Tag: United States
Diplomacy stirs
I won’t claim it is due to what I asked three days ago on peacefare.net (where are the diplomats?), but there are stirrings in the last day or so of American diplomacy. Ambassador Robert Ford made his way to Hama in a show of support show of support for the Syrian demonstrators there, along with French Ambassador Eric Chevallier. Anti-terrorism “czar” John Brennan met with Yemen’s President Saleh in Saudi Arabia and let it be known he had asked Saleh to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement that would begin a transition with Saleh stepping aside. Less visible: U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz has cancelled a scheduled Middle East Institute event this week, I understand in order to meet with Libyan National Transitional Council people in Doha about planning for the post-Gaddafi era.
All good, if a bit late and less decisive than I might like. Ford is in a particularly sensitive spot, as the Syrian-government sponsored “national dialogue” is supposed to have started today, with a good part of the street opposition staying away. The Americans still have not asked for President Assad to step aside, and it seems unlikely he would even if they did. That said, there is likely more to be gained from the American perspective from a successful transition to a more democratic society in Syria than just about any place else, since it would presumably offer less cooperation to Iran and Hizbollah. Ford needs somehow to signal clear support for transition without getting out ahead of the demonstrators or President Obama, who inexplicably hangs on to the hope that Bashar al Assad will undertake serious reform.
Brennan’s visit with Saleh to read him the riot act and get him not to return to Sanaa is likewise a good move, but one that comes late in the game. Saleh shows no signs of wanting to sign an agreement he has repeatedly promised to sign. Brennan is the right guy to deliver the message because he controls the military assistance to counter-terrorism in Yemen that Saleh values. But I trust he is also lining up the Saudis not only to say the right things but to do them: they should not allow Saleh to leave for Yemen and they should make it clear his allowance will be zeroed out if he manages somehow to get back to Sanaa.
As for Libya, it is high time Europeans, Americans and Arabs put their heads together to plan the post-Gaddafi era. As I’ve previously note, there is a lot to do, and the international community is thoroughly occupied elsewhere. But somehow we’ve got to put together a serious post-conflict reconstruction effort in Libya, if only to prevent a failed transition: restoration of a Gaddafi or Gaddafi-like dictatorship, split up of the country, or breakdown into chaos. Any of these outcomes would discredit the Security Council-authorized, NATO-led intervention and put American interests at risk, if only by providing our terrorist enemies with a new platform. We need a Libyan-led post-Gaddafi effort, one that can command broad legitimacy not only in Benghazi but also in Tripoli. Easier said than done, but I’m glad to the effort beginning to move ahead.
PS: For those with Arabic, and even for those without (watch Brennan’s unhappy face) here is a video report on Brennan’s meeting with Saleh:
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Where are the diplomats?
In Libya and Yemen, presidents are hanging on way past their “use by” date. Ali Abdullah Saleh appeared today on TV, both defeated and defiant. Muammar Gaddafi is defiant and seemingly delusional. In Syria, Bashar al Assad may not be quite as far along to perdition as the other two, but he seems to have chosen their path: hang on until physically removed from the scene (and in Saleh’s case even after being transferred to a hospital in Saudi Arabia).
Military means are not working well against Gaddafi or Saleh. This is not entirely surprising: Gaddafi obviously prides himself on personal resistance to the use of force and doesn’t give a hoot what happens to his country. Saleh seems like-minded. I wouldn’t even want to imagine what Bashar al Assad thinks: he no doubt was brought up to believe the use of force is vital to a ruler, and he is well on his way to imitating his father’s use of it. What is needed in all three cases is a stronger diplomatic effort.
It is hard to believe that the Saudis can’t deprive Saleh of enough money and other support to make him choose retirement over an attempt to return to Yemen. The question is why they don’t use the leverage they’ve got, and what can we do to get them to use it? The American Ambassador reportedly threw his support behind the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for transition in Yemen. My hope is that he is working assiduously to get it implemented.
Gaddafi seems to have stockpiled enough cash and gold to survive a long time, but he too should be realizing about now that the cause is lost. The British, African Union and maybe others have been sporadically engaged in trying to devise a plan to get Gaddafi out. They need to redouble those efforts, making it clear that any sweeteners will soon be irrevocably lost if he doesn’t grab hold tight now.
Republicans in Congress are asking for the recall from Damascus of Ambassador Robert Ford, certainly among the State Department’s finest Arabists. This is wrong-headed. They should be asking the Ambassador to do more, not less. His visit to Hama in support of the demonstrators today was a step in the right direction. Far better that he do enough of this kind of thing to get expelled rather than be withdrawn by Washington.
We should keep the lines of communication open to all these miscreant presidents. But there should be no doubt whose side Washington is on: the people of these three beknighted countries are asking their presidents to make way for more democratic societies. That’s what the diplomats should be helping to make happen.
PS: Here is the greeting Ambassador Ford got in Hama:
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A Political Solution to the Afghan War
My piece, as published this morning at theatlantic.com:
The U.S. wants a negotiated peace with the Taliban. Here are the issues we’ll face, and how they might be resolved
The timeline for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is now clear: 10,000 troops out by the end of this year and 23,000 more out by the end of next summer. That will leave 67,000 troops, who, if all goes according to plan, will be withdrawn before the end of 2014, with a possible residual assistance force of unspecified size thereafter. That solves the military equation. But what about the political formula? How will Afghanistan be governed after we leave? Will it remain under its current constitution? What role will there be for the Taliban? How will power be shared between Kabul and the provinces? How about the most troublesome neighbor, Pakistan? What will its role be? And what can the United States do to make the answers these questions come out in a direction that does as little harm to our interests as possible?
President Obama in his withdrawal announcement last month was remarkably silent on these issues. While clear as usual that our primary interest in Afghanistan is to defeat Al Qaeda, on governance in Afghanistan he said only that it won’t be “perfect.” That is not much guidance for our diplomats and aid workers, who are looking ahead to an end-of-year international conference in Bonn expected to set the course for our coalition partners as well as the Afghans for the three years then remaining before completion of the withdrawal process.
The governments of Europe and of other coalition partners want to see political reconciliation, which has become a popular notion in the U.S. as well. Retiring Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested that the end of this year is a reasonable timeframe for negotiations with the Taliban to begin yielding results. What can we hope for by way of a political settlement? What are the options? President Obama, in his June announcement on Afghanistan, reiterated his goals for reconciliation negotiations with the Taliban: they must break with Al Qaeda, foreswear violence, and accept the Afghan constitution. The insurgent leaderships — most importantly the Haqqani network and Mullah Omar’s Taliban Quetta Shura — show little sign of feeling compelled to comply. A few days after the speech, and presumably in response, Taliban members attacked the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, targeting Afghan politicians gathered to discuss the impending turnover of security responsibility for Kabul and several provinces to the Afghan National Security Forces. It’s clear that at least some of the Taliban will fight on for a long time, as insurgents in Iraq have done.
Some Taliban, however, may want a deal, and the German government has been hosting talks aimed at one. What might the Taliban hope to get in return for meeting something like the President’s redlines? So far, the focus seems to have been on confidence-building measures like freeing prisoners and removing Taliban from terrorist lists. Washington does not like to discuss it, but an overall political settlement will only be possible if the Taliban get something more substantial in return for whatever we get.
The options are few (and not mutually exclusive): a share of political power in Kabul, control over territory, economic benefits, and guarantees of U.S. withdrawal.
Sharing political power in Kabul is not an easy fix. The Taliban fought a ferocious civil war against Northern Alliance and other politicians who today govern in Kabul, having thrown the Taliban out of Kabul with U.S. assistance in 2001. The Islamist Taliban would want to reintroduce their version of strict religious practices, a move many in Kabul would resist. Northern Alliance, many women, secularists, and others would not want to see the Taliban back in power in Kabul. Former presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah and former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh have become the leaders of this rejectionist front. It won’t be enough for the U.S. to approve Taliban political involvement — these Afghan groups would also need to go along.
Another option would be sharing power at the provincial level, especially in the more Pashtun provinces of the south and east. Afghanistan has only rarely been effectively ruled from Kabul. The Taliban could dominate politics in Helmand, Kandahar, and other provinces along the border with Pakistan, thus allowing the group its long-desired role in government without handing over all of Afghanistan. This could, however, lead to a virtual partition of the country, with the Taliban-dominated provinces becoming a de facto part of Pakistan. Some might even say this is good: it would give Pakistan the strategic depth it seeks in Afghanistan — reducing its incentives to continue meddling and promoting militancy — and prevent New Delhi from exploiting its relationship with Kabul to the detriment of Islamabad, at least in the border provinces.
There are only three economic assets of real value in Afghanistan: control over drug production and trade, control over mineral resources, and control of border crossings and transport. The Taliban already exercise a good deal of control over all three in parts of the countryside where they are dominant. We are not likely to gain enough control over drugs to interest the Taliban, who know we would not want to return any control we do gain to them. Mineral resources, to be effectively exploited, require a national mining and export framework and guarantees to foreign investors that only the government in Kabul can provide. If Afghanistan is to prosper, border crossings and transport will also need to be mainly under national control.
Finally, the Taliban have sought withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. This is a problem. President Karzai has made it clear that he would like one or more American bases to remain in Afghanistan after 2014, and talks have begun on a strategic framework that would enable American forces to stay, provided the Afghan government asks them to do so. Washington wants such bases so that it will have the capability to strike against Al Qaeda, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The Taliban will fear that the Americans will use any residual presence to strike them as well as to shore up Karzai’s government.
Bottom line: the Taliban may well feel that they can get more by fighting on than by negotiating, but if they get serious about negotiations they will likely seek a share of power in the south and east, along with some representation in Kabul. Political power is likely to bring some economic benefits as well, in particular control over border crossings and transport. The Taliban would also continue to control at least some drug production and trade where they are politically dominant.
This is an unattractive proposition, especially to Afghan women and the Northern Alliance. It would most likely resemble Hizbollah’s role in Lebanon, which has been a source of regional instability in the Middle East for many years. Is there anything that could be done that would amount to more than putting lipstick on this pig?
The answer is “yes,” but it requires the United States to worry about something it has studiously ignored for many years: the Durand line, which is the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan that Afghanistan accepts but Pakistan has not.
I don’t know of any two countries without an agreed and demarcated border that live happily side by side. When I called on a national security advisor in Kabul years ago and asked why Afghanistan had not recognized the Durand line, he responded: “I wouldn’t want to foreclose options for future generations.” Pakistan is a country that lives with what it considers an “existential” threat from India to the south and east. It surely does not need another threat, however remote, on its western border. Ethnic Pashtun irredentism — the Pashtuns live on both sides of the Durand line — greatly complicates Islamabad’s challenges.
Afghan recognition of the Durand line as part of a broader deal with the Taliban would provide Pakistan with an important benefit, without depriving it of “strategic depth” inside Afghanistan. This would have to be done in a way that allows a good deal of free movement across the border, since otherwise the Taliban and other locals, who have enjoyed relatively free movement for decades, would object. But agreeing to and demarcating the Durand line would markedly improve relations between Kabul and Islamabad, enabling them to collaborate on what really counts for the United States: ensuring that their border area does not become a haven for international terrorists.
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Independence is over-rated
Yes, that’s what I said: over-rated. Despite the inspirational words, the declaration of July 4, 1776 didn’t change much. Seven years of war ensued. That didn’t settle it either: the British continued to interfere with American shipping, so we fought another war in 1812 (-15). Friendship with Britain did not begin until late in the 19th century, and the “special relationship” is a product of the 20th.
My Kosovar and Southern Sudanese friends are discovering that things haven’t changed much.
The NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo ended in June 1999. Seventy-six countries have recognized Kosovo since its independence in February 2008, but Belgrade is using Russia to block Kosovo’s entry into the United Nations General Assembly, which is the modern world’s equivalent of universal recognition. Pristina is now engaged in discussions of practical issues with Belgrade, with modest results, but good neighborly relations are still far off. The promise of eventual EU membership–much sooner for Belgrade and much later for Pristina–may keep things on track, but there are no guarantees.
Sudan’s independence will be declared July 9. Despite extensive arrangements for this eventuality in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between Khartoum and Juba in 2005, things are not going smoothly. The Abyei region is still contested, despite two arbitration decisions. Ethiopian peacekeepers are now being deployed there, after Khartoum’s army displaced more than 100,000 people last month. There is instability in two northern states, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, where southern sympathies are strong (and some of the sympathizers armed). There are still no agreements on crucial issues: citizenship for northerners in the South and southerners in the North, division of assets and debt, as well as oil revenue and oil transport from the South through the North.
Independence can be declared, but it is sovereignty and statehood that really count. Neither is a function of saying, only of doing. They are acquired through practice, not expression. The three concepts are often confused, and in a well-established state they in fact are congruent. But they are three distinct concepts: statehood depends on the existence of an organized distribution of political power, sovereignty on the state having a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, and independence–a relative term–on the sovereign state being able to make its own decisions without seeking the approval of others. Neither Southern Sudan nor Kosovo is yet a fully independent sovereign state, though I trust both will make it in due course.
There will be a lot of ups and downs along the way. There certainly were in the United States. The Washington, DC I visited as a child was a segregated city, not by law but by preference of the white majority. Many times while I served abroad in the U.S. Foreign Service I was asked whether a black president was possible. I always said “yes,” but I wasn’t at all sure it would happen in my lifetime. It did, and a lot of people had to change their conception of what it means to be American for it to happen (which is why I’m not surprised that some haven’t changed and are still worrying themselves about the President’s birth certificate).
This process of infusing new meaning into old concepts is important to acquiring statehood and sovereignty: an inclusive concept of what it means to be Southern Sudanese or “Kosovan” is vital to organizing political life and exercising a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. If some people are excluded, or demoted to second class citizenship, the state will be less than worthy and sovereignty less than complete. So I conclude with Marvin Gaye’s effort to infuse new meaning into an old German drinking song, not so much because I like the results, but because I like the process:
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Here’s an idea for Bosnia
Balkans fans will know that Brčko, a northeast Bosnian town, became the knot that couldn’t be untied at Dayton and was therefore referred for arbitration thereafter. The result was an unusual decision in favor of a “condominium”–Brčko became legally part of both the Federation and Republika Srpska and de facto distinct from both, under international (American) supervision. Adam Moore of UCLA has written an interesting paper on the post-war evolution of Brčko, which has become a rare but fraying exemplar of reintegration in Bosnia: Why Brčko became one of the only success stories in Bosnia.
Those who worry about war in Bosnia worry about Brčko. It is vital to Republika Srpska (RS), since it sits in a narrow corridor that joins the eastern wing along the Drina with its western wing south of the Sava. If ever there is a war in Bosnia again, whoever gets Brčko wins: the RS needs it to survive intact, the Federation needs it to make RS independence impossible.
So protecting Brčko and preventing it from being “taken” by either the RS or the Federation should be a priority for the international community. The European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia has limited resources (1600 people “in theater,” whatever that means). Its mission is
…to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as Dayton/Paris Agreement).
It could pre-emptively begin to concentrate itself in Brčko (in addition to its near-Sarajevo headquarters), thereby providing a serious impediment to RS’s independence ambitions as well as to any pre-emptive move by the Bosniaks to prevent secession. Doing this would help to preserve the still integrated Brčko district and prevent it from fraying further.
A European move to strengthen its heretofore modest liaison and observation team in Brčko would demonstrate to all concerned–including the Americans–that EUFOR is serious and knows where Bosnia’s vulnerabilities lie.
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Avoiding a September Israel/Palestine train wreck
Doom and gloom over at Woodrow Wilson this morning: Shai Feldman and Aaron David Miller in particular foresee no prospect of agreement under current conditions. Train wreck is more likely, Feldman believes: what happens in New York will trigger youth demonstrations in Palestine. This will threaten the Palestinian establishment (Fatah especially) and force it into a more radical posture. Politics in both Palestine and Israel militate against a conflict-ending settlement. In the absence of some unexpected event, or act of unusual statesmanship, prospects are not good.
Nevertheless, Hussein Ibish suggests that there is some possibility of incremental progress in the fall at the General Assembly. Palestine will not become a member of the UN, because the U.S. will veto. What is important, according to Ibish, is that Palestinian progress in state-building be preserved and sustained. He believes there are real possibilities for avoiding a counter-productive clash at the UN. The Palestinians will not press a General Assembly resolution if negotiations are restarted, and they can accept something less than UN membership in order to back off.
Palestinian unity is not really on the horizon, Ibish suggests. The Hamas/Palestine Liberation Organization agreement is nothing more than an agreement to agree, but in fact there is still no agreement on anything important. They can’t even agree on who should be prime minister, much less on things more important than that, like how to deal with Israel.
Jackson Diehl suggests the U.S. has a good deal to lose from vetoing Palestinian membership in the UN. The Saudis have already warned that they will react. Aaron David Miller asks if there is a way to avoid Washington being put in this position? Is this sufficient reason for Obama to launch a grand initiative to solve the Israel/Palestine conflict? Or, Shai Feldman asks, is there something more modest that could be done, like adopting the Obama parameters (from his speech in May) as the basis for future negotiations? Aaron David Miller suggests this is a real possibility, with the Obama speech (including 1967 borders) as a common frame of reference.
But how close are they to a deal, Diehl asks? Shai Feldman thinks Netanyahu may be focused on demographic trends, which have been presented recently to the Israeli cabinet. The issue for him is not Palestine, whose population he envisages in a separate state, but rather the Arab population of Israel. This is the issue that may pull Netanyahu toward the center, as it has other Israeli leaders, and push him into serious negotiations.
Hussein Ibish thinks the sides are far apart on the issues. There will be no quick breakthrough. But once gaps start closing, they could close quickly. Nothing will happen without restarting the negotiations, so that is the way out of the September train wreck, even if Aaron David Miller suggests though there is nothing worse than another failed negotiation effort.
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