Tag: United States
Après eux?
President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen and non-president of Libya Muammar Gaddafi will soon be gone. They have cracked their respective countries beyond repair. It looks unlikely that Bashar al Assad will last much longer in Syria. What can, or should, come next?
There is no reason why these revolutions should follow a common pattern, but it may be worthwhile to look at what is happening in Egypt to get an idea of the issues that will arise. The New York Times has made a brave effort in this week’s magazine to give us a well-rounded, if optimistic, snapshot. I was struck with this compelling observation:
The revolutions of 2011 were led by a generation that is tired of ideologies and that tends to see its own struggle in terms of more concrete personal rights and freedoms.
Many observers worry that the generals who now run Egypt may want to remain in power, or that the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood may dominate the post-revolution political space, or that economic distress will upend hopes for democracy. All these worries are real, but the Times found the generals interested in returning to barracks, the Muslim Brotherhood split and other Islamist groups less threatening than imagined. Economic problems may well endure and present the most serious threat to improvements in personal rights and freedoms.
Jane Novak, a keen observer of Yemen blogging at Armies of Liberation, proposes a locally-based approach to politics, social services and jobs once Saleh is gone. I don’t really know if her “Interim Transitional Mechanism” and its local “Community Centers” is realistic. Is it too schematic? Cartesian organization doesn’t strike me as a likely formula for success in Yemen. But she is on to something: the Saleh regime’s attempt to run Yemen from Sanaa has been notably unsuccessful, and the political “opposition” seems also to lack strong roots outside the capital. It might be a lot smarter post-revolution to try something more locally based, drawing on tribal loyalties. There is of course a risk that southerners will take advantage of the opportunity to secede, but Novak seems to feel this can be prevented, at least temporarily.
It is easy to imagine something similar in Libya, where the resistance to Muammar Gaddafi seems to have evolved largely along municipal and tribal lines, starting in Benghazi but certainly extending also to Misrata and other towns. The same is true on Gaddafi’s side of the ledger, where his tribal strength in Sirte helps to protect Tripoli from the insurgent forces. Building the new Libyan state from the grassroots up strikes me as preferable to replacement of Gaddafi with some internationally acclaimed worthy. Far better a decentralized approach that makes Tripoli listen to other population centers more than it has in the past. Libyans seem fully committed to national unity, despite the current civil war, and economic hardship could pass quickly if the oil revenue is used effectively. But of course that is a tall order.
In Syria, the risk of disintegration is serious. Some of its Kurds–treated as second class citizens in an Arab Republic–aspire to the kind of autonomy they see next door in Iraq. So too is the risk of a Sunni Islamist takeover that would breach one of the current regime’s only virtues: commitment to religious pluralism. Many Syrians will be looking to settle accounts with the Alawites who run the current regime, and they will not wait to be attacked before defending themselves (that in a sense is already what they are doing). Constitutional succession in Syria seems even more unlikely than in Egypt, which abandoned that route mid-stream. Economic problems are likely to be at least as challenging, as Syrian oil production is declining and the current regime’s repressive efforts are no doubt emptying the treasury (if it hadn’t already been emptied by the kleptocrats).
I don’t have a ready-made formula for Syria, Yemen or Libya except this: we need to listen to the locals, and follow their lead if we can figure out what it is. It is striking, as the Times observes, how the street protesters are committed to individual rights and freedoms. We should be finding and supporting that vein of gold in each of these societies. I remember all too well how we quickly abandoned the Otpor youth who led the revolt against Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, because we were more concerned to support the new government than to make sure it was true to democratic ideals. Above all, we should not make that mistake again.
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Own goal
Serbian President Boris Tadic is apparently prepared to skip a summit of Central and Southeastern European leaders in Warsaw Friday and Saturday because Kosovo’s president will be present and treated as an equal.
I of course understand Tadic’s domestic political problem. He doesn’t want to be seen acknowledging Kosovo’s sovereignty, which Belgrade continues to contest. He and Foreign Minister Jeremic seem almost in a competition to see who can move more aggressively in the nationalist direction. The Foreign Minister has come out strongly for withdrawal of the international community High Representative from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tadic was pleased the other day to tell Serb school children from Kosovo that Serbia is their country.
This despite the fact that Serbia’s delegation to the EU-hosted talks has met with the Kosovo delegation at a symmetrical table, where rumor has it they will soon be able to announce modest progress on issues like mutual recognition of documents and customs stamps. Tadic needs that, in order for Serbia to gain EU candidacy status for Serbia before calling elections. Kosovo in the meanwhile will try to gain entry into the visa waiver program, whose technical requirements it claims to have fulfilled.
So there appears to be at least some limited progress on practical issues, but Serbia is unwilling to take the next step. Atifete Jahjaga is the constitutionally elected president of Kosovo. Whatever Kosovo’s status, she is clearly its legitimate leader. Tadic needs to learn to make this distinction: between recognizing Kosovo as sovereign and independent, and accepting its leader as its legitimate representative. He should take the advice of Sonja Licht, president of the Foreign Policy Council at the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
I personally believe that the time has come that the policy of the Government is reconsidered in order that more creative solution is found. That solution has to respect the fact that the circumstances have changed in the meantime. We have started dialog with Kosovo and accepted it as a side in negotiations. More courageous and determined steps are necessary.
Tadic’s refusal to go to Warsaw is an own goal. The Americans will certainly want to think more than twice before inviting Tadic to Washington if he is unwilling to join President Obama for this group summit in Warsaw.
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Veh is mir!
The issue is not the 1967 border–President Obama did not ask the Israelis to accept it, but to use it as the basis for negotiation of territorial swaps that would result in a more secure and defensible Israeli border. There is nothing controversial about that. It is what all Israeli prime ministers before Netanyahu have accepted.
Nor did Netanyahu use his speech to Congress to pick at that scab. In fact, he was at pains to close ranks with President Obama as much as possible. But note that he did not talk about “swaps,” which imply equal exchanges of territory, only about generosity.
But he made it clear that he is asking much more than other Israeli prime ministers have been prepared to accept. He wants explicit recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (the existing PLO recognition of Israel tout court is not sufficient), he wants all of Jerusalem (which would presumably preclude part of it being the capital of Palestine), he wants Israeli troops along the Jordan river (not clear to me which way the guns will be pointing), he wants no return of Palestinian refugees to Israel (even though Israel would end up with the lion’s share of the land).
And he expects American support for these positions, which would wreck any near-term hope of a negotiated agreement. So does he really accept the two-state solution? I think not, despite his explicit reference to it as free, viable and independent.
The next big move in this diplomatic game will be at the General Assembly in the fall, when the Palestinians attempt to get a resolution that will “recognize” their state. This is a bit silly, since the GA doesn’t recognize states, and GA resolutions are cheaper by the dozen and often ignored. But Israeli and American opposition to the resolution has made it symbolically important. The GA does recommend states for UN membership, but President Obama has signaled clearly that the U.S. would veto that in the Security Council, which has the final say.
My grandmother would support Netanyahu. I say what she taught me: “oy, veh is mir.”
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Netanyahu channels Jefferson
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke last night at AIPAC. The speech was notable for three things:
- No vision of what peace with the Palestinians would look like–he promised that for today in Congress.
- His assertion that “Israel is America’s indispensable ally.” I thought it was the other way around.
- His welcoming of the Arab Spring, and his related claim that Arabs have equal rights in Israel.
On this last point, I’m glad Netanyahu took the line he did on the Arab Spring, but I’m afraid he was as insincere as the slave holder Thomas Jefferson, whose memorial he visited. Rather than debate complex issues, I’ll quote the State Department’s last human rights report:
Principal human rights problems were institutional, legal, and societal discrimination against Arab citizens…
In Israel proper, see the New Israel Fund. For the occupied territories, pay a visit to B’tselem. Prepare to not like what you read.
The question of whether Israel is indispensable to the U.S. or the U.S. is indispensable to Israel is an important one. The fact is that the U.S. is indispensable to Israel. The United States would survive without the Jewish state, but Israel would not survive without American support.
Like most Americans, I am glad for that support, which helps to ensure Israeli security. But when an Israeli prime minister gets the basic relationship backwards I’ve got to wonder what we are doing wrong.
The answer is too much support and not enough questioning. President Obama did well last week to make clearer what everyone (including Israeli prime ministers before Netanyahu) has always assumed: that a peace settlement would include 1967 borders with land swaps. Putting Netanyahu on the spot was far better than conspiring with him, as Aaron David Miller would have preferred.
I’ll be listening today for what Netanyahu has to say about his vision for a peace settlement between Israel and Palestine. I hope it proves better than what I expect.
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Gaddafi won’t stop or go
While Bashar al Assad won’t stop the repression in Syria and Ali Abdullah Saleh won’t leave office in Yemen, Muammar Gaddafi is willing to do neither in Libya.
NATO is pounding Gaddafi’s command centers more seriously than in the past, and the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council is gaining diplomatic prominence. Yesterday, the European Union’s “foreign minister” Catherine Ashton opened an EU office in Benghazi. I think some Americans are already there, though they have not made a big deal about it. President Obama said in his Middle East speech on Thursday that Gaddafi would “inevitably” leave power–when Americans use the i-word, they usually mean that they are trying hard to make it happen.
The Libyan oil minister has defected, Gaddafi’s wife and daughter are reportedly in Tunisia and the International Criminal Court prosecutor has requested a warrant for his arrest. As the prosecutor put it:
The evidence shows that Muammar Gaddafi, personally, ordered attacks on unarmed Libyan civilians. His forces attacked Libyan civilians in their homes and in the public space, repressed demonstrations with live ammunition, used heavy artillery against participants in funeral processions, and placed snipers to kill those leaving mosques after the prayers.
Also included in the request to the judges for arrest warrants are Gaddafi’s son Saif al Islam and brother-in-law, who heads the military intelligence service.
This real-time use of judicial proceedings is controversial, as it appears to close off options for Gaddafi and give him an incentive to continue his resistance. My own view is different. He has had lots of opportunity to stop the repression and leave Libya. The arrest warrants, if they are issued, will be a clear and compelling warning to his subordinates that they face the same fate if they don’t act soon to stop Gaddafi’s criminal behavior.
It is impossible to predict how much longer the military campaign against Gaddafi will have to continue before he leaves the scene, one way or the other. Smarter folks are saying there is a stalemate, but my sense is that Gaddafi’s military capabilities are gradually eroding and that at some point the Libyan people will discover that his fortress is largely empty. I wouldn’t want to be identifiable as being on his side when that day comes.
PS: On Saif and his relationship with Muammar, see yesterday’s New York magazine piece, “The Good Bad Son.”
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Saleh won’t go
President Saleh of Yemen today again refused to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement that would have him step down in 30 days. This time he is insisting on a public signing, while flooding the streets with loyalists who have trapped the American and EU ambassadors along with others in the United Arab Emirates embassy in Sanaa.
It is anyone’s guess how today will wind up. Brian Whitaker, who certainly knows Yemen better than I do, sees little possibility of the president wriggling out, mainly because the Saudis won’t let him. But I think it is a pretty good bet that we are more than 30 days from Saleh stepping down.
If he is smart–and generally he is at least wily–his security forces are likely to “rescue” the American and other ambassadors, after letting them stew a while. Even if he ends up having to sign the agreement, implementation is going to be difficult. He has slipped the leash before and will certainly try to do it again. Only when he sees the real possibility of needing the immunity provided for in the agreement will he go.
In the meanwhile, there are tensions between the opposition political parties and the protesters who have sustained the effort to oust Saleh. They have never really been united. It is the opposition parties, not the protesters, who have signed the agreement. They will need to retain the capability of putting large numbers of people in the streets if they want the transition to be a real one and not just a reshuffling of the Yemeni elite.
That is certainly what the Saudis have in mind, though that may give them more credit for a coherent view than Ginny Hill of Chatham House did in an appearance last week at the Middle East Institute. The aging and health problems of the Crown Prince seem to have cut off payments to the Yemeni tribes and reduced Saudi Arabia’s ability to impose a solution in Sanaa. Maybe Saleh’s latest maneuvers will awaken them to the need for decisive action by the GCC. Failing that, Saleh could continue to not go for a while yet.
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