Tag: United States
Yemen’s loss
I did not know Chris Boucek, who died today at 38, well. We crossed paths at a few meetings, and I always found what he said interesting. But we only occasionally exchanged a few words, not much more than hello really. But I regarded him as among the most interesting, amiable and perceptive people in a community of frequently interesting, mostly amiable and highly perceptive people.
The best memorial I can think of on peacefare is a quote from a piece dated October 27 on the Carnegie Endowment website:
The three biggest things that the United States can do to help Yemen and reduce the threat of terrorism are increasing access to water for all Yemenis, helping fight corruption, and supporting land reform….There needs to be a better balance in U.S. support and more attention paid to prevent terrorism before it gets worse. It’s shortsighted to only rely on counterterrorism efforts and more work needs to be done to ensure that the ungoverned spaces in Yemen don’t get any bigger.
Yes, he also discussed al-Awlaki, President Saleh and other matters, but it is striking and characteristic that Chris could not finish an interview on Yemen without this thoughtful attention to the less obvious but critically important issues of water, corruption and land.
Yemen has lost a good friend. America has lost a fine mind. I hope his family can take some comfort from knowing that even those of us who did not know him well treasured his contributions.
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Afghanistan is a Vietnam that matters
Expectations are low for this week’s “regional” meeting in Turkey on Afghanistan. Until Pakistan is convinced to reign in the Taliban, regional cooperation doesn’t mean much.
I suppose the Istanbul meeting may, as the diplomats say, set in motion a process that will eventually produce some sort of regional security and economic arrangement, but that kind of goobledy gook is unlikely to save many Pakistani, Afghan or American lives anytime soon. Afghanistan’s very real importance to the “New Silk Road” cannot be realized under current conditions.
The U.S. military is anxious to reassure us that the overall number of Taliban attacks in Afghanistan is down this year, but the insurgents seem more capable of reaching into Kabul and other formerly safe areas. Twelve or so Americans died in an improvised explosive device attack Saturday in the capital. That’s not the kind of mass infantry attack on American outposts of which they were capable a few years ago, but it sure as hell makes people in the capital nervous.
The problem, as the Pentagon’s latest report to Congress makes strikingly clear, has as much to do with governance inside Afghanistan as cross-border infiltration. Under the heading Weak Afghan Government Capacity Puts Progress At Risk, the Pentagon says:
However, the capacity of the Afghan Government has been limited by a number of issues, including the political dispute in the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament, the continued absence of an International Monetary Fund program, widespread corruption, and the lack of political progress in enacting key reforms announced at the July 2010 Kabul Conference. Setbacks in governance and development continue to slow the reinforcement of security gains and threaten the legitimacy and long-term viability of the Afghan Government. The United States and the international community continue to work closely with their Afghan partners to address these challenges.
This is the polite version. What it means is that few have confidence in the Karzai government, which appears incapable of curbing corruption or reaching workable agreements with even its peaceful political opponents.
Hillary Clinton has stopped talking about “clear, hold, build” and has started talking “fight, talk, build.” The new mantra has the virtue of necessity. We’ve done pretty well at fighting and clearing insurgents from parts of Afghanistan, but we don’t have enough troops to hold and the Afghans aren’t proving good at it. So we are looking for a negotiated solution (that’s the talk part), one that would presumably bring the Taliban in from the cold and give them a slice of the governing pie, especially in the south and east.
That’s the build part, but the questsion is what can be built on a foundation as weak as the Karzai government? This could begin looking more and more like Vietnam, where all the metrics were favorable, an agreement was negotiated, but the incapacity and illegitimacy of the government in the South eventually opened the door to the north’s military superiority once the Americans had withdrawn. Those like John Barry who drew the analogy almost two years ago are looking prescient.
The saving grace could be this: the Taliban are even more unpopular with Afghans than Karzai. If the Afghan army can improve enough between now and 2014, Afghans–even Pashtuns–may be willing to defy and reject people who didn’t have much to offer last time they took over.
The big difference between Afghanistan and Vietnam is that the United States really does have national security interests in Afghanistan and especially in nuclear-armed Pakistan. It is hard to see how the we can protect those interests if withdrawal from Afghanistan ends the way withdrawal from Vietnam did. Afghanistan is looking like a Vietnam that matters.
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Game changer
Politics and Policy in the New Middle East: that’s what they are calling the Middle East Institute 2011 Annual Conference at the Grand Hyatt, 1000 H Street:
Wednesday, Nov. 16th
6:00pm: Kickoff Banquet: Keynote by Bill Burns, DepSecState; awardees Lakhdar Brahimi and Esraa Abdel Fattah
Thursday, Nov. 17th
Conference
8:45 – 9:00am: Opening Remarks: Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, President MEI
9:00-10:30am: After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy In the Middle East
10:45am-12:15pm: The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
12:30-2:10pm: Keynote Luncheon: Samih al-Abed and Yossi Beilin
2:15-3:45pm: Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
4:00-5:30pm: Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
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They’ll miss it once it’s gone
Tim Wirth argues that UNESCO admission of Palestine as a member will initiate a cascade of U.S. withdrawals from UN specialized agencies, damaging important American interests. This is because current law prohibits the U.S. from providing financial contributions to any UN entity that admits Palestine as a member.
John Bolton says
UNESCO has made its decision: It prefers Palestinian membership to American participation. Now let the rest of the U.N. specialized agencies make their choice.
This is game of chicken, played between the U.S. Congress, which is not interested in changing the law, and foreign governments, most of which have so far seen support for Palestine’s membership in international organizations as a cheap way of supporting the Palestinians and expressing dissatisfaction with the Israeli government’s negotiating stance.
Despite its good works, few care much about UNESCO, which the U.S. stayed out of for years without much harm done. As Wirth notes, the more important UN agencies for American interests are the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Telecommunications Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Each will make its own decision based on the procedures outlined in its charter.
Some argue that failure to pay dues does not automatically lead to withdrawal from membership, and the U.S. could continue in arrears for at least several years, and possibly more, without legal consequences. That may be so, but American influence would certainly decline, as would the capabilities of organizations that really do perform functions–like inspection of nuclear programs–that serve U.S. interests.
We are watching a diplomatic game of chicken, which like most diplomatic games occurs in slow motion. If Palestine’s supporters blink first, their cause suffers a setback, but not really a very serious one. More than 100 countries have already recognized Palestine. Membership in international organizations won’t add much. The international system would then remain what it is: an imperfect but useful multilateral instrument through which Washington has often been successful in pursuing its interests.
But if they don’t and the U.S. cuts off funding, we could be witnessing the end of the post-World War II international system, one that depends on the United Nations and its specialized agencies to carry a lot of water for Washington. Bolton and company don’t see it that way–they see it as a hindrance to American power and would rather get rid of it altogether. But they’ll miss it once it’s gone.
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Arresting developments
Ali Hawar, a friendly Kurdish journalist for Al Rudaw weekly published in Erbil, writes:
A few Days ago Iraqi security forces cracked down on former members of the former ruling Baath party. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki defended the crack down and there are rumors that those who were arrested were planing for military coup….
I answered his questions:
1- Do you think a military coup can happen in Iraq?
DPS: I imagine a military coup could happen in Iraq, but I personally have no reason to believe that one was being planned. If the government has evidence against the people it has arrested, I hope it will be presented soon in public.
2- What does this latest event tell you about the future of Iraq, especially now that the US will defiantly leave at the end of the year?
DPS: It tells me Iraqis had better learn how to sort out their problems by peaceful means without the Americans around. Some of the people who were most critical of the American presence in the past are now hoping the Americans will rescue them from what they claim is abuse of power by the Prime Minister. I might even sympathize with their complaint, but they should have worried a bit more about the American withdrawal they so stridently demanded. The Americans aren’t being defiant–they are doing what the government in Baghdad has asked them to do.
I imagine the Americans will ask a lot of questions about these arrests, and depending on the answers they may register some objections, but they cannot do a whole lot more than that. The problems emerging now have to be settled among Iraqis.
3- Do you believe this is another scenario from Maliki, so he can show his political power toward his rivals?
DPS: I don’t really doubt that Maliki fears a coup attempt. What I don’t know is if he has real reason to fear it.
He has also unquestionably been trying to consolidate his hold on power. It is up to other political forces in the society to use the means provided by the constitution to respond if they think he is going too far. The provision in the constitution for formation of regions is one possible route for those who don’t appreciate Baghdad’s behavior. But the constitutional procedure for a referendum has to be followed.
The main thing is that Iraq stick with the rule of law. I could be arrested in the U.S., too, maybe wrongfully. I would have to hire a lawyer and defend myself. The trouble in Iraq is that the courts are not sufficiently independent to guarantee a fair trial. A bit more focus on problems like that, and less on who holds what position in which council, would be a good idea.
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There are worse fates
The annual EU Forum, a confab sponsored by the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies and SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, convened Thursday and Friday in Washington to focus American and European luminaries on the thing we all call the Arab Spring, even though we know it started last winter, varies from country to country and may not have results as upbeat as the appellation implies. Almost entirely missing from the day and a half conference were Arab voices. This was an opportunity for the “the West” to put its heads together, not for the revolutionaries or the oppressive regimes to offer their narrative.
They were nevertheless much present in the minds of the participants, who leaned towards enthusiasm for the values of the protesters, as well as their energy and determination, while worrying about the impact on Western interests. The three big areas of worry arise from
- the Islamists: what do they really mean by sharia law? will they really play fair in democracy?
- increased Arab support for the Palestinians: will it make the Israel/Palestine equation even more difficult to solve?
- sectarianism (will it lead to civil wars and possible spillover to other countries, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen?
Underlying all was a sense that the West has precious few resources with which to respond effectively to the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, to the continuing repression in Syria and Yemen, or to the reforms in Jordan and Morocco, never mind the still solid autocratic regimes in the Gulf or the fragmented polity in Palestine. No one seemed to feel Western credibility or influence was strong, especially in light of the long-standing support (and arms) both Europe and the U.S. had given to Arab autocracies in the past (and continue to provide to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and others even now). And everyone was aware that the Chinese, Turks, Brazilians, Indians and other emerging powers will play increasing roles in the Middle East, offering contracts and aid on terms far less complex and burdensome than those of the West.
The Europeans nevertheless came with a strong sense that the Middle East is their “southern neighborhood” and they need to up their game in response to changes that will affect their interests directly, whether through immigration, economic interdependence, oil and gas supplies, contracts, investment and myriad other ties. Precisely what they are going to do about it was not clear, and there was a strong sense that European policy on the Arab Spring has been re-nationalized. The British and French in particular are carving out their own distinct approaches, taking advantage of their forward role in the NATO military action against Qaddafi, while other countries are lagging and the EU itself is still contemplating the interior walls of the Berlaymont.
The Americans would like to focus more on Asia, not only Afghanistan/Pakistan but also China and North Korea as threats to national security. It was clear to all that Europe would not share this Asian interest to the same degree, but yesterday’s talk of Chinese financing to back the euro might change a few minds on that score. The problem for the Americans is that the Asian challenge requires a very different set of policy instruments from the Arab Spring, which apart from Egypt and Yemen Washington might rather leave primarily to the Europeans (no one of course says this quite so bluntly, but if you follow the money that is what they mean). Everyone expects, though, that NATO will remain somehow important and in the end the only real military instrument capable of effective power projection available to the Europeans.
There were lots of other points made. Trade and investment are far more important than aid. We need to be talking not only with secular women but also with Islamist women. Liberal economic reform, associated in Egypt and other countries with the old regimes, is in trouble, at least for the moment. Civil society in the Arab Spring countries needs Western support, but it should not be done through governmental channels but rather by nongovernmental organizations like the American National Endowment for Democracy (and the talked about European Endowment for Democracy). Western conditionality should focus on transparency and accountability rather than specific policy prescriptions.
I could go on, but I trust the sponsors will be doing a far better job of writing up in due course, and tweets are available from EUISS for those really interested. Bottom line: the West is fading even as its values spread. There are worse fates.
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