Tag: United States
Getting to post-Assad Syria
By Adam Lewis, Editor & Webmaster at Peacefare.net
Today a Middle East Institute panel entitled “Syria on the Verge: Implications for a Nation in Revolt” stirred hopes for the revolt there to succeed.
The four panelists featured were Radwan Ziadeh (Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and a member of Syria’s “opposition in exile”), Ausama Monajed (Executive Director of the London-based Strategic Research Communication Centre), Andrew J. Tabler (a Next Generation fellow at the Washington Institute) and former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Theodore Kattouf. While offering different perspectives, there were a few key points on which they agreed: The collapse of the Assad regime has become inevitable.
- The Obama administration announcement that President Bashar al Assad must step down will have positive effects.
- There are still major obstacles to overcome on the road to a democratic Syria. Most worrisome is that the regime continues to maintain almost uniform loyalty among the security and military forces.
- To facilitate the collapse of the Assad regime and the peaceful emergence of a new Syrian government, the U.S. should lead in international efforts to isolate the regime. This will require sanctions and diplomatic pressure while at the same time offering “lifelines” (or incentives to defect) to key regime supporters: senior military commanders, Allawite community leaders, and members of the Sunni business elite.
Through this combination of carrots and sticks the international community can convey to the regime loyalists that they have a great deal to lose by going down with the Assad ship and alternatively have the option to be part of a brighter future for Syria.
Radwan Ziadeh
The Assad regime’s Ramadan offensive has not impeded the gathering momentum of the Syrian opposition. It is a mistake to overestimate the role that religion is playing in the uprising. Ramadan, and specifically the Friday prayers, have provided a gathering place where protesters organize. It is difficult for the regime to prevent such gatherings.
Prominent Allawites are beginning to speak up against the regime. By doing so, they are undermining the regime’s attempts to present the Allawite community as an unconditional supporter and are diffusing sectarian tension. In fact, many Allawites have not done particularly well under the regime.
More forceful U.S. and global condemnation of the regime would give Syrian protesters greater momentum while also encouraging wider-scale defections within the regime. But Ankara should take the diplomatic lead in international efforts as Syrians view Turkey more favorably and with less suspicion than the U.S.
Ausama Monajed
While the growing movement has created a vast proliferation of opposition groups, committees and factions (each city or small town has its own), it should not be understood as divided. All of these various factions share a similar vision for a post-Assad Syria and have a similar set of core principles that guide their activity. On any given day, 70% of the slogans protesters use are shared across Syria.
The international community should not worry about a non-democratic outcome. Syrian protesters are experiencing a form of democracy as they build a broad coalition. Many of the larger opposition groups are already discussing the formation of political parties as well as the drafting of a new constitution.
International efforts can be most helpful if they:
- help Syrian opposition groups both inside and outside the country coalesce. The outsiders have a stronger grasp of foreign policy and can help the domestic Syrian movement develop a leadership core that can effectively engage internationals;
- convince the Sunni business elite to abandon the regime. This can be accomplished by pairing sanctions that undermine any benefits that come from working with the regime with assurances that those who jump ship now can avoid prosecution. If this group can be won over, Damascus and Aleppo will succumb to protest and the regime will crumble.
Andrew Tabler
The Syrian regime is not immune to international economic and diplomatic pressure. It has anticipated this movement for a long time. Since 1980 Syria has been one of the twenty fastest growing countries in the world, and the regime has recognized the economic challenges that its now burgeoning population poses. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 is an example of how international pressure caused the regime to change policy. The international community’s best leverage is energy export sanctions. Oil proceeds account for about 25-33% of Syria’s revenue and if eliminated could cripple the regime without decimating society (as occurred with oil sanctions in Iraq).
The opposition’s lack of a clear leadership group is both its greatest weakness and greatest strength. While it has not offered the international community an effective negotiating partner, it has also avoided a hierarchical structure that the Syrian security forces could decapitate.
A coup is an alternative to either the regime maintaining power or the opposition winning outright. The lack of government control in Eastern Syria, as well as the growing Saudi support for opposition elements in that area, could lead to the creation of a Benghazi-type opposition stronghold.
Theodore Kattouf
Since talks in Geneva broke down in 2000 there has been general confusion about how the U.S. government should approach the Syrian regime. The aftermath of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon in 2005 shook Bashar al Assad. Since then, however, Assad has become smug and overconfident.
The Obama administration has been right to be cautious, even if it was overly optimistic early on that the protests could inspire Assad to implement meaningful reforms. The administration recognized at the beginning of the conflict it simply did not have the leverage to take effective action without Arab League or UN Security Council support. It thus avoided taking ownership over the outcome of the conflict. The Syrian opposition generally endorsed this approach, as it did not seek international intervention.
The U.S. is now in a much stronger position. It can and should push the UNSC to apply sanctions against Syria as well as encourage Turkey and the EU to help it further Syria’s economic isolation. The Syrian security forces still appear fiercely loyal to Assad. These forces will have to be stretched much further before they break. If sanctions can trigger an economic collapse that prevents the regime from paying the troops, loyalties could shift quickly.
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Post-Qaddafi Libya
I’m traveling tonight, so I’m putting up tomorrow’s blog post today:
Politicians don’t like to answer hypothetical questions, but analysts do. When Paul Stares, who leads CFR’s conflict prevention efforts, asked me a month or so ago to write about post-Qaddafi Libya, I jumped at the opportunity. I’ve been thinking about Libya since the uprising there started six months ago, discussed it in my post-war reconstruction class here at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, and published a few pieces about it on www.peacefare.net.
To my great regret I’ve never been to Libya, but I did work on it at the State Department once upon a time (around 1994), trying to figure out whether we could convince our allies to tap a small portion of frozen Libyan oil assets to compensate families of Pan Am 103 victims. It was a flaky idea the Brits told me. They had what I regarded as an even flakier one: a trial for the perpetrators in a Scottish court convened in The Hague. Go figure.
That was Libya before Qaddafi decided to give up his nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs. But in one profound sense nothing changed. Qaddafi gave up his WMD because he feared the Americans would do to Libya what they had done to Iraq. He was still in power and wanted to stay there.
The rebellion in Libya is determined to deny him that privilege. I don’t know whether they are going to succeed. I could certainly write another paper treating a scenario in which he stays in place in Tripoli and central Libya, having lost control of Benghazi and the east (Cyrenaica) as well as parts of the west. But this one focuses on a scenario in which he and the regime collapse. I’ve tried to imagine the most urgent problems arising in the days after Qaddafi’s fall, outline options for dealing with them, and recommend appropriate policies.
The result is Contingency Planning Memorandum 12, the first CFR has done on what most people would define as a post-conflict situation, albeit one that has not yet come into existence. I prefer to refer to “societies emerging from conflict,” since conflict doesn’t end, even if you are relatively successful and violence does. That’s just the point with Libya: there are many ways in which post-Qaddafi Libya could be conflictual and even violent, unless we prepare carefully and take the necessary preventive measures.
I am convinced that American interests do not justify a major U.S. role in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall, just as they do not require a continued leading role in the military action the UN Security Council authorized. The Europeans stand to lose oil and gas supplies as well as investments in a chaotic Libya, not to mention the possibility of Libyan migrants reaching Italy, France and Spain in numbers that would cause serious political tension. The Europeans should lead, preferably with a UN Security Council mandate and lots of Arab and African support. We should be prepared to fill in, and step in with NATO intervention if the Europeans fail.
It will be interesting to see how much of what I’ve written holds up in the weeks after Qaddafi loses power. Analysts like hypotheticals more than they like reality, unless they get lucky and hit the mark. We’ll see, soon enough I hope.
PS: “Q”addafi is CFR’s (and the NY Times’) preferred spelling. “G”addafi is what I’ve been using, I don’t remember why. I guess I’m inclined to switch to the usage of my betters. Anyone want to tell me which one is closer to being correct?
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Anyone still think it was the downgrade?
Yesterday’s sharp bump upwards on the stock market following the Fed’s announcement that it would keep interest rates low for two years demonstrates all too clearly that the sharp falls the previous two days were not reactions to the S&P downgrade of U.S. government debt. I shouldn’t say it, but I will: I told you so.
The press this morning attributes the Fed action to concern about growth, which is surely in part true. But it also reflects concern about banks and the financial system, which are always close to the Fed’s heart. Low interest rates have helped to save the banks for several years now–their profits are soaring–and will continue to help in the future, as a result of the Fed’s commitment.
Does this change the picture for foreign policy? Is the Federal budget under any less pressure? The short answer is “no.” If Congress sticks with the debt deal, it still has to cut expenditures sharply starting in fiscal year 2013. All the Fed has done is to make monetary policy carry the burden of adjustment until then.
The longer answer is a bit more nuanced. Certainly U.S. government borrowing costs for the next two years will continue to be unusually low, unless the markets really do lose confidence in the dollar or inflation rears its you know what. Low interest rates will ease the government’s fiscal situation. I confess to relief about this, but it does not reduce the need for triage on foreign policy.
Nina Hachigian, who was overly optimistic about the American role in the world a few years ago, is overly pessimistic now. America is no less indispensable today that it was last week, but it is likely to be less available in the future. People who have grown to rely on the United States to help them out of the deep holes they dig for themselves–from the Balkans to Israel/Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan–are going to find us preoccupied elsewhere, with our own top national security risks.
This is not a bad thing–most of them will discover their own capacities to manage are greater than they had imagined. And it is high time some of America’s burdens shifted to Europe and the Arab League, even if the former has financial problems of its own and the latter lots of money but little experience. Far more often than in the past, the message from America will be handle it on your own, or figure out a cheap way to get it done.
What we need to be careful about is cheap shortcuts that end up of creating expensive longterm problems. In the Balkans, that expensive delusion comes from those who advocate rearranging borders to accommodate ethnic differences, a sure formula for instability if not war. In the Middle East, it comes from those who resist defining clearly the borders of the Palestinian state or want to turn a blind eye to the Arab spring, ignoring Egypt and Tunisia because the revolutions there have been “successful.” Backing a revolution doesn’t necessarily mean paying for it or bombing a regime into submission, as Robert Ford (our man in Damascus) has demonstrated with his deft visits to protesters in Hama.
Diplomacy is not inherently expensive. Military action is. In tight financial times, we’ll do better with a foreign policy that relies less on deployed forces and more on alert diplomats.
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Forget the downgrade
Forget the downgrade. It really is a non-event given the decline in U.S. government bond rates. If the world is still willing to buy USG paper, why should anyone worry about how S&P rates it? Though I hasten to add that I think S&P had a point: the Tea Party has demonstrated it will stop at nothing, including default, to try to ensure that President Obama is not reelected.
The downgrade did not cause the fall in stock markets. It is the shrinking prospects for growth that did that. The debt deal is clearly deflationary. It will reduce aggregate demand by reducing government expenditures. Reduced demand means less growth.
Among the more interesting but little noted things that happened yesterday was the European Central Bank purchase of Italian government bonds. This kind of central bank support for government finance is verboten in Europe. The Fed calls it quantitative easing, and it is precisely what the Germans think should not happen in monetary policy. They’ve got to be pretty desperate to go along with it.
Some of you will know that I spent 10 years in Italy, whose government paper is now declining sharply in value. That’s a problem because a lot of it is held by European (and American) banks. The big worry is that depositors will think the banks shaky and decide to withdraw their funds. A “run” on the banks–in Italy or elsewhere–could be catastrophic. As in: need a lot of government funds, potentially dwarfing the U.S. bank bailout.
So what does all this have to do with peace and war issues? Tight budgets and potentially large bailout costs make it hard for many governments to think about, much less execute, operations abroad. We are broke. The Europeans are broke. Some will welcome a major retrenchment; others will think it a really bad idea to pull troops from commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. But the pressures for retrenchment are going to be enormous.
The right approach is to see this as an opportunity to define our priorities more clearly. Triage is necessary: which commitments really do serve our national security interests? which don’t? are there alternative (and cheaper) ways to meet our goals? are there others who should pitch in more?
The United States has traditionally depended on its military to execute much of its foreign policy. Military spending has doubled since 9/11, not counting the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Are we using an effective but expensive military instrument in the best ways we can? is it the appropriate instrument for the purposes for which it is being used? are there alternatives?
The questions are obvious. The answers are not. I’ll be trying to offer some answers over the next few months, as this is precisely what the book I am writing is about. So stay tuned: we are going to explore American foreign policy in a century that is still young but is already challenging us think hard about national priorities and the instruments of foreign policy.
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Is Macedonia better off with Ohrid?
I am hoping to be in Ohrid Saturday. Here is an interview I did with Slobodanka Jovanovska of Utrinski Vesnik, a Macedonian daily. They planned to publish it today:
1. You will take part in conference about the ten anniversary of Ohrid Agreement. What will be your message there?
A. The Ohrid Agreement saved and consolidated the Macedonian state. That in my way of thinking is an excellent achievement. I find it hard to imagine that there are many people in Macedonia—Macedonians, Albanians or others—who think they would be better off today without the Ohrid agreement.
2. Macedonia celebrates the Ohrid Agreement, EU countries and US call it major achievement. If it is so good, why no one of the neighboring countries is not using this experience and, even implement the opposite policy? Greece is not recognizing minorities, Bulgaria didn’t allow questions about ethnic origin in the last census, Albania the same…
A. Each country has its own circumstances and will implement policies it thinks appropriate. I think it is a mistake to deny people the opportunity to define their own ethnic origin in a census, but I have to admit that the issue is a sensitive one also in the United States. We have moved in the direction of allowing more choices, but that is because we have confidence that the vast majority of citizens of all ethnic groups consider themselves first and foremost Americans. Maybe unwillingness to allow more choices reflects fear that some citizens will choose other identities as primary. Greece in particular seems to suffer from this fear.
3. There is a resolution in the US Congress calling for decrease of US aid to Macedonia, for conditioning it with the name dispute and referring to the country as FYROM instead of Republic of Macedonia. In Macedonia it was understood as a sign that Barack Obama’s administration is changing sides and inclining more to the Greek positions about the name dispute?
A. It is important to remember that the United States has separation of powers: the Administration is distinct from the legislative branch, where there has long been sympathy with the Greek perspective on the name dispute. It is also true that both President Obama and Vice President Biden have previously indicated sympathy with the Greek perspective when they were in Congress. The Administration clearly wants to see a compromise, and in the last year or two has come to the conclusion that Skopje is more an obstacle to compromise than Athens.
That said, the United States still recognizes Macedonia as Macedonia. I trust Skopje’s diplomats are doing everything they can to keep it that way.
4. How you you see Macedonia-American relations now? Good, excellent, downgraded…
A. So far as I know, relations are good, but I have to admit that few in Washington see Macedonia’s problems as among America’s top priorities.
5. From this time distance, do you think that the veto for Macedonia’s membership in NATO, initiated by Greece and supported by other countries, provoked some steps forward in the country?
A. I really don’t know, but I’d like to see Macedonia in NATO, where it belongs. If it remains willing to enter as FYROM, I think Greece should allow it to happen.
6. How do you comment the controversial project Skopje 2014?
A. I don’t. But I would note that Washington DC was designed in the late 18th century as the “new Rome.” Dreams of grandeur are not limited to Skopje. I just hope you have the money to pay the bills for it.
7. The leader of the Albanian coalition party DUI, Ali Ahmeti, last week said that he will not be able to guarantee the peace in Macedonia if Kosovo is destabilized and divided? Do you agree that the crisis in Kosovo inevitably will provoke crisis in Macedonia and what should be the role of Albanian leaders here?
A. Proposals to divide Kosovo cause strains not only in Macedonia but also in Serbia and Bosnia as well. The proper role of Albanian leaders in Macedonia will be to try to ensure that pan-Albanian political forces do not take advantage of the situation, but that will not be easy. One thing is clear though: the Albanians in Macedonia have a far stronger role in Skopje, partly due to the Ohrid agreement, than they would have in any Greater Albania.
8. This fall the International Court of Justice in Hague will decide about the case of Macedonia against Greece, about the veto in NATO. What you think could be decision and whether it will change something?
A. I really don’t know what the legal decision will be, but I think it is wrong for Greece to veto Macedonian (in fact FYROM) membership in NATO.
9. For the first time in the last US report for human rights there was a part about political prisoners in Macedonia. Independent media almost disappeared in the country, and instead of creating transparent and free society, the Government is hunting people, “collaborators to the secret services.” Why there is such a silence about this political climate in Macedonia in US and also in EU?
A. There are a lot of other problems in the world that affect the EU and US directly: Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, just to name a few. I think Brussels and Washington expect Macedonia to care for itself these days and not to rely too much on EU and US intervention.
10. Was the decision to give up the prosecution of war crimes in Macedonia during 2001 the right one? Is it possible to give amnesty for war crimes?
A. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that there is no amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But in many countries prosecutors have discretion. If Skopje has decided to exercise that discretion, I would want to think twice before suggesting it was a mistake.
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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