Tag: United States
While we weren’t watching
I admit it is hard to shift attention away from the consequences of Osama bin Laden’s death. America and Pakistan have embarked on a great debate. Sticking with the claim that they knew nothing about either OBL’s whereabouts or about the American operation to kill him, Pakistan’s government now has to explain its apparent incompetence. The Obama Administration has to explain why we should provide billions in assistance to a country that incompetent, or worse, one that harbored OBL.
These debates will go on for some time but is unlikely to change much. Congress will fulminate, but President Obama will not want to reduce aid, for fear of making the situation worse, and he will stick to his drawdown schedule in Afghanistan, starting small. Maybe in Pakistan the debate will have a broader impact: its military and intelligence services deserve a thorough airing out, though they are likely to survive with their prerequisites intact.
More interesting for the long term are the things that were, and were not, happening in the Arab world while we weren’t watching.
In Syria, the crackdown is proceeding, with hundreds more arrested in apparently indiscriminate security sweeps of major provincial centers of unrest. Bashar al Assad shows every sign of continuing. Aleppo and Damascus, Syria’s two biggest cities, remain relatively quiet. Friday will tell us whether the repression is succeeding.
In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has managed to slip out of an agreement negotiated with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia plus other oil-rich gulfies) to step down in 30 days. It is unclear whether the GCC, the political opposition or the protesters can do much at this point to resurrect the agreement, so it is likely both demonstrations and repression will continue.
In Libya, a kind of tottering stalemate has developed, with Gaddafi continuing to pound the western town of Misrata and to hold off the rebels in the east. Turkey has turned against the Colonel, but it is unclear whether that will make much difference. For all the much-vaunted rise of Turkey as a regional player, Ankara seems to have trouble making its weight felt with either Bashar al Assad or Muammar Gaddafi.
In Bahrain, repression is also in full swing, with the Americans seeming to bend to Saudi pressure not to object too strenuously. The regime there, in the past one of the milder ones, has been arresting doctors and nurses who provided medical treatment to protesters.
So it looks as if counter-revolution is succeeding for the moment across the region. It would be ironic if OBL’s death were to coincide with failure of the protests that showed promise of harnessing the discontents that used to be channeled into terrorism. Mr. Obama, where was that right side of history last time we saw it?
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Slippery slope, moral hazard and tall order
The big questions for me in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death are how it will affect America’s relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as the Arab Spring. I leave it to others to consider the impact on Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the terrorist enterprise in general, but I have to assume that the already weakened enterprise will suffer some further fragmentation and demoralization, even as it tries (and occasionally succeeds) to exact revenge.
Pakistan has got some explaining to do. It seems likely someone in the Pakistani government knew that Osama bin Laden was hiding out in a garrison town not far from Islamabad. There is no sign they tipped off the Americans, their putative allies. How come? How many other Al Qaeda principles harbored in Pakistan? And if no one in the Pakistani government knew that OBL was there, that would suggest true incompetence, no? So too would failure of the Pakistani government to intervene to block the American operation, if the Americans are telling the truth about not having informed the Pakistanis.
My best guess is that some Pakistanis (army? intelligence service?) knew where bin Laden was hiding. They likely also knew about the American operation, or at least knew something was “going down.” So they both hid him and allowed him to be captured. That sounds like the kind of duplicity we’ve witnessed for years, practiced to our detriment. Glad it was at someone else’s expense this time. The unexcited and even congratulatory reaction of official Pakistan to the news suggests this was the case.
So what do we do now? Is it business as usual with the Pakistanis? Or is it time for a shift toward a more demanding stance? Should we make military assistance conditional on greater cooperation? Surely someone in the Congress will push that idea. The problem is we would then have to be prepared carry out the threat, which would surely reduce military and intelligence cooperation further. That’s a slippery slope. Are we really reduced, as Madeleine Albright suggested on the PBS Newshour this evening, to “working with” the Pakistanis?
Maybe. With OBL out of the way, Al Qaeda is a lot less interesting to the Pakistanis, whose purposes inside Afghanistan might just as well be served by the Taliban without all the international complications OBL necessarily engendered. Besides, they’ve now got lots of homegrown jihadis to throw against India when the need arises. OBL wasn’t so good in that direction anyway.
What about Afghanistan? President Karzai, in his usual uncharitable mood, took the occasion of OBL’s death to suggest that the Americans and their allies have been wasting a lot of time and Afghan lives looking for him inside Afghanistan. Meanwhile, American senators were suggesting that OBL’s death might make it possible to draw down American troops in Afghanistan faster than currently contemplated, leaving Karzai to his fate. Of course the two ideas are compatible: Karzai would like less U.S. military effort, and so would the Americans.
This “beggar thy ally” approach on both sides does not bode well for continuing anything like the current level of effort in Afghanistan, where the Taliban are proving resilient and resurgent. I confess to temptation: maybe we should try withdrawing faster than had been anticipated, making it clear to Karzai that we are in part responding to his pressure. He pushes us out because he has been pretty sure we wouldn’t take him up on it. If he thought we might, he would be getting his act together faster.
This is what is called “moral hazard.” Leon Panetta, about to become Defense Secretary, was big on the idea of giving the Iraqis a quick time line for U.S. withdrawal when he served on the Iraq Study Group (I’m not breaking confidence–he said so publicly on many occasions). I wonder if he might adopt the same posture on Afghanistan. Of course David Petraeus, whether in his current job or his future one, is likely to be on the other side of that argument.
As for the Arab Spring, it seems to me that OBL’s death should reduce the fear some have of Al Qaeda exploitation of the demonstrations and weaken the argument that we need autocrats to repress international terrorists. Those arguments have not gained much traction with me these past few months, but I hope those who believe them will reexamine the situation and come to the obvious conclusion: the faster we can help get something like democratic regimes up and running in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria the better off we will be. I wish I could say the same about Bahrain, but it seems to have fallen hostage to the regional sectarian standoff. We’ve already got what most would consider a tall order.
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Let’s not make mistakes now
Relief, even pleasure, I understand, but there is a real risk of drawing incorrect conclusions from the killing of Osama bin Laden. Here are just of few of the mistakes that I already see being made:
- Triumphalism. This is not an American triumph of historic proportions. It is the culmination of 10 years of assiduous intelligence work that proves how really difficult it is to find an individual, though once you’ve found him killing is relatively easy.
- Justice. I might regard his death as just, but this is not justice, as the President claimed. Justice requires a process, even in a case as apparently justified as this one.
- Victory in the war on terror. Obviously there is the real potential for terror to continue and even escalate. Just as important: terror is a means, like military force. Victory is when ends triumph, not means: democracy over totalitarianism, for example. “War on terror” is the wrong framing, as we say in the conflict management business.
- Pakistan was cooperating with al Qaeda, or on the contrary deserves credit. We can’t be sure of either, yet. But they certainly have some explaining to do, since bin Laden was “hiding” near Islamabad in a military-oriented community. President Obama suggested that their intelligence cooperation was helpful, but it is not clear what that means.
- Pakistan did or did not know about the operation. I find that it hard to believe that Pakistan did not know, but if they didn’t it tells us something about their military and intelligence capabilities. More than likely they were told something was happening and to keep out of the way, but they may not have been told exactly what.
My son, Adam Serwer at the American Prospect, reminds on Twitter that I predicted some time ago that bin Laden would not be found in a cave, or in a hole like Saddam Hussein, but rather in a luxury villa. I got that right.
Now it is important to restrain ourselves and treat this event as the death of a mass murderer whose minions continue to threaten Muslims and non-Muslims alike. We need to stay grounded and figure out, better than we have for the past ten years, what will reduce the risks we face. Maybe it is less war–on terror, or in Iraq and Afghanistan–and more assiduous intelligence work. Let’s not make mistakes now.
PS: I’d like to agree with Lawrence Wright, who says “Democracy and civil society are the cure for the chronic misery of Muslim countries that has fed the rise of Islamic extremism.” But the fact is that Pakistan has quite a bit of democracy and civil society. Islamic extremism, which once had little purchase there, is definitely on the rise. Certainly it is true that the Arab Spring offers an alternative narrative to young Muslims, but societies in transition to democracy are notoriously prone to war and other pathologies. I don’t think we can disband the special forces and rely on civil society to restrain extremism.
PPS: Far worse is Jennifer Rubin, whose celebratory triumphalism and crediting of harsh interrogation techniques (with no evidence) seems calculated to appeal to her public’s worst instincts while offending the rest of the world as much as possible. I needn’t even mention her crediting of George W. Bush, whose efforts she says were far more important than you know whose.
PPPS: For those, like me, who did not wait up for the official announcement last night:
PPPPS: See also http://yfrog.com/gzlctaoj
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I don’t get it
Why is the Obama Administration so hesitant about supporting the demonstrations in Syria?
Yesterday’s UN Human Rights Council resolution on Syria was good: it clearly and unequivocally condemned the mistreatment and killing of protesters. The Administration understands the difference between right and wrong in this matter. Russia and China opposed the resolution, which signals why the UN Security Council is having such a hard time making a statement. I can’t really fault the Administration for that, and I imagine Susan Rice is working hard to get around their opposition.
But why does the Administration impose sanctions targeted on just three Syrian officials? Why does the President not speak out more forcefully? What more would Bashar al Assad have to do to get on the wrong side of history? Are 400 deaths not enough?
Talking to a U.S. government official yesterday, I got some hints: the Administration is worried about sectarian chaos that might spread to Iraq, it wants to maintain stability in Syria’s mutually hostile but nonviolent relationship with Israel, it has its hands full with Libya (not to mention Yemen and Bahrain) so doesn’t want another problem. It is trying hard not to raise expectations among the Syrian protesters that will likely be disappointed. It is especially important that the demonstrators understand that no military intervention is going to happen, so they had better keep their protests nonviolent.
All of that is fine, but it is creating a moral hazard on the other side: Bashar al Assad feels he can do as he pleases because no one will really try to stop him. He is likely also hinting that if only left in place he’ll be more forthcoming with Israel once things calm down.
It is hard for me to credit this hint, as there have been so many disappointments in the past. Nothing about Bashar’s past behavior suggests that he is a true reformer, or a leader capable of an historical advance in relations with Israel. Those who believe he is–Senator John Kerry most explicitly among them–have a burden of proof that has not been met.
The crackdown in Syria has been so pervasive and effective that there are few good first-hand accounts and interviews with protesters. This piece from the New York Review of Books is the best I’ve seen. I’ve also confirmed independently the report therein that at Deraa, an epicenter for the protests, the fourth division of the Syrian Army fired on the fifth, because of its refusal to fire on the demonstrators. The fourth is an elite group led by Bashar’s brother while the fifth is mainly conscripts, like most of the army. But it will take more than an incident or two to bring the security forces around to the realization that Bashar is leading the country in the wrong direction.
The NYRB piece cites these as the protesters’ immediate demands:
the lifting of emergency law; the release of political prisoners; the right to form new political parties and to protest peacefully; the right of freedom of speech and of the media; an end to corruption; permission to exiled dissidents to return to Syria; and the bringing to justice of those responsible for killing, arresting or torturing protesters and political opponents.
Longer-term goals are also being prepared. They may not be calling consistently for the end of the regime, but the regime is certainly making it clear that the objectives sought are incompatible with the continuation of Ba’athist rule.
Which side is history on?
PS: I hope on this guy’s side:
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You make peace with your enemies
News of Hamas/Fatah rapproachement–that’s diplomatese for kissing and making up–has agitated Israel and the United States, which found it more convenient to deal with divided Palestinians and pursue peace only with the Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank. Washington and Tel Aviv say Hamas, which controls Gaza, is a terrorist organization that targets Israeli civilians and is therefore not a legitimate negotiating partner.
This is odd. You make peace with your enemies. Israel is well within its rights to defend against Hamas and otherr attacks, including by attacking Gaza (as it has repeatedly). But to refuse to negotiate with the people doing the most harm condemns Israel to perpetual war. And to expect the Palestinians to remain divided so that Israel can deal with the ones it likes and not with the ones it doesn’t like is unrealistic.
The vital question is whether there is any hope for peace with Hamas. Opinions differ on this important issue. A former head of the Mossad and national security advisor to Ariel Sharon suggests it is worth a try. Three years ago most Israelis agreed. Many others say no. Hamas says peace talks with Israel are not on the agenda of the interim government it is to form with Fatah in preparation for Palestinian elections.
So Israel and the United States have something like eight months to think about this issue. Unfortunately, Israel will do so with a government that seems not to want peace on terms that are even remotely acceptable to the Palestinians. We’ll hear more about this side of things directly from Prime Minister Netanyahu when he addresses the U.S. Congress next month. The Americans have had little luck with the so-called Middle East peace process so far. Will they, and the Israelis, be prepared to talk with a new, post-election Palestinian Authority that will likely include Hamas participation in some form? And will Hamas be prepared to talk with Israel and the United States?
The flux in the Arab world makes it really very difficult to imagine the conditions under which such decisions will be made eight months hence. Let’s hope they improve the likelihood of a serious peace process.
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Preventing political violence
My problem with the second of my lunch time events yesterday at Brookings, “Defusing the Bomb: Reversing the Process of Radicalization and Preventing Political Violence,” was not so much what was said but the need to continue saying it. The study, undertaken for the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies by the Soufan Group (as in Ali Soufan, formerly of the FBI), looked at strategic counter-terrorism approaches in France, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Singapore and Great Britain.
While none of the programs “had systematic ‘outcome’ data that could be used to evaluate them,” the takeaway was clear enough: comprehensive (psychological, social, religious) community-based approaches that rely on former militants work better than law enforcement alone, especially if the law enforcement is not of the community policing variety. The French approach was the exemplar in this study.
Why? Because it is not really about theology or ideology. Recruitment is about identity and relies for its effectiveness on finding (mostly) young people who feel stereotyped, marginalized, misunderstood and unfairly stigmatized. Countering this requires offering a new narrative that enables people to re-engage their critical thinking skills and disengage from a narrative that they have found highly compelling in the past.
The process of recruitment is similar to recruitment into gangs in the U.S.–no one yesterday was parepared to say exactly how it differs. Of course we have largely failed to prevent gang recruitment, and the prospects for preventing radicalization don’t seem much better, at least in the U.S. Singapore has powers to detain and treat that don’t exist here, and it is difficult, especially at the local level, for the U.S. to mobilize the kind of comprehensive approach that even the UK and Indonesia are able to mount. Particularly notable in Indonesia is the individual and respectful treatment of detainees, which the Indonesians believe elicits more and more reliable intelligence information.
That said, it seems to me more than time that we start to do what Soufan Group, Quilliam Foundation and others suggest: engage in a comprehensive way, preferably using at least in part former radicals, with people and communities for whom political violence is a way of asserting identity with a bang. This will not be easy either at home or abroad, but it is what is needed to reduce a threat against which military force has proven ineffective and law enforcement is essential but not sufficient.
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