Tag: United States
The rap, good and bad, from Iraq
The several dozen attacks across Iraq today that killed at least 68 people raise many questions: is al Qaeda in Iraq reviving? can the government handle the violence as the Americans withdraw? is the failure of Prime Minister Maliki to name Interior and Defense Ministers a contributing factor? what can be done to prevent future attacks of this sort? should the Americans consider slowing their withdrawal?
It is too early for answers to most of these questions, though personally I doubt there is any reason to slow American withdrawal. Responsibility for preventing this kind of attack clearly lies with the Iraqis. There is no way that slowing the withdrawal will help in preventing them. It is even arguable that doing so would stimulate more, and encourage targeting of the Americans, who were not targeted today.
I am not as exercised about this as those who rail against slowing the withdrawal, largely because I do think that the United States has continuing national security interests in Iraq that need protection. That means we need to keep our commitment to helping Iraq acquire the means to defend itself. The gigantic American investment in Iraq over eight years should not be written off as a total loss. But it is no longer an American responsibility to protect Iraq and its citizens from its internal enemies.
That is Prime Minister Maliki’s responsibility, in particular because he has dragged his feet in naming the Defense and Interior Ministers, in an apparent effort to enhance his own control over the country’s security forces. With that control comes accountability. In a more established parliamentary system, attacks like those that occurred today would lead to the prime minister’s resignation. At the very least, he should recognize that naming new ministers would give him someone to hold responsible when things don’t go well.
The fundamental problem is that Maliki does not trust his own institutions and believes his personal authority is the only trustworthy authority. That’s a bad rap. He underestimates Iraq’s institutions and leans in authoritarian directions. It is time for Maliki to share power more effectively with his coalition partners, enlisting their considerable talents in an effort that requires the broadest possible political consensus.
While you hold your breath for that to happen, here’s a good rap out of Iraq, from before today’s terrible events:
Making unity attractive
I’ve just arrived back in Pristina from North Mitrovica, where things couldn’t be calmer. Adults in the shade drinking beer, kids in the sun enjoying a beautiful, warm Sunday, a few in the river getting happily wet. A few people moving back and forth across the bridge between the Serbian-controlled north and the Albanian-controlled south without hindrance.
The only real cloud was the guy in the singlet with Karadzic’s portrait. Who wears the face of someone accused of genocide in another country to the local cafe for a beer with a friend? The nationalist graffiti and Serbian state symbols everyplace are to be expected. The Serbs of northern Kosovo want to remain citizens of Serbia, not of Albanian-majority Kosovo.
The north seems a good deal less populated and the population older than on the south side of the bridge, but the poverty on both sides is all too apparent. It is truly difficult to imagine this as the front line in a confrontation that once absorbed the world’s attention. Today a few bored Italian carabinieri and Romanian police preside over a bridge where nothing has happened for a long time. Even when the Kosovo government sent its special police in late July to seize control of the customs posts along the border with Serbia, the bridge in Mitrovica remained calm.
Two sentiments dominated the few conversations I was able to have with Serbs in the north: fear and resentment. The fear is directed towards the Albanian-dominated institutions headquartered in Pristina. The Serbs cannot imagine trusting the court system, or being governed by institutions that report to Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister and a wartime political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The resentment is directed mainly towards Belgrade, which is viewed as abandoning northern Kosovo in the dialogue it is conducting with Pristina. Belgrade has already “given away” the Serbs south of the Ibar and seems prepared to give away those in the north as well, the Serbs there believe. President Tadic has bought himself little credit by taking what the international community regards as a relatively hard nationalist line, or even by proposing partition.
There is also an edge of resentment for the international community in general, and the Americans in particular. The internationals are collecting nice salaries and doing little. And the American bombing may even have grown in the Serb imagination. One elderly pensioner said he thought the Americans would blow up the whole world.
Everyone, north and south, is awaiting the visit of German Chancellor Merkel to Belgrade August 24. If she tells Belgrade clearly and unequivocally to give up its control of north Kosovo, dreams of partition will be ended. If she doesn’t, or if she leaves even a slight ambiguity, the aggravation on both sides of the Ibar river will continue.
The Pristina government believes it has succeeded in changing the facts on the ground, so that the border crossings in northern Kosovo will not be returned to Serbian control. But that will do nothing to enable Pristina to govern the Serb population in the north. It will need to have the wide degree of autonomy allowed it under the Ahtisaari plan that Belgrade has so far rejected. But even that much will not come easily: people in the north lack confidence in Pristina and will need some clear demonstrations that they can expect fair treatment.
“Making unity attractive” is the apt phrase the Sudanese used to describe what was required to keep north and south Sudan together, an effort that failed. It is what Belgrade failed to do for the Albanians of Kosovo during the Milosevic regime. It is what is needed now from Pristina to gain confidence of a significant portion of the Serb population in the north.
I am under no illusions. Some of the Serbs will leave northern Kosovo no matter how gentle and attractive the offers they get, because they have good reasons to fear Albanian retaliation or because their livelihoods depend on the Serbian administration or the smuggling it has enabled. But the guy who served me burek today may well be one of the many who never did any harm to his Albanian neighbors, would leap at the opportunity to double his sales and can be convinced to stay.
Statecraft is not only knowing when to act forcefully. It is also knowing when to act gently. My advice to Pristina is to be absolutely unequivocal about where the state borders of independent and sovereign Kosovo lie, but at the same time to offer to the Serb population of the north self-governance and even preferential treatment if they will stay and begin to participate in Kosovo’s institutions. I don’t see anything else that has a chance of restoring Kosovo’s territorial integrity.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Macedonia is not an island
I’ve been out all day getting to Ohrid and back to Pristina, so haven’t posted or tweeted. The best I can do after eight hours of road travel is to offer a few summary tics of what I had to say at the conference celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Ohrid agreement, which ended the fighting in Macedonia in 2001 and ushered in a new era of stronger Albanian participation in the Macedonian state.
- Macedonia is not an island. The Ohrid agreement is mainly about internal governing arrangements: decentralization, representation of Albanians and others in the state institutions, police reform, use of languages. While the agreement unquestionably saved the state, it has also meant that Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia have spent 10 years focused mainly on their own internal arrangements. There is a tendency to forget that what happens in Macedonia affects the region, and what happens in the region affects Macedonia. It is time for Macedonia to play a stronger role regionally, in particular by helping to make sure Kosovo and Bosnia are not partitioned.
- Changing the status of a boundary is not the same as moving a border to accommodate ethnic differences. Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia all gained independence within well-recognized and accepted borders, some of which had previously been boundaries internal to former Yugoslavia. But none of these borders was moved from their previous positions. Belgrade today would like to move Kosovo’s border to hive off the Serb-populated portion of the north, with the explicit purpose of accommodating ethnic differences. That is fundamentally different from changing the status of a boundary. If we start down that road, we will never finish, or maybe we’ll finish but not peacefully.
- The era of separations in the Balkans is over, the era of reintegration has begun. In any event, the many after-shocks of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia are now clearly fading in magnitude and significance. There will be no more new states in the Balkans. What people need to focus on now is ensuring equality before the law for all their citizens, which is what makes me comfortable with being a minority in the United States: I’ve got precisely the same rights as the rich, white, male slave-holder Thomas Jefferson. That’s a good deal, if it can be implemented fully. The ultimate paean to the Ohrid agreement will be sung when people tell me its provisions are no longer required to ensure proper treatment of anyone.
This new era of reintegration is going to require vision and leadership that is sometimes lacking. Macedonia is facing a difficult choice. Greece is blocking its path to integration in NATO and the EU by refusing to allow it to enter until it adds a geographical qualifier to its constitutional name, since Greece claims “Macedonia” as its own. Prime Minister Gruevski, who notably did not attend the Ohrid conference and takes a negative view of the agreement, has remained adamant against this change, a position that gains him votes and avoids his having to call a referendum on a new constitution that he might lose.
The Albanian leadership in Macedonia is keen on NATO and EU membership. The former they regard as a guarantee of Macedonia’s internal security; the latter they see as eventually opening up Macedonia’s borders to Albanians in Kosovo and Albania. So refusal to compromise on the “name” issue gives the Albanians of Macedonia real heartburn.
None of this is insoluble. In fact, we’ve gone from doubts about the very existence and viability of the Macedonian state to doubts about what to call it, though I hasten to add that my own preference is to call it what its citizens want it to be called, which for now is “Macedonia.”
PS: I gratefully acknowledge Ylber Hysa, one of Kosovo’s finest, for suggesting the “Macedonia is not an island” theme.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Reintegration requires a plan
Pristina is a lot cooler than I had anticipated–barely a cloud in the sky too. It looks a lot better under these weather conditions than raining or foggy, that’s for sure!
The weather may be clear and cool, but the security situation is not. Pristina’s move late last month to seize control of the two border posts with Serbia has inspired widespread support among Albanians in Kosovo, without triggering the inter-ethnic strife south of the Ibar River that some might have feared. But it did trigger Serb roadblocks and violence in the north that killed a Kosovo police officer and destroyed one of the border posts.
KFOR, the NATO force that deployed in Kosovo after the war with Serbia in 1999, has now taken charge of the border. Most imports from Serbia are blocked (humanitarian assistance and goods for the Serbiann Orthodox Church can pass). Belgrade and Pristina are to meet September 5 to try to find a way forward by September 15, when the agreement for KFOR control of the border gates expires.
What might be the solution? It really all depends on what is decided about the status of northern Kosovo, which has remained under Belgrade’s control since the war. Belgrade wants to keep it that way. Pristina wants to take control of what it regards as its sovereign border, with the Serb communities of the north enjoy the wide measure of autonomy allowed to them in the Ahtisaari plan, an international community product that Belgrade never accepted.
The three dimensions on which this game will be played include a) the situation on the ground in the north, b) Belgrade’s efforts to gain candidacy status for the EU as well as a date for the beginning of negotiations, and c) Pristina’s efforts to make its governance acceptable to the Serbs of the north.
The situation in the north
Belgrade will try to get back to the status quo ante, in which it controlled the border posts and refused to allow collection of Kosovo customs duties on the products crossing there. It woud also prevent Kosovo products from entering Serbia with a stamp and documentation reading “Kosovo customs.” This practice in the past deprived Pristina not only of an important export market but also of what it figures as $30-40 million euros per year of customs duties. It also fed a substantial operation smuggling untaxed products to the area south of the Ibar.
Pristina will try to prevent return to the previous situation and to ensure that its police and customs officers control the northern border, with the eventual goal of retintegrating the north with the rest of Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan.
Belgrade’s EU ambitions
With elections likely early next year, Belgrade is looking this fall for the European Union to grant it status as a candidate for membership and a date for the beginning of negotiations. The issue is what it will have to do to achieve these substantial goals. It has already met the EU requirement to arrest the remaining war criminals. Now several European states appear to be insisting that it also agree to give up its territorial ambitions in northern Kosovo and agree to reintegration in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan, perhaps elaborated further.
German Foreign Minister Westerwelle appears to have said this in a visit to Pristina this week. The question is whether Chancellor Merkel will repeat the hard line in Belgrade when she visits August 24.
Pristina’s efforts
It is not going to be possible to force Pristina’s governance on the Serbs, who believe they have good reason to fear retaliation. The Ahtisaari plan would provide the northern municipalities with wide autonomy, but that is not in itself going to compensate for the loss of tens of millions of euros as well as a general lack of confidence, amounting to fear and loathing.
The Pristina authorities have tried to signal their willingness to provide substantial resources to the north and claim that Serb communities in the rest of Kosovo get far more per person from the government purse than Albanian majority communities do. They are going to have to make more efforts in this direction than they have made so far if they hope to convince anyone who lives in northern Kosovo.
What the situation requires is a goal and a plan. In my view, the goal should be reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo. With that kind of clarity, the international community successfully reintegrated Eastern Slavonia (a Serb-majority area) in Croatia and Brcko (a town contested by Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia). The plan needs to be worked out jointly between Pristina and Belgrade, with help from their European friends (and the occasional push from the Americans). Such a reintegration plan does not require Serbia to accept Kosovo’s independence–only its territorial integrity, which in any event is implicit in UN Security Council 1244, to which Belgrade appeals regularly.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Preparing for post-Qaddafi Libya, shortened
For those who think the full Council on Foreign Relations version is too long, here is my 750-word version, most of which has also been published on CFR’s The Water’s Edge and CNN.com:
Muammar Qaddafi clings to power in Tripoli. The end could come with little warning. That will mark the beginning of a difficult transition in Libya, not the end. We need to be prepared.
The first challenge will be security. Failure to maintain public order is what got us into big trouble in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s “stay behind” operation stirred civic unrest and destroyed government buildings. The murder in Libya last month of the overall rebel commander is a reminder that internecine warfare among the more than 45 rebel militias is a real possibility. People who lost family and tribal members to the Gaddafi regime may seek to settle scores. Former regime elements may seek to defend themselves and to “privatize” state assets. Criminals will see opportunities to traffic in arms, drugs and even people.
The humanitarian challenges will be no less daunting. Fighting has displaced at least half a million Libyans from their homes. Perhaps half of those are still in Libya, and many who are not will seek to return quickly once Qaddafi falls. Food, water, shelter and health services need to be secured for the most vulnerable. In addition, keeping water and electricity flowing to the residents of Tripoli and other major urban centers will be vital to maintaining public order, especially if Qaddafi falls this summer.
U.S. interests in Libya are limited, but a relatively successful transition from the Qaddafi regime to a united, stable, more open and democratic Libya would be seen in the region and more widely as a credit to the NATO-led intervention. It would also enable Libya to resume oil and gas exports, demonstrate international community capacity to manage such transitions and encourage positive outcomes to other Arab Spring protests, including those in Yemen and Syria.
Failure to stabilize Libya could lead to chaos, breakup of the Libyan state that sets an unwelcome precedent elsewhere, or restoration of dictatorship. These outcomes would all damage American and allied credibility and likely also cause major problems for our European allies, including shortfalls in energy supplies, loss of major investments and a continuing refugee flow. Refugees could also cause problems in Tunisia, Egypt, and the rest of the Mediterranean.
It is therefore the Europeans, along with the Arab League, who should take the lead in post-Qaddafi stabilization of Libya, under a clear United Nations Security Council mandate that recognizes a legitimate post-Qaddafi Libyan authority and sets out strategic goals for the transition. The goals should include a united and sovereign Libya within its well-established borders that can sustain, govern, and defend itself through inclusive democratic institutions, using Libya’s resources transparently and accountably for the benefit of all its people.
Quick deployment of a peacekeeping force of several thousand paramilitary police, mainly to keep order in Tripoli and other population centers, would help ensure these goals are met. The European Union and its member states can deploy several hundred paramilitaries. Turkey and Arab countries might supply the remainder. An international peacekeeping operation would not administer Libya but would support an inclusive interim authority in maintaining stability, providing humanitarian assistance, and beginning the reconstruction process.
What if this does not work? NATO will need to be prepared to step in. Only as a last resort—to deal with widespread disorder, a threatened breakup of the Libyan state, or a humanitarian catastrophe—should the international community consider armed intervention without the invitation of a legitimate Libyan authority. This could mean U.S. boots on the ground, but only briefly as part of a broader multilateral effort.
Leadership in post-Qaddafi Libya should be passed as quickly as possible to the Libyans, who have already set up local councils and a Transitional National Council, which help to organize and provide services in the liberated portions of the country. These indigenous institutions merit nurturing and support, including unfreezing of Qaddafi-era assets so that the councils in liberated areas can begin to meet the needs of their populations. The post-Qaddafi era has already begun there.
Libya is a resource-rich country with a relatively well-educated citizenry that has demonstrated courage under fire. The country lacks institutions and political experience, but not talent and commitment. The international community should prepare to support Libyan efforts to take charge of the country’s destiny once Qaddafi leaves the scene.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Getting to post-Assad Syria
By Adam Lewis, Editor & Webmaster at Peacefare.net
Today a Middle East Institute panel entitled “Syria on the Verge: Implications for a Nation in Revolt” stirred hopes for the revolt there to succeed.
The four panelists featured were Radwan Ziadeh (Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and a member of Syria’s “opposition in exile”), Ausama Monajed (Executive Director of the London-based Strategic Research Communication Centre), Andrew J. Tabler (a Next Generation fellow at the Washington Institute) and former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Theodore Kattouf. While offering different perspectives, there were a few key points on which they agreed: The collapse of the Assad regime has become inevitable.
- The Obama administration announcement that President Bashar al Assad must step down will have positive effects.
- There are still major obstacles to overcome on the road to a democratic Syria. Most worrisome is that the regime continues to maintain almost uniform loyalty among the security and military forces.
- To facilitate the collapse of the Assad regime and the peaceful emergence of a new Syrian government, the U.S. should lead in international efforts to isolate the regime. This will require sanctions and diplomatic pressure while at the same time offering “lifelines” (or incentives to defect) to key regime supporters: senior military commanders, Allawite community leaders, and members of the Sunni business elite.
Through this combination of carrots and sticks the international community can convey to the regime loyalists that they have a great deal to lose by going down with the Assad ship and alternatively have the option to be part of a brighter future for Syria.
Radwan Ziadeh
The Assad regime’s Ramadan offensive has not impeded the gathering momentum of the Syrian opposition. It is a mistake to overestimate the role that religion is playing in the uprising. Ramadan, and specifically the Friday prayers, have provided a gathering place where protesters organize. It is difficult for the regime to prevent such gatherings.
Prominent Allawites are beginning to speak up against the regime. By doing so, they are undermining the regime’s attempts to present the Allawite community as an unconditional supporter and are diffusing sectarian tension. In fact, many Allawites have not done particularly well under the regime.
More forceful U.S. and global condemnation of the regime would give Syrian protesters greater momentum while also encouraging wider-scale defections within the regime. But Ankara should take the diplomatic lead in international efforts as Syrians view Turkey more favorably and with less suspicion than the U.S.
Ausama Monajed
While the growing movement has created a vast proliferation of opposition groups, committees and factions (each city or small town has its own), it should not be understood as divided. All of these various factions share a similar vision for a post-Assad Syria and have a similar set of core principles that guide their activity. On any given day, 70% of the slogans protesters use are shared across Syria.
The international community should not worry about a non-democratic outcome. Syrian protesters are experiencing a form of democracy as they build a broad coalition. Many of the larger opposition groups are already discussing the formation of political parties as well as the drafting of a new constitution.
International efforts can be most helpful if they:
- help Syrian opposition groups both inside and outside the country coalesce. The outsiders have a stronger grasp of foreign policy and can help the domestic Syrian movement develop a leadership core that can effectively engage internationals;
- convince the Sunni business elite to abandon the regime. This can be accomplished by pairing sanctions that undermine any benefits that come from working with the regime with assurances that those who jump ship now can avoid prosecution. If this group can be won over, Damascus and Aleppo will succumb to protest and the regime will crumble.
Andrew Tabler
The Syrian regime is not immune to international economic and diplomatic pressure. It has anticipated this movement for a long time. Since 1980 Syria has been one of the twenty fastest growing countries in the world, and the regime has recognized the economic challenges that its now burgeoning population poses. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 is an example of how international pressure caused the regime to change policy. The international community’s best leverage is energy export sanctions. Oil proceeds account for about 25-33% of Syria’s revenue and if eliminated could cripple the regime without decimating society (as occurred with oil sanctions in Iraq).
The opposition’s lack of a clear leadership group is both its greatest weakness and greatest strength. While it has not offered the international community an effective negotiating partner, it has also avoided a hierarchical structure that the Syrian security forces could decapitate.
A coup is an alternative to either the regime maintaining power or the opposition winning outright. The lack of government control in Eastern Syria, as well as the growing Saudi support for opposition elements in that area, could lead to the creation of a Benghazi-type opposition stronghold.
Theodore Kattouf
Since talks in Geneva broke down in 2000 there has been general confusion about how the U.S. government should approach the Syrian regime. The aftermath of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon in 2005 shook Bashar al Assad. Since then, however, Assad has become smug and overconfident.
The Obama administration has been right to be cautious, even if it was overly optimistic early on that the protests could inspire Assad to implement meaningful reforms. The administration recognized at the beginning of the conflict it simply did not have the leverage to take effective action without Arab League or UN Security Council support. It thus avoided taking ownership over the outcome of the conflict. The Syrian opposition generally endorsed this approach, as it did not seek international intervention.
The U.S. is now in a much stronger position. It can and should push the UNSC to apply sanctions against Syria as well as encourage Turkey and the EU to help it further Syria’s economic isolation. The Syrian security forces still appear fiercely loyal to Assad. These forces will have to be stretched much further before they break. If sanctions can trigger an economic collapse that prevents the regime from paying the troops, loyalties could shift quickly.
RSS - Posts
