Tag: United States

Iraq’s security, now and future, in the balance

Asharq Alawsat reminds us that the important Ashura holy day, which for Shia Muslims commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali at the battle of Karbala in 680, occurs this week (starting Wednesday evening through Thursday afternoon). The holiday is often marked by security problems in Iraq as pilgrims converge on Karbala (in the millions) and on Shia sites throughout the country.  Jerry Bremer interrupted a meeting with my colleagues and me during Ashura in March 2004 when one of the first suicide bombings in Baghdad produced a loud detonation audible in his office.

This year for the first time Iraqis will be unequivocally in charge of security arrangements throughout the country during Ashura.  If the Iraqis are able to control the situation effectively, it will mark an important step forward.  If they fail, it will irritate inter-sectarian relations and complicate the government formation process, which is struggling to make its Christmas eve deadline.

In the meanwhile, the Americans seem to be dropping their studied indifference and have begun, according to David Ignatius, pressing the Iraqis (Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen was in Baghdad yesterday) to sign up to a longer-term strategic relationship with the United States, one that would presumably allow U.S. troops in some number to remain past the current end 2011 deadline to help train and support the Iraqi security forces.  This, too, could complicate the government formation process, since the Sadrists–a vital part of Maliki’s proposed coalition–have vigorously opposed the U.S. military presence and will have a hard time approving an agreement to have it remain.

The Sadrists changed their minds on supporting Maliki, but that decision was precipitated by a change of heart in Tehran.  It is hard to see how Tehran is going to want the Americans to remain in Iraq, but it is possible that the Sadrists will bend for the sake of gaining a strong position in the new government.  And the Sadrists I’ve talked with want the Americans to fix Iraq, by adequately arming security forces not unfriendly to them, before they head for the exits.

Ironically, if Ashura passes relatively peacefully, the Iraqis may see less need for a continued American presence.  If however pilgrims are attacked as in the past, they may see more need for the foreigners.

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Richard Holbrooke: an appreciation in spite of myself

Dick Holbrooke and I had a contentious relationship.  He didn’t like things I said about policy issues in private and wrote in public, and (incorrectly) thought I was disloyal and out to get him.  I thought he was too often unappreciative, egotistical and unnecessarily hard on people who had served him well, including me.

But you have to admire his gumption and achievements.  He dared to imagine bringing an end to the war in Bosnia, and he did it.  He turned around a flagging civilian effort in Afghanistan, even if it still cannot claim success.  As UN ambassador, he solved the delicate and vexing problem of US arrears.  In each of his many jobs, he got difficult things done, sometimes breaking crockery along the way.

He could also be extraordinarily charming.  I first met him in Rome, where I was deputy chief of mission.  Before a meeting with Italian bankers, he took me aside and asked me what was on their minds.  He then spun a standard briefing into an appeal to their needs–I don’t know if it won the bank he was with any business, but it was a great pitch.  And you should have heard him admire Pamela Harriman’s painting collection!

Dick was concerned–many would say obsessed–with correcting what had gone wrong in Vietnam.  He thought American power should be a force for good, and he set out to make it so.  Our odds of achieving that are lower now that he is gone.

Listen to Jackie Northam’s appreciation on NPR.

I don't know whether the finger was loaded...
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Too early to declare a South Sudan success

Rift Valley Institute (Aly Verjee) updates a previous paper on just-in-time preparations for referenda in Southern Sudan (January 9) and in the border area Abyei, where no progress has been made and the referendum there will clearly be postponed.

While I share Michael Gerson’s enthusiasm for the American officials working on getting Sudan right, it is clearly too early to declare an Obama foreign policy win in South Sudan, as his headline writer did (reflecting accurately the contents of the op/ed).  There is a long and difficult road ahead that could be upset by violence, political games, logistical difficulties, technical incompetence, interference from neighbors and miscalculation by Khartoum or Juba.  The American officials of course know that better than I do.

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Diplomatic ballet with Iran

While Tehran is touting its “superior” position in talks with the P5+1 Monday and Tuesday in Geneva and asserting that the nuclear issue is settled, reality looks different from Washington. While no one seems to think the Geneva meeting made any substantive progress, insiders think sanctions are biting, due to an unusual degree of US/EU common resolve as well as tacit cooperation from money centers in the Middle East. The recent seizure of Iranian ships in Singapore is possibly related to sanctions.

Lady Ashton at least thought the Iranians agreed to meet again (in January in Istanbul) to discuss nuclear questions, but the Iranians denied it. If the Iranians refuse to meet again, or continue to claim that nuclear issues can’t be discussed, Washington and Brussels will need to consider ratcheting up the sanctions, which are said to have already denied Tehran the overt use of dollars, euros and pounds in international transactions.

Tightened sanctions could however have unintended consequences:  they need to be targeted on the leadership and avoid hurting ordinary Iranians and strengthening the hand of the Iranian government against its opponents, at least some of whom might want Tehran to adopt a more flexible approach on the nuclear issue.

Diplomats generally call this walking a tight rope.  I prefer the ballet analogy.  Or is it all really just a soap opera?

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A diplomat’s guide to reading wikileaks

I wrote thousands of diplomatic cables during 21 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, and I dread calculating how many I’ve read. Here is an insider’s view of how to read them.

Don’t believe everything they say (and don’t say)
. A good diplomat will of course report what foreigners say as accurately as possible, but even when she does there are still several sources of uncertainty. Most important is language.

I have top scores in both Portuguese and Italian, but I did not always understand every word an interlocutor (that’s diplomatese for “person,” implicitly someone worth talking to) said to me in Brazil and Italy. Many conversations occur in non-ideal conditions (noisy restaurants, standing up at cocktail parties, in crowded hallways, over unreliable cell phones, at opposite ends of a long conference table). If the foreigners are speaking to you in English, they may not always understand the subtleties of our complex language and may say things that require interpretation. If the conversation is conducted through an interpreter, a great deal may be lost in translation.

In addition to language, there are omissions. Diplomats don’t usually report a lot on what they themselves say, though there are exceptions to the rule. If there is a need to prove that you carried out your instructions, you may reproduce the instructions in the cable almost to the letter, even if you didn’t really say all that stuff.

What is missing is more important than what is there. The cables being published are not the most sensitive ones. Those are usually “captioned” with markings that limit their distribution (limdis, exdis and nodis are the most common captions, but there are others for special topics). Captioned cables are not routinely shared interagency, so the low-level Defense Department type who leaked these did not have access to the more restricted material. There is of course Top Secret material as well that is not included in the wikileaks. But “Top Secret” is not used as much as people imagine for normal diplomatic discourse. Wikileaks has provided the iceberg, but the tip of limited distribution materials is missing. That is often the most interesting material.

The people who write the cables are not always the ones speaking in them or signing them. It is common for ambassadors and other high-level officials to go to meetings with “principals” (big shots) accompanied by a note-taker. They are lower-ranking Foreign Service officers who know that their job is in part to make the principals look good in the cable that inevitably they have to draft. Being a note-taker is a privilege, a greater one the higher ranking the principal. You want to be asked to do it again.

Note-takers draft, circulate the draft for clearance, and get a higher-up to sign off. All diplomatic cables leaving an American embassy are sent in the name of the Ambassador or Charge’ (the person he leaves in charge when out of the country, usually the “Deputy Chief of Mission” aka Minister for most non-American embassies). This does not mean that the Ambassador necessarily read or signed the cable—there will be others in the Embassy authorized to “sign out”—though if an ambassador was involved in the discussion reported she normally would want to read it before it goes to Washington.

The cables you are reading are on the whole well done, and you can read millions more if you want. The general reaction around the world in diplomatic circles is horror at the release of these documents, but admiration and even acclaim for their quality.

There are many more available for the asking: under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the National Security Archive at George Washington University has acquired many more than wikileaks is publishing. Those obtained under FOIA are scrubbed to make sure no risks to the national security will arise; they are generally older than some of those being published now and of less obvious journalistic interest.

You can even ask for cables yourself: submit a request on the State Department website and ask for whatever you want. They won’t come right away, but they do eventually come (you may have to pay reproduction costs). I’ve collected many more over the years than I’ll ever be able to read and make sense of!

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Stay the course, smartly

Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has broken the monotony of reports recommending early withdrawal from Afghanistan. Its Responsible Transition:  Securing U.S. Interests in Afghanistan Beyond 2011, takes as given  the Administration’s time line:  start of the turnover to Afghan security forces in July 2011, completion by the end of 2014.  It also imagines a continuing substantial counter-terrorism and support presence (25-35,000 troops) beyond that date.

This is the most forward-leaning of the recent reports on Afghanistan, and it is likely correct in regarding the July 2011 and 2014 dates as locked in by the recent NATO Summit.  Its definition of vital U.S. interests is not markedly different from those others have put forward: preventing Al Qaeda from regrouping and attacking the U.S. as well as stabilizing Pakistan.   It attempts

to craft an effective middle ground between large unsustainable expeditionary force commitments that would sap the long-term power of the United States and “offshore” minimalist strategies that would fail to disrupt, dismantle and defeat transnational terror groups.

The emphasis is mainly on the military side, but it also focuses on politics, commending the ongoing refocus away from support for the government in Kabul and towards more support for local governance and implicitly viewing President Karzai as a problem rather than a solution. The text gets notably vague when the issue of preventing corruption and dealing with warlords at the local level comes up, and how the local focus will be sustained when drawdown starts is not at all clear. As the Iraq precedent shows, once the U.S. military starts withdrawing the civilians go too.

The report’s treatment of Pakistan is robust. It recommends significant toughening of the diplomatic message and a reduced but long term commitment in Afghanistan aimed at convincing the Pakistanis that they will have to do more about the Taliban and Al Qaeda, or the U.S. will do it for them. The Pakistanis, no longer believing that the Americans are leaving soon, will then have less need to hedge their bets by allowing the Taliban to continue operating and more incentive to crack down so that the Americans don’t come calling.

This is a “stay the course” report, but one that pays serious attention to resource limits. But will we maintain even 25-35,000 troops indefinitely in Afghanistan? Will the Afghans want them there?

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