Tag: United States
Keeping focused
While Iran’s defenders are pooh-poohing the charge that Iran’s Quds force backed a plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States, its detractors see escalation in the covert war with the United States.
Certainly if the charges are true, it is hard not to see the plot as escalation. But it is important to remember that there are at least two, if not more, belligerents in the covert war. Murder of Iranian nuclear scientists, the Stuxnet virus that seems to have slowed the nuclear program, U.S. capture of Iranians who claim diplomatic immunity working inside Iraq, and support to ethnic rebellions inside Iran all indicate that paranoid Iran really does have enemies.
It is important now for Washington to show some cards. The alleged plot supposedly involved Iranian hiring of Mexican drug cartels to carry out the dirty work. A cooperating alleged perpetrator seems to have identified Quds force operatives and arranged financial transfers from them. Putting at least some of the evidence into the public domain would go a long way to removing skepticism, which is rife even among those who are no friends of Iran.
This development comes at an awkward moment. Iranian President Ahmedinejad has been flashing an offer that some American analysts would like to take up, if only to call his bluff:
[Ahmedinejad] has stated on a number of occasions that his country will cease domestic efforts to manufacture fuel for one of its nuclear reactors if it is able to purchase the fuel from abroad. The United States should accept this proposal — publicly, immediately and unconditionally.
That seems highly unlikely at first blush: how do American diplomats make nice with Ahmedinejad while announcing to the world that Iran’s security forces have been plotting murder, even mass atrocity if one version of the alleged plot had taken place, inside the United States? But it is precisely at a moment like this–when Iran is going to find itself weakened and isolated–that the international pressure might be sufficient to force progress on the nuclear issue, with the added potential benefit of further fragmenting a regime whose president and “supreme leader” are already on the outs. Maybe taking up the offer privately, cautiously and conditionally would work too.
Preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons is a vital American interest, all the more so if the regime there is prepared to contemplate mass atrocity on American soil. We need to not lose sight of that objective while holding Iran accountable for whatever role it had in the alleged plot to murder the Saudi ambassador. Focusing on two objectives at once is not easy, but nonetheless necessary.
Not too much to ask
In today’s hierarchy of international challenges, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks low. It is an out of the way place, off the main axes of current concerns: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, oil, shifting sands in the Middle East, economic crisis. It had more than its 15 minutes of fame in the 1990s, when war in Bosnia attracted worldwide attention, NATO intervened and the international community at Dayton imposed and sustained a settlement that has more or less lasted until now. Isn’t that enough?
Vlado Azinović, Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber argue forcefully in a report published this week by the Atlantic Initiative and the Democracy Policy Council that it is not. They see real risks of renewed instability and spell them out in striking detail: dismantling the Office of the High Representative and the extraordinary powers he once wielded, inflammatory rhetoric, capacity of the Bosnian state institutions (including the police and judiciary), the impact of the global economic crisis on the country’s weak economy, the Bosnian armed forces and the extraordinary dispersal in the country of weapons, football hooligans, minority returnees and Islamic radicals. If war ever does break out again in Bosnia, no one is going to be able to claim there was no warning.
They also outline what they view as a necessary policy shift in the international community approach to Bosnia:
At the policy level, this shift would mean accepting, at least implicitly, that the path pursued since 2005 has failed and must be redesigned, starting from the identification of the strategic goal. That goal must be that BiH function well enough to meet the requirements to join the EU and NATO. Until that goal of durable functionality is reached by popular consent and demonstrated, it should be clear to all in BiH that the Dayton rules will continue to prevail and be enforced. That the country will not be allowed to fall apart, and that efforts in that direction will bring appropriately strong responses, needs to not only be articulated forcefully and clearly, but be believed.
What will that take?
– Additional troops from EU and non-EU members. EU/NATO member PIC SB countries not presently participating in EUFOR should make significant contributions.
– Sufficient helicopter lift for a quick reaction force based at Butmir of at least platoon, preferably company strength.
– Forward deployment in company strength to obvious potential flashpoints: Brčko and Mostar.
– Regular patrols between Tuzla airfield and Brčko, also to areas of minority return.
– De-emphasis of EUFOR activities not directly linked to the Chapter 7/Annex 1A SASE mandate.Restoration of credible deterrence would not only prevent a return to violent conflict, but would create the potential for forward movement on the political and social fronts by stripping the entrenched political elites of their current ability to leverage fear. This would create space for citizens and potential leaders who want to find a way to make the country function consensually. Restored, credible deterrence is the sine qua non of any political and social progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This all makes a good deal of sense. We are not talking giant resources here but a relatively modest increase in European commitments, including from non-members of the EU.
But the forces pushing against it are heavy. The United States is understandably frustrated with years of trying to convince the Bosnians to fix the Dayton constitution and anxious to confront more substantial risks to American national security. Distracted by the eurozone crisis, Brussels is happy to delegate Bosnia to its bureaucracy and entangle Sarajevo in the details of getting ready to make itself a candidate for EU membership. The longer that takes, the better from the perspective of those EU members hesitant about enlargement.
So we can’t expect much. I’m hoping that at least EUFOR will strengthen its forces in the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, which would be a primary objective of opposing Muslim and Serb forces if there is ever a return to conflict. The more important adjustment is less tangible but not less meaningful: making all concerned understand that Bosnia will remain a single country and enter both NATO and the EU as such, or not at all.
This should not be beyond Brussels’ capacity to communicate, even with its current distractions. And Washington will back it up. It is not too much to ask.
Good facts, lousy policy
It wasn’t easy, but I managed to plow, or at least skim, my way through the 37 pages of ICG’s report on the 49% of Bosnia that constitutes Republika Srpska (RS), since I know you are all waiting for my verdict.
It’s mixed. The report seems to me clear and compelling in portraying the profound corruption and extreme nationalism that dominate the RS as well the difficulties in the relationship between the RS and the governments in Sarajevo (both Federation and “state,” as Bosnians call what Americans would term the Federal government). There are few better sources than this report, if any, for a comprehensive account of how RS has sought to weaken the state government and establish its own control over as many state functions as possible. And the section towards the end on “The War: Facts” is a useful compilation.
But when it comes to policy, the report treats the RS as if neither corruption nor extreme nationalism is really a serious problem. RS President Dodik’s efforts to block transfer of competences to the state are treated as mistakes from which it might be convinced to back off, not as a concerted effort to wreck any real prospect for a functional state government. Dodik’s push for referendums on issues that clearly are intended to weaken the state are viewed as quixotic and erratic, when they are all too clearly purposeful and consistent. Even the hope for independence is described as “vague”, when it in fact is clear and explicit.
Here’s a sample of ICG perceiving ambiguity:
The government in Banja Luka plays a strange game when it comes to independence – shifting from advocating a referendum on independence to reforms to return Bosnia to its
Dayton roots. While Dodik constantly publicly threatens secession,and the RS leadership continues to harden its positions, Dodik’s aides explain that his statements are meant for internal RS consumption and complain that Federation officials and internationals take them seriously. Yet,even far from the public and in bilateral meetings, Dodik and his closest advisers say they do not believe Bosnia has a future.
I am at a complete loss how anyone can think this “strange game” is anything but the usual one in which internationals are led around by aides who have placed a figurative ring in their nostrils. Dodik has publicly and repeatedly told his electorate that he intends to deliver them to freedom from Sarajevo. There is no ambiguity. The only thing that prevents him from doing this is the international community.
ICG can’t admit this because it has committed itself to dismantling the main international community barrier to Dodik’s secessionist ambition: the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Instead, ICG thinks the EU will solve all. Somehow this view creeps into the Executive Summary, though I looked in vain for any detailed discussion of the issues involved in the main text of the report:
The EU’s response, aided by the U.S. and others, to the political and legal challenge the RS posed in June offers a non-coercive alternative from which it will be difficult for any party to walk away.
This is almost comic: I can’t remember the last time I heard American diplomats angrier at their European colleagues than over Catherine Ashton’s ill-conceived and poorly executed maneuver to create this “non-coercive alternative,” a maneuver in which she managed not only to side-line the OHR but blind-side the Sarajevo government and provide a gigantic boost to Dodik’s claims of RS sovereignty. The only good thing about it was that it ended Dodik’s hope of an early dissolution of the OHR, because it stiffened American spines and gave even Europeans second thoughts.
I won’t grace the recommendations with a detailed critique, though it is notable that they lack any for Belgrade even though the report itself highlights its role in supporting Dodik’s last electoral campaign. The recommendations that do exist amount to asking everyone in the RS to do good things without providing any real reason why they should do so other than the goodness of their hearts. I think we all know how that will work out. But there is one recommendation that is downright pernicious:
Declare that neither partition nor greater centralisation is compatible with Bosnia’s early progress toward EU membership.
This is neither true nor wise. The Bosnian state is clearly incapable of EU membership without greater centralization, which is unquestionably compatible with early progress in that direction. Centralization of some functions is not the same as eliminating the RS, a canard that ICG should be savvy enough not to believe. I am a strong proponent of decentralization and subsidiarity for those issues that can be handled at an entity or municipal level, but EU membership will require more functionality in Sarajevo than currently exists there. ICG’s effort at balance, falsely equating centralization with partition as two polar evils, has led it to err more than its fine leadership should allow.
Who is right?
When it comes to vital American interests, little trumps stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Bruce Riedel may be right that we need to begin to imagine how we can live with the prospect, but most of those who worry about these issues would want to maximize at least the non-military effort to prevent it from happening. Ken Pollack and Ray Takeyh think we need first to “double down.” Stephen Walt says that would be counterproductive. Instead we should ease up and try to get an agreement that Iran will not weaponize its nuclear technology. Who is right?
Walt starts from the obvious: pressuring the Iranians hasn’t worked. Regime survival is Tehran’s primary concern. Increasing the pressure implicitly or explicitly threatens the regime, which sees nuclear weapons as a guarantee of regime survival. Pressure will only solidify Tehran’s determination to get them. So why would redoubling work?
Pollack and Takeyh agree that regime survival is Tehran’s primary concern. They propose that we threaten it. Doing so, they argue, will require that we support the Green Movement–Iran’s so far failed popular uprising–as well as ethnic opponents of the regime, try to block (mostly Chinese) investment in the energy sector, target the Revolutionary Guards in ways they claim we have been reluctant to do, and increase criticism of Iran’s human rights record.
I’ll be accused of straddling, or maybe of mixing and matching, but it seems to me the sweet spot lies somewhere in between these stark perspectives. Yes, the United States should talk with the Green Movement and the ethnic groups in Iran and provide what support they think will be productive, so long as they remain nonviolent (violence, especially from the Baloch and Kurds, gives the regime the excuse it needs to crack down). It should certainly be focusing global attention on Iranian human rights abuses.
But it is unlikely that the Chinese are going to pass on energy investment in Iran unless there is a broad international agreement (read Security Council resolution) that asks them to do so, and we’ve got to be cautious about the ways and means used to support the Greens and other oppositions. American support, especially in covert form, can do more to harm them than to help.
Walt may be correct in his analysis of the failure of current policy. But it does not follow that if we ease up now the Iranians will be interested in accommodating our interest in seeing them stop their nuclear program short of weaponization. Why wouldn’t they just plow ahead if there is no clear cost associated with doing so? If making the benefits of stopping clear would help, why wouldn’t it also help to make the costs of plowing ahead clear?
Walt concludes his piece with his “real concern”:
…by falsely portraying the United States as having made numerous generous offers, by dismissing Iran’s security concerns as unfounded reflections of innate suspiciousness or radical ideology, and by prescribing a course of action that hasn’t worked in the past and is likely to fail now, Pollack and Takeyh may be setting the stage for a future article where they admit that “doubling down” didn’t work, and then tell us — with great reluctance, of course — that we have no choice but to go to war again.
That is a separate issue, perhaps the most important of war and peace question of this decade.
Karzai may have it right, but it will cost him
It isn’t common or popular in Washington to say nice things about Hamid Karzai, but I confess I find his statement yesterday that he intends to refocus peace talks on Pakistan rather than trying to negotiate with the Taliban refreshing. Afghans have long believed that they are really at war with Pakistan, which uses the Taliban as a proxy. I first heard this perspective from a national security advisor to Karzai the better part of a decade ago. Is it realistic to negotiate with Pakistan, reaching an agreement that would then require Kabul and Islamabad to impose the consequences on the Taliban who remain in their respective countries?
Of course we won’t really know until it is tried, but the proposition is reasonable. Administration sources are now claiming that outgoing chairman of the joint chiefs Mike Mullen exaggerated the degree of Pakistani control over the Haqqani network. But there is no doubt but that the Haqqani network harbors in Pakistan’s North Waziristan. The Pakistani Army has certainly not done all it could do to pressure them there or to chase them out into Afghanistan, where it could be hoped the Americans and Afghans would deal with them.
Can Karzai do anything to convince Pakistan to undertake an operation to oust the Haqqani network from North Waziristan? I think he can, but it will require that he do something no Afghan leader for the past 100 odd years has been willing to do: recognize the Durand line that is the ostensible border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, established in 1893 between British India and an Afghan Amir.
Talking to another national security advisor in Kabul some years ago, I asked why Afghanistan would not do this. The answer was chilling: Afghanistan did not want to close off options for future generations. In other words, someone in Afghanistan harbors irredentist ambitions in the Pashtun-populated parts of Pakistan. I’ve told this story before, but somehow the Durand line never gets any attention in DC, so I’m telling it again.
Giving up the vanishingly small hope of reuniting the Pashtun population within a greater Afghanistan would appear to cost Kabul little at this point. It should be much more worried about whether the Pashtuns might be reunited in a greater Pakistan, or even in an independent Pashtunistan. Pakistan claims to have accepted the Durand line. Afghan acceptance of it, and a bilateral agreement to demarcate it, would go a long way to removing one serious irritant and give the Pakistanis good reason to try to tidy up their side of the border.
PS: Those who doubt the importance of the Durand line might want to read what the “tribal elder from Paktika has to say to the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN).
The friends we need in Islamabad
If all roads lead to Islamabad, which one do we take to get out?
Max Boot says we have to begin treating our “frenemies” in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate the way we do Iran’s Quds force in Iraq:
Apply economic sanctions against its vast range of business interests. Limit the travel and freeze the assets of its leaders, starting with its current head, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. A designation of the ISI as a formal state sponsor of terrorism might also be in order. No doubt the Pakistani military would react angrily to such steps, but many civilians in Pakistan—including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani—who chafe under heavy-handed military dominance might quietly welcome them.
Vali Nasr understands the temptation, but urges that we make nice anyway, in order to keep to our 2014 date for drawdown from Afghanistan:
Confrontation with Pakistan presents Washington with a dilemma that will make leaving Afghanistan harder. If the United States truly wishes to change Pakistani behavior for the greater good of the region, then Washington has to be prepared to do what it takes to get that job done. That includes potentially keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan indefinitely to protect that country against the fallout from our policy and to convince Islamabad that it is futile for Pakistan to pursue its own goals in Afghanistan.
But if our goal is to leave Afghanistan in short order, then the prudent course of action is a return to stability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. That would have to start with ending the recent public acrimony but also confronting head-on what Pakistan is after in Afghanistan.
This is as sharp a policy choice as diplomats ever face. Which option is the right one?
Neither Max nor Vali discusses the issue I would regard as paramount: Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Nothing about Afghanistan–even our withdrawal–is more important than making sure they do not threaten the United States. This could happen if the Pakistani government were to fall under extremist control or if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear technology or materials to people who would use them against the United States. For those who think that unlikely, it is important to remember that Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan already transferred sensitive technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s.
It seems to me that what we need to ensure our interests are protected is a two-pronged approach. We should isolate and target (I would say even with military means) those who insist on supporting the Haqqani network and other Taliban forces, as Max suggests. At the same time, we need to make nice, as Vali suggests, to both civilians and military in the Pakistani government who understand the responsibilities of a nuclear power and are prepared both to cut off support to extremists and ensure that Pakistan’s weapons and technology remain under tight control. We will also have to provide Pakistan with assurances on limiting the role of India in Afghanistan and with a role in any peace negotiation there.
It is no easy matter to make these distinctions. What if we don’t find reliable civilians and military in the Pakistani government willing to opt unequivocally against extremism? Then, as Vali suggests, full withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes impossible and we’ll need to hunker down for a long confrontation across the Durand line that marks the border with Pakistan. That is an unattractive proposition that should make us try all the harder to find the friends we need in Islamabad.