Vucic meeting the special envoy of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “The Russian people are our brotherly people, and centuries of history have proven this more than once. Therefore, Russian-Serbian relations cannot be destroyed under any pressure.”
I like the hat.
Washington is sending strange signals in the Balkans. It has supported a decision by the international community High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting a post-election change in the way votes determine outcomes. This favors ethnonationalist political parties aligned with Moscow. The Americans are canceling Kosovo ministerial visits with US officials. Washington wants their Prime Minister to delay insisting on Kosovo license plates in the Serb-majority northern municipalities of his country, without assurance that further delay will bring compliance.
All this seems disconnected, maybe even random and unimportant. It is neither.
It’s all about Belgrade
The through line here is Belgrade. Joe Biden was a strong supporter of Kosovo’s fight for liberation from Serbia. But he long ago decided Belgrade was the heavyweight in the Balkans. I testified in the Senate more than 15 years ago in front of him. He made it clear he supported getting Serbia into the EU accession process, even though it was patently unqualified at the time. Biden believed that would constrain Belgrade to move in the European direction.
He and his White House have now delegated responsibility for the Balkans to the State Department. There key players believe Serbian President Vucic is seriously committed to the EU accession process and also seriously concerned about the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. Pacifying Serbia has become a US policy objective. It welcomed recently a Serbian diplomat who used the occasion for notably undiplomatic remarks about Montenegro, a recent NATO member that has endured prolonged political instability. State cheers for Vucic’s unnecessary and divisive Open Balkans Initiative. That mostly empty box pretends to do things better done in other fora.
Too bad it isn’t so
There is little evidence that Vucic is serious about the EU. Serbia has made progress in recent years in implementing the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire. That is the easy part of qualifying for EU accession. The hard part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Those include democratic institutions, free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and an open, market-based economy. Serbia has made little progress on these and marched backwards on some. It has also failed to align its foreign policy with that of the EU, especially but not only on Russia sanctions.
On Serbs living in neighboring jurisdictions, Vucic’s minions advocate what they call the “Serbian world.” Yes, that’s just like the “Russian world” slogan that led Moscow to invade Ukraine. Vucic has sought and largely achieved dominance over Serb communities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all three, Russian “hybrid warfare” is helping Serbia push for de facto if not de jure partition. Vucic aims to limit the authority of his neighbors’ state structures and create an intermediate level of Serb-dominated governance Belgrade controls. That is what the license plate issue is really about.
The new dividing line in Europe
America after the end of the Cold War hoped for a Europe whole and free. It is not going to happen any time soon. Europe is dividing between a NATO sphere in the west and a Russian-dominated sphere in the east. Serbia is opting to remain in the Russian-dominated sphere, along with Belarus and whatever Moscow can hold onto in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Belgrade is also hoping to maintain the pipeline of EU accession funds it receives from Brussels. That is supposed to finance preparation for eventual membership, but Serbia uses it to fuel a state-dominated economy.
A Serb-controlled level of governance in its neighbors will be especially useful to Moscow. It The Russians will use it to de-stabilize present and prospective NATO members. That will make further Alliance enlargement a risky affair.
Ill-conceived and poorly executed
So what’s wrong with Washington policy on the Balkans? It is ill-conceived because based on faulty assumptions about Serbia’s EU ambitions and its activities in neighboring jurisdictions. US policy is also poorly executed. There is no excuse for changing the rules of vote counting after an election or failing to recognize the “Serbian world” for the peril it presents to Serbia’s neighbors and potential US allies.
The US needs to return to a Balkan policy that would support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the Balkan states, as well as respect for the human rights of their citizens. That should include their right to decide democratically, without interference from Belgrade, on which side of the new line dividing Europe they choose to be. We can hope Serbia will change its mind about alignment with Russia, but that will require strategic patience, not pacifying Belgrade.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, commented on the statement of Danijel Server, a professor of international law [sic], which he gave to the Voice of America, which is that he “expects that Serbia will refuse the introduction of sanctions against Russia, and that it is more realistic for Serbia to turn to China than to the West.”
– Serbia is on the European road. I believe that Serbia will go more strongly on that path and that’s why there are people there who are less tired than me, and they will have my support, to pull Serbia towards Europe. As for our Chinese partners, we tell our Chinese friends that we are on the European path and we have no problem with that – said Vučić and added:
– With that, he wanted to say: the Serbs might leave the Russians, but they might look for someone else just so they wouldn’t be in the West. Well, this is the man who said that we are a danger in the region and that we are just waiting for someone to attack, on Putin’s order, but for 250 days now, that has not happened. I listened to those senseless stories and lies about Serbia and read and saw them in many Western countries.
But I’ve never heard the word “sorry” from anyone when none of that happens. We are continuing our path, the European path, and we will try to preserve our traditionally good relations with China and principled positions in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. In any case – Let Mr. Server do his job, we’ll do ours. May God bless him, and above all, may he bless our beautiful Serbia.
He confirms that Serbia will continue to refuse to impose sanctions on Russia. That is its “principled position,” though what principle it maintains I am not sure.
He confirms that Serbia will keep its good relations with China. That is crucial now that Russia is pursuing partition of a sovereign state inconsistent with Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.
In any event, China wants to use Serbia as a trade and investment route into the EU. Of course it doesn’t object to Serbia’s European ambitions.
Vucic will implement the acquis, but not the Copenhagen criteria
The question is whether you can do these things and still pursue membership in the EU. The answer is yes. I expect Serbia to do its best to implement the acquis communautaire, which is necessary but not sufficient for EU membership. Much of the acquis consists of technical requirements, down to curb cuts on city streets. Vucic should have no problem with allowing Brussels to decide things Serbia has little capacity to deal with on its own.
The harder part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria and aligning its foreign policy with the EU. The former require a democratic political system, an open economy, free media, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights. This is the part Vucic ignores. Serbia’s media are not free, its economy is far from open, its judiciary is not independent, and the political system is semi-autocratic.
On all of these dimensions, Serbia has gotten worse, not better, since Vucic first became President in 2017. In addition, his affection for what his minions term the “Serbian world” threatens the territorial integrity of three of Serbia’s neighbors: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, each of which have Serb populations advocates of the “Serbian world” want annexed to Serbia. Doing that is not “good neighborly relations.” The fact that it has not yet led to large-scale violence should be no comfort.
The crucial test
The crucial test is likely to come in Kosovo. The Europeans and Americans have backed off the demand for immediate diplomatic recognition. They are now toying with the idea of transitional steps short of that. These would include recognition by the five non-recognizing EU countries, Kosovo membership in international organizations as well as creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo consistent with its constitution. This is sometimes referred to as a “two Germanies” scenario, but that is a misnomer. Both Germanies were members of the United Nations. Even without Belgrade’s opposition, Moscow and Beijing are certain to veto Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia is skilled at heaping blame for the lack of progress in the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue on Kosovo. The question is whether it will be prepared to go in a more accommodating direction. A clear indicator will be its response to Kosovo’s decision to phase in over three months the requirement that Serbs in Kosovo’s north start using Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones. The Americans wanted a longer delay–10 months. But Belgrade’s obligation to allow this long-delayed exertion of Pristina’s authority is clear.
No apologies
President Vucic is correct to call on me to do my job. What is it? To analyze the parts of the world I know well in realistic terms and to suggest ways of improving their prospects. That is what I did in the interview. The question is whether he is doing his. Is he taking Serbia in the direction of liberal democracy? Or is he hoping the EU will relax its standards and allow Serbia to accede without meeting the Cophenhagen criteria?
I am going to go out on a limb. Broadly speaking, the Ukraine war can end with three outcomes:
Complete Russian withdrawal from the 2013 borders of Ukraine.
Partition of Ukraine, with Crimea and perhaps some other slices of the south and east annexed by Russia.
Russian victory.
Note that these are outcomes. They say nothing about the path, which could include war, political change in Moscow or Kyiv, or negotiations. Outcome 2. looks much more likely today than 1. or 3., but there really is no telling. Let’s assume for current purposes that Russia remains under the control of Putin, or someone with similar territorial ambitions. Let’s also assume that a pro-EU government remains in Kyiv. What are the implications from the American perspective of these possible outcomes?
Complete Russian withdrawal
Complete Russian withdrawal would leave Ukraine still at risk. It would want to join the EU, for which it has already applied, and NATO. The former is a real possibility, provided Ukraine reforms its politics and economy to qualify. But the latter is unlikely. It would require all NATO members to agree. Several will be reluctant.
This circle can be squared, as it has been during wartime. NATO would need to provide security guarantees to Ukraine ensuring the kind of support Ukraine has received since February. This would ideally include not just ammunition and equipment, but also training, intelligence, logistics, funding, and political solidarity. A Ukrainian win will not be cost free.
Partition
The costs will be higher if Ukraine is partitioned. Putin would claim victory. Russia would be an even greater continuing military threat. NATO would need to arm “rump” Ukraine to repel another potential Russian invasion and repress the kind of “hybrid warfare” Moscow would continue to conduct inside Kyiv-controlled territory. NATO would also need to counter Moscow’s intensified hybrid warfare campaigns in member state Hungary or non-member state Moldova.
Partition of Ukraine would also encourage Moscow to expand its support for partition elsewhere, especially the Balkans. There Serbian President Vucic would welcome expanded Russian support for his “Serbian world” efforts, which entail de facto or de jure partition of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kazakhstan, where there is a large Russian population, might also be at risk.
Russian victory
Russian victory, achieved by either military or political means, would entail the incorporation of all of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv would be, like Minsk, subject to Moscow’s suzerainty. It would loyally follow Moscow’s foreign policy directives. Russia would likely garrison troops in Ukraine, which would be mostly disarmed.
Ukraine’s subjagation would put not just Hungary and Moldova at risk from hybrid warfare but also Poland, the Baltics, and other NATO members (possibly Romania and Slovakia) from Russian conventional as well as unconventional attack. Maintaining NATO solidarity would become more difficult as Moscow threatens these newer neighbors while leaving the older NATO members untouched.
Where the line is drawn matters
American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has aimed for a Europe “whole and free.” That isn’t happening. The Ukraine war is drawing a new line. The question is whether that new line will go through or encompass Ukraine. If it does, NATO will pay a higher price. The cost will be lower, but still substantial, if Ukraine as a whole can complete its Western ambitions.
Arbnore Zhushi of Bota Sot asked questions. I replied:
Q: Recently, we have seen frequent visits by people of the most important allies of Kosovo (emissaries and government officials) whose main message was the progress of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. How do you see their visits?
A: Kosovo’s friends are trying to encourage progress in the dialogue. That’s their job and I wish them success. It is not clear however that they are producing the kinds of responses in Belgrade that would enable Pristina to reciprocate. Both capitals seem to me unready for compromise.
Q: The US and the EU have asked Kosovo to postpone the deadline for the re-registration of vehicle license plates for a period of 10 months. Prime Minister Kurti said today that the deadline for this is October 31. Do you think that Kurti is wrong with this decision? Should he postpone the deadline?
A: Kurti is exercising Kosovo’s sovereignty. I hope he is prepared to deal with the consequences. I certainly understand his impatience–I’ve even suggested that 10 minutes is too long. But being right works only if the move you make does not create bigger problems.
Q: EU envoy Lajcak mentioned 2024 as the last time Kosovo and Serbia should sign a comprehensive agreement. When do you think an agreement will be reached based on recent developments, when do you think an agreement will be reached?
A: Whenever Pristina and Belgrade decide it is in their interests. They are not there yet. I have no idea whether they will be ready in 2024.
Q: Should Kosovo accept a non-recognition agreement?
A: I can imagine lots of agreements short of recognition that would be advantageous for Kosovo. Even with recognition, there will be a need for many other agreements. I see no reason to wait for recognition to get things done that will improve the lives of citizens in both countries. That was the philosophy behind the “technical” phase of the dialogue. While many of those agreements have not been fully implemented, some did result in real benefits.
An idea: why don’t the US and EU constitute a commission for implementation of dialogue agreements (like the International Civilian Office that supervised implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after independence). With assistance from knowledgeable NGOs in both Kosovo and Serbia as well as the two governments, such a commission could make real progress in implementing the agreements and improving relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: In Kosovo, there is also talk of a possible fall of the Government. Do you think that the Kurti Government can fall under pressure to sign the agreement with Serbia?
A: In a parliamentary system it is always possible for the government to fall. In this instance, that would require a break in the governing coalition, either within Vetevendosje or with the other coalition partners. You know better than I do whether such a break is likely. Those who would like to engineer the fall of the government should remember however that last time they did it Albin returned to parliament strengthened.
– NYT finds that GOP members who voted against certifying Biden’s election tend to come from districts with sharply decreasing white populations compared with other GOP members.
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