Tag: United States
Put the ball in Serbia’s court
State Department Counselor Chollet and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar have published a strong appeal for Kosovo to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) it committed to in 2013. The piece is intended to pressure Prime Minister Kurti to drop his opposition to the ASM, which he has been willing to consider only in the context of Belgrade’s recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kosovo state.
Serbia has refused to do that. The Chollet-Escobar appeal is consequently one-sided. It offers nothing at all to Pristina in exchange for satisfying one of Belgrade’s primary negotiating objectives. It essentially says “America is your best friend, you owe us this because of all the support we’ve given you, your government in the past pomised it, we’ll make it come out all right.” This is diplomatic bullying. Similar moments in the past have led to disappointments for Kosovo.
The Americans are offering lemons. Is there a way for Kosovo to make lemonade?
What is Serbia after?
What President Vucic seeks is official blessing for its hegemonic control of the Serb population in Kosovo. That control already exists, especially in the four northern municipalities contiguous with Serbia. Belgrade has for two decades controled their governments, education and health systems, police and courts. Money flows directly from Belgrade into these institutions and their employees. Little happens in the northern Serb communities that Belgrade could not change if it wanted to do so. That includes the ample organized crime activities.
Serbia wants the international community to accept this ethnic control. Belgrade often tells Western diplomats that the objective is a better deal for the Serb community in Kosovo. It is pursuing similar objectives in Bosnia and Montenegro as well. But inside Serbia this extension of Belgrade’s control to ethnic Serbs beyond Serbia’s borders is called “the Serbian world.” Comparable to the Russian world President Putin is pursuing inside Ukraine, this is an irredentist effort to deny the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries that have significant Serb populations. Vucic is tying to construct de facto if not de jure the Greater Serbia that Milosevic failed to create in the 1990s.
What is Kosovo after?
Prime Minister Kurti wants a sovereign country with equal rights for all its citizens and no ethnic privileges on its entire territory. That would leave authority unequivocally in the hands of Albanians, as they constitute more than 90% of the population. Kosovo however starts constitutionally far from that objective, as there are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as requirements for minority participation in its government. There is also a Council of Communities that gives minorities direct access to the President. Some of the Serb-majority municipalities were created explicitly to give Serbs more local control. All have the extensive powers provided for in Kosovo legislation. None of that is going to change.
Albanians are no less attached to their ethnicity than Serbs. They are concerned about the welfare of Albanian communities in southern Serbia, which have been under significant pressure from the Serbian security forces for decades. Nor are those communities offered anything like the privileges Serbs have already and are seeking inside Kosovo. Reciprocity is rule one of diplomacy. Belgrade should not ask for anything it isn’t willing to give.
Squaring the circle
The question is whether there is any way to satisfy, at least partially, both Vucic and Kurti. The Americans view the ASM as a coordination mechanism. They are promising that it will have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution, include non-Serbs living in Serb-majority municipalities, make financial transfers from Belgrade more transparent, and better integrate the Serb population into Kosovo. Those are worthy objectives. Can they be achieved?
I suspect so, but they will require something different from the Serb-dominated ASM assembly and executive that Belgrade envisages. That structure would lend itself to infringements on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which the Americans say they don’t want. Instead, the “Association” should be a bilateral enterprise, one that includes active participation by both Belgrade and Pristina as well as American and European guarantors. If Belgrade wants to pay for education or economic development in Serb-majority municipalities, the transfers should require the approval of Pristina as well as input from the communities involved, not just Serbia’s unilateral decisions.
Coordination among the Serb-majority municipalities should also take into account the needs of their neighbors in Kosovo’s Albanian-majority municipalities. So one requirement might be active Serb participation in the already existing Kosovo municipalities association.
Pristina should consider its options
Chollet and Escobar invite the Kosovo government to put forward its own proposal for the ASM. Prime Minister Kurti should accept that challenge, designing an international structure that meets Kosovo’s constitutional and other requirements while rendering Serbia’s role in the Serb majority communities more transparent and accountable. Kosovo should ask that a comparable structure be created inside Serbia for th Albanian-majority communities.
Nothing designed in Pristina is likely to please Belgrade, but it would at least satisfy the Americans that in the context of recognition Kurti is prepared to move forward on the ASM. That would put the ball in Serbia’s court, which is where it belongs.
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It’s all over but the fighting
Winter has mostly frozen the front lines this winter in Ukraine. But preparations for the spring are well under way.
Dozens of recent-model NATO tanks are heading for Ukraine. Its air defenses are already taking down most Russian missiles and drones. More and better are on their way. Ukraine still needs longer-range artillery and missiles, but the US is resisting sending those that could target Crimea or Russia proper. Ukrainian war aims are clear: to regain control of its entire sovereign territory.
In Russia, a second mobilization (read “draft”) is under way. This will increase Moscow’s manpower by perhaps 200,000 untrained personnel. Iran has been sending drones to Russia, but China is sending little. It is unlear whether the weekend attack on Iranian drone-production facilities will have a signifiant mipact. Signs of Putin’s desperation are apparent: changing commanders, recruiting prisoners for cannon fodder, attacks on civilian infrastructure rather than military targets, crackdowns on dissent and economic protest at home. Russia intends to outlast Ukraine and hold on to Crimea and as much of Donbas as possible.
On the merits
The military, legal, and moral merits of the case favor Ukraine. Its military has proven far more capable, far better led, and far better motivated than anticipated a year ago. Russia attacked Ukraine on the basis of demonstrably false claims that its Russian-identifying population was at risk. President Putin’s “special operation” is patently a war of aggression, whichis a war crime. Ukraine’s efforts to regain control over its entire sovereign territory are a legitimate exercise of force, so long as they are conducted in accordance with the well-established laws of war.
Russia’s forces have proven a shadow of their reputation. They are poorly equipped, supplied, motivated, and trained. Their manpower is low quality, including a substantial number of convicts released from prison in order to fight. Their leadership is divided and competitive. Russia has conducted its war of aggression without regard for civilian casualties. It denies Ukrainian identity and has plundered Ukrainian cultural artifacts, kidnapped Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia, and ethnically cleansed territory it seizes.
On the battlefield
This war’s outcome will not however be settled on the merits, but rather on the battlefield. Neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have concluded it would be better to negotiate. The Ukrainians are now racing to master and absorb all the new kit they are receiving from NATO members. The Russians are racing to incorporate their new recruits.
Ukraine will likely allow Russia the first offensive move this spring, as fewer forces are needed to defend. Only after destroying part of the attacking Russian forces will Ukraine launch its own offensive. If I had to guess the spearhead would aim somewhere along the Sea of Azov coast between Mariupol and Crimea. Dividing the Russian forces along the coast would enable Ukraine to target either Donetsk or Crimea. Russia might even have to decide between defending one or the other.
The home front
Russia is simmering with discontent. While the Kremlin maintains its dominance of the information space, Russian citizens know the war is not going well. Military bloggers are focusing on ineptitude. Even television is rife with complaints about military performance. The economy is sputtering. Increasingly, non-Russian citizens are doubting why they should be involved in invading Ukraine. Many would prefer to seek more autonomy from Moscow for themselves.
Ukraine is in better shape on the home front. The economy is in smithereens, but morale is high. Ukrainians support President Zelensky’s anti-corruption campaign. They want to regain control over Ukraine’s entire sovereign territory, including Crimea. There is little appetite for compromise. Ukrainians know all too well that would leave them exposed to future aggression.
Our home front
Perhaps even more important is the home front in the US and in Europe. American and European support is vital to Ukraine’s prospects in this war. In Washington, some philo-Russian Republicans would like to cut or end American support for Ukraine. Their only real opportunity will be in the budgetary battles to come this year. The outcome is unpredictable, but the Demcrats remain united and the Republicans divided. That bodes well for aid Ukraine. In Europe, solidarity with Ukraine has remained strong, despite serious differences among the allies on whether and when to negotiate. Putin has long hoped the US and Europe would crack. They haven’t yet.
It won’t be over until it’s over
States fight wars because their outcome is uncertain. On the merits at home and abroad, this one should be a win for the Ukrainians. But we’ll have to wait until at least mid-summer to know whether the merits will prevail. It’s all over but the fighting.
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Rising hopes can be realized or dashed
Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”? Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects. Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is uncertain but easy to imagine. Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF, and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable change in President Vucic’s tone:
Have been following many of these conferences. This was the most realistic by far. Vucic spoke about need for Serbia to stop “lying to itself” and “open its eyes” and understand the consequences of rejecting French-German proposal.
He noted that Serbia can not stop Kosovo membership into NATO, CoE, etc. He underlined that if Serbia rejects French-Gerrman proposal: (1) EU accession process will be stoped, incl visa ban, (2) withdrawal of EU investments, (3) overall economic sanctions.
I think what we saw tonight is a first clear step in prepping the the ground for agreement with Kosovo.
Let me echo Demush. Something is beginning to move. Branko, a keen observer of the Balkans even if he mostly focuses on inequity worldwide, is opting for taking the agreement rather than suffering the consequences. It is not however yet clear whether the push will be sufficient. We’ll have to wait and see whether hopes are realized or dashed.
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Problems and solutions: perceptions matter
What you do about a problem depends on how you perceive the forces at work creating it and the possibilities for solution. Perceptions often diverge. Here are some issues in the Balkans today where that is the case, including my own views:
Did President Vucic control this month’s Serb rebellion in northern Kosovo?
He claimed not. He told Western diplomats that if they press him too hard about northern Kosovo without offering him something he might lose control there. That would presumably make things worse. Vucic is expert at playing this game. What he wants is the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). That would be an institutional vehicle for maintaining Belgrade’s control over the Serb population in Kosovo permanently.
In my view, it’s nonsense to pretend Vucic doesn’t control what happens among the Serbs in northern Kosovo. It is true Vucic is not liked by many of them, because he has delivered nothing they want. But the barricades erected there in recent weeks came down the day, nay the hour, in which he said so. The Serbian security services and organized crime they control are the main instigators in the north. Anyone who bucks them will be arrested, beaten up, fired, or worse.
Is the problem Kurti?
Many American and European officials dislike Albin Kurti, the prime minister of Kosovo. There are several reasons for this. In opposition, he was a firebrand and his political movement used violence both inside and outside the parliament. He has advocated a referendum on union with Albania, something Washington and Brussels won’t permit. He is often uncompromising, or as he says “principled.” He does not, as his predecessors did, bend easily to American and European preferences.
In my view, Kurti is a sovereigntist. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but it is still not completely sovereign. A NATO-led force defends its territorial integrity. Foreigners still play roles in its judicial system. Kurti wants to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty, in part by reaching a “final” agreement with Serbia that includes strict reciprocity in all matters and mutual recognition. He doesn’t want to settle for the half measures Washington and Brussels encourage. That frustrates their diplomats.
Can KFOR solve the current crisis?
The NATO-led force in Kosovo, KFOR, now has about 3800 troops from 27 countries. In principle, that force concentrated in the north and properly equipped and trained could have readily taken down the barricades and calmed the situation. Its responsibilities also include Kosovo’s territorial defense. Serbia mobilized its forces along the border/boundary with Kosovo. Were the Serbian Army to enter Kosovo, KFOR (not the still nascent Kosovo Security Force) would be responsible for pushing them back.
In my view, KFOR is lacking what it needs for both its civil and territorial defense roles. Its troops are not all in the north, they are not all trained and equipped for civil unrest, and many of the troop-supplying countries would not want to see their forces in violent conflict. Belgrade understands this and exploits KFOR’s weaknesses. KFOR needs more capacity, not just to push back demonstrators (Albanian or Serb) and the Serbian Army but also to negotiate from a position of strength.
Is the solution two Germanies?
Paris and Berlin have been working for months on a proposal for a half measure that is usually referred to as the “two Germanies” model. The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic in the early 1970s agreed to live and let live, without mutual recognition. The idea to use this as a model for Kosovo and Serbia has been around for a long time. A version of the French-German proposal leaked in November, but there is said to be a more recent version that includes the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
In my view, the leaked document isn’t too bad, but it is not two Germanies. Both Germanies became members of the United Nations in 1973. No one thinks Serbia will concede on UN membership for Kosovo. Even if Belgrade were to cave, Moscow won’t without exacting a high price from the West. The model discussed is “two Germanies minus.” It might have some virtues, but the ASM should be included only in a final agreement that provides for mutual recognition. In that context even a sovereigntist like Kurti should be open to considering the proposition.
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Aggression needs a firm and effective response
Albioneta Ademi of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: NATO-KFOR still did not respond to Serbia’ s request on deploying military in Kosovo. Why do you think it took so long to “analyze” such request?
A: I doubt they will ever answer. It’s a question that was asked as a provocation, not to get an answer.
Q: In November, Prime Minister Kurti said that Serbia aims to destabilize the north of Kosovo to cover the EU proposal rejection. Do you agree with Kurti? What’s hidden after the Serbia’s actions?
A: Albin knows better than I do. I think the evidence is in favor of what he says. Nothing is hidden. Serbia is trying to make it impossible for serious normalization talks to occur.
Q: Kosovo is waiting for KFOR to act saying Kosovo Police is ready and capable to take off the barricades but still Kurti is giving time to KFOR. Why so?
A: Because he is wise. It would be far better not to risk his police in a direct confrontation with people whose sole purpose is to destabilize.
Q: N1 (a CNN affiliated media in Serbia) reported on Monday that Serbia deployed its military close to Jarinje cross border. This can remind one what Russia did before Ukraine’s invasion. Is this a ‘benign’ threat, a show of force for internal use in Serbia or Kosovans should be really concerned?
A: Whenever military forces are deployed in an offensive mode, it is wise to take it seriously. There are no benign threats.
Q: Do you think the US and EU are doing enough in de-escalation? DAS Escobar and other EU’s representatives visited Kosovo and Serbia in mid-December. What is your comment on their way of addressing to tensions?
A: The US and EU have tried to appease Serbia by talking up the Association of Serb-majority municipalities. That appeasement has failed to produce moderation. Instead it has whetted Belgrade’s appetite. Brussels and Washington need a course correction.
Q: With all these developments, are you optimistic that spring will come with an Agreement or all of this will lead elsewhere?
A: I always hope to be wrong, but I see no prospect of an Agreement by spring. Serbia is playing the Milosevic/Putin game of threatening a neighbor. We know where that led in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, and Ukraine. How many lessons before we learn? Aggression needs a firm and effective response.
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Trouble in Kosovo comes from Serbia
I did this interview for Spat Blakcori of Pristina’s TV1 yesterday:
Q: It has been more than 2 weeks since there are barricades in the North of Mitrovica. KFOR has yet to make a move and remove the barricades. Do you think they should act immediately?
A: They should not have allowed the barricades, but now that they are there they need to proceed with caution.
Q: What do you think about the criminal groups in the North of Mitrovica. Should Vucic be responsible for their actions?
A: Yes, they are agents of the Serbian secret service for which he is responsible. None of this would be happening without Vucic’s approval. Brnabic’s tweets are confirmation of that.
Q: Do you think that the approach of the West is too soft towards the Serbian president?
A: Yes. I don’t understand why the West has failed to react appropriately to Vucic’s provocations, which are blatant and obvious. I fear there are those in both Washington and Brussels who sympathize with Belgrade’s effort to establish separate governance for Serbs in northern Kosovo.
I also did this one for Luli Gajtani of RTV Dukagjini:
Q: How do you see the situation created in the north of Kosovo, what do you think would be a long-term solution that would no longer produce tensions?
A: The long term solution will be mutual recognition and decentralized governance in Kosovo, which already exists.
Q: Should the forces of KFOR or the Police of Kosovo forcefully remove the barricades located in the northern municipalities of Kosovo, or do you see another solution?
A: They should not have allowed construction of the barricades, but now they need to be cautious in removing them. Negotiation from a position of strength would be my preference.
Q: Serbia has admitted that the barricades were placed with their permission, how do you think the international community should act?
A: There should be consequences. Brussels and Washington are better equipped than I am to figure out what those should be.
Q: Do you think that Miroslav Lajcak and Josep Borrell should intensify the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue? Do you think that the dialogue would speed up the solution of the problems in the north of Kosovo?
A: I doubt they can speed up the dialogue without levying consequences for Belgrade, which has intentionally destabilized northern Kosovo in order to block progress in the dialogue.
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