Tag: United States
Rope-a-dope it is, for this round
This morning President Mubarak is playing rope-a-dope, letting the protesters tire themselves out while he offers a vice president, reform, political dialogue, a new cabinet, food and other subsidies, promises of jobs and 10% discount coupons. The big crackdown may not come as soon as I had thought–he might wait a few days, making sure the army is in all the right places and hoping the crowds thin as people start to worry more about protecting their property in the absence of the police, who are playing hide and seek (or maybe cops become robbers). He could then use the discovery of weapons (or maybe al Qaeda?) among those who remain as an excuse for reestablishing law and order.
Meanwhile, former IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei has emerged as the leading figure among the demonstrators. That may be an American illusion caused by his appearance Sunday on Fareed Zakaria’s CNN program calling for Mubarak’s resignation rather than real enthusiasm among the demonstrators, who seem to regard him more as a bridging figure for a transitional arrangement. He, Ayman Nour and other luminaries of the opposition are said to have formed a 10-person (let’s hope there are some women included) “People’s Popular Parliament” (sounds good!) to manage the crisis, including security and negotiations with the army. El Baradei is hardly your usual Jacobin, but he has a lot of experience handling delicate situations, joined the demonstrations (better late than never) and could well help to bring about a relatively nonviolent end to the regime.
Washington hasn’t quite pulled hard on the rug beneath Mubarak’s feet, but talking about transition rather than reform and thinking about blocking aid has its implications.
My twitter feed tells me the million Egyptian march is scheduled for Tuesday, so maybe we’ll all have to hold our breath until then.
Even pharaoh knew when to let people go
While the U.S. may be trying to engineer a smooth transition, my guess is that Mubarak has something else in mind. His devotion to order was apparent in last night’s speech. He regards himself as essential to order. The appointment of intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as vice president seems far off the mark if the objective is reform. It is more likely a precursor of crackdown, at which he is experienced and successful, than a smooth transition. Ditto with the appointment of the Aviation Minister, Ahmed Shafiq, as prime minister. Unless there is a negotiated solution, the regime will be tempted to try, likely tonight and if not tomorrow, the kind of brutal dispersal of demonstrators that has worked in the past.
Will it work this time? I doubt it. Crowds in Cairo today stayed on good terms with at least some of the soldiers, many of whom are presumably conscripts and therefore less subject to command and control than the professionals, while the Interior Ministry seems to be a focal point of police violence and the main TV station is heavily guarded. The objective of the demonstrators has become increasingly into focus: they want Mubarak out. If the mid-ranking army officers are smart–and there is every reason to believe they are–they will be wondering whether they really want to crack skulls to save Mubarak, who in any event is starting to look like someone packing his bags. BBC is reporting that his two sons are already in London.
It is of course possible that Egypt will suffer a period of disorder, with or without Mubarak in place, providing opportunities for extremists to push the country in directions inimical to U.S., and most Egyptians’, interests. This would not be pretty and could veer in very dangerous directions.
But it is also possible that the constitution, which calls for new elections within 60 days of the president stepping down, will be respected (Article 84):
In case of the vacancy of the Presidential Office or the permanent disability of the President of the Republic, the President of the People’s Assembly shall temporarily assume the Presidency; and, if at that time, the People’s Assembly is dissolved, the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall take over the Presidency, however, on condition that neither one shall nominate himself for the Presidency. The People’s Assembly shall then proclaim the vacancy of the office of President. The President of the Republic shall be chosen within a maximum period of sixty days from the day of the vacancy of the Presidential Office.
This choice of the president is presumably done within the People’s Assembly, as provided for in Article 76.
It is hard to picture the demonstrators tolerating the choice of a new president by a parliament elected last fall in blatantly unfree and unfair elections, though I suppose they might accept if it is clear that the choice will be a transitional one, i.e. not Omar Suleiman or some other Mubarak appointee (former IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei for example). But it is going to be hard to satisfy anyone seriously interested in democracy in Egypt within the current constitutional framework, which is tailored to suit the likes of Hosni Mubarak. Writing a new constitution will not be an easy, or quick, process.
In the meanwhile, lifting of the emergency law and formation of a government free of Mubarak’s military buddies would be the clearest signals that whoever is in charge is serious about moving ahead with democratic reform. We are not there yet, and we may never get there–if the crackdown is successful, something like the previous system might be restored, with or without Mubarak as president.
An NPR correspondent told what I would regard as a good Egyptian joke this morning. Informed by a speechwriter that his farewell address to the people was ready, Mubarak asks “why? are they going someplace?” Even pharaoh knew when to let the people go. In the modern version, the pharaoh leaves.
Two presidents try to contain the damage
First an uninspired Mubarak, who promises ill-defined reforms and fires the government but sees no problems in the regime and only chaos in the demonstrations (someone sell him a teleprompter please!):
Then an almost animated Obama, who favors universal human rights, peaceful demonstrations and concrete reforms (he didn’t use a teleprompter either, but he is better at it!):
Nothing Mubarak said suggested to me that he understood what real reform meant, and quite a bit of it suggested a willingness to crack down. Obama did not sound as if he wanted to put up with another day like today, when the Egyptian security forces were clearly unleashed and encouraged to trash the demonstrators.
Mubarak’s choice: step down or crack down
We’ll have to wait for more than one Ph.D. thesis before we understand all that has happened today in Egypt, but it seems clear that the police attacked quickly as worshipers left the mosques in Cairo and continued to do battle for most of the rest of the day. Demonstrators are reported to have welcomed the army this evening.
This is not surprising, and it may even be encouraging. If the demonstrators can convince the army to abandon the regime, we could see a lot of fast reform in Egypt. That is more or less the current situation in Tunisia–the army abandoned Ben Ali and is now saying that it will protect the reform process (pray that it does). The difference is that Egypt’s army has more privilege left to defend–it will not be easy to get them to abandon that, even if they abandon Mubarak.
In Alexandria, the demonstrators and police seem to have made their peace much earlier in the day, with at least some police refusing orders to use tear gas and to attack the protesters. This too is encouraging. Violence against the security forces plays into an autocrat’s hand, by enabling the use of force and depriving the demonstrators of at least some of their popular support.
Whatever the differences, one thing is clear everywhere: it’s about the regime. If Mubarak ever hoped to retire peacefully like Diocletian to his villa in Split, he seems to have missed the opportunity. Nor will he be able to easily pass the baton to his son, who is the day’s biggest loser. The Mubaraks have lost their best opportunities to make peace. The President faces a starker choice than yesterday: step down or crack down.
My guess is he will try crack down first. It has worked for him in the past. Washington, which as The Guardian says is wobbling on a tightrope, needs to get ready for one of the biggest foreign policy choices of our time: back Mubarak or go for change.
A charm of powerful trouble
That’s Shakespeare’s description of the witches’ brew in Macbeth, but it seems apt for what may be brewing in parts of the Arab world these days. Today’s big demonstrations in Egypt aiming to spook President Mubarak and derail his effort to give the presidency to his son follow closely on yesterday’s naming of a Lebanese prime minister (albeit a wealthy, Sunni one) by Hizbollah. We need hardly mention the uprising in Tunisia, whose outcome is still in doubt despite (or maybe because of) the vows of the army chief to defend the popular will. And the pot may still boil over in Algeria or Libya.
To me, there is nothing surprising about people discovering the will to rebel and overthrow oppressive or unrepresentative political systems, however difficult to predict it may be.
What is interesting to watch is the differentiated reaction to events in the West. How is what’s happening in Lebanon less democratic than what’s happening in Tunisia? You’d think from Washington’s reaction that the devil himself had ceased power in Beirut, when all that has happened is naming of a government that can gain a majority in parliament. Hizbollah is not a legitimate democratic political party, since it runs its own army and terrorist cells as well as social services. But does anyone doubt it would be successful politically in Lebanon even without its military dimension?
Washington’s enthusiasm for popular revolt in Tunisia, which otherwise doesn’t count for much in the West, is palpable. We rarely send an Assistant Secretary of State off to ensure free and fair elections in the aftermath of a popular revolt. You’d think we hadn’t spent several decades helping former President Ben Ali avoid the popular will. But I guess there is little else you can do when your man has fled the country. I do hope however that we are keeping an eye on the army chief and trying to ensure that he protects, rather than expropriates, the popular will.
Egypt is a different case altogether. You can watch one tidbit that demonstrates considerable police discipline, and somewhat less than complete determination on the demonstrator side, here:
The blogotwittersphere may be enthusiastic, and critical of Al Jazeera for downplaying today’s events. But official Washington is not going to welcome in Egypt anything like what happened in Tunisia. I do hope however that President Obama will find the gumption to tell President Mubarak that the legitimacy of the succession depends in large part on how open and fair the process is. How it is handled will determine more than anything else whether the result is “Like a hell-broth boil and bubble,” or something more like a democratic opening in the Arab world.
Adult supervision needed
The New York Times reports that President Karzai has agreed to convene Parliament Wednesday, after making a genuine mess of things by trying to get changes made in the results of last September’s elections. Somehow I have a feeling we have not heard the last of this story, but even thus far it tells us something about Afghanistan.
The President had good reason to be unhappy with the outcome of the September parliamentary elections: due to insecurity in the parts of the country where they live, Pashtuns are underrepresented, especially in Ghazni province, and some of his favorites did not get in. The last parliament had become increasingly aggressive in questioning ministers, claiming it had ultimate responsibility for constitutional interpretation, and in general exercising some oversight of the executive branch. This is not fun for any president, especially one who lacks a strong power base of his own and is fighting a counter-insurgency war with allies he regards as fickle while he tries to negotiate a political settlement with the enemy. A little support in parliament would be nice.
What Karzai tried to do was use a panel of judges he appointed expressly for the purpose to outflank the internationally supported electoral commissions that were supposed to have final say on the election results. Normally I might cheer a president who is feisty enough to tell the internationals where to go, but that would not have been the appropriate reaction in this instance. It is hard always to credit the rule of law arguments (“integrity of the electoral process” and all that) my colleagues make, but every once in a while something is so blatantly abusive that we should, if only because the Afghans who did vote are entitled to the parliament they voted for.
So what does this story tell us about Afghanistan? It tells us that the international intervention there needs to maintain its vigilance and act when necessary to counterbalance abuses.
But it also tells us that the Afghans have their own balancing mechanisms–President Karzai apparently backed down after a very long lunch with the people elected to the new parliament, who had been threatening to open their session without him. Maybe, just maybe, the adult supervision that is needed can come in the future a bit more from Afghans than from the foreigners.
We’ve got our own politicians to keep on the straight and narrow. As well as an ex-spy and his friends to rein in.