Tag: United States
The Palestine question needs answers
I am perfectly willing to believe that today’s pro-Palestinian demonstrations on Israel’s borders with Syria, Lebanon and Gaza, in which Israeli security forces killed at least eight people, were in part efforts to use the annual Nakba (“catastrophe”) commemoration of Israel’s founding as a way of refocusing attention away from poor governance in Arab countries and towards the plight of the Palestinians. This seems especially likely in the case of Syria, which has a real need to show Israel and the United States that there is good reason to preserve autocratic rule, which has ensured peace on the Syrian-Israeli border for decades. Israeli claims that Iran is stirring the pot seem far-fetched, but who knows, maybe even that is true.
None of that excuses the ham-fisted reaction of the Israeli security forces, which seemed unprepared and undermanned for the occasion. Of course the country has a right to defend its borders, and stone-throwers in my view do not qualify as unequivocally peaceful demonstrators. But how stupid is it for democratic Israel to adopt the methods of the Arab autocrats in responding to provocation? Where has shooting protesters had a stabilizing impact? And just how serious is the presence on your sovereign territory of even a few hundred demonstrators? How long do you think they will be able to stay once the security forces move deliberately and without violence to cut them off from support across the border?
This overreaction comes at a delicate moment, with Prime Minister Netanyahu getting ready to visit Washington and President Obama preparing to unveil who knows what now that his Middle East special envoy, George Mitchell, has quit in obvious frustration. If Iran and its Arab allies in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza are successful in an effort to refocus the Arab Spring on Palestinian issues, Israel and the United States are both in deep difficulty. The best thing they can do to avoid that unfortunate trap is to stop killing protesters and offer some clear answers on when and how the state of Palestine can emerge from the chaotic soup in which the Middle East finds itself.
Rebel leader big hit in wonk world
I confess I was distracted during the visit to DC this week of Mahmoud Gebril ElWarfally, interim prime minister of the Transitional National Council of the Libyan Republic. But he unquestionably performed well: on NPR, in the New York Times, and at Brookings. I imagine also at the White House, where he met with National Security Advisor Tom Donilon.
Gebril, as most seem to call him (and as the New York Times spells his name), has to his credit University of Pittsburgh degrees in political science and strategic planning (MA and PhD respectively) as well as more than two decades of making a living in the Middle East as a leadership trainer, after which he served in the Gaddafi regime as head of the National Economic Development Board. Sophisticated and urbane are the usual adjectives, the kind of Libyan who had enough to say to merit occasional mention in U.S. embassy cables made available by you know who.
Washington was warm and fuzzy on the occasion of his visit, but it did not immediately give him what he was looking for: recognition as the legitimate head of government in Libya, money (from Gaddafi’s frozen stash of $34 billion) or a meeting with the President. I imagine some in Libya may see this as less than half a loaf, but it really isn’t too bad. The United States has the annoying habit of recognizing countries, not governments, so it is hard for Washington to treat Gebril the way he would have liked until he gets to Tripoli. Congress is working on legislation to free up at least some of the money, and Gebril is not actually the top dog in the Interim National Council. That glory belongs to its Chair, Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, so a call on the president might have created as many problems as it solves. A presidential drop-by to Donilon’s office would have been nice though.
Still, Gebril did okay. Compliments to the Harbour Group. NATO has intensified its efforts, so maybe on his next visit he’ll get more of what the rebellion certainly deserves: unequivocal support from Washington. The sooner we are finished with Gaddafi, the better off Libya and North Africa generally will be.
Sometimes at odds, sometimes not
I owe a debt of gratitude for this piece to Dennis Kux, author of The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, a retired State Department South Asia specialist, and currently a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He writes:
Osama bin Laden died in a fashion that could not have been better from the American standpoint or worse for Pakistan. For Americans, the end to the man who organized 9/11 and other deadly, if less bloody, Al Qaeda operations was like the script of a Hollywood movie. The good guys–the Navy Seals–swoop out of the sky, get their man, suffer no casualties, and return to base. The only hitch, the loss of a helicopter, provides suspense, but is not a game stopper since there is fortunately a back-up chopper available.
The episode brought a sense of closure over the horrors of 9/11. In a victory lap, President Obama symbolically visited Ground Zero in New York City and then flew to Fort Bragg, Kentucky to salute the Navy Seals who performed so flawlessly. The US admittedly carried out the operation inside Pakistan without the knowledge, let alone permission, of the government of Pakistan. Indeed, as CIA Director Leon Panetta told the media, informing the Pakistanis in advance would have risked operational security.
So it was a great day for Uncle Sam. Osama is no more. The master terrorist has gotten his just reward. Furthermore, the present occupant of the White House revealed himself a cool and decisive Clint Eastwood not, as many previously thought, a distant intellectual who had trouble making up his mind.
For Pakistan, the episode was a major disaster. Even Pakistani liberals who applauded the death of bin Laden were embarrassed by way it happened. They were irate that the al Qaeda leader could have been hiding almost next door to their country’s West Point in a city full of military installations and supposedly tight security. If Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the ISI, did not know that bin Laden had been in Abbottabad for five years, it was woefully incompetent. If ISI knew who lived in the high-walled compound, it was guilty of hiding the world’s most wanted terrorist.
Either way, it was enormously embarrassing. This observer is skeptical that something as conspicuously different as the bin Laden compound from the rest of the neighborhood would not have attracted the attention of the omnipresent ISI, especially over half a decade. In turn, Pakistan’s security establishment, and a large section of the public, were infuriated by the US’s blatant disregard for their country’s sovereignty and were red-faced that the Americans were able to fly across more than a hundred miles of Pakistani territory undetected by the vaunted air defense system.
Thus, while there was enormous satisfaction and pride in the US, for Pakistan, the response was very conflicted. This was reflected in the stark contrast between President Zardari’s op ed in the May 2 Washington Post applauding the US action and the querulous statement issued the same day by the Foreign Ministry. The latter mentioned bin Laden’s death almost in passing, waxed indignant about the violation of Pakistani sovereignty, and said menacingly that any repetition would shake the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. The Pakistan military leadership issued a similar warning after a meeting of the powerful corps commanders and the army chief General Kayani. The army leadership further announced that US military personnel in Pakistan would be reduced to the “bare minimum.”
Many Pakistanis, while unhappy about the unilateral US action and the violation of sovereignty, directed their ire against the security establishment, alleging that the army and the ISI were guilty of either incompetence or complicity. To counter these charges, pro-military media outlets tried to place the blame on the wobbling civilian government, generally regarded as having little say in national security matters. The opposition Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) predictably joined in the chorus of voices calling for the president and prime minister to resign.
On Monday, Prime Minister Gilani, speaking in the National Assembly, stoutly defended Pakistan’s record. He said that many intelligence agencies failed, not just Pakistan’s, blamed the US for allowing bin Laden to flee into Pakistan, warned that any attack on the countries “strategic assets” (i.e. its nukes) would be answered with a robust riposte, and stated that Lt. General Iqbal (an officer supposedly close to Kayani) would lead an inquiry into the episode. Gilani announced that parliament would meet in camera on May 13 to consider the report. At the same time, the prime minister also stressed the importance of good relations with the US. Someone obviously less concerned about US-Pak ties leaked the name of the CIA station chief to an English-language newspaper considered close to the ISI.
So how will this all play out for the US-Pak partnership against terrorism? In Washington, the Obama administration has made clear its belief that a cooperative relationship with Pakistan is important for a satisfactory outcome in the war in Afghanistan. The president chose his words carefully in his lengthy interview with 60 Minutes last Sunday. While not blaming the Pakistani authorities, he pressed for answers regarding the support network that helped bin Laden during his lengthy stay in Abbottabad. Irate Congressmen have called for slashing US aid to Pakistan, but administration supporters have argued that this would hurt, not help, US interests in the region. Washington hopes that a chastened Pakistan will prove more, rather than less, cooperative in the days ahead.
It remains unclear how events will play out in Pakistan. Possibly, the military’s embarrassment will lead to a stronger civilian voice over national security matters. Although the military is more vulnerable now than in many years, it is very uncertain that the wobbly civilian leadership will be able to take advantage of the situation. The jury is also out whether Pakistan will agree to crack down on the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network (seen as useful proxies to defend Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan) and the Lashkar-i-Toiba and related groups that have in the past served as proxies against India. Public pressure by US officials will not sway the Pakistanis, but perhaps private persuasion may prove more effective in the post bin Laden era. Reportedly, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry will be on his way in a few days to try his hand.
Until such a change occurs, the basic contradiction in the US-Pak relationship will continue: specifically that while Pakistan and the US see the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a common foe, only the US considers the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-i-Toiba as enemies. To Islamabad, these groups remain potentially useful instruments to promote Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan and against India. This kind of strategic disconnect has periodically undermined US-Pakistan alliance relations ever since Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the mutual security agreement with Pakistan in 1954. In 2011, as in the past, US and Pakistani interests and policies in part coincide and in part conflict.
How to save Bosnia and Herzegovina
John Menzies, post-war U.S. ambassador in Sarajevo in 1996 and war-time Charge’ d’affaires in 1995, writes:
Background
The U.S. has made an enormous investment in Bosnia; billions of dollars, thousands of man-years, and actual blood. The Dayton system is unraveling due to the depredations of hard-line nationalist elements. We cannot afford the success of these elements. It is time to act quickly and effectively to reverse the current trend toward fragmentation and dissolution of the Bosnian state.
Current systems seem unable to address the urgency of the moment. Here are a few simple suggestions for correcting the current course.
Moving Forward
1. Name a Special Envoy to Bosnia; provide high level political support.
2. Create a new “Friends of Bosnia” group to meet on the margins of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This group would include the U.S., the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey. Membership should be open to those who genuinely want to make the peace work. No other venue serves the purpose of the NAC. Turkey can participate as a NATO member, and the NAC can discuss much tougher approaches than can the EU or any other umbrella.
3. Reinvigorate (if at all possible) the OHR. As unlikely as it sounds, it is worth trying; it is an institution already in place. This does not substitute for a U.S. Special Envoy. The Special Envoy will add resolve and strength to the OHR, and can extend the Envoy’s own mandate by supporting the OHR.
4. Press for a new Dayton-like process to correct the flaws of the original. The new effort should have an open mandate, but only to make Bosnia work. It should be clear from the outset that there will be no multi-state solutions.
We have invested far too much to allow Bosnia to fail. Heightened resolve is the key to finding solutions.
An aging peacehawk
Not everyone will like this interview with Israeli President Shimon Peres, but I find it remarkable. He declares Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas still a partner for peace, despite the unity agreement with Hamas. He says President Obama is a friend of Israel, in particular for vetoing a UNSC resolution on settlements that accorded with Obama’s views, something I wish the United States had not done (but I’m glad Obama at least gets credit from someone for it). And he says apropos of the Arab Spring:
“Either [the Arab world] will return to tribalism and poverty, or the Arab world will enter the 21st century. There’s no middle option.” Israel’s interest, he declared, was that “they should enter the 21st century, of course. We’re not idiots. All of Judaism is built on the basis that all men are created in the image of God. Our values must be stronger even than our policies.”
This would be enough for me to take back “Israelis are from Chelm,” if more of them agreed with their president.
That said, Peres is no pushover when it comes to Israeli security. An architect of Israel’s nuclear weapons program, he says:
There are two components: a Palestinian state and Israel’s security needs. If we only talk about Israel’s security needs, that’s only half of it. If they only talk about a Palestinian state, that would only be half of it. And if only half the work is done, that will mean a continuation of the conflict.
It is hard to believe a Palestinian state necessarily threatens Israel’s security more than the mess in Gaza and the West Bank today. More likely, today’s situation is far more perilous.
Of course Peres is only the president. Prime Minister Netanyahu holds Israel’s cards, which he’ll reveal in a May 23 speech to Congress. Michael Omer-Man suggests he announce an initiative at the UN in favor of a Palestinian state, security arrangements and borders to be settled later. This may be a bridge too far, but I hope Netanyahu is at least wise enough to listen to his aging peacehawk president.
Red card
The High Representative for Dayton peace agreement implementation in Bosnia has submitted two reports to the Secretary General, one more a routine update and the other finding that one of the two entities constituting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srspska (RS), is in breach of the Dayton agreements. HiRep Valentin Inzko adds:
The recent decisions taken by the RS authorities represent the most serious violation of the GFAP [General Framework Agreement for Peace] since it was signed more than 15 years ago.
This is the more or less the equivalent of giving Republika Srpska a red card. The problem of course is that RS’s sin is refusing to recognize the authority of the referee, by calling a referendum that will reject his decisions and those of Bosnia’s state court.
This puts Inzko, and the international community, in a difficult spot. What would a soccer ref do if a player refused to leave the field? What if the player suspected the referee did not have sufficient force or sanctions to make it happen? And the player knew half the stadium was full of people ready to back him up, while the other half would not want to fight?
The issue was raised at my discussion this afternoon at the Woodrow Wilson Center with Jim O’Brien and Gerald Knaus, two experienced Bosnia hands for whom I have a great deal of respect. Nida Gelazis was in the chair.
Gerald argued that Inzko is playing into Dodik’s hands by making a big deal about the referendum. We should oppose it in a more low key way, saying that it violates Dayton and would only delay progress on the EU accession project. Inzko should not try to stop it, since he doesn’t have the power, but he should make it clear we will not respect its results.
Jim O’Brien wisely suggested that we make clear to Belgrade that its path to the EU will be encumbered if Dodik crosses whatever the international community decides is its red line. He also suggested we should focus on the consequences of Dodik’s move, which will hurt prospects for trade and investment. We should continue to build consensus on technical issues to recreate the positive dynamic evident in the case of visa liberalization policy.
I imagine that the internationals will find a way to muddle through this one, yielding a bit more ground to RS while trying to reassure the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims to the American press) that it really doesn’t make much difference. That is basically what we’ve been doing for years–accommodating Serb and Croat nationalists while soothing those among more Dayton-friendly forces who might want to stand up and object. In my view, this is taking us down a path to state dissolution, which is the RS’s stated objective.
The real problem will come the day the Bosniaks decide to engage rather than yield. I have no idea when that will be.