Tag: United States
Reciprocity is vital, but not everything
A visit last Saturday from a group of Albanian citizens of Serbia got me thinking again about the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. It is stuck. While French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz are supposedly working on a new grand proposal, I’m inclined to think that neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti (this originally said ”Thaci,” apologies to both!) wants to do anything big at the moment. They are both busy consolidating power, using their mutual hostility as a means. I’ll be the first to applaud if the Macron/Scholz initiative succeeds. But if something big isn’t possible, smaller propositions may be worth considering. Here are a few, ranging from the mundane to the daring.
Reciprocity should be the rule
Reciprocity is a fundamental diplomatic principle. My visitors told me people at the State Department prefer the term “symmetry.” I confess I don’t understand the difference. The point is that whatever you ask of someone else you should be willing to give something equivalent in return, if an equivalent exists. So if there are ten reserved seats for Serbs in the Kosovo parliament (there are), Belgrade should be prepared to offer some proportional number of reserved seats to Albanians in the Serbian parliament (where there are none today).
This principle should apply as well to the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, which Belgrade wants formed inside Kosovo. It should have no more executive authority than a comparable association of Albanian communities inside Serbia.
Reciprocity should also apply to military forces along the boundary/border between Serbia and Kosovo. The international community has restricted Kosovo from deploying its Security Force in the northern Serb-majority municipalities. Serbia should be likewise restricted from deploying its Army in Albanian-majority municipalities of southern Serbia. That is not the case today:
Lack of reciprocity is a mistake
The international community violated the principle of reciprocity/symmetry in establishing the Special Chambers to investigate crimes that occurred 1998-2000. Their mandate was limited to the territory of Kosovo. That was a serious mistake, not only for Kosovo but also for the United States. Serbian forces killed three Albanian American brothers (the Bytyqis) shortly after the war on Serbian territory. Despite Belgrade’s many promises, its prosecutors have not indicted those who ordered the murders. Two lower-level indictees have been acquitted. Washington should be telling Belgrade that it expects Serbia to prosecute the commanders or to accept the jurisdiction of the Special Chambers.
Some more reciprocity propositions
Here are a few more reciprocity propositions that would enliven the moribund dialogue process. They could also become steps towards eventual mutual recognition in any future Macron/Scholz proposal. Belgrade and Pristina should
- initiate military to military relations consistent with OSCE principles. Their chiefs of staff should be meeting regularly to exchange information on equipment, training, and deployment of their forces.
- agree and demarcate the boundary/border between them, without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Good fences make good neighbors, as Kosovo discovered when it agreed and demarcated its border with Macedonia.
- base the Open Balkans initiative on equality among the entities participating, again without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Kosovo would participate without the infamous asterisk (*) and footnote.
It’s not all about reciprocity
Reciprocity won’t settle everything between Pristina and Belgrade. There are some inherent asymmetries.
Belgrade has persistently harassed Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Forces. The Serbian secret services and their proxies threaten both them and their families. The EU should be telling Belgrade that if the harassment doesn’t cease Serbia’s progress towards EU accession will stop. The Americans should end Serbia’s cooperation with the Ohio National Guard if the harassment continues.
The rape of tens of thousands of Kosovo women and girls by Serbian forces during the 1999 war has no comparable crime committed by Albanians in rebellion against Serbia. Belgrade should make a formal apology and offer compensation. The 1998/99 expulsion of Albanian civilians from Kosovo, and the murder of close to 10,000 of them, was a clear breach of the laws of war. On that issue too an apology and compensation would go a long way.
The historic Serb churches, monasteries, and other monuments in Kosovo have no comparable Albanian equivalent inside Serbia. The Kosovo government needs to be prepared not only to protect them from harm but also to convince the remaining Serb population in Kosovo that they will be fairly treated.
It’s not all about reciprocity. These items require political courage and unilateral action. But Serbian apologies and compensation would vastly improve Kosovo Albanian attitudes towards the country’s Serb population as well as its religious institutions. If Vucic is truly concerned about the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo (as he claims), he should consider apologies and compensation as a means to that end.
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Stevenson’s army, October 14
– NYT has important background on interagency debates before new order on Chinese tech.
– NYT also has details on US-Saudi pissing match.
– Axios has background on French West Africa policy.
– Military Times quotes conservatives arguing recruiting shortfalls are because the armed forces are too “woke.”
– US is punishing countries with child soldiers after waiving that sanction for years.
– NYT has short piece on subpoenaing former presidents, citing this CRS study.
– WaPo has details on the finally reopening Air & Space Museum.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The stab in the back that isn’t
The Biden Administration is portraying Saudi support for the OPEC+ reduction in oil production quotas as as betraying the Saudi-American alliance The Kingdom’s move also appears to align Riyadh with Moscow against Kyiv.
It doesn’t add up
There is a lot wrong with this perspective:
- The Saudis have never been US allies, either de jure or de facto. The relationship inaugurated in 1945 with a meeting between President Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdul Aziz has always been transactional. The US supplied security in exchange for moderate oil prices and reliable supplies. The relationship was not based on shared values or even common security concerns.
- Circumstances have changed. The US was once a major oil importer. It is now a modest net oil exporter. American hydrocarbon companies benefit handsomely from higher oil prices. Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s had trouble spending all of its oil revenue. It now requires prices of about $100/barrel in order to balance its national budget. Maintaining an absolute monarchy ruling over a much larger population is expensive.
- Saudi Arabia no longer maintains as much excess production capacity as once it did. It is down to perhaps 2 million barrels per day above current production levels. That is small compared to its previous excess capacity of 4 million barrels per day or more. This is in part due to the privatization of part of Aramco. That required the company to behave more like a profit-seeking enterprise rather than a a state-subsidized one.
- Oil around $100/barrel is required for the transition away from hydrocarbons. The many alternatives to oil and natural gas are far more competitive if the price of oil is high. You won’t be hearing this from the Green New Deal folks, but they know their interest in moving the US away from climate-changing carbon dioxide requires higher oil prices, not lower ones.
National interests prevail
What we are seeing is not a stab in the back, but a convergence of Saudi, Russian, and Iranian interests in higher oil prices. Riyadh, Moscow, and Tehran are all frightened that the impending slow-down in the world economy will lead to dramatic cuts in oil prices. Reducing production first serves their national interests.
The Americans are seeing all issues through Ukraine-tinted glasses. But others do not. Riyadh has made it clear it does not regard the Ukraine war as one in which it has a vital interest. This is not surprising. Even if the Kingdom did regard Ukraine as vital, why would an absolute monarchy with no regard for human rights favor Zelensky over Putin?
What is to be done?
The question is how the US should react. Proposals so far include continuing drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), allowing lawsuits against OPEC for price-fixing and cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Continuing drawdown of the SPR makes obvious sense. Its one million barrels per day have moderated oil prices since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The drawdown also returns substantial profits to the US Treasury (average acquisition price was about $30/barrel).
Cutting arms sales to the Kingdom doesn’t pass muster as a good idea. Riyadh will turn to others–read Russia or China or both–less fastidious about the conditions imposed. The Saudis like high tech American weapons. But they don’t really need them compete militarily with Iran, their only serious potential adversary in the region.
“NOPEC” legislation pending in Congress would allow lawsuits in the US against OPEC and OPEC+ for anti-competitive behavior. It is not clear that such lawsuits would be successful, or that they would lead to successful remedies. Nor would it likely improve relations with the Saudis. But at least this approach is consistent with US policy on monopolies and does not empower US adversaries.
Another approach, one politically less palatable, is to wait and see. If OPEC+ manages to maintain high oil prices, that will presumably incentivize alternatives worldwide. It won’t help the Democrats in the November election, but at least it is something the Biden Administration supports. If the world economy slows dramatically and prices either remain at current levels or fall, Biden will also have the last laugh.
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The one-trick pony and its master
I am unable to embed this, but it is worth watching: Alexander Vindman and Bill Taylor on CNN today.
I was correct day before yesterday when I suggested President Putin would resort to long-range fire, rather than tactical nukes, to retaliate for the attack on his favorite bridge. But I was wrong in suggesting he might not have many left. Today Moscow launched close to 100 missiles and drones against civilian targets in Ukraine. That’s what Vindman calls Putin’s one trick–making civilian life miserable in Ukraine.
Next
This is a patent violation of the laws of war, which prohibit targeting civilians. The Russians have violated that prohibition repeatedly not only in Ukraine but also in Syria. The West needs to respond. The United States and others should provide both air defense and longer-range missiles to Ukraine. These would enable Kyiv to hit all the Russian military targets inside Ukraine, including in Crimea. Hesitancy to provide these weapons has failed to convince Putin to restrain Russian attacks on civilian targets. There should be consequences.
The only question is whether the West should seek Kyiv guarantees that longer-range weapons won’t be used against targets inside Russia proper. I would favor public ambiguity on this issue. Moscow should be left guessing whether it can anticipate attacks on its military infrastructure inside Russia’s sovereign borders. The day may come when such attacks will be necessary for successful prosecution of the war. We should not rule them out.
He’s down but not out
Putin is increasingly desperate. His milblogging extreme nationalists are unhappy with Russian army failure in Ukraine. Russia’s annexations of provinces in Ukraine have not stopped the loss of territory within those provinces. The Russian economy is facing recession or worse. Men of draft age are aggressively avoiding mobilization. It will take months even to begin training and equiping them for the exigencies of war in Ukraine. There is no longer any plausible scenario in which Russia wins the war in Ukraine. Moscow’s only option is to wreck more harm on Ukrainians, who have remained stalwart.
Washington’s weak knees
Some in Moscow however see hope on the American home front. Donald Trump is their ace in the hole:
Trump-echoing Republicans have become de facto supporters of Putin, along with a few of their usual ideological opponents on the left. But mainstream American opinion still favors arming the Ukrainians to defend themselves and to retake territory. Support is weakest among Republicans, but still stands at 50%.
If however things start going south in Moscow there will be many inside the Biden Administration who will argue against pressing Putin too hard. They will fear a breakup of the Russian Federation due to ethnic minority rebellion and civil wars that could lead to “loose nukes.” The Pentagon will want Russia’s thousands of nuclear weapons to remain under firm, centralized control.
The war ends when Putin is gone
But executive control overr the nukes should be no excuse for backing Vladimir Putin. There will be no peace in Ukraine so long as he remains in power. He has decided to sacrifice the Russian Army in what will prove a futile effort to defeat Ukraine. Any successor will want to rebuild the Russian military, revive Russia’s tattered friendships, and restore Russia’s economy. Hostility to Russia’s “brothers” in Ukraine may persist. But there will be a decade-long window of opportunity to consolidate Ukraine’s ties with the West and ensure that Ukraine can continue to defend itself. The one-trick pony and its master will be consigned to the ash heap of history.
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Happy birthday Vladimir Vladimirovich!
Beginning of the end?
This could be the beginning of the end for Putin, but not necessarily the end of the war he began. The main complaint against him in regime circles in Moscow is his failure to prosecute the war successfully. Most in the regime don’t fault him for invading Ukraine. But Russia’s resources are limited. The Ukrainians have seized or interrupted many supply lines. Ammunition and supplies for the Russian Army in Ukraine are short. The military mobilization Putin declared won’t produce many soldiers for months. Even then, they will be poorly equipped, trained, and motivated.
Putin’s desperation has already led him to imply he might use tactical nuclear weapons, which Moscow has in abundance. The Americans however will have made it clear that their response would be massive, even if conventional. There likely wouldn’t be much left of the Russian Army in Ukraine if Moscow resorts to nukes. The better bet is long-range missile fire, but it is not clear how many cruise missiles Russia has left. Ukrainian President Zelensky claimed in July that Russia had already used 3000. There are indications since then that the Russians are using older missiles as well as anti-aircraft batteries against ground targets.
The center of gravity is now in Moscow
Ukrainian advances both in Donbas and in the south near Kherson are important and likely to continue, but the center of gravity of this conflict is now moving to Moscow. Putin is in trouble, albeit primarily from his ultra-nationalist right wing. There is little the West can or should do about that. Anyone coming to power in Moscow tomorrow will want to save the Russian Army from its impending defeat in Ukraine. Whether or not Putin remains in power, we should expect soon a ceasefire proposal from Moscow.
Kyiv will reject it if it doesn’t include at least withdrawal to at least the February 23 lines. Even that might not be attractive to Zelensky, whose war objective is to chase Russia from every inch of Ukrainian territory, including Donbas and Crimea. Nothing less will end Moscow’s monkeying in Ukraine and its politics. Even an outright Ukrainian victory will leave the country with a neighbor that does not recognize its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Reversal of Putin’s fake annexations of Ukrainian provinces is unlikely even if Moscow is defeated.
The West needs to steel itself
As it becomes apparent that the Ukrainians have won, the temptation in Europe and the United States will be to restrain Ukraine and accommodate Russia. The Europeans will want Russia to ease its restrictions on selling natural gas. The coming winter will otherwise be a cold one. The Americans will not want to make Putin more desperate. Some will even argue that driving him from power would hurt the chances to make peace.
We should resist these temptations. Europe made a huge mistake to become so dependent on Russian gas. The Americans made a huge mistake not to react more vigorously to the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea. We need now to steel ourselves for the consequences of those mistakes. Ultimately, Russian defeat will be the best basis possible for future relations with Moscow.
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To JCPOA or not to JCPOA is the question
The Biden Administration in the runup to the November 8 election has hesitated to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka Iran nuclear deal). This is understandable. In domestic US politics, return to the JCPOA carries no political advantage and considerable political risk.
The post-election dilemma
This hesitation sets up a post-election dilemma. During the past month, a serious protest movement has again emerged in Iran. The main focus has been rules on wearing the hijab, which is a highly visible symbol of the theological dictatorship. The protests have been widespread and growing. No doubt if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, the nuclear question would be seen in a different light.
But there is no telling whether that will happen within a relevant time frame. Iran has seen repeated episodes of public protest that the Islamic Republic has repressed brutally. Any one of the protest movements might have succeeded. They did not.
So immediately after the US election, President Biden will confront a choice. He can go ahead with a return to the JCPOA, or he can wait to see if the protest movement will succeed at displacing the Islamic Republic. If he proceeds with the JCPOA, that will give the Islamic Republic massive resources as well as sanctions relief and diplomatic prestige, thus enabling it to repress and buy off opposition. If he continues to hesitate, a vital opportunity could be lost to back Iran away from nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons or return to the JCPOA?
This is a serious dilemma. Nuclear weapons aren’t so useful in wartime, as their non-use the past 77 years demonstrates. But Iran can see from North Korea’s experience that they make other nuclear powers hesitate to destabilize a country. They also enable increased power projection in the region, which others will try to counterbalance. Iranian nuclear weapons would thus precipitate a regional arms race, with Turkey and Saudi Arabia the main contestants. The United States would not welcome that.
But return to the JCPOA will give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life as well as the resources it requires to remain in power. The gain in pushing Iran back from nuclear weapons would be a few months, not years. Once you know how to enrich uranium, the remaining technological obstacles are not great. Certainly the billions the US and others will need to return to Iran will be sufficient to ensure that nuclear weapons are only a few months in the future.
Make lemonade?
Someone might ask, if you have lemons why not make lemonade? Why not insist that Iran stop the internal crackdown as part of the price of returning to the JCPOA? While I might want Washington to try, I doubt that gambit would succeed. The negotiations are already overloaded with lots of non-nuclear issues. These include American prisoners in Iran and Iranian prisoners in the US, Iranian power projection in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and American encouragement of ethnic rebellion inside Iran. Getting back to the JCPOA will require ignoring most if not all of these. The main question is JCPOA or no JCPOA. And it isn’t an easy one to answer, even if like me you think Trump’s withdrawal was a stupid mistake.
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