right direction. That’s a tall order for our diplomats, but one worthy of their efforts.
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Is Iraq really open for business?
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki spoke today to a warm welcome at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Iraq, he said, is open for business and it welcomes American companies, which risk losing out if they don’t get more aggressive. So far, so good. I can’t agree with Donald Trump, who thought it remarkable we didn’t take the oil with us as we left, but I am surprised how few American companies (other than the Blackwaters of security protection fame) have pursued Iraqi business.
There was something missing in Maliki’s remarks: he made no promises about a level playing field, about accountability or transparency, about doing business cleanly and on the merits. Instead he underlined that he and his Iraqi government colleagues will be glad to help American companies do business, a promise that skeptics like me view as dubious at best and downright illicit at worst. Call me cynical, but if you have to come to the right people in government to help you do business, there is something wrong with the way government has set up business to be done.
I don’t mean to rain on the Iraqis’ parade. It is good for Maliki, as part of the overall noralization of relations, to court U.S. business and to promise assistance. It is also good for American companies to get busy competing. But in an open and competitive system, assistance should only rarely be needed.
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