Yesterday’s EU-hosted meeting between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti ended without signature of a “normalization” agreement. That ranks as a failure, especially after months of built-up expectations. But let’s take a closer look, based on the criteria I outlined yesterday: improved state-to-state relations, reciprocity, and international engagement.
Assessing the unsigned agreement
Improved state-to-state relations: Articles 1-2 score high in this category, as they would require recognition of each others’ sovereignty, equality, independence, territorial integrity, symbols, and documents. Article 3 would also apply the UN Charter provisions on the use and threat of force, which apply to sovereign states. Together they amount to mutual recognition as sovereign and independent states, in all but name. This is virtual recognition.
Reciprocity: Article 4 provides that neither party can act on behalf of the other or represent the other internationally. This rates high in the reciprocity category. It also provides that Serbia will not block Kosovo’s membership “any” international organization, which presumably includes the United Nations. That is not reciprocal, but it need not be, since Kosovo has not tried to block Serbian membership. Article 5 applies mutual “non-blocking” specifically to the EU. Article 6 requires both parties to continue the dialogue with the goal of a “legally binding agreement on comprehensive normalization of their relations.” That doesn’t say mutual recognition. But it is close, especially when read in conjuntioin with Article 8 for exchange of permanent diplomatic missions.
International engagement: Article 9 promises international financing and investment. Article 10 provides for an EU-chaired implementation committee. Article 11 provides for an implementation roadmap to be negotiated in future dialogue sessions. There is no mention of recogntion by any of the five EU nonrecognizers. Nor are there any specific financial commitments.
Not bad I’d say: maybe an 8 out of 10, if the parties had signed it. It is a shame Vucic was unwilling.
The rub
Article 7 is the rub. I quote it in full:
Both Parties commit to establish specific arrangements and guarantees, in accordance with relevant Council of Europe instruments and by drawing on existing European experiences, to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo and ability for service provision in specific areas, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia and a direct communication channel for the Serbian community to the Government of Kosovo.
The Parties shall formalise the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and afford strong level of protection to the Serbian religious and cultural heritage sites, in line with existing European models.
These are non-reciprocal provisions intended to satisfy the Serb population of Kosovo, without any comparable arrangements inside Serbia. The first paragraph replaces provisions in the 2015 Brussels agreement for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). Instead of presuming that institutional form, it instead outlines the functions Belgrade wants from such an Association: “self-management” for the Serb community, “service provision” partly financed by Serbia, and a “direct communication channel” with the Kosovo government.
This is a major step in the right direction. There are many ways, other than an Association that could pose a threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to meet these functional objectives.
The second paragraph requires a law on the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which will be controversial because of property issues but in the end doable.
Kurti yes, Vucic no, EU moves ahead, US should reevaluate
Prime Minister Kurti said he was ready to sign this agreement. It moves the dialogue in a good direction: toward recognition, toward reciprocity, away from the ASM, and toward more even-handed international engagement. President Vucic refused to sign. That puts the monkey on his own back. It also demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the many inducements he has been granted up front to get him to sign.
The EU decided to move ahead in the dialogue anyway on the basis of the unsigned agreement. This is the best they could do. Next step will be the implementation plan.
It won’t be easy to get Vucic to drop the ASM or proceed with any of the other provisions that move in Kurti’s direction. But Kosovo’s officials have an opportunity to shift the momentum of these talks on the basis of this unsigned agreement. In the meanwhile, the Americans and Europeans need to admit their appeasement strategy vis-a-vis Vucic has failed. Put away the carrots and take out the sticks.
My Balkanite friends are clamoring to know what is going to happen tomorrow when Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti meet once again. The Europeans and Americans are pressing hard for a “normalization” agreement. No one knows quite what that means.
But I have some ideas about how to evaluate whatever happens tomorrow. These come from my personal perspective, which supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Kosovo. Those who imagine Serbia ever again governing Kosovo, or annexing part of its territory, need read no further.
My assessment criteria include these:
Improved state-to-state relations
Normalization should mean making the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo more like a “normal” state-to-state relationship between respectful neighbors. This requires agreement, at least in principle, on the line of control between them. A commitment to agree and demarcate that line would be a clear positive signal. Normalization should also mean forswearing the threat or use of force to settle disputes. Serbia has recently mobilized its army and threatened the use of force in response to imagined abuses against Serbs in Kosovo.
Good neighbors need however to do more than respect a line and not use force or threats of it. They need also to respect their neighbor’s state institutions. This applies in particular to Belgrade. Serbian state security and other personnel remain in the Serb communities inside Kosovo. The situation is especially egregious in the four northern municipalities contiguous with Serbia. But Serbian security agents intimidate Serbs throughout Kosovo who seek to join the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and other Kosovo institutions.
Belgrade should welcome, not resist, the recruitment of Serbs into the KSF and other Kosovo institutions, especially the police and judiciary. Return of the Serbs to those institutions in northern Kosovo should be a touchstone in assessing whatever is agreed. So too, should be elections in the northern municipalities, held under the authority of Pristina.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity is a critical dimension of any state-to-state relations. It has been lacking in the loud international community insistence on the formation inside Kosovo of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). Pristina has asked for a reciprocal Association of Albanian-majority Municipalities inside Serbia with comparable powers, but Belgrade has not welcomed that idea. Pristina is also insisting that the ASM be formed consistent with the Kosovo constitution. That would mean without executive powers and without a sectarian name. It would be a purely consultative body not limited to Serb participation.
Serbia however wants the ASM as a means of permanent control over the Serbs in Kosovo and leverage over the Kosovo state. It has no intention of conceding anything comparable to the Albanian population in southern Serbia. If a unilateral ASM with executive powers is permitted, you can expect trouble not only in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There the main Serb leader has said bluntly it would be a prelude to independence for the 49% of the territory known as Republika Srpska.
If the ASM were to be formed before Belgrade recognition of Kosovo in an agreement generated by the US and the EU, that would give the ASM even more implicit EU approval than the Kosovo state itself. No government in Pristina should want that to happen. The ASM should be formed only after Serbian (and presumably then all-EU) recognition.
International engagement
If implementation is left up to Belgrade and Pristina, the results will be predictably minimal. They have already spent more than 10 years discussing the Brussels agreement that introduced the ASM and called for application of the Kosovo police and judicial systems in the northern municipalities. Unless the international community seriously engages, we can expect no better in the next 10 years.
That engagement can come in several forms. One would be formation of an implementation task force in which the EU and US act as guarantors, prepared to intervene actively and effectively in pointing out implementation failures of that sort. A body of this sort could deliver on promises American officials have already made ensuring the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Kosovo. The International Civilian Office that supervised Kosovo’s implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan after independence might be a model.
Another form of international engagement would be recognition by the five EU states that have not already done so. That could soften the blow of unilateral formation of the ASM, without a comparable association inside Serbia. All five might be more than one can hope for, but several would be good. Even one would be desirable. None will lead to serious disappointment in Kosovo.
NATO could make its position on future Kosovo membership, after its army is fully accredited in 2027, clear and unequivocal.
Financing is another possibility. Serbia has already received a major grant for railway reconstruction. Kosovo has received nothing comparable. It should.
Minimal outcome
Serbian President Vucic has for years fed Serbia’s tabloids a diet of anti-Albanian racism that has fired up his nationalist opposition. That includes expressing his personal regret that Serbia released Prime Minister Kurti from prison. Russian bots and agents pitch in frequently. Kurti indulges in less overt hate speech. He also has more support at home for an agreement, but only if it does not infringe on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He is implacable on that subject.
One or the other leader, or both, may walk away from tomorrow’s meeting unwilling to sign. Either would likely increase in domestic popularity if he did so. Democracy, in this case, is the enemy of conflict resolution, because the leaders have not prepared their constiuents for compromise. Only international pressures and inducements can compensate for domestic unhappiness. The US and EU, if they get an agreement, will need to continue to engage.
PS: As I have left out mention of Ukraine, let this letter from Prime Minister Kurti to President Zelensky fill the gap:
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Last Wednesday I published a popular piece on Ugly Diplomacy in the Balkans. The “hook” of the piece was a recent agreement to create liaison positions for Serbian diplomats in the State Department. I was critical of that decision because I assumed that Kosovo diplomats had not yet been offered the same opportunity. I was wrong.
Mea culpa
I have been informed that a Kosovo diplomat has been working in the State Department since early 2022. A second started working there in January 2023. That information is available in tweets from Embassy Pristina that I had missed. I welcome this news and hasten to acknowledge my incorrect assumption.
One of the Kosovars is working in Educational and Cultural Affairs. I haven’t had an answer to my inquiry about the other or the Serbs.
The Secretary of State is tweeting nonsense
None of that changes my view of the the current diplomacy pursued at State vis-a-vis Serbia. The State Department is anteing up goodies for Belgrade well before it has done what we would like on Ukraine and many other issues. I know of no backing for this tweet from Secretary Blinken:
Had a productive conversation with Serbian President @AVucic today at the @MunSecConf. We discussed the importance of normalized relations with Kosovo and I conveyed our appreciation for Serbia’s continued support for Ukraine. We share Serbia’s desire for a future with the EU.
This is nonsense. President Vucic, who has aligned himself increasingly with Moscow and Beijing, so far as I am aware has done little or nothing in the West’s favor on Ukraine, other than vote for a couple of helpuful but toothless UN General Assembly resolutions. He hasn’t done a whole lot on normalization with Kosovo or EU accession either.
The Americans don’t care
But the Americans don’t care. Witness Washington’s full-throated support for Serbia’s Open Balkans initiative and its much-vaunted proposal for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo. Many in the region perceive both these propositions as threats to the territorial integrity of neighbors.
Washington support for Belgrade contrasts sharply with the pressure Washington is bringing to bear on our friends in Pristina, who aren’t getting nice photo ops with the Secretary or full-throated praise for their successful anti-corruption efforts or their acceptance of the French-German proposal on normalization as a basis for negotiations.
Ugly is still ugly
So yes, I was wrong in my assumption about Kosovo diplomats inside the State Department. They are already there. But it is still ugly diplomacy when you reward people who refuse to do what you want and pressure your friends. I know it is easier to twist the arm of your friend than your adversary, but it is still ugly.
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