Tag: United States
Part 2: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper yesterday. I posted strengths and weaknesses yesterday. Here is the second installment: opportunities and threats.
3. Opportunities
Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has moved a long way. Its constitution is now broadly accepted by all but a relative handful of Sunni insurgents. Its politics, while still organized mainly around sect and ethnicity, have developed in directions that often cross ethnic and sectarian boundaries at the national, provincial and local levels. There have been moments when it appeared that major politicians like Allawi—a secular Shiite who leads a virtually all-Sunni political coalition—or even Maliki might successfully form a more coherent, cross-sectarian national political movement.
The Arab Spring brought to Iraq a significant increase in citizen demands for improved services and a fuller realization of democratic ideals. Prime Minister Maliki announced he would not seek a third mandate even before the protests hit Iraq. Maliki also set a 100-day deadline, which expired June 9, for improved performance by his ministers. Little progress in either word or deed was evident, pro-government thugs and security forces have attacked pro-democracy demonstrators, and the government seems to have missed the opportunity to use discontent to accelerate its efforts to improve performance in service delivery and reduce corruption and other abuses.
The handling of its oil revenue is a critical issue for Iraq’s future as a democratic state. Oil production is expanding now that the government has entered into agreements with international oil companies. If oil prices remain around $100 per barrel, the Iraqi state will be collecting far more revenue than its current spending plans, or any reasonable future ones, require. Baghdad has many choices, but the fundamental one is this: will all the new revenue go to the state, to dispose of as politicians decide, or will at least some of it go to the Iraqi people, to use as they see fit?
If the latter, one can envisage an Iraq where the state has to meet the burden of convincing citizens to provide revenue, political parties consequently begin to organize around issues rather than sectarian or ethnic protection, civil society continues to develop even with reduced international support, and media become more independent. This would be a polycentric Iraq, one more closely resembling modern Western democracies and likely to align itself with the West against autocracy and Iranian efforts to establish hegemony in the Middle East.
Even if the Iraqi government holds on to the lion’s share of oil revenue, there remains the question of how wisely it is used and whether there will be transparency and accountability, not only for revenue but also for expenditures. The importance of reining in corruption is generally acknowledged in Iraq today. If Iraq can reduce the well-known abuses that plague its public sector, the country would become a far more attractive place for non-oil investment.
Iraq is geographically advantaged when it comes to exporting oil and gas. In the past, the lion’s share of oil has been exported through the Gulf. But some oil produced in Kurdistan is already exported to the north, and it is not beyond Iraq’s means to greatly expand its capacity to export economically to both the north and west, through Turkey, Syria or Jordan. Iraqi gas, still mostly undeveloped, could also go in these directions.
4. Threats
The most immediate threat to Iraq’s democratic development is resurgent violence that causes the state to crack down hard and in doing so returns the country to arbitrary and potentially autocratic rule. While it is difficult to imagine the restoration of the Republic of Fear, it is relatively easy to imagine de facto autocrats, or more likely small groups of kleptocrats, gaining control over their own ethnic or sectarian groups. This is already apparent in Kurdistan, and Maliki is gradually gaining hegemonic control over large parts of the Shia south. No single hegemon has yet emerged in Sunni-majority areas.
Prime Minister Maliki, who currently holds the defense, interior and national security portfolios, has done a great deal to strengthen his position over the past five years. He seems willing to go farther in this direction. He has assembled strong, extra-constitutional counter-terrorism and intelligence forces that report directly to him, he has installed army commanders on an interim basis without parliamentary approval, he has obtained a decision from the Supreme Court giving the executive branch some power over the central bank and election commission, and the Supreme Court has also ruled that only the executive can initiate “legislative projects.” This concentration of power generates fear that democratic development may be blocked.
Arab/Kurdish tensions could cause serious problems as well. Kurdish claims to the so-called “disputed territories” are being met with strong Arab resistance. While there are rational—even easy—solutions to many of the problems, Kirkuk city and province represent a seemingly intractable quandary. While there is a great deal to be gained economically from maintaining the peace, it is not yet clear that after American withdrawal at the end of the year Arabs and Kurds will be willing and able to maintain stability there as they work towards a settlement. Even if intentions are good, miscalculation is possible. Control over oil production and revenue are also sources of Kurdish/Arab tension, but they are increasingly viewed as parts of the solution as well.
Intra-Kurdish tensions have generated demonstrations and violence in recent months in Kurdistan, where a third party threatens the traditional duopoly. While the crackdown there would not appear to threaten Iraq, it could threaten the development of a more open and democratic Kurdistan.
Iran will seek to expand its influence as the Americans draw down. While they would have many legitimate ways of doing this in a democratic Iraq, they may prefer to avoid that paradigm on their borders. They may also want, once Ayatollah Sistani is out of the way, to see Iraq turn in a theocratic, or at least a more Islamist, direction. Iran will use Sadrist and other political and militia groups to counter Saudi and U.S. influence, encourage maximum U.S. withdrawal and ensure that Islamist Shiites remain dominant in Iraq.
Risks exist from other neighbors as well. The Syrian Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi one never got on well, but Damascus will not want a successful democracy on its borders. It may continue to allow the export of at least a minimal flow of insurgents into Iraq, especially if Iraq is less than fully supportive of the Syrian regime’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations. Saudi Arabia will seek to ensure that a democratic Iraq is one in which Sunnis have a voice larger than their numbers in the population.
Turkey will want to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan does its best to limit haven for the PKK or other insurgent Kurds, something it has achieved in recent years by establishing excellent economic and political relations with Erbil. But if Turkey were to return to military incursions into Iraq, that could undermine the development of a more democratic Kurdistan.
Kuwait has several outstanding issues with Baghdad: payment of reparations and the maritime border are among the most important. While there are reasons to expect these to be settled peacefully, politicians in Baghdad have a notable temptation to demagoguery when discussing Kuwait that could strengthen undemocratic forces in Iraq.
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Oil stock draw is not a good idea
President Obama today decided to draw down 30 million barrels of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the White House claims in response to disruption of oil supplies from Libya.
For those of us who developed the policies governing coordinated stock drawdown more than 25 years ago (I was the U.S. representative to the emergency committee of the International Energy Agency from 1984 to 1987), this is an odd decision, even if it is allegedly paired with drawdown of an additional 30 million barrels by other members of the IEA and an apparent Saudi decision earlier this month to increase production. Having others contribute is nice, but only if they contribute to a good cause.
The oil market is not in crisis–in fact the price has generally declined for the past month, and supplies are ample. To some, the decision seems aimed to lower prices and deter speculators (with corresponding political benefits) rather than to respond to an emergency.
Internationally coordinated drawdowns have occurred previously in response to the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Those seem far more appropriate occasions than the present to use “the nation’s first line of defense against an interruption in petroleum supplies.” The onset of the summer driving season seems to have precipitated this decision rather than any emergency in the oil market. If it was not a good idea to use the SPR in March, it is not a good idea now, when oil market conditions are calmer.
None of us like to pay more for gasoline. But the plain fact is that Americans pay relatively little, because we tax gas far less than most other developed countries. That would be fine, except for the real costs of using gasoline and other oil products that are not paid by consumers. Oil supplies are a major reason we have all those bases around the world and aircraft carriers in every major ocean. Who pays for American efforts to protect oil supplies? The general taxpayer, not the gasoline consumer. The price is on the order of $1 per barrel, which is essentially a subsidy to oil consumption.
Lowering the price of gasoline encourages consumption, increases the costs of ensuring security of supply and discourages domestic production (which I hasten to add is not a short-term solution anyway). Not the right direction. American politics don’t allow any of our elected leaders to say what they all know is true: the right long-term direction for oil prices is up, with the additional “rent” captured by taxes that return to the Federal budget the costs of protecting oil supplies worldwide. That way the price increase doesn’t go to our adversaries (or our already well-compensated friends).
It’s a good thing I’m not planning to run for office.
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Part 1: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. I’ll post it here over the next couple of days. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper today. Here are the first two parts: strengths and weaknesses:
Getting to Denmark
By
Daniel Serwer
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Iraq is already a proto-democracy. Relatively free and fair elections chose its current parliament, 80 per cent of which are newly elected members. It has in theory an independent judiciary that is supposed to decide issues based on the law. It has lively media that are not entirely government-controlled and a vibrant civil society, including a multitude of political parties and nonprofit associations. Until the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Iraq was arguably the most democratic Arab state. Even today it likely still merits that appellation.
But “the most democratic Arab state” is not saying much. Iraq is still far from Denmark and likely never will meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. What will it take to move it farther in that direction and prevent Iraq from slipping back into autocracy?
1. Strengths
Iraq has a state, established in accordance with a constitution adopted by referendum in October 2005. It is an Islamic federal republic, “in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic.” The state is asymmetrically federal, providing a wide degree of autonomy to Kurdistan and somewhat lesser degrees to the 15 non-Kurdish governorates. The state came close to total collapse in 2003 and again in 2006-7 but has slowly recovered since. Today it manages a budget of $82.6 billion, produces oil at a rate of about 2.2 or more million barrels per day, sometimes makes a minimal basket of food available to virtually every Iraqi and produces 8000 MW of electricity.
The Council of Representatives is the supreme legislative body, and there are also provincial, municipal and district councils as well as a Kurdistan parliament. The Council of Representatives has been elected twice under the current constitution, and it has twice chosen the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic as well as approving the Prime Minister and his government.
The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by Article 87 of the Constitution. The Federal Supreme Court is established pursuant to Articles 92 and 94 of the Constitution.
In short, Iraq has the right institutions on paper. Its weaknesses lie elsewhere.
2. Weaknesses
Iraq has little history of democratic governance. While the monarchy was in principle a constitutional one, little of liberal democratic culture survived 45 years of autocracy. The Ba’athist regime led Iraq into three catastrophic wars (with Iran and with two different U.S.-led coalitions) and established a standard for brutality that has rarely been exceeded. It will not be easy to turn the Republic of Fear into the Republic of Hope.
The current Iraqi system of governance is complex. It requires for its effective operation a high degree of cooperation and coordination among different levels of government, and among entities at each level of government. Good governance would not be easy even under ideal conditions.
Conditions are far from ideal. While violence is dramatically down from its peak in 2006/7, it has ticked up recently, as a wave of assassinations has struck security officials and politicians even as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices continue more indiscriminate killing. The government response is not always respectful of the rule of law, and pressures to crack down hard to repress the violence are strong.
The current government, formed in December 2010, is far from cohesive. It is a broad coalition that includes all the major political coalitions and commands in theory a big majority in the Council of Representatives. But the political coalitions dictated the choice of its members, the prime minister has not named key security ministers so retains those portfolios himself, and political tension is high between Prime Minister Maliki and Iyad Allawi, who head the most key partners in the coalition.
Despite the formation of this “national partnership” coalition with participation from the major Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political groups, sectarian and ethnic tensions continue to plague the government. There is little sign of programmatic coherence in its deliberations, beyond general avowals of support for democracy and human rights. With some exceptions, the ministers seem more committed to protecting their own party, sectarian and ethnic interests than to providing Iraq’s citizens with the kind of good governance many of them would like.
The relationship between Iraqi citizens and their government is in fact tenuous. More than 90% of the government’s revenue comes directly from oil, not taxes. This makes Iraq an oil rentier state with no need to convince citizens of the value of the services it provides in order to obtain revenue. While Revenue Watch has ranked Iraq ahead of other Middle Eastern oil producers in revenue transparency, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index used foreigners’ perceptions to rank Iraq towards the bottom end in “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
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It’s the mission, smarty
Foreign policy eyes and ears will be on the President’s Afghanistan speech tonight. But I fear the President will focus where the press points: on the size of the troop drawdown. Important though it may be, that is not the fundamental issue. The key thing is defining the mission end-state, as I and others have already pointed out.
Why is this so important? Because it is the mission that determines the number of troops (and civilians). If you only want to kill Al Qaeda, you don’t need many civilians and the troops you need are not regular infantry but rather special forces. If you want to stabilize Afghanistan and build up the state there so that it can continue to keep Al Qaeda out, that is an entirely different mission requiring lots of civilians and substantial numbers of regular army and marines to “clear, hold and build.” And many years.
The President has been consistently ambiguous on the counter-insurgency mission. His emphasis is always on counter-terrorism (killing Al Qaeda), with the occasional coda mentioning stability but without clarity about the end-state. This is not a small issue. It is the heart of the matter, as it determines how much personpower, years, blood and treasure we will have to invest. And that in turn determines the “opportunity costs,” that is what we’ll have to give up in order to achieve our goals in Afghanistan.
President Obama is no dummy. He understands perfectly well that the mission defines the requirements. If I had to bet, he would keep the focus tonight mainly on counter-terrorism, mentioning counter-insurgency in the context of ensuring regional stability. After all, the main problem with leaving Afghanistan before it can defend itself is that militants will begin to use it to attack Pakistan, a big and important country with a substantial nuclear arsenal.
He’ll say yes, Osama bin Laden is dead, but our job is not done. We need to ensure that Al Qaeda cannot return to Afghanistan and that the region is stable, so that never again will extremists harbored there attack the United States. Enabling Afghanistan to defend itself is in the U.S. interest, he’ll argue.
My colleagues in the Twittersphere will snigger and say that it is our very presence in Afghanistan that attracts extremists and enables their recruiting. That is not an argument that can win in a world still governed by Bacevich’s Washington Rules.
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Afghanistan decision time, again
Douglas Ollivant at foreignpolicy.com is asking the right questions:
What are our national interests in Afghanistan? Which of those are vital?
How much are we willing to pay for them (money, blood, institutional focus)?
What other costs does our policy in Afghanistan incur (e.g., reduced leverage in Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan due to reliance on supply lines through their territory)?
What are the opportunity costs? How might our goals be accomplished in other ways?
Is our policy sustainable to some sort of completion?
And what — if anything — do we owe to the people of Afghanistan who have sided with the NATO effort?
None of these questions is about numbers of troops or about the timeline for withdrawal, which is what the press focuses most attention on. But the troop decision depends on the answers to these prior questions: what do you want them to do, how much will it cost (important to include the opportunity costs, as Ollivant does), and how long will it take?
The New York Times offers at least some insight into possible answers to the first question. If, as President Obama has said many times, our primary objective in Afghanistan is to rid it of al Qaeda, then the mission we need to continue is a counter-terrorism one (find them and kill them) that likely requires relatively few troops. Vice President Biden and a goodly number of members of Congress will line up on that side.
The problem is “gone today, back tomorrow.” If we leave Afghanistan a weak state unable to control its territory, there is every reason to think that al Qaeda will come back. That’s why there has long been a state-building, counter-insurgency component to the mission, though the President has never made it clear what end-state he is seeking to achieve when it comes to governance in Afghanistan. That’s not surprising considering the challenges, currently epitomized by failure of the country’s largest bank. But we could just as easily make reference to the country’s thriving drug trade and endemic corruption. If we stay, and if building the Afghan state is part of the mission, we are going to need to get more precise about what we are trying to accomplish.
Why should we care how Afghanistan is governed? The one-word answer is “Pakistan.” If al Qaeda or other extremists re-establish themselves in Afghanistan, there is every reason to expect them to attack Pakistan, an already fragile state with a large and growing nuclear arsenal. As Trudy Rubin explains in the Philadelphia Inquirer, this is a major reason for continuing the counter-insurgency and statebuilding effort in Afghanistan and presumably explains why outgoing Secretary of Defense Gates seems confident that the President will resist domestic political pressure to reduce troops rapidly.
None of this makes staying in Afghanistan look attractive. As the American ambassador has made clear, President Karzai’s harsh criticism of the American and NATO efforts in his country is taking a toll, as are the mounting costs of the war. I find it hard to fault people who would prefer to get out quickly (my wife has been on that side of the argument for a couple of years now), even if my brain tells me having to return to Afghanistan would be worse than staying.
The one thing I would ask is this: if we are going to stay to stabilize Afghanistan and build its state to the point that it can fight al Qaeda and other militants on its own, we need to be honest about how long it is going to take and how much it is going to cost. The projected date for turning over security in the whole country to the Afghans, 2014, is looking far too soon, even if Washington remains willing to pay Kabul’s security bills. I’ve seen something of “stabilization” in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and I’ve studied it elsewhere. My guess is that we’ll be there at least 10 more years in significant numbers if we want to get a half-decent job done. That’s another trillion dollars, more or less. Even among friends, that’s a lot of money, and a lot of other opportunities foregone.
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Pandora’s box should stay closed
Thursday I offered a few pleasant surprises from my visit to Kosovo, but with no firm conclusions on the vital issue of whether rule of law could or would prevail there. Today the other shoe drops: I have to offer a pessimistic view on where current political trends are leading. Ironic though it may be as Albania struggles with its own problems, the idea of greater Albania is gaining in Kosovo, largely due to failures in international policy.
Kosovo, now nominally independent for more than three years, lives with multiple limitations on its sovereignty: NATO (rather than its own security forces) guarantees its defense, the EU monitors its justice system and provides prosecutors and judges in cases of interethnic and organized crime, its budget is monitored by the International Monetary Fund, and its monetary policy is determined by the European Central Bank (since it uses the euro, not its own currency). In addition, there are of course any number of additional restrictions and conditions that donors impose on specific development and governance projects.
Few chafe much at these restrictions, though the prime minister did recently fulfill a campaign promise to raise public sector salaries in defiance of the IMF, precipitating a withdrawal of IMF budget support that will require his government either to cut back or fill the gap. “Self-Determination,” an opposition political party led by firebrand Albin Kurti, has gained something under 13% of the voting public with cries of resistance to limitations on sovereignty. For the moment he is a relatively small factor in the parliamentary equation, but with obvious potential for growth.
Belgrade’s control of northern Kosovo (three and a half municipalities north of the Ibar river) is rousing more serious problems. As demonstrated in a recent report from the Coordinator’s Office for Strategy Regarding the North of Kosovo (I’ve posted it here), Serbia has established a full array of its institutions in the north, with the obvious intention of holding on to the territory it controls there in any negotiated settlement of Kosovo’s status.
For Brussels and Washington, the talks begun late last year between Pristina and Belgrade on “practical” problems are not supposed to touch on the status issue, which the United States and 22 out of 27 members of the EU regard as settled. But few in Pristina (or I suspect Belgrade) think either Brussels or Washington shows anything like the fortitude needed to undo Belgrade’s growing domination of the north.
There are a number of practical ways in which the current division of Kosovo might be softened, and it is my understanding that these are being discussed in the EU-sponsored talks between Pristina and Belgrade. If agreement can be reached on electricity supplies and telecommunications services in the north, it could help to reintegrate the Belgrade-controlled territory with the rest of Kosovo. Agreement on mutual recognition of documents, on recognition of Kosovo’s customs bureaucracy and on export of Kosovo made goods to Serbia would also help a good deal.
But I understand that Belgrade has asked for a postponement in the next session of the talks, when a number of these agreements were expected to be reached. We can hope that this is related to the Dutch parliament’s decision to postpone approval of an EU agreement with Serbia, pending certification of Belgrade’s full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (Ratko Mladic is in The Hague, but he was one of two outstanding indictees).
That may not be the only reason for postponement. Belgrade may be having trouble accepting the already negotiated agreements because its political level has decided that the technical agreements make Serbia’s intention of dividing Kosovo more difficult. Belgrade yesterday indicated willingness to unilaterally accept Kosovo documents for travel in Serbia, which would be an important symbolic step, but one that has little relevance to the question of partition.
Judging from my discussions in Pristina last week, there is no question but that if Belgrade presses to divide Kosovo it will open a Pandora’s box of ethno-territorial issues, starting in the Albanian-majority areas of southern Serbia, extending to the Serb-majority areas of Bosnia and ending in the Muslim-populated areas of Serbia itself. Thursday Muslims of Bosnia and Sandjak (a region lying partly in Serbia and partly in Montenegro) established a “Bosniak Academy of Arts and Sciences,” no problem in of itself but a sign of growing ethnic nationalist sentiment.
Kosovars are showing a marked increase in interest in greater Albania, an historical ambition that was abandoned during the past decade in an implicit bargain with the international community: Kosovo gets independence and Albanians forget about all trying to live in one country, since eventually the borders that divide them will come down once the Balkans countries all enter the EU.
Why anyone would want to be part of an Albania that can’t even run a decent municipal election, and in which the chief political protagonists compete to see who can be more offensive and unreasonable, I don’t know. Kosovo seems to me to have a relatively good deal as an independent state under international tutelage, except in one important area: access to Europe.
Kosovars, unlike most other Balkan citizens, don’t have visa-free access to Europe’s “Schengen” area. This, and a “contractual” relationship with the EU (meaning one in which the EU can sign agreements with Kosovo, despite the five non-recognizing states), were supposed to come with completion of the first phase of the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. If Belgrade is going to block completion of the first phase, it only seems right to me that Brussels should go ahead with its commitments to Pristina, provided Kosovo is prepared to maintain its commitments to the already negotiated agreements.
I also don’t know why anyone in Serbia would want the north: its Trepca mine likely isn’t worth much and requires facilities in the south, less than half the Serb population of Kosovo lives there, and all the important Serb monuments, churches and monasteries are farther south. And if Trepca is the issue, as one of the commenters on a previous post claims, some sort of division of the spoils from the mine can likely be negotiated.
There is little accounting for nationalist aspirations in the Balkans. Best to keep Pandora’s box firmly closed. That will require a willingness on the part of the Washington and Brussels to confront Belgrade’s territorial ambitions in northern Kosovo, relegating them to the oblivion in which they belong. The time is coming to end Belgrade’s hopes for partition of Kosovo, and to recognize that Serbs, too, will one day see the borders between them fall as the Balkans countries enter the EU.
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