Tag: United States
Embellishing reality isn’t helpful
Genc Pollo, former minister and member of parliament in Albania, reacts to this “debrief” with US Ambassador to Belgrade Chris Hill:
“War is too important to be left to the generals” is a bon mot attributed to Georges Clemenceau. As French Prime Minister, he oversaw the victory of his country and the Entente Alliance in the First World War.
I would hesitate a lot to apply his wisdom to diplomats dealing with the Balkans, especially with former Yugoslavia problems. Diplomats here means primarily European and US officials trying to find solutions to challenges ranging from bloody conflicts to dangerous political impasses.
We ought to be thankful for their well-meaning efforts and should celebrate the ones with successful outcomes.
Still listening to this interview of Christopher Hill, the US Ambassador to Serbia, with the Atlantic Council I was a bit perplexed. Disclosure: he’s a good friend of mine from the early 90s when he was a cooperative a helpful Deputy Head of Mission in Tirana. Chris Hill is connoisseur of the region with a lot of experience in difficult situations. He is right in most of what he says. But some of his assertions could be problematic. Let us take these issues one by one.
Issue 1: “There is a criticism that you sometimes hear in the Balkans that somehow this is some effort by Serbia which is so big to dominate the others. That’s the kind of criticism you might have heard in the European Union decades ago about Germany….I’m not sure it’s that valid a criticism.”
Germany is big for sure, but in the initial EEC of six and the actual EU of 27 member states, she finds herself in a balanced structure in terms of political power, economic weight, and population. Berlin carries much weight but can’t and doesn’t rule single-handedly. Look at the European Central Bank.
Besides post-war Germany is a friendly democracy.
By contrast, within the Open Balkans trio (Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia) Serbia would rule unchallenged.
Issue 2: “[Open Balkans] does support EU standards, in terms of the rule of law, in terms of regulations.”
It remains a mystery to many why supporters of Open Balkans are silent about the Common Regional Market of the Berlin Process. Or trash it along with defunct initiatives. The Berlin Process has all the pretended virtues of Open Balkans and none of its serious downsides. Simple question: would you trust the observance of EU standards in a Western Balkans initiative where the EU is institutionally involved rather than in a local get-together hosted by two corrupt autocrats? Lobbyists might paint a Potemkin village, but Serbia and Albania are well advanced in their latest trajectory towards one-person rule.
Issue 3: “I would say that the Serbian relationship with Albania is as good as it’s probably ever been in history.”
The relationship between Albania and Serbia has generally been always excellent or normal, Including during the rule of Enver Hoxha and Josip Broz Tito. It went awry when things in Kosovo turned terrible. The current rapprochement between Prime Minister Rama and President Vučić is solves a problem that doesn’t exist. It hasn’t contributed in any meaningful way to “normalization” between Kosovo and Serbia, let alone mutual recognition, which is the crux of the matter!
Issue 4: “But I think, if you look at the broad sweep of this issue and the broad arc of where Serbia is going, it’s heading West. You point out the opinion surveys that suggest that Serbia that many Serbs have sympathies that lie further east. …if you look at where Serbian young people are going for their education for jobs, for their training and what type of model they see themselves focusing on, it’s very much toward the West.”
Past are the days when people in the West should believe globalization and economic engagement wwill tame China and Russia, nudging them towards becoming responsible actors in the rules-based world order. We’ve seen Chinese and Russians, including the nomenclatura’s offspring, enjoying life or studying in the West only to return home to embrace autocracy and imperial revisionism.
This to some reasonable extent applies to Serbia. Because the nature of the Serbian regime has not changed much, and its propaganda has worsened.
If the model of post-Milosević Serbia applied to post-war Germany, it would mean having Joseph Goebbels as West Germany’s chancellor in the 60s. He would have refused to adopt Western policies toward the Soviets.
This is reality, and embellishing it isn’t helpful.
Strategic failure has consequences
9/11 produces lots of reflections. Here are mine.
Tactical success, strategic failure
The Al Qaeda attacks using commercial aircraft were largely successful. Three of four hit their intended targets and killed lots of people. But that tactical success did not lead to strategic victory. The Americans and others have hunted Al Qaeda for 20 years, killing not only its two leaders and many foot soldiers but destroying much of its organizational capacity.
But that tactical success has also not led to strategic victory. Al Qaeda has splintered and metastasized, spinning off the Islamic State and other extremist jihadi insurgents fighting in many more countries than two decades ago. This includes not only the imploded Middle Eastern states of Syria and Yemen, but also the African states of Libya, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia.
Thus the prospect of tactical success tempts those with the capacity for violence into enterprises that end in strategic failure. This happened to the US in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We invaded because we could. Tactical success however saddled us with burdens we did not want. It took 10 years to extract most US forces from Iraq, and 20 from Afghanistan. The failure of state-building in Afghanistan has vitiated most gains from the initial military success. In Iraq, the failure is not complete, but the costs have been high.
It’s Russia’s turn
The Russians are now facing their own consequences of strategic failure. Their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely successful. They annexed Crimea and occupied most of Luhansk and Donetsk using proxies. But President Putin wanted more. This year he tried to take Kyiv, complete the conquest of Donbas, and expand Russian control in the south. The Ukrainians fought off the attack on their capital and are now pushing the Russians back rapidly in Kharkiv province as well as more slowly around Kherson.
The ultimate military outcome is still uncertain. The Ukrainians could over-extend themselves. The Russians could succeed in regrouping and stop the Ukrainian advances or even return to territory they have lost in the past week.
But the strategic failure is already apparent. The Russian army, air force, and navy are in tatters. A reinvigorated NATO is expanding to Finland and Sweden as well as the troop presence on Russia’s borders. Sanctions are sapping the Russian economy. Europe is weaning itself rapidly from Russian oil and gas. States on Russia’s periphery are looking for opportunities to expand ties with the West. Nationalists in Russia who advocated the Ukraine war are turning on Putin. The war is solidifying Ukrainian national identity, increasing support for President Zelensky and the Ukrainian state even among Russian speakers.
The lesson
What should we learn from these strategic defeats of great powers? Confident of their military superiority, they go to war for reasons they think worthy. But war is a political as well as a military enterprise. Tactical military superiority makes it difficult to consider the consequences of strategic failure. Strategic failure is however always a possibility even if you win a war, as the Americans did in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians did in 2014 in Ukraine. This failure to take into account the real possibility of strategic failure is a major source of the blunders that lead to war.
Apply it to Iran
A quick footnote on applying this lesson to Iran. Israeli and American military superiority is overwhelming. But Iran is a big country, more or less the size and population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. No one should be thinking about an invasion. Even hawkish thinking is limited to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. Tactical success in that enterprise is not certain, as the Iranians have put a lot of their enrichment facilities deep under ground.
But strategic failure is almost certain. An Iran that has suffered an attack on its nuclear facilities will surely redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons, as that would make repeat of the attack unthinkable. Sure, the attack could be repeated ad infinitum, “mowing the grass” as the Israelis say. But sooner or later Tehran would succeed in getting nuclear weapons. What then? Tactical success guarantees nothing. Strategic failure has consequences.
Turning point, but no timetable
@IAPonomarenko tweets:
This is incredible, folks. Balakliya has been retaken. I think the next main goal is Kupyansk — the key railroad and automobile transportation center between Russia and northern and central Donbas. Sever this GLOC and Russians are in the world of shit.

The Northeast
Russian forces are reportedly collapsing southeast of Kharkiv. Moscow thinned its forces there to prepare for a much-ballyhooed Ukrainian offensive in the south near Kherson. That southern offensive has relied however less on infantry and more on artillery. The Ukrainians apparently kept their infantry in place in Donbas and appear to have snookered the Russians into a serious defeat.
Of course a few nights advances do not make a victory. The Ukrainians will need to be careful not to overextend themselves. Russia still has massive capabilities that have not yet suffered the kind of defeat that would make them turn around and head back to Moscow. Kupyansk and Izyum are close to the Russian border, making it relatively easy for Moscow to reinforce its troops there.
Putin’s hollow defiance
President Putin is still projecting defiance. Yesterday he said:
We haven’t lost anything and we won’t lose anything. The main gain is the strengthening of our sovereignty.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/07/putin-threatens-to-tear-up-fragile-ukraine-grain-deal-in-bellicose-speech
I wonder how the tens of thousands of families of Russians killed and wounded feel about that, not to mention the destruction of a good part of the army, navy, and air force. Russia’s far right bloggers have already foreseen Moscow’s defeat.
The South
The Ukrainians have also made small gains near Kherson, but the big challenge in the south is the fighting near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant:

The Russians are using it to shield military operations. The big risk is that a stray shell from either side could damage non-nuclear electrical or cooling systems at the giant nuclear facility, precipitating a loss of coolant and a meltdown of the fuel within the reactor. Such an event could easily rival or exceed the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which killed only hundreds because of heroic efforts on the part of the Soviets that would not be possible under today’s conflict conditions.
The IAEA, which now has experts at the power plant, is calling for a demilitarized zone around the plant. Putin isn’t likely to go for that. My guess is the Ukrainians will in due course try to surround it and await Russian withdrawal.
Defeat is certain, timing is not
However the tactical advances of the Ukrainians work out, it has been clear for some time that the Russians have suffered a massive strategic defeat. Their forces and supplies are severely damaged. They may be able to hold on to part of Ukraine when the fighting stops, but they have no capability to populate it or develop it. Their best bet is Crimea, not Donbas, but even that may prove a (Kerch) bridge too far. Unless the Americans and Europeans call a halt, the Ukrainians are likely to make further incremental progress. I might hope the Ukrainians could celebrate their Christmas (January 6) in Luhansk, Donetsk, Mariupol, Kherson, and Sevastopol, but it might not be in 2023.
Stevenson’s army, September 5
This seems right for Labor Day (courtesy of @ClydeHaberman):
-WaPo has a history of the holiday — established for political, anti-union purposes. FYI, the 1894 law also set Christmas as a federal holiday for the first time.
-Some Republicans are pushing for a convention to amend the Constitution. FYI, in the 1990s we were within 1 or 2 states for a similar convention to add a balanced budget amendment. A worried Congress passed a line item veto bill — that was soon ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Be careful: wholesale rewrites may contain too many extreme changes, and lose, as Chile’s new constitution did this weekend.
– NYT sees lots of low tech in Russian weapons.
– DOD seems divided over Africa policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 1
– SAIS Prof Mark Cancian analyzes US aid to Ukraine.
– SAIS Prof Tom Mahnken discusses US-China tech competition.
– At Vox, Jonathan Guyer sees a possible Iraq civil war.
– Former SecDef Esper sees danger in extreme partisanship.
– Political scientists see more GOP use of unreliable information than Democrats.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Why thin gruel is still progress
The Balkans world is breathing easier today, after Belgrade and Pristina reached agreement to accept each other’s identity documents. Heretofore, Belgrade has been issuing its own identity documents to Kosovars crossing into Serbia, based on Pristina’s documents. That was done to avoid implied recognition of Kosovo’s statehood and independence. It has already announced it will issue a disclaimer at the border asserting the new agreement is for practical purposes and does not imply recognition:

Thin gruel is still progress
While Belgrade’s disclaimer suggests the larger issues at stake, the agreement is pretty thin gruel. It is only half the original problem, which also concerned license plates. These will presumably continue to have their state symbols covered to cross the border/boundary. We measure progress in the Balkans in millimeters. Still: compliments to the diplomats involved–especially EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak and American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gabe Escobar!
There is encouragement to be found in the method: the US collaborated visibly with the EU. That kind of tandem effort is responsible for most progress in the Balkans in the past three decades. Balkanites will tell you nothing has changed. But there is a deep chasm between genocide and ethnic cleansing and quarreling over state symbols on license plates.
Zeno’s paradox applies
The reward for virtue is heightened expectations. Energy is perhaps the next subject to tackle. The existing agreement that enables a Kosovo subsidiary of a Serb firm to collect fees from Serbs who live in the Belgrade-controlled north of Kosovo needs implementation. It is common for people not to pay for utilities during wartime. Twenty years of free electricity is at least a decade too long. Kosovo Electric will also gain access to facilities in the north.
This kind of step-by-step, incremental progress is really what is needed right now. Neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti is ready to make the compromises required for what Balkanites call a “final” agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. Vucic resists recognition. Kurti resists the creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities he thinks would violate Kosovo’s sovereignty. The day will come, but in the fashion of Zeno’s paradox. If you halve the distance between two human bodies every year, they should never touch. But for practical purposes, they do.
Not with Vucic however
“AVucic” is unlikely to be the signature on the final agreement. He has turned definitively in the ethnonationalist direction domestically and eastward internationally. While he still mouths platitudes about seeking EU membership, he is far more welcoming to Russia and China than to the EU and the US. Serbia has steadfastly refused to levy sanctions on Russia for the invasion of Ukraine and has welcomed the Chinese into its infrastructure, including telecommunications. Vucic is capable of extraordinary contradictions. As he renominated Serbia’s lesbian prime minister, he also announced cancellation of Belgrade’s Europride celebration in September.
Unfortunately, the West (that’s US, UK, and EU for Balkan purposes) has come to treat Vucic on most days with kid gloves, fearing that he will tilt even further east and doubting that any better is available in today’s Serbia. But the agreement on identity documents is a good lesson. Squeeze him hard and he yields. I hope the West’s diplomats haven’t exhausted themselves–they are going to have to continue to work hard to get both Vucic and Kurti to yes.