Tag: United States
Here’s an idea for Bosnia
Balkans fans will know that Brčko, a northeast Bosnian town, became the knot that couldn’t be untied at Dayton and was therefore referred for arbitration thereafter. The result was an unusual decision in favor of a “condominium”–Brčko became legally part of both the Federation and Republika Srpska and de facto distinct from both, under international (American) supervision. Adam Moore of UCLA has written an interesting paper on the post-war evolution of Brčko, which has become a rare but fraying exemplar of reintegration in Bosnia: Why Brčko became one of the only success stories in Bosnia.
Those who worry about war in Bosnia worry about Brčko. It is vital to Republika Srpska (RS), since it sits in a narrow corridor that joins the eastern wing along the Drina with its western wing south of the Sava. If ever there is a war in Bosnia again, whoever gets Brčko wins: the RS needs it to survive intact, the Federation needs it to make RS independence impossible.
So protecting Brčko and preventing it from being “taken” by either the RS or the Federation should be a priority for the international community. The European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia has limited resources (1600 people “in theater,” whatever that means). Its mission is
…to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as Dayton/Paris Agreement).
It could pre-emptively begin to concentrate itself in Brčko (in addition to its near-Sarajevo headquarters), thereby providing a serious impediment to RS’s independence ambitions as well as to any pre-emptive move by the Bosniaks to prevent secession. Doing this would help to preserve the still integrated Brčko district and prevent it from fraying further.
A European move to strengthen its heretofore modest liaison and observation team in Brčko would demonstrate to all concerned–including the Americans–that EUFOR is serious and knows where Bosnia’s vulnerabilities lie.
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Avoiding a September Israel/Palestine train wreck
Doom and gloom over at Woodrow Wilson this morning: Shai Feldman and Aaron David Miller in particular foresee no prospect of agreement under current conditions. Train wreck is more likely, Feldman believes: what happens in New York will trigger youth demonstrations in Palestine. This will threaten the Palestinian establishment (Fatah especially) and force it into a more radical posture. Politics in both Palestine and Israel militate against a conflict-ending settlement. In the absence of some unexpected event, or act of unusual statesmanship, prospects are not good.
Nevertheless, Hussein Ibish suggests that there is some possibility of incremental progress in the fall at the General Assembly. Palestine will not become a member of the UN, because the U.S. will veto. What is important, according to Ibish, is that Palestinian progress in state-building be preserved and sustained. He believes there are real possibilities for avoiding a counter-productive clash at the UN. The Palestinians will not press a General Assembly resolution if negotiations are restarted, and they can accept something less than UN membership in order to back off.
Palestinian unity is not really on the horizon, Ibish suggests. The Hamas/Palestine Liberation Organization agreement is nothing more than an agreement to agree, but in fact there is still no agreement on anything important. They can’t even agree on who should be prime minister, much less on things more important than that, like how to deal with Israel.
Jackson Diehl suggests the U.S. has a good deal to lose from vetoing Palestinian membership in the UN. The Saudis have already warned that they will react. Aaron David Miller asks if there is a way to avoid Washington being put in this position? Is this sufficient reason for Obama to launch a grand initiative to solve the Israel/Palestine conflict? Or, Shai Feldman asks, is there something more modest that could be done, like adopting the Obama parameters (from his speech in May) as the basis for future negotiations? Aaron David Miller suggests this is a real possibility, with the Obama speech (including 1967 borders) as a common frame of reference.
But how close are they to a deal, Diehl asks? Shai Feldman thinks Netanyahu may be focused on demographic trends, which have been presented recently to the Israeli cabinet. The issue for him is not Palestine, whose population he envisages in a separate state, but rather the Arab population of Israel. This is the issue that may pull Netanyahu toward the center, as it has other Israeli leaders, and push him into serious negotiations.
Hussein Ibish thinks the sides are far apart on the issues. There will be no quick breakthrough. But once gaps start closing, they could close quickly. Nothing will happen without restarting the negotiations, so that is the way out of the September train wreck, even if Aaron David Miller suggests though there is nothing worse than another failed negotiation effort.
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An Arabic student and Middle East scholar
The Middle East Institute, where I studied Arabic through several levels to little avail, has kindly taken me on as one its scholars and this week published an interview covering my career and views on several ongoing conflicts. Here is what they published:
Q: Tell me a bit about your early career. What led you to government service? How did you become involved with peace-building initiatives and mediation?
A: It was all the girl’s fault. I first worked in international affairs at the United Nations, hired by the father of someone I dated in college. I had a scientific background through a Master’s degree in physical chemistry. He needed someone to deal with environmental issues — this was 1970 and we were really just beginning to think about such things. After I finished my doctorate at Princeton, the State Department hired me as a science and technology specialist, dealing mainly with nuclear and missile proliferation issues in Rome and Brasilia. I later worked energy issues and became Economic Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge’ d’affaires at the US Embassy in Rome.
I did not really get involved in peace-building and mediation until the Bosnian war, when I landed in Sarajevo in November 1994 in a plane hit by small arms fire during the landing. It’s been peace-building all the time since then.
Q: You are currently teaching at George Washington University, Georgetown University, and Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. After careers devoted to both government service and peace-building and conflict resolution initiatives, why did you turn to teaching?
A: It was always my intention to teach, and over the years I have enjoyed lecturing in many different settings. It was about time that I taught my own courses. I just got my student evaluations from last term — both gratifying and humbling. The classroom is an intellectual feast and challenge.
Q: On your blog (www.peacfare.net), you have written that the US must remember that “Afghanistan matters” and the country’s fate and success lies in what the US leaves behind. What is your vision of the Afghanistan that the United States needs to leave behind and how might the US reach this goal?
A: I said in the Washington Post last July that the [US] President [Barack Obama] should specify an end state and suggested: “an Afghanistan that provides no safe haven to terrorists, ensures equal rights to all its citizens and maintains its sovereignty with international help but without foreign troops on its territory.” He seems inclined, however, to stick with only the “no safe havens” part. I think that is hard to achieve without the other pieces.
Q: Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said that Afghans are starting to view NATO as an occupying force, warning that NATO air strikes could lead to a national uprising in Afghanistan. In your opinion, is there potential for a large movement within the country? If so, what might this look like and what implications would this have for US-Pakistani relations?
A: I guess even Karzai is inspired by the Arab Spring, but he should remember that the protests are against local leaders, not against the US.
That said, he is an elected president who clearly is at the limit of what he can tolerate, even if you discount some of what he says as political cover. Of course, there already is a movement against the US presence — we call it the Taliban. Fortunately, most Afghans don’t like it any better than they like our presence. The way to square this circle is with more capable Afghan forces doing most of the heavy lifting.
US-Pakistani relations raise their own complex set of issues, on which I confess I am a neophyte and hesitate to comment. I would just note that whatever we think we’ve been doing does not seem to be improving the situation.
Q: With regard to the situation in Iraq, you wrote on your blog that “the US, UN and Iraqis need to get their heads together sooner rather than later on how to handle Arab-Kurdish disputes, especially as resistance to a continuing US troop presence after the end of this year seems to be strengthening.” What are the core concerns in this debate?
A: Kurds want to extend the territory of Kurdistan to include areas that they claim are historically Kurdish (especially Kirkuk Governorate), guarantee themselves a substantial percentage of Iraq’s national oil revenue, and govern themselves with minimal reference to Baghdad, especially in exploration for and production of new oil discoveries. Arabs want to ensure that Iraq is not divided, either de facto or de jure, and that oil exploration
and production is planned and operated in accordance with a national framework. The Americans don’t want Arabs and Kurds to come to blows, something that seems less likely as they are making a lot more money by cooperating than they would otherwise. I think the UN can help them find a way of untying these knots.
Q: In a March Washington Post article, you discussed the possibility of the United States earning returns on the “enormous investment” in Iraq if it becomes a “reliable, high-volume supplier of oil to world markets” and “can defend itself with only a modicum of U.S. support,” while also holding “relatively free and fair elections that put in power people who reflect the wide diversity of the population and feel real pressure to deliver services efficiently.” What can the US and Iraq do to ensure that Iraq moves toward this ideal state of affairs?
A: I’ve just finished a short brief on this subject. Here are its conclusions:
The following US assistance would reduce a number of risks to Iraqi democracy and help to create the kind of pluralistic society that will generate its own stronger opposition and state institutions:
- support to the Parliament, constitutional court, elections commission, and related civil society organizations, especially for women;
- continued military education and training;
- UN assistance in resolution of Arab/Kurdish issues;
- encouragement to export oil and gas to the north and west;
- assistance for protection of religious and other minorities;
- cooperation in designing a plan to distribute some oil revenue to citizens.
Q: In spite of reports of a tentative agreement between northern and southern Sudan, many people are skeptical about the efficacy of negotiations and the implementation of the established terms, especially with the recent seizure of Abyei. Do you believe that peaceful solutions are possible in this situation, or do you think we will see continued violence in the area, especially as we approach the proposed July 9 date for southern independence?
A: At this point I think the South is so concerned with maintaining peace and stability in advance of independence that it will do its best to avoid further problems up to and even past July 9. Diplomatic recognition will be much easier if independence does not lead to war. Of course the North may not cooperate fully, but I do expect restraint from the South. That said, the seizure of Abyei is likely to cause serious problems in the future,
if there is no negotiated solution.
Q: Given your use of blogs, Twitter, and other social media outlets, what are your thoughts on the significance of Internet activism in the “Arab Spring”? Do you believe that social media sites can and/or will play a part in state-building projects and the “end game” in these national movements, or are they simply useful for the initial stages?
A: Social media seem a lot better suited to organizing a demonstration than establishing a supreme court. That said, I don’t think we’ve reached the limit of human ingenuity, and social media may well prove useful in overcoming the obvious democracy gap in many post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. But we should also note that media only enable you to do things you want to do — the movements generating change
use the media, not, I hope, the other way around.
Q: On your blog, you indicated that with regard to the current situations in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, it should be US policy “to listen to the locals, and follow their lead if we can figure out what it is” and support their efforts. How can the US support these protestors in their effort to promote democratic ideals, and not make the mistake of settling for a government for government’s sake and the perhaps false promise of stability?
A: It’s difficult. Embassies are not places that interface easily with 18-year-old protestors. And when they do, they may get in hot water with the host government. Many years ago in Italy, I wanted to invite a bright young activist to a meeting on alternative energy technologies. A name check turned up indications that he was a member of what the Italian government regarded as an extreme-left, vaguely anarchist political group. I somehow managed to convince the Embassy that it would be okay. He went on to study and work in the US and is today the distinguished head of an important industry association in Italy. Those are the risks you need to take if you really believe in democratic ideals.
I like the model we’ve developed: NGOs out hunting for talent and providing training, visits to the US, projects run by local people, without too much “Chief of Mission” control. You may not, however, find a lot of State Department officials who agree with me.
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Has Obama done right on Afghanistan?
Michael Cohen and I had a go-round on Bloggingheads about Afghanistan:
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Part 3: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper last week. I posted strengths and weaknesses here on Thursday and opportunities and threats yesterday. Here is the third installment: U.S. policy options and conclusions.
5. U.S. policy options
It is in the U.S. interest that Iraq remain on a democratic path and continue to move, even if slowly, in the democratic direction. Anything else would endanger Iraq’s unity and likely make at least a part of it into an Iranian satellite. How can the U.S. support democracy in Iraq?
A limited U.S. contingent, for training and counterterrorism, may remain in Iraq after the end of 2011. Whether the contingent is 10,000 or 20,000 does not make an enormous difference to maintenance of Iraq’s democracy (it may however make a big difference to the military balance with Iran). What really counts for democracy is that the U.S. continue to have a good rapport with the Iraqi officer corps, whose training in U.S. military schools is vital to maintaining the kind of professionalism and civilian oversight that will permit democratic evolution to continue.
Just as important will be continuing American rapport with the Iraqi people in general, with civil society organizations, and with key institutions of the Iraqi government, including not only the executive branch but also the Council of Representatives and the judiciary. This is normal diplomatic work, encouraged by the Strategic Framework agreement, but it needs to be on steroids in Iraq, where we will be trying to counterbalance not only the weight of Iraqi history and the weakness of its institutions but also the considerable weight of its non-democratic neighbors in order to protect an enormous American investment of lives and money.
Let me offer a couple of examples. I have been involved for years in supporting a dialogue among Iraq parliamentarians concerned with national reconciliation. They have now decided to institutionalize their efforts in a parliamentary caucus. We could walk away at the end of the year and say it is now all in Iraqi hands. But I hope we will continue to support this and other comparable efforts aimed at overcoming sectarian and ethnic divides.
Likewise, I hope we will continue to provide support to the Iraqi judicial system, especially the Supreme Court, as well as the election commission. The Court has played a critical role in strengthening the prime minister’s powers and will have to play an equally critical role if those powers are to be limited in meaningful ways. Likewise the election commission is a vital piece of democratic machinery that should not be left to fend for itself. Nor should we abandon women’s advocacy organizations.
Another example is the “disputed” territories. We could walk away at year’s end, saying it is time for the Iraqis to take over and maintain whatever confidence building measures are needed to keep the peace, especially in Kirkuk. Or we can remain engaged, along with the UN, to support the Iraqis in ensuring that they do not come to blows.
A fourth example concerns the role of religion in Iraq. We should be supporting those who are prepared to defend pluralism, which requires at least some distance between religion and the state. Increased protection of Christian and other minorities is important if Iraq is to remain democratic.
A fifth but important example arises from Iraq’s oil exports. Today the bulk leaves Iraq through the Gulf, where it runs an Iranian gauntlet. Only a small amount is exported to Turkey from Kurdistan. Fixing the “strategic” pipeline, which links northern and southern Iraq, would enable Iraq to export even oil produced in the south through the north. Getting the Iraqis to do this should be a top priority for the U.S. So, too, should be development of Iraqi gas for transport to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline.
Last but not least, automatic distribution of at least some oil revenue on a per capita basis would give citizens a more direct stake in Iraq’s success. This would begin to change the relationship between the citizen and the state, empowering the former and giving the latter more incentive to provide improved services. Current levels of state revenue are sufficient to provide payments to citizens, which would require a strict system of accountability and transparency.
None of these ideas in and of themselves will directly create a serious democratic opposition, which Iraq admittedly lacks and only Iraqis can form. But the following would reduce a number of risks to Iraqi democracy and help to create the kind of pluralistic society that will generate its own stronger opposition and state institutions:
- support to the parliament, constitutional court, elections commission and related civil society organizations, including for women’s issues;
- assistance to protection of religious and other minorities;
- continued U.S. military education and training;
- beefed up UN assistance in resolution of Arab/Kurdish issues;
- encouragement to export oil and gas to the north and west;
- cooperation in designing a plan to distribute some oil revenue to citizens.
6. Conclusion
Ultimately, whether Iraq continues to develop as a democracy or lapses into something more like its unfortunate past depends on the Iraqis themselves. They seem ambivalent. Some of them, at least on some days, appreciate the freedom they enjoy today, which far exceeds the norm in the Middle East as well as Iraq’s own past. They want more democracy, not less, as recent street protests have demonstrated.
Others, or maybe the same people on other days, are impatient with democratic processes and cry out for “action”—someone who will fix all that ails the country without bothering to consult, legislate or show respect for human rights. Any serious effort to restore autocracy in the whole country would be met with dramatic opposition, most likely organized on an ethnic or sectarian basis.
My guess is that the appreciation of democracy will prevail over the hope for a quick fix. We should certainly do what we can to try to help ensure that outcome.
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Part 2: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper yesterday. I posted strengths and weaknesses yesterday. Here is the second installment: opportunities and threats.
3. Opportunities
Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has moved a long way. Its constitution is now broadly accepted by all but a relative handful of Sunni insurgents. Its politics, while still organized mainly around sect and ethnicity, have developed in directions that often cross ethnic and sectarian boundaries at the national, provincial and local levels. There have been moments when it appeared that major politicians like Allawi—a secular Shiite who leads a virtually all-Sunni political coalition—or even Maliki might successfully form a more coherent, cross-sectarian national political movement.
The Arab Spring brought to Iraq a significant increase in citizen demands for improved services and a fuller realization of democratic ideals. Prime Minister Maliki announced he would not seek a third mandate even before the protests hit Iraq. Maliki also set a 100-day deadline, which expired June 9, for improved performance by his ministers. Little progress in either word or deed was evident, pro-government thugs and security forces have attacked pro-democracy demonstrators, and the government seems to have missed the opportunity to use discontent to accelerate its efforts to improve performance in service delivery and reduce corruption and other abuses.
The handling of its oil revenue is a critical issue for Iraq’s future as a democratic state. Oil production is expanding now that the government has entered into agreements with international oil companies. If oil prices remain around $100 per barrel, the Iraqi state will be collecting far more revenue than its current spending plans, or any reasonable future ones, require. Baghdad has many choices, but the fundamental one is this: will all the new revenue go to the state, to dispose of as politicians decide, or will at least some of it go to the Iraqi people, to use as they see fit?
If the latter, one can envisage an Iraq where the state has to meet the burden of convincing citizens to provide revenue, political parties consequently begin to organize around issues rather than sectarian or ethnic protection, civil society continues to develop even with reduced international support, and media become more independent. This would be a polycentric Iraq, one more closely resembling modern Western democracies and likely to align itself with the West against autocracy and Iranian efforts to establish hegemony in the Middle East.
Even if the Iraqi government holds on to the lion’s share of oil revenue, there remains the question of how wisely it is used and whether there will be transparency and accountability, not only for revenue but also for expenditures. The importance of reining in corruption is generally acknowledged in Iraq today. If Iraq can reduce the well-known abuses that plague its public sector, the country would become a far more attractive place for non-oil investment.
Iraq is geographically advantaged when it comes to exporting oil and gas. In the past, the lion’s share of oil has been exported through the Gulf. But some oil produced in Kurdistan is already exported to the north, and it is not beyond Iraq’s means to greatly expand its capacity to export economically to both the north and west, through Turkey, Syria or Jordan. Iraqi gas, still mostly undeveloped, could also go in these directions.
4. Threats
The most immediate threat to Iraq’s democratic development is resurgent violence that causes the state to crack down hard and in doing so returns the country to arbitrary and potentially autocratic rule. While it is difficult to imagine the restoration of the Republic of Fear, it is relatively easy to imagine de facto autocrats, or more likely small groups of kleptocrats, gaining control over their own ethnic or sectarian groups. This is already apparent in Kurdistan, and Maliki is gradually gaining hegemonic control over large parts of the Shia south. No single hegemon has yet emerged in Sunni-majority areas.
Prime Minister Maliki, who currently holds the defense, interior and national security portfolios, has done a great deal to strengthen his position over the past five years. He seems willing to go farther in this direction. He has assembled strong, extra-constitutional counter-terrorism and intelligence forces that report directly to him, he has installed army commanders on an interim basis without parliamentary approval, he has obtained a decision from the Supreme Court giving the executive branch some power over the central bank and election commission, and the Supreme Court has also ruled that only the executive can initiate “legislative projects.” This concentration of power generates fear that democratic development may be blocked.
Arab/Kurdish tensions could cause serious problems as well. Kurdish claims to the so-called “disputed territories” are being met with strong Arab resistance. While there are rational—even easy—solutions to many of the problems, Kirkuk city and province represent a seemingly intractable quandary. While there is a great deal to be gained economically from maintaining the peace, it is not yet clear that after American withdrawal at the end of the year Arabs and Kurds will be willing and able to maintain stability there as they work towards a settlement. Even if intentions are good, miscalculation is possible. Control over oil production and revenue are also sources of Kurdish/Arab tension, but they are increasingly viewed as parts of the solution as well.
Intra-Kurdish tensions have generated demonstrations and violence in recent months in Kurdistan, where a third party threatens the traditional duopoly. While the crackdown there would not appear to threaten Iraq, it could threaten the development of a more open and democratic Kurdistan.
Iran will seek to expand its influence as the Americans draw down. While they would have many legitimate ways of doing this in a democratic Iraq, they may prefer to avoid that paradigm on their borders. They may also want, once Ayatollah Sistani is out of the way, to see Iraq turn in a theocratic, or at least a more Islamist, direction. Iran will use Sadrist and other political and militia groups to counter Saudi and U.S. influence, encourage maximum U.S. withdrawal and ensure that Islamist Shiites remain dominant in Iraq.
Risks exist from other neighbors as well. The Syrian Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi one never got on well, but Damascus will not want a successful democracy on its borders. It may continue to allow the export of at least a minimal flow of insurgents into Iraq, especially if Iraq is less than fully supportive of the Syrian regime’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations. Saudi Arabia will seek to ensure that a democratic Iraq is one in which Sunnis have a voice larger than their numbers in the population.
Turkey will want to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan does its best to limit haven for the PKK or other insurgent Kurds, something it has achieved in recent years by establishing excellent economic and political relations with Erbil. But if Turkey were to return to military incursions into Iraq, that could undermine the development of a more democratic Kurdistan.
Kuwait has several outstanding issues with Baghdad: payment of reparations and the maritime border are among the most important. While there are reasons to expect these to be settled peacefully, politicians in Baghdad have a notable temptation to demagoguery when discussing Kuwait that could strengthen undemocratic forces in Iraq.
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