Tag: United States

What good is the European Union?

Yesterday afternoon SAIS hosted a discussion of “Europe, Italy and the Libya” crisis to celebrate the publication of Federiga Bindi’s Italy and the European Union.  I couldn’t stay the whole time–I had to go teach my post-conflict reconstruction seminar–but I’ll try to give a sense of the hour and a quarter of the proceedings that I was able to attend.

The question on my mind, and I suppose on the minds of many of the Americans in the room, was “what good is the European Union?”  When we need help from it, can we get it?  And to what extent does it even exist on an issue like Libya, where disarray has been more apparent than the Common European Security and Defense Policy?  Will the EU be prepared to take over the post-conflict reconstruction once the war is over?  No one will be surprised I trust that the answers are uniformly gloomy.

I confess that the three Italian presenters are people I know and respect, as is Marta Dassu’, who chaired.  The gloom I felt should not really be blamed on them–they are more observers than participants.

Roberto Toscano, former Italian Ambassador in Tehran now at the Wilson Center, led off noting that the heady days when we were talking with abandon about “revolution” are already over.  In Egypt, the Army and at least part of the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be conspiring to chill revolutionary fervor while in Libya we really don’t know who the rebels are.  The outcomes there could be partition, or a failed state.  Contradictions and double standards hound the intervention there.  There are questions also about Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.  Our interests in these places often conflict with our principles. Maybe we went too far with humanitarian intervention in Libya, and also in Ivory Coast.  Can we say we are protecting civilians and then use military means that necessarily kill some of them?

I was relieved when Roberto finally got around to mentioning the positive part:  people who have been subjects are demanding their rights as citizens, things are beginning to change even if we are nowhere near the end of the transition process.  And then the inevitable but obvious:  the EU will find this a difficult challenge to meet and will require a major military, political and security effort.

Erik Jones of the SAIS center in Bologna, in response to a query from Marta, denied that the U.S. financial crunch would affect the American effort–after all, Defense is the one department of the government still getting an increase, and the Iraq and Afghanistan war expenditures are not included in the budget deal.  U.S. leadership, he went on to note, will still be needed.  There is a broad political consensus in the U.S. in support of U.S. global leadership, but President Obama has been wise to seek contributions from others.  In focusing on that, though, he failed to do all that was needed to line up domestic support for the Libya operation.

The key issues for the U.S. have to do with the timing of when it gets involved, and when it gets out.  It is now out of the direct combat operations but continues to provide unique capabilities like intelligence and refueling, even including close air support in some instances.  One of the contradictions in U.S. policy is that it asks the Europeans not to duplicate U.S. capabilities, but then the U.S. is stuck doing things that the Europeans can’t do. The Americans really don’t care who does what among the allies, so long as someone picks up a good chunk of the burden.  The Europeans though are preoccupied with who does what–whether it is the French or British, the EU or the member states.

The big problem now is when to declare victory.  This is especially important to the Europeans, since what frightens them most is the prospect of emigration from North Africa.  The longer the war goes on, the more likely that problem will grow.  Maybe regime change isn’t necessary?

Federiga Bindi noted that the public discourse in Italy, which for many years shied away from discussion of the national interest because it was associated with the Fascists, now allows for the discussion, but without firm conclusions to date.  Italy’s history in Libya is fraught with problems, from the time of the 1911 occupation, through the colonial period, to Gaddafi’s accession to power and expulsion of the Italians.  Italy depends on Libya today for important slices of oil and gas supplies and would have preferred a negotiated solution.  But that won’t work now, and the Foreign Minister at least (but perhaps not the Prime Minister) is betting on the Benghazi authorities, whom Rome has now recognized.

Italian interests are much more complex than French and British interests.  Essentially Paris and London had nothing to lose by intervening, Federiga thought, while the EU has remained largely silent and Turkey is using this and other developments as a means of emerging as a regional power.

Francesco Olivieri, who now represents the Italian electrical company ENEL in Washington but is a thoroughly  experienced Italian diplomat, doubted that oil and gas had much to do with the intervention.  Libyan exports at 1.6 million barrels per day were not very important during the recession, the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear crisis has sharply reduced Japanese demand, and OPEC has increased production to make up in part for the shortfall.  Whatever the outcome of the Libya crisis, its oil and gas will reach the market, as it did under Gaddafi.

One real issue, Francesco suggested, was what happens to the $60 billion dollars per year, more or less, that flows to Tripoli in payment for its oil and gas.  This could be used for bad purposes if the wrong kind of regime ends up in power.  A second big issue is the problem of refugees–so far the numbers are manageable, but the EU should recognize that it has a common purpose in making sure it stays that way.

European friends:  I appeal to you to stop worrying about whether we should have intervened or not, about why the French went first and the British soon thereafter (with the Germans ducking out), about whether oil and gas were the real issue (or not), about Italy’s complicated relationship with Tripoli, about our interests and our values.  This is all water under the bridge.

The issue now is to make this “humanitarian intervention” come out right.  There are two things required for that:  get Gaddafi and his family out of there (I suspect the Americans, as Hillary Clinton has been implying, are still taking the lead on that, likely with help from the Turks) and begin planning for the post-war stabilization and reconstruction.  That is something the EU can really help with, as it has lots of experience in many difficult places.

 

 

 

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Is it time to negotiate with Qaddafi?

Theatlantic.com published this piece of mine this morning:

Apr 11 2011, 9:50 AM ET

It’s time to look for a way to end the war in Libya, but dealing with the regime won’t be easy

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Louafi Larbi/Reuters

With self-appointed African Union mediators shuttling between Tripoli and Benghazi meetings with the Libyan government and rebel leaderships to try and end the war, the important question is whether the international community should be negotiating with the Qaddafis. The answer depends on what we are negotiating about and how well prepared we are to pursue our shared interests.

The subject of the negotiations must begin with the departure of Muammar Qaddafi and the rest of his family from Libya. Anything less than that would create a difficult fractious post-war situation in Libya, with a de facto division of territory between Qaddafi-held west and rebel-held east, and with Qaddafi continuing to control Tripoli. If, as former Congressman Curt Weldon proposed, Muammar were to step aside but his son Saif al Islam continued to play a role in the transitional structures, the probability of a successful transition would likewise be reduced to nearly zero.

The Qaddafi family will not give up power in Libya so long as it remains physically present. It has its own armed forces as well as security agents and controls the vast funds derived from Libyan oil exports over the past 42 years. Tens of billions squirreled away in U.S. banks have been frozen, but we can be certain more billions remain unfrozen elsewhere, or stowed in gold ingots in Tripoli. It is not even clear what “step aside” would mean for Muammar, since he has no official position in a Libyan state.

Since Qaddafi’s power does not depend on his position in the Libyan state, he and his sons could well maintain their military and political power even if they were to accept retirement to a desert tent. In any case, Saif al Islam, who was educated at the London School of Economics-educated and has spent much of his life enjoying Europe’s most luxurious hotel, would be unlikely to accept such a life out of power. Libya is quite unlike Egypt in this respect. Hosni Mubarak’s retirement to Sharm el Sheikh was acceptable to the protesters not only because Sharm is far from the maddening crowd but also because the army seemed prepared to guarantee the political transition. It was accepted by the protesters as loyal to the Egyptian state, not to Hosni Mubarak.

Even in Egypt, there are now profound doubts about what the army is up to. Mubarak’s return to the public sphere with a statement flatly denying corruption and the army’s harsh treatment of protesters in Tahrir square the last few days have left many wondering whether the counterrevolution is in full swing. But Libya has no army loyal to the Libyan state. This lack of institutional framework (no constitution, few ministries, no chief of state, not even a real rubber stamp parliament) would make the transition in Libya so problematic.

The ongoing violence contributes to this uncertainty as well. Under violent attack from security forces, the opponents of Qaddafi long ago gave up nonviolent protests for an ill-prepared military assault on his regime. Qaddafi has redoubled his efforts, ensuring that there will be many dead on both sides. Accountability for the violence will not come quickly, but it will probably not come at all if Qaddafi and family are allowed to remain in the country. Most Libyans simply won’t stop resisting if they remain.

So if we are negotiating about Qaddafi and his family departing from Libya, then how well prepared are we to pursue that objective?

Leverage in negotiations depends on what other options you have, should the negotiations fail. In this case, our best alternative to a negotiated solution appears to be to continue fighting. That is not a very good option. NATO will have increased difficulty finding legitimate targets, as Qaddafi’s forces park their heavy armor near schools and mosques and disguise their remaining vehicles to look as much like rebel vehicles as possible. Enthusiasm for the continued military effort is likely to fade. Neither the French nor the British — the leading forces striking Libya — will want to go on ad infinitum, and some of the others participating will likely want to quit even earlier.

Qaddafi knows all this. Like us, his best alternative is also to continue fighting. No one should be fooled by Saif al Islam’s London School of Economics degree or his smooth talk about transition to democracy. Qaddafi and his family give every indication of wanting to preserve their own power. It is hard to know for how long they can go on without running out of money, troops, or cronies, several of whom have already defected. But we can be certain that Muammar regards the issue as one of life or death and will therefore fight on until he finds a way out that enables him and his family to survive.

That is what we may very well need to put on offer: a way out, but one that will only be available if Qaddafi and family to take advantage of it soon. That is what the five AU “mediators” could usefully offer: a comfortable retirement, available only for a short time, in Mauritania, Mali, Congo, Uganda or South Africa. Of these, only Mauritania is not a state party to the International Criminal Court, which may eventually want to prosecute. Venezuela is another possibility, but it is also a state party to the ICC, and the Americans are unlikely to welcome Qaddafi as a resident of the Western Hemisphere. For those who worry that the ICC might never get hold of Qaddafi, remember Charles Taylor, who was allowed to retire to Nigeria only to later be captured and put on trial.

It appears doubtful that the AU delegation will take the kind of hard line required to get Qaddafi to leave Libya. It is much more likely that it will come back with a vague, wishy-washy offer from Qaddafi that sounds good on paper but enables him and his sons to remain in Tripoli making all sorts of trouble and preventing transition to a new, more representative regime. We should not be tempted. Compromised conclusions to NATO air wars in Bosnia and in Kosovo have proven frighteningly difficult and expensive to implement. Nor should we be tempted to put boots on the ground, as we know from Iraq and Afghanistan how painful that can be.

A satisfactory outcome in Libya will be one that vindicates Responsibility to Protect and allows the Americans to stand aside from the post-war reconstruction and leave it to the Europeans, whose energy interests give them motive and means to be helpful to the New Libya.

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Sudan on the eve of divorce, velvet or not

The Middle East Institute and the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique are cosponsoring a conference today on “Protracted Displacement Challenges Facing Sudan:  What Scope for EU-US Cooperation.”  They wisely ignored their title for the first session and focused instead on the broader political and military dimensions of the situation a few months before Southern Sudan becomes a separate state on July 9.  I’ll try to give a quick summary of a rich set of presentations.

Jan Pronk, former Dutch Minister for International Assistance and former UN Envoy to Sudan,  offered 10 lessons from his experience:

  • Humanitarian assistance and military intervention are not sufficient; a political strategy is needed to prevent conflict.
  • The political strategy needs to be timely, early enough in the game to avoid escalation and establishment of facts on the ground that will be impossible to reverse.
  • The international community needs the political capacity to intervene early based on a UN Security Council mandate, but without having to go through UNSC procedures each time–this would mean a committee mandated by the UNSC but under the authority of the Secretary General.
  • Nothing works unless there is a common approach based on consensus that allows joint action, avoids sending conflicting signals and eliminates the possibility of divisive tactics used by the host country.
  • Such a comprehensive approach may have to be implemented step by step, but within an overall political framework.
  • We may have to occasionally step back and reevaluate, as we should have done after the Darfur Peace Agreeement, in order to avoid building our approach on a basis that is the wrong one.
  • Each UN organization has its own board, with even the same governments saying different things in different organizations; we need to unify the UN approach under a single person who provides common transport, communications, intelligence and security.
  • This requires that UN organizations delegate coordination to the field, where it is done best.
  • The referendum decision in Sudan needs to be implemented peacefully, but we cannot allow Khartoum to sell Southern Sudan independence as a substitute for Darfur cooperation.
  • The military efforts in Ivory Coast and Libya are important because they mean force is being used to protect civilians, but we need to think ahead, avoid collateral damage and put forward a political strategy that opens a back door for the “villains” to depart.

Former US Sudan Envoy Andrew Natsios offered 5:

  • Southern Sudan will be able to gain independence because it has armed itself well, but the North will continue to try to destabilize the South.  Darfur fighting has been fed by Libya, which is supporting the JEM.
  • Two new states will emerge July 9: the North will be majority Arab, the South will be a state with a big army 150,000 strong.
  • The government in Khartoum is weak and nervous, for good reasons.  Turabi is still dangerous and the North faces continuing problems in Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Beja and Darfur.  President Bashir is frightened even of his own army, which is largely kept out of Khartoum to prevent a coup (there are only 5000 soldiers in the capital).  The secret police, not the army, sustains the regime.
  • A unified approach among donors is obviously desirable, but difficult because of legal differences among the Europeans, Canadians and Americans.
  • There is still a need for a political settlement concerning the 500,000-1,000,000 Southerners still in the North, but large-scale conflict is unlikely in July because both North and South know it would disrupt the oil flow and bankrupt both their governments, something neither can afford to see.

Rosalind Marsden, EU Representative for Sudan:

  • The EU is trying to develop a comprehensive approach to Southern Sudan and is also looking at the North.
  • EU assistance to the referendum commission, and monitoring of the referendum, was successful.
  • There is a need to make arrangements still for the Southerners in the North and the Northerners in the South.
  • President Mbeki’s African Union effort is looking at these issues and others, but the time is short before July 9.
  • The positions on Abyei have hardened, agreements have not been implemented, half the population of Abyei town has left, and everyone is waiting for Mbeki’s proposals.
  • There are also delays and difficulties with the popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, which are not likely to be completed before July 9.
  • For Darfur, the main game is the Doha negotiations, where the stakeholders conference is the next important step, but Khartoum’s intention of holding a Darfur referendum has complicated matters.
  • Insecurity is rising in Darfur, with the government conducting military operations and JEM under pressure from developments in Libya.
  • The US and EU need to speak with one voice, as they did on the referendum.  For this, a common assessment and agreement on benchmarks would help.  The Southern Sudan 3-year development plan, now being worked in Juba, will be an enormous step forward.

Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator at AID, suggested:

  • Good donor coordination and contingency planning helped avoid problems at the time of the referendum, with UN DPKO helping to focus international efforts as well as cooperation with both North and South.
  • The big issues are still out there:  oil revenue, citizenship, currency, borders are unsettled.
  • The South is absorbing 320,000 returnees, many of whom are urbanized, into a society that is mostly rural, largely illiterate , lacking in infrastructure and with a high rate of infant mortality.
  • AID is focused on mitigating conflict, combating corruption, promoting economic growth (mainly via agriculture) and building the capacity of the Southern Sudan government to provide essential services.
  • The effort is shifting from relief to development, including urban planning, land distribution, small business and youth.
  • The next big issues will come from governance.

It would be hard to be optimistic based on this event, but at least officials are thinking hard and ahead about the requirements.  And it is comforting to know that there are such capable people still engaged.

But what they need in Juba is a stronger architecture for the international assistance effort, and stronger links to the host country’s own plans.  As things stand, conditionalities are never met because the Southern Sudanese can always donor shop elsewhere.  Nothing like the pillar structure in Kosovo or even the High Representative in Bosnia exists in Southern Sudan.  Even the UN effort is fragmented.  Donors need to get together on a common approach shared by the Southern Sudanese.

 

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Riyadh and Washington try to get it together

With King Abdullah back in the saddle throne since late February, after months abroad for medical treatment, it seems to me that Saudi diplomacy has gone into relative overdrive.  Their biggest move was troops into Bahrain, to free up the Bahraini security forces to beat up demonstrators, but now they appear to be taking an active role in arranging for the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh from his post, if not from the country. I imagine they’ve decided now he is more liability than asset, something most Yemenis seem to have concluded weeks ago.

The Americans are also in overdrive, with Defense Secretary Gates and National Security Adviser Donilon wearing out the flying carpet to Riyadh.  This is likely in part damage limitation–the Saudis aren’t happy to see the Americans plumping for transition in the democratic direction in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain.  It must be difficult to convince them that somehow we’ll manage to stop the process before it gets to the Kingdom, which has largely pacified its own population and cracks down hard when soft power fails to do the job.

But it looks as if there may be more on the agenda:  the Iranian challenge looms large for both Washington and Riyadh, and both have taken to implying that the Iranians are up to no good in Bahrain, though there is little evidence that the protests were fueled by Tehran.  This I suppose is where the Saudis would like the Americans to draw the line:  democracy is good, but not if it threatens to bring a Shia majority into power (as it did of course in Iraq, and the Saudis were not pleased).

This leaves Libya and Syria.  I see no real unhappiness coming from the Saudis about what is going on in Libya, and it is difficult to imagine that the United Arab Emirates would lend its air force to the cause if the Saudis were not prepared to go along.  Gaddafi is not a Saudi kind of guy, and of course there is no Shia threat there.  Syria is harder to read:  are the Saudis backing Bashar al Assad, who runs an Alawi (sort of Shia) regime, or not?  Riyadh and Damascus have in the past competed with him for influence in Lebanon.  Would the Saudis prefer a Sunni regime in Damascus?  Or does the preference for stability prevail?  So far, the latter.

Saudi influence is likely one of the reasons the Americans haven’t been as welcoming of the protesters in Syria as might have been expected.  Both Washington and Riyadh are worried about chaos in Syria, and how that might affect Iraq and Jordan.  This is odd, of course, since Damascus is allied with Tehran and Bashar al Assad has not hesitated to make trouble for the Americans in both Iraq and Lebanon.  I wonder if things started really coming apart in Damascus whether the Saudis would reconsider.

Now if you’ve got a headache from all this diplomatic mumbo jumbo, I’m not surprised.  But the world really is complicated, the Middle East more than most other regions.  And if something happens in Saudi Arabia to disrupt its giant oil production and exports, that $4 gasoline is going to start looking cheap.

 

 

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What is Afghanistan good for?

Americans, weary of the war in Afghanistan, are doubting that anything good can come of it, and wondering if it will ever be over.  Two recent reports reminded me of what Afghanistan is good for.

The first is  “Afghanistan’s Drug Career: Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug Economy” from the Afghanistan Analysts’ Network (AAN).  The second, “Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building” from the Silk Road Studies Program here at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, is about the importance of transit routes across Afghanistan and their potential to contribute to building peace there.

Like it or not, Afghanistan is remarkably good for the production of opium poppy.  The AAN report is interesting on the political economy of the drug trade, which implicates President Karzai and other “political upperworld” figures in protecting and profiting from it.  But it is remarkably tame in its recommendations.  Twenty or thirty years will be required, it says, for its “holistic” approach to work.  The initial steps recommended are modest adjustments of current policies:  eradication should be applied to all poppy fields in a given district, interdiction should target bigger traders, and alternative livelihoods should encompass rural development in general and not just crop substitution.  I suppose any long journey starts with just a few steps, but it is hard for me to picture that these recommendations will really carry us through several decades.

More interesting is S. Frederick Starr’s enthusiastic endorsement of transportation as the key to economic development in Afghanistan:

The reopening [of] all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millenium. It was unintended, unrecognized, and, by most Americans, unacknowledged, even thought they paid for it with the lives of loved ones and with hard-earned tax money. Nonetheless, this development offers the most promising solution to the U.S.’ present strategic dilemma and the key to possible success in Afghanistan and the region….Whatever its larger geopolitical significance, the reopening of continental transport and trade to, from, and across Afghanistan is the single most important determinant of the future of Afghanistan itself….This is not a scheme devised by GS-12 bureaucrats in Foggy Bottom for some generic distant land. It is the logic of Afghanistan itself and has been validated by the experience of 3000 years.

So who stands in opposition to 3000 years of experience? According to Starr,

At a series of meetings held throughout the autumn of 2010 representatives of the State Department were, to say the least, reserved about a strategy based on the opening of transport corridors, presumably out of concern that it might be taken as an alternative to the development of agriculture or the exploitation of mineral resources rather than the essential and unavoidable measure for achieving them.

Starr goes on to suggest that resistance is softening, and there is enthusiasm in military and some other circles.  But the high-level support he sought has not yet emerged.  That is what is needed to drive what Starr suggests: a regional Coordinating Council on Continental Transport and Trade to pursue the strategy of reopening the corridors of transport and trade that war has done much to clog in recent decades.

Of course when it comes to cross-border trade, nothing moves more expeditiously than drugs.  That is the trick here:  helping the Afghans to create a border regime that will allow legitimate trade and block the illegitimate version.  It will not be easy–in fact, it requires just the kind of state Afghanistan lacks, and that the AAN report suggests will be difficult to construct because of the interaction of the drug economy with top levels of the Karzai government.  We’d all like to avoid the daunting task of state-building in Afghanistan, but few good things can happen if we don’t embrace the requirement.

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Why it’s time to negotiate with the Taliban

This went up on theatlantic.com this morning:

By Daniel Serwer

Apr 7 2011, 7:00 AM ET

Peace talks won’t be easy, and may be likely to fail, but they’re worth the risk

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Delegates of an Afghan peace jirga in Kabul discuss negotiating with the Taliban. By Ahmad Masood / Reuters

News that the U.S. may negotiate with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan raises many questions, the most important of which is, should we, or shouldn’t we? That question has generated a small cyberspace library of its own in recent weeks, with the consensus so far in favor. It is widely believed that there are at least informal official talks about talks going on behind closed doors. But should we harbor any continuing doubts? And what can we expect from negotiations?

The arguments in favor are often based on the explicit proposition that there is no military solution in Afghanistan, with the implicit understanding that the U.S. will want to get out as soon after 2014 — the date fixed by NATO for turnover of security responsibilities to the Afghan government — as possible. If we really believe there is no military solution, why bother fighting to what conflict management experts call a “mutually hurting stalemate,” a condition in which neither side can improve its position by further military effort? If we want to get out, why not make the arrangements now rather than waiting for what we believe to be inevitable? Much blood and treasure can be saved and little of value lost.

This line of thinking has been bolstered recently by research suggesting that at least some of the Taliban can be divided from Al Qaeda. The Taliban is an Afghan movement with national ambitions to establish an Islamic state. Al Qaeda has much broader international goals that go far beyond Afghanistan, to recreating a supra-national caliphate encompassing the entire Muslim world, in some interpretations the entire globe. These two objectives are not only different; they are incompatible. Maybe we can keep Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, even if we agree to let the Taliban back in.

<blockquote> A skilled negotiator will discover more in two days of conversation with an adversary than all the intelligence we’ve collected so far in ten years of war</blockquote>

However, the Taliban have now been fighting for a generation without serious signs of fatigue, at least until recently, and may believe they can get what they want by fighting on. If the Taliban feel they are winning, they will have little incentive to negotiate. They may also doubt that the U.S. is really prepared to leave Afghanistan to the Afghans, at least with respect to Al Qaeda. President Karzai’s talk about permanent U.S. bases will have given them doubts as well.

There are other points of potentially irreducible contention. The Taliban, who are not experienced democrats and lack confidence in democratic processes, would naturally expect a guarantee of a share in political power, both at the local level and in Kabul. Many Afghan women, who were not even allowed to go to school under their rule, could suffer dearly under a strong Taliban role in governance. Nor would the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and other minorities who fought against and defeated the Taliban be likely to welcome their return.

Many advocates of negotiations therefore want to make the talks “inclusive” — bringing in not only top government officials but also civil society (especially women’s organizations) as well as local leaders. After all, the Karzai government has little real control of rural areas, and many of the more contentious issues involve local disputes that will need to be settled by local leaders if the Taliban are going to reintegrate peacefully. As one advocate put it, negotiations must be run “by, with and through the Afghan people” in order to work.

But is forging a peace deal “by, with and through” Afghan leaders really possible? A multi-faceted, multi-level peace process that includes women and minorities may be far more than the Karzai government is able to manage. Most Kabul officials lack the capability even to identify, much less understand or work to solve, local problems. If they did, they might have already won the war. And how much concern has Karzai shown for the plight of Afghan women? He has only appointed a sprinkling of women and civil society types in the High Peace Council, assigned to deal with the Taliban. Most of the members are male, with a heavy representation of warlords. If Karzai and company are beyond redemption, negotiations are unlikely to save them.

Even though a successful deal remains unlikely, negotiations may still be worthwhile. The Pentagon plans to spend about $120 billion on the war in 2011 alone. If there is only a tiny chance — let’s say one in a thousand — that negotiations would eliminate that expenditure, a rational gambler would say it is worth spending $120 million on negotiations. There is no way negotiations will cost a fraction of that sum. The largest possible expense would be the Afghan government providing housing and jobs for defected Taliban.

What you find out about the enemy can be well worth whatever commitment is required in negotiations. In my experience, there is nothing like staring a military commander in the face, asking him what his war objective is, and discussing alternative means to achieve it.

I asked the commander of the Bosnian Army that question in 1995, having been told by both the State Department and the U.S. intelligence community that his objective was to conquer 100 percent of the country’s territory, at the time two-thirds occupied by the Bosnian Serb Army. He responded that his president had told him to fight until all the refugees and displaced people could go home. This was significantly different from the consensus understanding in Washington. His objective was achieved in principle at the Dayton peace talks later the same year by negotiation.

A skilled negotiator will discover more in two days of conversation with an adversary than all the intelligence we’ve collected so far in ten years of war. Of course the effect is mutual: the enemy will also discover how committed and unified the Afghan government and the coalition are or are not, and what we might be willing to trade off to achieve early withdrawal.

Such mutual discovery does not always improve matters. I once asked a presidential advisor in Kabul whether it would help relations with Pakistan if Afghanistan were to recognize the de facto border — the Durand Line — as the legal boundary between the two countries. He responded that he would not want to close off options for future generations. I can’t imagine that people in Islamabad react positively when they hear this suggestion that Afghanistan may have designs on Pakistani territory.

Bottom line, negotiations are a good bet even if they don’t end in a deal. But Afghan political leaders are unlikely to be able to lead a complicated process and may be more likely to cut a deal behind closed doors, without the involvement of women or anything resembling civil society. Such a deal would not resolve underlying drivers of conflict and would require — like the deals Washington cut behind closed doors on Bosnia and Kosovo — a massive international implementation effort. Even though peace talks are certainly worthwhile, there are no easy solutions to these dilemmas. Negotiations may be a good idea, but they are not a short cut out of Afghanistan.



PS: Peter Bergen comes to similar conclusions, six weeks later.

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