This question for Ukraine has aroused a good bit of interest. President Zelensky has made it clear that achieving his war aims will require a Russian defeat. Many others think that is impossible, as Russia has so much deeper manpower resources than Ukraine. Few are still considering President Putin’s preferred option. He would like a clear-cut Ukrainian defeat, but Kyiv’s stalwart defense and now successful offense has muted the likelihood of that outcome.
Ripeness
The canonical conflict management response to the question is “ripeness.” Negotiations have a chance for success when they meet two conditions:
The parties are locked in a “mutually hurting stalemate” and are consequently looking for
A “mutually enticing way out,” one at least as attractive as continuing the fight.
For the observer, judging ripeness is more difficult than feeling a piece of fruit at the grocery store, though it bears some resemblance. What is the feel of the conflict? Are both sides really hurting? What alternatives to a negotiated agreement do they still have that they have not pursued? What kind of “way out” would appeal to the warring parties? If the conditions are not fulfilled, are there outside forces prepared to create the necessary pressures? Or are there events that might do so?
Not now
I see little sign the current situation is ripe and even less that outside forces or events will force a serious negotiation. Ukraine is still advancing, albeit slowly. Its citizens still support the war effort. @PetroBurkovskyi reports:
This was asked befoe the successful offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson.
Russian public opinion is more equivocal and harder to measure. But it doesn’t matter as much because Putin gets to make all the important decisions. He is is gearing up for another manpower mobilization this winter, including more prisoner brigades enlisted to brutalize their opponents. Putin has been explicit that talks will require as a pre-condition recognition of his claim to annexed territories.
Russia’s air attacks are persistent. Ukraine’s air defenses are improving and its ability to strike deep inside Russia developing. Both sides are escalating, within the limited means at their disposal. Ukraine’s minimal objectives–pushing back Russia to the February 23 lines–are still far off. Russia’s minimal objective of occupying fully the four provinces it has “annexed” are also far off.
Talk and fight
Lack of ripeness does not mean the sides shouldn’t or don’t communicate and even negotiate. It only means ending the war by negotiation is unlikely. The UN and Turkey have successfully negotiated with Kyv and Moscow an agreement that allows some export of Ukrainian grain, which will help to stave off famine in the Middle East and Africa. The warring arties no doubt also meet to exchange prisoners and allow civilians with urgent needs to cross confrontation lines. There is also non-verbal communication. The successful Ukrainian drone strike on a big Russian air base is a clear signal to Moscow of ability to escalate further.
It is common to “talk and fight,” since doing so can provide vital information on the enemy and his intentions as well as communicate messages of one’s own. Putin’s hints about the use of tactical nuclear weapons were intended to frighten. They did that in some Europeaan capitals and Washington, though not in Kyiv. The Ukrainian fight is already existential. The Russian one is not, except for Putin personally. It is unlikely that negotiations can produce an end to this war with him still in power.
There are two big known unknowns
Two key factors in deciding how this war ends will be what happens in Moscow and what happens in Washington. Putin won’t likely give in, but his successors might. Biden seems solid, despite his conditional offer to talk with Putin if the latter wants to end the war. That’s a big if. But Biden will come under a lot of pressure from some European and American experts to allow Russia half a loaf, on the unproven theory that will satisfy him. Biden will also face resistance from the substantial pro-Russian wing of the Republican Party, but they are unlikely to prevail.
So we are in for more war, and more jaw. Serious negotiations to end the war are not on the horizon.
I was preoccupied with granddaughters when Ukrainian President Zelensky elaborated his 10-point peace plan at the Bali G-19 (G20-Russia). It merits some attention.
He started with a convenient falsehood:
I am convinced now is the time when the Russian destructive war must and can be stopped.
This is an indirect way of denying that Ukraine is responsible for the failure to negotiate an end to the war, which some in Washington are wanting. Zelensky knows that President Putin shows no sign of interest in serious negotiations (beyond a ceasefire that would enable Russia to recover from recent defeats). Certainly not on the terms that Zelensky proceeds to outline:
Radiation and nuclear safety
Fearing another Chernobyl-type accident, Zelensky wants immediate surrender of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power to Ukraine and the IAEA as well as restoration of its vital connections to the grid. He invites the IAEA to all of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear power plants as well as the Russian-occupied Chernobyl corpse.
Compellingly, he calls also for an end to Russia’s nuclear threats on the basis of “the Budapest Memorandum and respective capabilities of the signatory states.” The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994 provided explicit US, UK, and Russian guarantees of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its then existing borders. In exchange, Ukraine surrendered the Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory and entered into the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Food security
Zelensky celebrated the existing agreement that has allowed 10 million tons of Ukrainian grain exports. He proposed expanding the scheme to 45 million tons this year and making it of indefinite duration. Clearly he is trying to win over grain-importing African and Middle Eastern countries that have sat on the fence or even supported Russia.
Energy security
Zelensky denounced Russia for trying to “turn cold into a weapon.” He claimed Moscow’s air attacks had destroyed about 40% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as well as capacity to export electricity to neighbors. Ukraine wants air defense systems and a UN mission to assess the damage and restoration needs. Kyiv also wants limits on what Europe pays for Russian oil and gas (for oil this was tentatively announced today).
Zelensky calls the attacks on energy and water facilities “terror,” presumably because the facilities are civilian. The attacks are intended to accomplish a political purpose, breaking Ukrainian will to fight. The Russian claim that the facilities are “dual purpose” and therefore legitimate targets might be valid in a legal war, but not in a war of aggression.
Release of all prisoners and deportees
Zelensky wants the thousands of captured Ukrainian military and civilians released, including 11,000 children whose names are known and tens of thousands more. Surprisingly, the Russian Defense Ministry has admitted to deporting 200,000 (!) children, supposedly from dangerous areas. Forced displacement is a war crime.
Zelensky angrily denounced the International Committee of the Red Cross for not providing assistance with access to prisoner camps and finding deported Ukrainians: “This self-withdrawal is the self-destruction of the Red Cross as an organization that was once respected.” He also indicated a willingness to release Russian prisoners the Ukrainians hold, “all for all,” including the deportees.
Implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity
Zelensky cites Article 2 of the UN Charter. Based on “the sovereign equality of all its Members,” it requires states to refrain from the threat and use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
Russia, Zelensky demands, “must reaffirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine.” That demand he suggested is not negotiable.
Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities
Justice
Zelensky wants Russia to withdraw from the entire territory of Ukraine and to restore its border with Russia. This presumably also means Crimea, though he did not say so. He pledged that this will end hostilities, meaning I suppose that then Ukraine would cease fighting.
Justice
“This is what stokes the greatest emotions,” Zelensky says. The Russians are leaving behind in territory Ukrainian forces liberate “torture chambers and mass burials of murdered people.” Russian air strikes he claimed had killed 430 children. He questioned what will be discovered in the future in a place like Mariupol. Resistance to the invasion there was particularly strong and fighting intense.
Zelensky wants a special international tribunal for Russian aggression against Ukraine and international compensation at Russian expense. Kyiv has proposed a UNGA compensation mechanism. Nothing of that sort can pass in the UNSC, where Moscow sits as a permanent member. Kyiv will also submit a proposal for the special court.
Ecocide, the need for immediate protection of environment
Shelling has destroyed forests. Mines, chemicals, and unexploded ordnance contaminate the land. Burned oil, chemical, and sewage plants as well as animal carcasses pollute the air. Coal mines are flooded. Zelensky says this includes a mine used for a nuclear test in 1979 that poses a threat to nearby rivers and the Black Sea. Zelensky wants experts to come help with all these environmental issues.
Prevention of escalation
Zelensky blames the Russian aggression on Ukraine’s lack of alliances. He also warns Russia might repeat it if Kyiv doesn’t get “effective security assurances.” These Kyiv has elaborated in a draft Kyiv Security Compact. It proposes to formalize a coalition of the willing to ensure Ukraine can defend itself. The willing would include US, UK, Canada, Poland, Italy, Germany, France, Australia, Turkey, and Nordic, Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries.
This is essentially the coalition supporting Ukraine already (and thus with a lot to lose if there were to be a recurrence of the war). Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, but key NATO allies would form a purpose-built post-war security architecture.
Confirmation of the end of the war
If there is political will, Zelensky hopes for a quick end to the war. He cites the positive experience with the grain exports, which is a product of UN and Türkiye mediation between Ukraine and Russia. He thinks that model might be repeated.
Conclusion
That would be nice. There is only one fly in the oinment. Russian President Putin would have to decide to give up on a war in which he has sacrificed something like 100,000 troops killed or wounded as well as massive defense materiel, surrender all the territory he claims to have annexed, explain to Russia’s citizens that he tanked their economy and destroyed their army without gaining anything, pay massive compensation, and be branded forever a loser.
Those are all things Zelensky wants, but they will only happen with Russian military defeat. Zelensky knows that.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
Vucic meeting the special envoy of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “The Russian people are our brotherly people, and centuries of history have proven this more than once. Therefore, Russian-Serbian relations cannot be destroyed under any pressure.”
I like the hat.
Washington is sending strange signals in the Balkans. It has supported a decision by the international community High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting a post-election change in the way votes determine outcomes. This favors ethnonationalist political parties aligned with Moscow. The Americans are canceling Kosovo ministerial visits with US officials. Washington wants their Prime Minister to delay insisting on Kosovo license plates in the Serb-majority northern municipalities of his country, without assurance that further delay will bring compliance.
All this seems disconnected, maybe even random and unimportant. It is neither.
It’s all about Belgrade
The through line here is Belgrade. Joe Biden was a strong supporter of Kosovo’s fight for liberation from Serbia. But he long ago decided Belgrade was the heavyweight in the Balkans. I testified in the Senate more than 15 years ago in front of him. He made it clear he supported getting Serbia into the EU accession process, even though it was patently unqualified at the time. Biden believed that would constrain Belgrade to move in the European direction.
He and his White House have now delegated responsibility for the Balkans to the State Department. There key players believe Serbian President Vucic is seriously committed to the EU accession process and also seriously concerned about the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. Pacifying Serbia has become a US policy objective. It welcomed recently a Serbian diplomat who used the occasion for notably undiplomatic remarks about Montenegro, a recent NATO member that has endured prolonged political instability. State cheers for Vucic’s unnecessary and divisive Open Balkans Initiative. That mostly empty box pretends to do things better done in other fora.
Too bad it isn’t so
There is little evidence that Vucic is serious about the EU. Serbia has made progress in recent years in implementing the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire. That is the easy part of qualifying for EU accession. The hard part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Those include democratic institutions, free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and an open, market-based economy. Serbia has made little progress on these and marched backwards on some. It has also failed to align its foreign policy with that of the EU, especially but not only on Russia sanctions.
On Serbs living in neighboring jurisdictions, Vucic’s minions advocate what they call the “Serbian world.” Yes, that’s just like the “Russian world” slogan that led Moscow to invade Ukraine. Vucic has sought and largely achieved dominance over Serb communities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all three, Russian “hybrid warfare” is helping Serbia push for de facto if not de jure partition. Vucic aims to limit the authority of his neighbors’ state structures and create an intermediate level of Serb-dominated governance Belgrade controls. That is what the license plate issue is really about.
The new dividing line in Europe
America after the end of the Cold War hoped for a Europe whole and free. It is not going to happen any time soon. Europe is dividing between a NATO sphere in the west and a Russian-dominated sphere in the east. Serbia is opting to remain in the Russian-dominated sphere, along with Belarus and whatever Moscow can hold onto in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Belgrade is also hoping to maintain the pipeline of EU accession funds it receives from Brussels. That is supposed to finance preparation for eventual membership, but Serbia uses it to fuel a state-dominated economy.
A Serb-controlled level of governance in its neighbors will be especially useful to Moscow. It The Russians will use it to de-stabilize present and prospective NATO members. That will make further Alliance enlargement a risky affair.
Ill-conceived and poorly executed
So what’s wrong with Washington policy on the Balkans? It is ill-conceived because based on faulty assumptions about Serbia’s EU ambitions and its activities in neighboring jurisdictions. US policy is also poorly executed. There is no excuse for changing the rules of vote counting after an election or failing to recognize the “Serbian world” for the peril it presents to Serbia’s neighbors and potential US allies.
The US needs to return to a Balkan policy that would support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the Balkan states, as well as respect for the human rights of their citizens. That should include their right to decide democratically, without interference from Belgrade, on which side of the new line dividing Europe they choose to be. We can hope Serbia will change its mind about alignment with Russia, but that will require strategic patience, not pacifying Belgrade.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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