Tag: United States
The Iran enigma post-November 8
I am no expert on Iran. I’ve never even visited. But it is an important country that interests me. So let me review what I perceive of its current situation, subject of course to correction by those more knowledgeable.
Widespread protests
The protests are widespread. The initial impetus for the demonstrations was the death of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, whose hijab was supposedly not worn correctly. It allegedly did not cover all of her hair. She died after physical abuse in police custody.
This triggered the current wave of protests, which have retained a focus on women’s rights. But they also have a distinct political direction. Some are calling for an end to the Islamic Republic, with slogans that focus on the Supreme Leader (“down with the dictator!”).
The regime has responded with violence against the protesters, killing something like 250, arresting thousands, and injuring many more. Demonstrations and regime violence have been particularly intense in Iranian Kurdistan.
Iran’s economic situation is not a focus of the demonstrations, but it is certainly a contributing factor. Suffering from both international sanctions and internal mismanagement, many Iranians are impoverished while regime supporters thrive. The contrast is glaring.
Power projection
Even as it tussles with domestic unrest, the Islamic Republic is increasing its power projection abroad. Iran joined in OPEC+’s decision to maintain high oil prices as the world economy declines. It is helping Russia use Iranian drones in the Ukraine war and mobilizing forces on the border with Azerbaijan. Tehran has maintained support for Syrian President Assad and continued its assistance to the Houthis in Yemen.
The JCPOA is at risk
These are fairly low-cost operations in financial terms, but they are high-impact in political terms. They signal a growing alignment with Russia, which also wants to maintain oil prices, supports Assad, and favors Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The EU, which has a mediating role at the nuclear talks, has imposed new sanctions on Iran because of its drone exports to Russia.
Iran’s current power projection also signals disinterest in renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka Iran nuclear deal). The repression inside Iran and power projection in the region and Ukraine make it difficult for the Biden Administration to revive the JCPOA even after the November 8 election.
Failure to renew the JCPOA will leave Iran free to continue to enrich uranium to levels needed for nuclear weapons. It is already at the nuclear threshold. It could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both stated that they will pursue nuclear weapons if more countries in the region do.
Uncertainties are unsettling
Some hope that the demonstrations will collapse the regime and lead to one that does not pursue nuclear weapons. But hope is not a policy. The relevant timeframe is short. Iran could have the material it needs for a nuclear weapon within 6 months if the JCPOA is not renewed. No one can be sure the demonstrators will succeed. Nor can we be sure the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will not dominate a successor regime. That could lead to an accelerated nuclear program.
If Iran does gain the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will likely want to maintain ambiguity about whether it has actually made them or intends to deploy them. This would mirror the Israeli stance, which has been successful in reducing awareness of its wepons and protests against its nuclear power status. But Iranian adoption of such an ambiguous stance would introduce one more uncertainty into the Middle East.
The Iran enigma
Iran presents a puzzling problem for Washington. Renewal of the JCPOA is certainly the best currently available answer to the nuclear issue. The demonstrations give some hope for internally-generated regime change. But even that would not guarantee a non-nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, the current regime’s commitment to power projection abroad and violent repression of the demonstrations makes JCPOA renewal difficult.
It will be interesting to see how the Biden Adminstration solves the Iran puzzle once the November 8 election is over.
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Life is unfair, so you need a strategy
Bledë Krasniqi from Television Tëvë 1, based in Prishtina, Kosovo, asked questions. I responded:
Q: As an expert on the issues of the Western Balkan, how have you seen the frequent visits to Kosovo and Serbia by the US emissary for the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, and the EU emissary, Miroslav Lajcak? Are these visits an indication that the final agreement between the two countries is near the end?
A: The envoys are trying to deliver a substantial agreement, but I’ll be happily surprised if they deliver a “final” one.
Vucic is not committed to stabiliity
Q: Escobar said that the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, is committed to regional stability? Do you agree with this statement?
A: No, I don’t agree. I think Vucic is committed to what he calls the Serbian world, in other words de facto greater Serbia. This threatens instability in both Bosnia and Kosovo [I should also have said Montenegro].
Why not ten minutes?
Q: The United States of America has asked the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, to postpone the implementation of the decision on the issue of license plates for another 10 months. In your opinion, should Kosovo take such a step?
A: Ten minutes is too long in my view. What is the reason for this American request?
No, the dialogue won’t end this year
Q: Do you believe that the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue will end this year? If so, under what conditions? Do you see relations between the two countries as tense recently?
A: Relations are certainly tense. I doubt the dialogue will end this year.
Yes, to the Association with conditions
Q: Should Kosovo establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities?
A: Yes, but only as part of a package that includes recognition and only with two conditions: 1) reciprocity for Albanian communities in Serbia and 2) compliance with the Kosovo Constitutional Court criteria.
Q: If the Association of Serbian municipalities is conditioned by the internationals, should the leaders of Kosovo accept this condition or do they have to look for other solution.
A: See my response above.
Q: Recently, the European Commission has also asked Kosovo to implement the Association without delays and obstacles? Should this count as a condition for visa liberalization?
A: I hope not.
Life is unfair
Q: Is it unfair to Kosovo the non-liberalization of visas by the European Council?
A: Yes it is unfair, but life is often unfair. Kosovo needs an improved strategy for getting what it wants from the EU.
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Stevenson’s army, October 20
– WSJ compares US & Chinese approaches to overseas bases.
– Washington Monthly says not all redistricting commissions are equal.
– FP China Brief has summary of party Congress so far
– Liz Truss resigns. Who might take over?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Reciprocity is vital, but not everything
A visit last Saturday from a group of Albanian citizens of Serbia got me thinking again about the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. It is stuck. While French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz are supposedly working on a new grand proposal, I’m inclined to think that neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti (this originally said ”Thaci,” apologies to both!) wants to do anything big at the moment. They are both busy consolidating power, using their mutual hostility as a means. I’ll be the first to applaud if the Macron/Scholz initiative succeeds. But if something big isn’t possible, smaller propositions may be worth considering. Here are a few, ranging from the mundane to the daring.
Reciprocity should be the rule
Reciprocity is a fundamental diplomatic principle. My visitors told me people at the State Department prefer the term “symmetry.” I confess I don’t understand the difference. The point is that whatever you ask of someone else you should be willing to give something equivalent in return, if an equivalent exists. So if there are ten reserved seats for Serbs in the Kosovo parliament (there are), Belgrade should be prepared to offer some proportional number of reserved seats to Albanians in the Serbian parliament (where there are none today).
This principle should apply as well to the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, which Belgrade wants formed inside Kosovo. It should have no more executive authority than a comparable association of Albanian communities inside Serbia.
Reciprocity should also apply to military forces along the boundary/border between Serbia and Kosovo. The international community has restricted Kosovo from deploying its Security Force in the northern Serb-majority municipalities. Serbia should be likewise restricted from deploying its Army in Albanian-majority municipalities of southern Serbia. That is not the case today:
Lack of reciprocity is a mistake
The international community violated the principle of reciprocity/symmetry in establishing the Special Chambers to investigate crimes that occurred 1998-2000. Their mandate was limited to the territory of Kosovo. That was a serious mistake, not only for Kosovo but also for the United States. Serbian forces killed three Albanian American brothers (the Bytyqis) shortly after the war on Serbian territory. Despite Belgrade’s many promises, its prosecutors have not indicted those who ordered the murders. Two lower-level indictees have been acquitted. Washington should be telling Belgrade that it expects Serbia to prosecute the commanders or to accept the jurisdiction of the Special Chambers.
Some more reciprocity propositions
Here are a few more reciprocity propositions that would enliven the moribund dialogue process. They could also become steps towards eventual mutual recognition in any future Macron/Scholz proposal. Belgrade and Pristina should
- initiate military to military relations consistent with OSCE principles. Their chiefs of staff should be meeting regularly to exchange information on equipment, training, and deployment of their forces.
- agree and demarcate the boundary/border between them, without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Good fences make good neighbors, as Kosovo discovered when it agreed and demarcated its border with Macedonia.
- base the Open Balkans initiative on equality among the entities participating, again without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Kosovo would participate without the infamous asterisk (*) and footnote.
It’s not all about reciprocity
Reciprocity won’t settle everything between Pristina and Belgrade. There are some inherent asymmetries.
Belgrade has persistently harassed Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Forces. The Serbian secret services and their proxies threaten both them and their families. The EU should be telling Belgrade that if the harassment doesn’t cease Serbia’s progress towards EU accession will stop. The Americans should end Serbia’s cooperation with the Ohio National Guard if the harassment continues.
The rape of tens of thousands of Kosovo women and girls by Serbian forces during the 1999 war has no comparable crime committed by Albanians in rebellion against Serbia. Belgrade should make a formal apology and offer compensation. The 1998/99 expulsion of Albanian civilians from Kosovo, and the murder of close to 10,000 of them, was a clear breach of the laws of war. On that issue too an apology and compensation would go a long way.
The historic Serb churches, monasteries, and other monuments in Kosovo have no comparable Albanian equivalent inside Serbia. The Kosovo government needs to be prepared not only to protect them from harm but also to convince the remaining Serb population in Kosovo that they will be fairly treated.
It’s not all about reciprocity. These items require political courage and unilateral action. But Serbian apologies and compensation would vastly improve Kosovo Albanian attitudes towards the country’s Serb population as well as its religious institutions. If Vucic is truly concerned about the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo (as he claims), he should consider apologies and compensation as a means to that end.
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Stevenson’s army, October 14
– NYT has important background on interagency debates before new order on Chinese tech.
– NYT also has details on US-Saudi pissing match.
– Axios has background on French West Africa policy.
– Military Times quotes conservatives arguing recruiting shortfalls are because the armed forces are too “woke.”
– US is punishing countries with child soldiers after waiving that sanction for years.
– NYT has short piece on subpoenaing former presidents, citing this CRS study.
– WaPo has details on the finally reopening Air & Space Museum.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The stab in the back that isn’t
The Biden Administration is portraying Saudi support for the OPEC+ reduction in oil production quotas as as betraying the Saudi-American alliance The Kingdom’s move also appears to align Riyadh with Moscow against Kyiv.
It doesn’t add up
There is a lot wrong with this perspective:
- The Saudis have never been US allies, either de jure or de facto. The relationship inaugurated in 1945 with a meeting between President Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdul Aziz has always been transactional. The US supplied security in exchange for moderate oil prices and reliable supplies. The relationship was not based on shared values or even common security concerns.
- Circumstances have changed. The US was once a major oil importer. It is now a modest net oil exporter. American hydrocarbon companies benefit handsomely from higher oil prices. Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s had trouble spending all of its oil revenue. It now requires prices of about $100/barrel in order to balance its national budget. Maintaining an absolute monarchy ruling over a much larger population is expensive.
- Saudi Arabia no longer maintains as much excess production capacity as once it did. It is down to perhaps 2 million barrels per day above current production levels. That is small compared to its previous excess capacity of 4 million barrels per day or more. This is in part due to the privatization of part of Aramco. That required the company to behave more like a profit-seeking enterprise rather than a a state-subsidized one.
- Oil around $100/barrel is required for the transition away from hydrocarbons. The many alternatives to oil and natural gas are far more competitive if the price of oil is high. You won’t be hearing this from the Green New Deal folks, but they know their interest in moving the US away from climate-changing carbon dioxide requires higher oil prices, not lower ones.
National interests prevail
What we are seeing is not a stab in the back, but a convergence of Saudi, Russian, and Iranian interests in higher oil prices. Riyadh, Moscow, and Tehran are all frightened that the impending slow-down in the world economy will lead to dramatic cuts in oil prices. Reducing production first serves their national interests.
The Americans are seeing all issues through Ukraine-tinted glasses. But others do not. Riyadh has made it clear it does not regard the Ukraine war as one in which it has a vital interest. This is not surprising. Even if the Kingdom did regard Ukraine as vital, why would an absolute monarchy with no regard for human rights favor Zelensky over Putin?
What is to be done?
The question is how the US should react. Proposals so far include continuing drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), allowing lawsuits against OPEC for price-fixing and cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Continuing drawdown of the SPR makes obvious sense. Its one million barrels per day have moderated oil prices since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The drawdown also returns substantial profits to the US Treasury (average acquisition price was about $30/barrel).
Cutting arms sales to the Kingdom doesn’t pass muster as a good idea. Riyadh will turn to others–read Russia or China or both–less fastidious about the conditions imposed. The Saudis like high tech American weapons. But they don’t really need them compete militarily with Iran, their only serious potential adversary in the region.
“NOPEC” legislation pending in Congress would allow lawsuits in the US against OPEC and OPEC+ for anti-competitive behavior. It is not clear that such lawsuits would be successful, or that they would lead to successful remedies. Nor would it likely improve relations with the Saudis. But at least this approach is consistent with US policy on monopolies and does not empower US adversaries.
Another approach, one politically less palatable, is to wait and see. If OPEC+ manages to maintain high oil prices, that will presumably incentivize alternatives worldwide. It won’t help the Democrats in the November election, but at least it is something the Biden Administration supports. If the world economy slows dramatically and prices either remain at current levels or fall, Biden will also have the last laugh.
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