Tag: United States
You won’t hear sorry from me, Mr. President
Courtesy of Kosovo Online and Googletranslate:
The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, commented on the statement of Danijel Server, a professor of international law [sic], which he gave to the Voice of America, which is that he “expects that Serbia will refuse the introduction of sanctions against Russia, and that it is more realistic for Serbia to turn to China than to the West.”
– Serbia is on the European road. I believe that Serbia will go more strongly on that path and that’s why there are people there who are less tired than me, and they will have my support, to pull Serbia towards Europe. As for our Chinese partners, we tell our Chinese friends that we are on the European path and we have no problem with that – said Vučić and added:
– With that, he wanted to say: the Serbs might leave the Russians, but they might look for someone else just so they wouldn’t be in the West. Well, this is the man who said that we are a danger in the region and that we are just waiting for someone to attack, on Putin’s order, but for 250 days now, that has not happened. I listened to those senseless stories and lies about Serbia and read and saw them in many Western countries.
But I’ve never heard the word “sorry” from anyone when none of that happens. We are continuing our path, the European path, and we will try to preserve our traditionally good relations with China and principled positions in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. In any case – Let Mr. Server do his job, we’ll do ours. May God bless him, and above all, may he bless our beautiful Serbia.
https://www.kosovo-online.com/vesti/politika/vucic-odgovorio-serveru-srbija-nastavlja-svoj-evropski-put-28-10-2022
Note two things:
- He confirms that Serbia will continue to refuse to impose sanctions on Russia. That is its “principled position,” though what principle it maintains I am not sure.
- He confirms that Serbia will keep its good relations with China. That is crucial now that Russia is pursuing partition of a sovereign state inconsistent with Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.
In any event, China wants to use Serbia as a trade and investment route into the EU. Of course it doesn’t object to Serbia’s European ambitions.
Vucic will implement the acquis, but not the Copenhagen criteria
The question is whether you can do these things and still pursue membership in the EU. The answer is yes. I expect Serbia to do its best to implement the acquis communautaire, which is necessary but not sufficient for EU membership. Much of the acquis consists of technical requirements, down to curb cuts on city streets. Vucic should have no problem with allowing Brussels to decide things Serbia has little capacity to deal with on its own.
The harder part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria and aligning its foreign policy with the EU. The former require a democratic political system, an open economy, free media, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights. This is the part Vucic ignores. Serbia’s media are not free, its economy is far from open, its judiciary is not independent, and the political system is semi-autocratic.
On all of these dimensions, Serbia has gotten worse, not better, since Vucic first became President in 2017. In addition, his affection for what his minions term the “Serbian world” threatens the territorial integrity of three of Serbia’s neighbors: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, each of which have Serb populations advocates of the “Serbian world” want annexed to Serbia. Doing that is not “good neighborly relations.” The fact that it has not yet led to large-scale violence should be no comfort.
The crucial test
The crucial test is likely to come in Kosovo. The Europeans and Americans have backed off the demand for immediate diplomatic recognition. They are now toying with the idea of transitional steps short of that. These would include recognition by the five non-recognizing EU countries, Kosovo membership in international organizations as well as creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo consistent with its constitution. This is sometimes referred to as a “two Germanies” scenario, but that is a misnomer. Both Germanies were members of the United Nations. Even without Belgrade’s opposition, Moscow and Beijing are certain to veto Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia is skilled at heaping blame for the lack of progress in the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue on Kosovo. The question is whether it will be prepared to go in a more accommodating direction. A clear indicator will be its response to Kosovo’s decision to phase in over three months the requirement that Serbs in Kosovo’s north start using Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones. The Americans wanted a longer delay–10 months. But Belgrade’s obligation to allow this long-delayed exertion of Pristina’s authority is clear.
No apologies
President Vucic is correct to call on me to do my job. What is it? To analyze the parts of the world I know well in realistic terms and to suggest ways of improving their prospects. That is what I did in the interview. The question is whether he is doing his. Is he taking Serbia in the direction of liberal democracy? Or is he hoping the EU will relax its standards and allow Serbia to accede without meeting the Cophenhagen criteria?
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Where the line is drawn matters
I am going to go out on a limb. Broadly speaking, the Ukraine war can end with three outcomes:
- Complete Russian withdrawal from the 2013 borders of Ukraine.
- Partition of Ukraine, with Crimea and perhaps some other slices of the south and east annexed by Russia.
- Russian victory.
Note that these are outcomes. They say nothing about the path, which could include war, political change in Moscow or Kyiv, or negotiations. Outcome 2. looks much more likely today than 1. or 3., but there really is no telling. Let’s assume for current purposes that Russia remains under the control of Putin, or someone with similar territorial ambitions. Let’s also assume that a pro-EU government remains in Kyiv. What are the implications from the American perspective of these possible outcomes?
Complete Russian withdrawal
Complete Russian withdrawal would leave Ukraine still at risk. It would want to join the EU, for which it has already applied, and NATO. The former is a real possibility, provided Ukraine reforms its politics and economy to qualify. But the latter is unlikely. It would require all NATO members to agree. Several will be reluctant.
This circle can be squared, as it has been during wartime. NATO would need to provide security guarantees to Ukraine ensuring the kind of support Ukraine has received since February. This would ideally include not just ammunition and equipment, but also training, intelligence, logistics, funding, and political solidarity. A Ukrainian win will not be cost free.
Partition
The costs will be higher if Ukraine is partitioned. Putin would claim victory. Russia would be an even greater continuing military threat. NATO would need to arm “rump” Ukraine to repel another potential Russian invasion and repress the kind of “hybrid warfare” Moscow would continue to conduct inside Kyiv-controlled territory. NATO would also need to counter Moscow’s intensified hybrid warfare campaigns in member state Hungary or non-member state Moldova.
Partition of Ukraine would also encourage Moscow to expand its support for partition elsewhere, especially the Balkans. There Serbian President Vucic would welcome expanded Russian support for his “Serbian world” efforts, which entail de facto or de jure partition of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kazakhstan, where there is a large Russian population, might also be at risk.
Russian victory
Russian victory, achieved by either military or political means, would entail the incorporation of all of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv would be, like Minsk, subject to Moscow’s suzerainty. It would loyally follow Moscow’s foreign policy directives. Russia would likely garrison troops in Ukraine, which would be mostly disarmed.
Ukraine’s subjagation would put not just Hungary and Moldova at risk from hybrid warfare but also Poland, the Baltics, and other NATO members (possibly Romania and Slovakia) from Russian conventional as well as unconventional attack. Maintaining NATO solidarity would become more difficult as Moscow threatens these newer neighbors while leaving the older NATO members untouched.
Where the line is drawn matters
American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has aimed for a Europe “whole and free.” That isn’t happening. The Ukraine war is drawing a new line. The question is whether that new line will go through or encompass Ukraine. If it does, NATO will pay a higher price. The cost will be lower, but still substantial, if Ukraine as a whole can complete its Western ambitions.
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Kosovo under pressure needs a strategy
Arbnore Zhushi of Bota Sot asked questions. I replied:
Q: Recently, we have seen frequent visits by people of the most important allies of Kosovo (emissaries and government officials) whose main message was the progress of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. How do you see their visits?
A: Kosovo’s friends are trying to encourage progress in the dialogue. That’s their job and I wish them success. It is not clear however that they are producing the kinds of responses in Belgrade that would enable Pristina to reciprocate. Both capitals seem to me unready for compromise.
Q: The US and the EU have asked Kosovo to postpone the deadline for the re-registration of vehicle license plates for a period of 10 months. Prime Minister Kurti said today that the deadline for this is October 31. Do you think that Kurti is wrong with this decision? Should he postpone the deadline?
A: Kurti is exercising Kosovo’s sovereignty. I hope he is prepared to deal with the consequences. I certainly understand his impatience–I’ve even suggested that 10 minutes is too long. But being right works only if the move you make does not create bigger problems.
Q: EU envoy Lajcak mentioned 2024 as the last time Kosovo and Serbia should sign a comprehensive agreement. When do you think an agreement will be reached based on recent developments, when do you think an agreement will be reached?
A: Whenever Pristina and Belgrade decide it is in their interests. They are not there yet. I have no idea whether they will be ready in 2024.
Q: Should Kosovo accept a non-recognition agreement?
A: I can imagine lots of agreements short of recognition that would be advantageous for Kosovo. Even with recognition, there will be a need for many other agreements. I see no reason to wait for recognition to get things done that will improve the lives of citizens in both countries. That was the philosophy behind the “technical” phase of the dialogue. While many of those agreements have not been fully implemented, some did result in real benefits.
An idea: why don’t the US and EU constitute a commission for implementation of dialogue agreements (like the International Civilian Office that supervised implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after independence). With assistance from knowledgeable NGOs in both Kosovo and Serbia as well as the two governments, such a commission could make real progress in implementing the agreements and improving relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: In Kosovo, there is also talk of a possible fall of the Government. Do you think that the Kurti Government can fall under pressure to sign the agreement with Serbia?
A: In a parliamentary system it is always possible for the government to fall. In this instance, that would require a break in the governing coalition, either within Vetevendosje or with the other coalition partners. You know better than I do whether such a break is likely. Those who would like to engineer the fall of the government should remember however that last time they did it Albin returned to parliament strengthened.
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Stevenson’s army, October 24
– Axios notes there are two quite separate campaigns going on, with few common media events.
– Chicago Council finds encouraging news on US public opinion.
– NYT finds that GOP members who voted against certifying Biden’s election tend to come from districts with sharply decreasing white populations compared with other GOP members.
– NYT has explainer on speech and debate clause.
– WSJ sees deep split between US and Saudi Arabia.
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Geopolitics after the Russian aggression
I was unable to travel to Pristina for this FAS Forum conference focused on implications for the Balkans today, but I provided a video and talking points for the occasion.
- It is a pleasure to join you remotely, much as I would have liked to be with you in person. But obligations here have kept me from traveling.
- I’ll make just three points.
Russia will lose
- First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a serious blow not only to Ukraine but also to the existing world order. If Putin were to succeed, we would see more efforts of this sort in the future, including in the Balkans.
- The concept of the “Serbian World” is no less dangerous than the “Russian World.”
- Second, the Russians are on the path to a strategic defeat. Even if they were to win the war, or keep some Ukrainian territory, which is unlikely, they would lose the peace, as they haven’t got the resources or even the population required to rebuild Ukraine.
The right track is clear
- Third, those in the Balkans who are building liberal democracies and aiming for NATO and EU membership are on the right track and need to redouble their efforts.
- It would be a serious error to allow yourselves to be side-tracked into any effort that slows accession to the key Western institutions.
- That raises key questions about the Open Balkans initiative. Will it accelerate progress towards EU accession, or is it going to become an indefinite waiting room? Will it contribute to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its participants, or will it favor the preferences of one?
So is the objective
- If, as I believe, Russia is defeated in Ukraine and forced back at least to its February 23 lines, if not all the way to its 2013 lines, EU enlargement will return as a serious proposition, if only because of Ukraine’s candidacy.
- I know how disappointing the EU’s performance in the Balkans has been. It has unjustifiably blocked even the visa waiver for Kosovo and accession talks for Albania.
- But that is all the more reason why those who want to be in the EU should not miss the political window next time it opens.
- Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will initiate that opportunity.
- It is not too early to begin preparing.
Not only rules but values
- In short, it means adopting European values, not only European rules and regulations.
- This is hard, not easy. Politicians even in democratic settings seek power and resist giving it up. You’ve seen that recently even in the United States.
- But going into opposition is a key role in any democratic system. It is the opposition that helps to ensure transparency and accountability.
- The institutions of the state should belong to no single political party. They need to serve, and hold accountable, whoever comes to power.
- To their credit, both Kosovo has seen peaceful alternation in power. May it ever be thus!
Autocracy will fail
- This is where autocracies like Russia and China fail.
- They mistake the strength of their temporary leaders for the strength of the state.
- That idea is suffering military defeat in Ukraine. Its defeat will open new opportunities in many parts of the world, but especially in the Balkans.
- Fortune favors the well-prepared. I hope you will be ready.
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The Iran enigma post-November 8
I am no expert on Iran. I’ve never even visited. But it is an important country that interests me. So let me review what I perceive of its current situation, subject of course to correction by those more knowledgeable.
Widespread protests
The protests are widespread. The initial impetus for the demonstrations was the death of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, whose hijab was supposedly not worn correctly. It allegedly did not cover all of her hair. She died after physical abuse in police custody.
This triggered the current wave of protests, which have retained a focus on women’s rights. But they also have a distinct political direction. Some are calling for an end to the Islamic Republic, with slogans that focus on the Supreme Leader (“down with the dictator!”).
The regime has responded with violence against the protesters, killing something like 250, arresting thousands, and injuring many more. Demonstrations and regime violence have been particularly intense in Iranian Kurdistan.
Iran’s economic situation is not a focus of the demonstrations, but it is certainly a contributing factor. Suffering from both international sanctions and internal mismanagement, many Iranians are impoverished while regime supporters thrive. The contrast is glaring.
Power projection
Even as it tussles with domestic unrest, the Islamic Republic is increasing its power projection abroad. Iran joined in OPEC+’s decision to maintain high oil prices as the world economy declines. It is helping Russia use Iranian drones in the Ukraine war and mobilizing forces on the border with Azerbaijan. Tehran has maintained support for Syrian President Assad and continued its assistance to the Houthis in Yemen.
The JCPOA is at risk
These are fairly low-cost operations in financial terms, but they are high-impact in political terms. They signal a growing alignment with Russia, which also wants to maintain oil prices, supports Assad, and favors Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The EU, which has a mediating role at the nuclear talks, has imposed new sanctions on Iran because of its drone exports to Russia.
Iran’s current power projection also signals disinterest in renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka Iran nuclear deal). The repression inside Iran and power projection in the region and Ukraine make it difficult for the Biden Administration to revive the JCPOA even after the November 8 election.
Failure to renew the JCPOA will leave Iran free to continue to enrich uranium to levels needed for nuclear weapons. It is already at the nuclear threshold. It could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both stated that they will pursue nuclear weapons if more countries in the region do.
Uncertainties are unsettling
Some hope that the demonstrations will collapse the regime and lead to one that does not pursue nuclear weapons. But hope is not a policy. The relevant timeframe is short. Iran could have the material it needs for a nuclear weapon within 6 months if the JCPOA is not renewed. No one can be sure the demonstrators will succeed. Nor can we be sure the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will not dominate a successor regime. That could lead to an accelerated nuclear program.
If Iran does gain the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will likely want to maintain ambiguity about whether it has actually made them or intends to deploy them. This would mirror the Israeli stance, which has been successful in reducing awareness of its wepons and protests against its nuclear power status. But Iranian adoption of such an ambiguous stance would introduce one more uncertainty into the Middle East.
The Iran enigma
Iran presents a puzzling problem for Washington. Renewal of the JCPOA is certainly the best currently available answer to the nuclear issue. The demonstrations give some hope for internally-generated regime change. But even that would not guarantee a non-nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, the current regime’s commitment to power projection abroad and violent repression of the demonstrations makes JCPOA renewal difficult.
It will be interesting to see how the Biden Adminstration solves the Iran puzzle once the November 8 election is over.
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