Tag: United States
Blasé is not what Bosnia needs
Amar Causevic, a young Bosniak friend studying at Johns Hopkins SAIS in Bologna, writes
US Embassy in Sarajevo has been attacked!…The attacker was a Wahabi follower of Bosniak origin from Novi Pazar [Serbia]…There are no words with which I can describe my anger at this moment. I feel so ashamed and disappointed as a citizen of Bosnia and dweller of Sarajevo. Americans are great friends of Bosnia-Herzegovina and if it was not for them God knows what would happen to us. Sorry if this email caused any inconveniences, but I simply wanted to share my frustration with you.
I’m glad he did share his frustration, as it illustrates well an attitude that is much more common among Muslims in Bosnia than the extremist Wahabi one, which will naturally grab a headline or two in the next 24 hours.
The Bosnian government has denounced the attack. Media are reporting that a policeman and the attacker were wounded. Embassy personnel are safe.
Sarajevo these days is about as quiet and relaxed as any city in Europe. But I confess to concern that radicalization of all sorts could ensue if Bosnia’s current political problems are not resolved. The country is going on a year without installing a government after the last elections. The financial situation is deteriorating. People are increasingly frustrated and annoyed. The passions are not readily contained within any given country’s borders. The potential for instability is real.
I don’t know which of Bosnia’s tripod of nationalisms will in the end cause an upheaval, but it would be unwise for the international community to continue its blasé attitude.
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Turkey is playing with fire
The emergence under Turkish protection of the Free Syrian Army raises again the question of whether the protesters against President Bashar al Assad should turn to violence.
Turkey has welcomed Syrian refugees for months. There is certainly nothing wrong with that: it is in fact an obligation (non-refoulement) to do so if the Syrians have a well-founded fear of persecution, which under the circumstances is evident. Disappointed in Bashar’s refusal to listen to their advice or respond to pressure in favor of reform, the Turks have not however yet done much to block investment in Syria or otherwise signal their displeasure with more than words. Now, rather suddenly, a Foreign Ministry official appears with a Syrian colonel who announces to the world that the Free Syrian Army has already attacked Assad’s forces inside Syria and needs better weapons in order to continue the effort.
This looks to me like a puzzle with missing pieces. Have the Syrians been allowing Kurds to attack inside Turkey? I can’t find indication of that in the press, but it would not be surprising, and might well prompt a response in kind. Or are the Turks just using the means at their disposal? Will Syria also respond in kind, raiding Syrian refugee camps across the border inside Turkey? Or, if they haven’t already, allowing Kurds to attack Turkish forces?
Whatever is going on, it is dangerous. The protesters’ umbrella group, the Syrian National Council, has so far opted not to use violence. The emergence of a separate group prepared to do so from outside the country puts peaceful protesters at even greater risk than they have been so far, and hurts the prospects for maintaining their unity.
The Americans have appeared to be urging the protesters to stick with nonviolence, knowing full well that third party armed intervention like that in Libya is not in the cards. The Turks are of course capable of their own initiatives, but I can’t help but wonder whether Washington has been in touch with Ankara about the Free Syrian Army. Did the Americans oppose letting it raid inside Syria from Turkey, or did they turn a blind eye?
Whatever, as my kids say. None of this is good. Violence–however justified on moral grounds–is going to make it harder for the protesters to win over minorities in Syria and opens the real possibility of ethnic and sectarian warfare that will spill over Syria’s borders into Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Lebanon. That could become a truly serious mess that all concerned would regret. It is time to ask the Turks to keep the Free Syrian Army inside Turkey and to stop playing with fire. If they want to do something, some stiff restrictions on Turkish business with Syria would help.
PS: Jeffrey White discusses the implications of various approaches to military action in Syria at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3415 (why can’t I get hyperlinks from their site?). Nothing he says there convinces me that civilians can be protected better by military means, even if the failure to use them also has dire consequences. Nor do I think, as he suggests, that open discussion of the option will strike fear into the heart of a regime that is increasingly confident of its ability to survive.
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Violence, or no violence?
As the regime of Bashar al Assad continues its bloody crackdown in Syria, at least some protesters are tempted to respond violently, especially those who have defected from the army. There is no question in my mind about their right to self-defense. The question is whether it is good strategy to resort to violence and whether the United States should encourage or discourage it.
Simon Henderson argues in The New Republic that the United States should not discourage it. He sees no reason to take the option off the table. He would also leave open the possibility of foreign military intervention, which the Obama Administration has so far ruled out.
Elliott Abrams takes a more nuanced view in a Council on Foreign Relations paper:
The United States should encourage defections but should not encourage violence in any form. Yet if a military opposition comes into existence and fights the regime, U.S. policymakers will not want to see that opposition crushed. Thus, the United States should not discourage other governments from assisting the rebels if they wish to do so. Nor should it try to stop other groups—for example, Sunni tribes living on both sides of the Syria-Iraq border areas—from assisting brethren inside Syria.
We took an approach of this sort with Bosnia in 1993-95: we turned a blind eye to arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to fight against the Bosnian Serb Army and its ample support from Belgrade.
I side with the Administration on this issue in Syria. Violence by the demonstrators will consolidate the security forces in support of the regime, reduce the likelihood of defections, and strike fear into minority populations, especially if there is cross-border Sunni cooperation in providing arms. The threat of military intervention (by NATO, the U.S., Turkey or someone else) is not credible. No UN Security Council resolution will pass authorizing it; U.S. action in its absence is theoretically possible but highly unlikely. The Arab League is far less antagonistic to Bashar than it was to Qaddafi. The Russians haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning the regime’s violence. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia is too valuable for them to risk another Libya-type air war that would likely put in place a regime unfriendly to the Russian presence on the Mediterranean.
Lest anyone wonder, I agree wholeheartedly with Elliott that the U.S. would benefit from seeing the back of Bashar al Assad. He puts it well:
The end of the Assad regime would be a great gain for the United States. The regime is a bloody dictatorship that is host to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Iran’s only Arab ally, the route through which Iran arms Hezbollah, and a permanent threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal peace. Moreover, by doing its best to assist jihadis seeking to fight Americans in Iraq, it was complicit in the deaths of many Americans soldiers and the wounding of far more. As the regime fights its own populace and clings to power, effective sanctions and vigorous diplomacy can help shorten its life and lay the foundations for a determined effort to build a democratic state in its place.
But violence on the demonstrators’ part has no place in a strategy aimed at weakening the regime, which has advantages in firepower and ruthlessness that simply cannot be overcome in today’s international environment. It isn’t fair, and it isn’t moral, to ask the Syrian National Council to foreswear the use of violence against a regime that is showing little restraint. But it is realistic and necessary.
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Or else what?
On Twitter, I mocked the Administration’s renewed effort to get Pakistan to act against the Taliban, suggesting that it amounted to doing the same thing over and over expecting to get a different result (one definition of madness). But here on the blog I should be a bit more analytical.
SecState Clinton was in Islamabad last week with a high powered delegation. The Guardian reported:
US officials are demanding that Pakistan either deliver the Haqqani network to peace talks, kill its leaders, or pave the way for the Americans to eliminate them.
The question is, or else what? what is America’s leverage? If the Pakistanis don’t do these things, what will the United States do? In the negotiation business, this is called “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA). I reviewed America’s broad policy options in July, leading to the conclusion that this is the damndest problem.
But there are “courses of action” for the United States:
1. Amp up drone attacks, aiming deeper into Pakistan. Hard to do without Islamabad’s cooperation, sure to create a negative reaction in Pakistan.
2. Reduce assistance to the Pakistani military. Drives them into the arms of the Chinese and reduces further the likelihood of cooperation on drone attacks.
3. Help the Pakistan civilian government to gain better control over the military and intelligence service. The civilians are less reserved in denouncing the drone attacks than the military, which isn’t going to like this idea and won’t sit still while it goes on.
4. Align the United States more with India (and Afghanistan) against Pakistan. Also drives Pakistan into the arms of the Chinese.
I was tempted to add a fifth: target the Inter Services Intelligence headquarters, or other elements of the Pakistani government that support the Taliban, but that is pretty near unthinkable unless we really are prepared to go to war with Pakistan. It is the kind of thing we’ve done elsewhere and may not remain unthinkable forever. Maybe this is what Karzai was referring to when he said Afghanistan would be on Pakistan’s side in a war with the United States.
Pakistan’s “BATNA,” which gives it leverage over the U.S., includes blocking or delaying military supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. As Jackie Northam notes this morning on NPR, Hillary Clinton’s post-Islamabad stops in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan presumably aimed at strengthening the “northern distribution network” supply route, thus reducing vulnerability to a Pakistani squeeze on Afghanistan supplies.
So, yes, there are things we can do, but they’ve got distinct downsides. For the moment, I remain wanting a thorough reassessment of our relationship with Pakistan, taking into account whatever we learned last week in Islamabad. It will likely come out in the direction of no. 3 above, but let’s try the reassessment and see.
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Next week’s “peace picks”
Relatively slim pickings this week, at least in numbers. Not sure why.
1. In the Eye of the Storm: Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Domestic Realignment, Brookings, October 25, 2:30-3:30 pm
Panelists
Ümit Boyner
Chair
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD)
Soli Özel
Professor
Kadir Has University, Istanbul
2. A Roadmap for Effective Economic Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Areas, USIP, October 26, 9 am-1 pm
The event will include two panels which will address structural as well as programmatic aspects of economic reconstruction, including: risk-aversion in donor institutions, inter-agency and international collaboration and cooperation, monitoring and evaluation, and the role of entrepreneurship and public/private partnerships.
Panelists will glean lessons from relevant case-studies and begin to chart the roadmap to peace and prosperity that World Bank President Robert Zoellick called for with the launch of the 2011 World Development Report.
Speakers
- Fred Tipson, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow
U.S. Institute of Peace - Basel Saleh, Assistant Professor of Economics
Radford University - Jomana Amara, Assistant Professor of Economics
Naval Postgraduate School - Sharon Morris, Director of the Conflict Management Group
Mercy Corps - Robert Aten, Senior International Economics
Ret. U. S. Agency for International Development - Gary Milante, World Development Report Core Team Member
World Bank - Graciana del Castillo, Co-founding Partner
Macroeconomic Advisory Group - John Simon, Founding Partner
Total Impact Advisors - Del Fitchett
Independent Economics Consultant - Raymond Gilpin, Director of the Center for Sustainable Economies
U.S. Institute of Peace
The Carnegie Endowment and the North-South Institute will host a discussion on the complexities of electoral support in conflict contexts and examine two compelling case studies—the recent elections in Afghanistan and Kenya. The event will also mark the launch of a new book by the North-South Institute, Elections in Dangerous Places.
Radwan Ziadeh, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, and Ammar Abdulhamid, founder of the Tharwa Foundation and a human rights activist, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact katarina@jhu.edu.
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Tehran’s options
While the world debates the significance of the Hamas/Israel prisoner exchange, let me turn back to something that really counts for the United States: Iran’s nuclear program. In the aftermath of the Iran(Car)Tel plot, friend Rashad Mahmood, formerly of Cairo, asks “What would be reasonable Iranian policy to having their nuclear scientists killed (by admittedly much finer spycraft since they haven’t aired any proof of who has done it)?”
This is a reasonable question with some scary answers. Let’s look at some of the (not mutually exclusive) options:
1. They can respond by killing the nuclear scientists of those countries they think responsible for the attacks on their own (presumably Israel, but as Rashad says there is no proof in the public domain). I assume they’ve tried this and haven’t succeeded, or at least we haven’t heard about it.
2. They can accelerate their nuclear program, hide it better, protect the people who work in it and try to get nuclear weapons as soon as possible. They may be trying, but they appear to be failing.
3. They can begin to wonder whether the nuclear program is worth the trouble it is causing and reach an arrangement that reassures friends and foe alike that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons even if it acquires the “fuel cycle” technology required to do so. President Ahmedinejad has proposed something along these lines, but no one is taking him seriously yet, so far as I can tell.
4. They can kill diplomats or citizens of third countries, say Saudi Arabia, that may have little to do with the killing of the Iranians but are hated enemies anyway.
My impression is that they’ve tried at one time or another Nos. 1-3, so far without success. No. 4 doesn’t make any sense to me, but maybe it does to someone in Tehran (and certainly it does to some in DC). The jury is still out on the extent of official Iranian involvement in the IranTel plot.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration seems to me to be doing the right thing: keeping the focus on the nuclear program and ratcheting up sanctions implementation. This may not bring immediate results, but at least it provides some incentive for no. 3. The trick is knowing when to take Ahmedinejad’s proposition seriously. It is really difficult for outsiders to judge when the right moment comes–we are going to have to trust the White House to call that shot.
Here is the version of what Ahmedinejad has said about limiting uranium enrichment published by the Washington Post:
Q: I understand that you were in favor of the deal you had reached with the United States in 2009, according to which the U.S. would sell you 20-percent-enriched uranium in exchange for Iran exporting low-enriched uranium. But you were attacked by your critics and came under assault and people here could not reach a consensus and the deal fell apart.
Ahmedinejad: In Iran, people are free to express their views. Every day some people criticize the policies of the government. This doesn’t mean that the government is going to abandon their policies. We felt that they wouldn’t give us the fuel required here for our reactor. There were some political leaders who gave interviews in the United States and Europe and they said they want to keep Iran from having access to such fuel. So we realized that they wouldn’t give us that fuel so we had to do it ourselves. Even if they gave us now uranium grade 20 percent, we would not continue with the production of this fuel.
Q: So if the United States sold you the enriched uranium, would you stop enriching yourselves?
Ahmedinejad: Yes. We don’t want to produce uranium of 20 percent. Because they did not give us that uranium, we had to make our own investments. If they start to give us that uranium today, we will stop production.
Q: You reached a deal in Geneva in 2009, and you came back here and the deal fell apart here, and now people in Washington don’t believe a deal is possible.
Ahmedinejad: If they give us uranium grade 20 percent, we would stop production. Those negotiations took place in Vienna. Apparently they know everything. I repeat: If you give us uranium grade 20 percent now, we will stop production. Because uranium grade 20 percent can only be used for such reactors, nothing else.
This is the proposition some commentators think worth considering. Many think it a mirage, but time is on Tehran’s side: even if their nuclear program has slowed, they will eventually get there if there is no verifiable agreement for them to stop.
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