Tag: United States
The Ukraine war creates risks and opportunities for Kosovo
I gave interviews late last week to two Kosovo outlets. Both were published in the past couple of days:
Arbnore Zhushi, Bota Sot:
Q: Do you believe that with the arrival of Christopher Hill as US Ambassador to Serbia, a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will be accelerated?
A: I might hope so, but we’ll have to wait and see. There are no signs yet that either Serbia or Kosovo s read for a “final” agreement.
Q: Seeing the Russian aggression in Ukraine, Kosovo is wanting to join the EU and NATO, how realistic are these demands?
A: They are realistic in the long-term. The right strategy is to implement the requirements of membership, then wait for the political window to open.
Q: How did you see the developments of the war in Ukraine so far?
A: Putin is losing in strategic terms even when Russian forces advance on the ground. Ukrainians will not accept Russian rule or hegemony. NATO has strengthened and unified in response to the invasion. Russia will remain under sanctions for a long time and lacks the resources needed to rebuild in Ukraine.
Q: How do you define the reaction of NATO and the West to the Russian aggression in Ukraine and do you think that enough is being done in this direction to help the Ukrainian people?
A: NATO and the West have reacted well. They need to do more, but the will seems strong.
Q: What will be the end of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, what do you think will be the scenario?
A: I hope the war in Ukraine will end with the downfall of Putin in Moscow.
Q: US President Joe Biden says Putin should leave. How close to collapse is the Russian leader actually?
A: We won’t know until the day after. There is no sign of sufficient rebellion yet in the security services, the oligarchs, or among the public.
Q: The Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti is worried that the conflict in Ukraine will affect Kosovo as well. How much of such a risk actually exists?
A: The risk is serious. If Russia succeeds in partitioning Ukraine it will encourage Serbia to once again pursue the partition of Kosovo.
Q: Serbia has not imposed sanctions on Russia for the occupation of Ukraine, how do you assess the attitude of the EU and the US towards Serbia in this case? Should Serbia be sanctioned, because it did not become an ally of the West in imposing sanctions on Russia, and its diplomacy continues to cooperate openly with Russia?
A: Serbia has chosen to side with Russia. The Americans need to recognize this and do what they can in response.
Q: Another crisis expert, Mr Bugajski, has called for talks with Serbia to be suspended because it is a party to Russia and has refused to impose sanctions on Russia. Kosovo has imposed sanctions on Russia and has adopted a resolution in the Assembly. How do you comment on this?
A: I think Kosovo should continue to talk with Serbia, mostly to avoid being blamed for failure of the Dialogue. There is little hope it will produce much under current conditions.
Q: If a Ukraine-Russia agreement is reached, which nevertheless favors Russian interests in Ukraine, such as the remaining Crimea under Russia, the recognition of a special status of the Donbas (or Luhansk and Donetsk provinces), could it complicate Kosovo’s position in the talks, and which seemed more favorable as a general war continues in Ukraine, due to the positions of Kosovo and Serbia towards the war there?
A: Let’s wait and see what the Ukrainians will agree to. My reading is that President Biden is aiming for a complete defeat of Russia in Ukraine, provided that is what the Ukrainians are willing to fight for.
Sokol Berisha, Periskopi:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is in the middle of nowhere. Do you belive that this blockade is in favour of Serbia more than in Kosovo (taking into consideration that the dialogue is crucial for Kosovo if we mention the fact the “5” EU states do not still recognize Kosovo and from the fact that Kosovo is not member of almost any important international organizations). What is your assessment regarding the importance of the dialogue?
A: The dialogue is important to Kosovo for three reasons. It puts Kosovo on an equal and symmetrical basis with Serbia. It has the potential to resolve many outstanding problems between the two countries. When it goes well it pleases the Europeans and Americans.
Q: Should the Kosovo side be more interested in the dialogue? Is Serbia benefiting from the “status quo” in this process? Although it seems like we- the people of Kosovo- are being isolated from “status qou”.
A: Serbia has played the blame game well. While offering little in the dialogue, it has convinced the EU and US that the stalemate is mostly the fault of Pristina. I thought Kosovo’s non-aggression proposal was a good way of countering that impression. Kosovo needs to come to the table with more ideas and more openness to discussion of others’ ideas. In the end, agreement will depend on whether the quid pro quo is an advantageous one. But the process is important as well.
Q: Kosovo’s isolation- without visa liberlisation and no new recognition. Is the blockade in the dialogue to be blame for this?
A: The stalemate in the dialogue doesn’t help,. But visa liberalization and new recognitions were blocked well before the current stalemate in the dialogue.
Q: The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has made it clear the Association of Serb Municipalities will not be established? According to his public statements, he has not left any other option that would lead to a final solution to the dialogue? What would be your recommendation for the Government of Kosovo for this issue?
A: I share the concern that the Association should not become an executive body or create a “Republika Srpska” inside Kosovo. But I think Pristina should look for a formula within the Constitutional Court’s parameters.
Q: Since it seems like every option in the dialogue is almost cancelled, where do you see the light at the end of the tunnel?
A: I think the problem may be a generational one. But I also think there are things to be done now that will improve the situation in the future. First and foremost are improved relations between the Serb population of Kosovo and the Pristina government, starting with implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the monastery property in Decan/Decani but going far beyond that. Vucic has given the Kosovo Serbs reason to be loyal to Belgrade. Pristina has to give them reason to be loyal to Pristina. The Serb presence in Kosovo is a vital element in its independent statehood. Any Kosovo patriot should want the rights, property, and presence of Serbs to be vigorously protected.
Q: Recently there have been some rising voices about a possible conflict in the Balkans following the war in Ukraine. Kosovo’s interior minister last week said that the police officers have been attacked in an “act of terrorism” close to the border with Serbia. Do you believe that our region can be in danger of another armed conflicted?
A: Yes, I do. Serbia is a de facto ally of Russia, with which it shares autocratic pretensions and irredentist ambitions. If Moscow is successful in Donbas, you can expect Serbia to try military force in northern Kosovo. Kosovo should be seeking, and the Americans should be transferring, Javelins and other defensive weapons to the Kosovo Security Force, so that by 2027 Kosovo will be able to defend itself without a KFOR presence.
Q: Our leaders like President Osmani and the Prime Minister Kurti are giving interviews for some prestigious news channels (such as CNN and Sky News). Ironically our doors are open for them. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kurti has not paid yet an official visit to the United States and this postponement is being looked at with great concern from the public opinion in Kosovo. What is your opinion about this?
A: Your President and Prime Minister merit being heard in the international media. They are doing a good job there. But on the question of a visit to the U.S., you’ll have to ask the Prime Minister and the Americans. I am pleased to recall that Albin spoke at Johns Hopkins, where I am a professor, many years ago, as has President Vucic. I would like to see Prime Minister Kurti back in the U.S., but such visits usually entail negotiation and conditions before they can take place.
Q: Ex-Swiss prosecutor Dick Marty, whose report was key in establishing KSC (Kosovo Specialist Chambers), has been under armed guard for nearly a year-and-a-half following death threats he believes originate from Serbia to put the blame on the Kosovars. How do you explain that this information came out recently even though it had happened some months ago? Can these claims have any impact on the overall process of Kosovo Specialist Chambers?
A: I don’t know why this news came out recently and I don’t know who is behind the death threats. Marty’s report was highly favorable to Serbia’s perspective. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers should proceed, like any respectable court, without regard to current events but focused instead on the charges and evidence before it. Its mandate should be extended to crimes committed inside Serbia, like the murder of the American Bytyqi brothers.
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Clarified aims betoken longer war
Secretary of Defense Austin clarified US war aims yesterday:
We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/
Meanwhile, the Russians have clarified theirs. They want control not only of all of Donbas in eastern Ukraine but also the southern coast. That would allow them to link up with their long-standing military presence in the Transnistria region of Moldova. The pretext for the Moldova campaign is already in the works.
Ukrainian war aims have long been clear. Kyiv wants to roll the Russians back at least to their pre-February 24 control of Crimea and part of Luhansk and Donetsk. President Zelensky would no doubt like to rid Ukraine altogether of Russian troops.
These different war aims are strangely compatible. Stretched thin already, the Russians have set themselves goals that will be difficult to achieve and will attrite their remaining forces. The Americans and NATO allies are pouring supplies into the Ukrainian army in an effort to give it the resources needed to withstand the Russian offensive and to push back when the time comes.
A longer war
The result will be a longer war than Russia anticipated or Ukraine wants. The Russian army has stalled in its western push from Kherson for the better part of two months. Resistance at Mykolaiv has been stalwart. The Ukrainians have retaken most of the now ruined areas north of Kyiv that the Russians had occupied earlier in the war. In Mariupol, vital to Russian consolidation of control along the Sea of Azov, Ukrainian fighters are still making their last stand. Agreements to allow the evacuation of civilians are breaking down faster than they can be negotiated.
The question now is whether the Ukrainian army can begin to retake some areas, or at least destabilize Russian control in the south. The Russians have lost a lot of men and armor, but they remain far stronger in artillery and airpower. The Ukrainians have acquired some armor but their air defenses and artillery still remain relatively weak. Offensive guerilla operations will be far more difficult for the Ukrainians in the relatively flat and cleared areas of southern Ukraine than in the wooded and hillier north.
War has consequences
Already about one-third of the pre-war Ukrainian population of more than 41 million is displaced, 5.1 million outside the country and 7.7 million inside. Poland has received more than half the refugees. Romania, Hungary, and Moldova have received most the remainder. The vast majority of Ukrainians are fleeing west, not towards Russia or Belarus. They are voting with their feet. Political consequences in the receiving countries so far have not been dramatic. The welcome mat is still out. Relief efforts inside Ukraine are falling short of requirements.
Ukraine and Russia are major grain suppliers to world markets. Their exports will fall dramatically this year, both due to the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. This will create a price problem more than a physical supply problem. That will be felt more strongly in poorer countries that susidize bread prices, like Egypt, than in the US or other rich countries. China, a big importer, is shifting its purchases to Russia, which may help to reduce the impact on world prices.
The broader political consequences of the war are already clear. With the exception of Hungary, NATO is more unified. Western forces on NATO’s eastern flank are increasing. Finland and Sweden appear likely to join the Alliance sooner rather than later. Many countries in Africa and Asia have tried to avoid “taking sides,” but still Russia is increasingly isolated in the United Nations when it comes to discussion and voting on humanitarian issues. China has so far backed Russia, but awkwardly given its position on sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is still unclear whether Beijing is supplying the weapons Moscow has sought.
Meaningful negotiations aren’t likely
Both sides in Ukraine are hurting, but there is as yet no stalemate. It will be weeks if not months before it is clear whether one side or the other can make significant progress in the continued fighting.
Nor is there any indication of a “way out.” The war aims are compatible only if the war continues. The Ukrainians have emphasized from the first their willingness to talk. Their aims in doing so have been limited to humanitarian issues and re-establishing sovereign control of Ukrainian territory. The Russians have met with the Ukrainians repeatedly, but with delegations that don’t appear to have authority over military forces. Supposed agreements break down while President Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons if the West continues to aid Ukraine.
That threat is one the Americans have to take seriously. The only way of deterring it is to make clear that it would trigger an American response, not in Ukraine but against Russia. There is enormous peril embarking on a course that leads to mutually assured destruction, but it is the only known route to preventing nuclear war. Extension of the American nuclear umbrella to Ukraine would, ironically, make Ukraine all but a de facto member of NATO, precisely what Russia claims it wants to avoid.
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The odds are bad, but Biden is aiming high
President Biden has often talked about Ukraine in recent days, but he never specifies clear goals. He presumably wants to avoid raising expectations and leave himself the option of settling for less. Can we interpolate his goals from what he and the Ukrainians say and do in public?
The evidence
I think so. Here are some hints:
- He has disappointed the Ukrainians by ruling out a “no-fly” zone. This is intended to avoid a direct military confrontation of NATO with Russia. But one way or another Biden has managed to send all the kit they have asked for. That apparently now includes aircraft or aircraft parts. If there is anything still lacking, it might be air defense systems. But those are complicated and difficult to operate without extensive training.
- The Ukrainians don’t complain about lack of intelligence information. Their success in the first phase of the war appears to have been due in part to an uncanny (and likely well-informed) ability to anticipate Russia’s moves. The Ukrainians anticipated the assualt on Kyiv.
- The sanctions the US and EU are imposing on Russia and Russians are close to the maximum ever. It will not be easy to dial these back so long as Russian troops remain in Ukraine, even if only in Donbas and Crimea. The sanctions are going to crater the Russian economy. That will drive Moscow into economic dependence on and subservience to China, if President Xi is willing. There is no sign the US is planning for a return to the status quo ante.
- Biden has called out Putin as a war criminal responsible for genocide. That rules out any Western negotiation with him as well as any chance for rehabilitation. The President has made it clear his statements were not intended as an official legal determination. But neither he nor any Western leader other than Hungary’s Prime Minister Orban will ever risk meeting with Putin again.
- Biden has explicitly expressed the hope Putin will not remain in power after the war.
What Biden wants
The evidence is clear: Biden is seeking a resounding defeat of Russia, including if possible complete withdrawal from Ukrainian territory and Putin’s removal from office. Of course the Americans may have to settle for less. The human costs to Ukraine of chasing Russia completely from Donbas and especially Crimea could be high. Putin may cling to power, as his pal Bashar al Assad has done in Syria. Though he is still popular in Russia, Putin won’t allow a serious, competitive election. He has murdered and imprisoned his two principal antagonists and shut off the rest from media access.
The laws of politics have not been revoked
Biden himself faces an important mid-term election in Novmber. One-third of the Senate and the entire House are at stake. Current odds favor the Republicans. Biden needs a hat trick to turn the tide in his own favor:
- The COVID-19 epidemic needs to definitively subside.
- The economy needs to continue to grow but inflation needs to decline sharply.
- The Ukraine war nneeds to turn out well for the Ukrainians, or at least seem to be heading in that direction.
The odds for all three of these outcomes are low. At 50/50 for each, we are talking a 1 in 8 chance of success, if I’ve calculated right. But what were the odds that President Zelensky would turn out to be an effective communicator and international statesman? Who knew that Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine would flee away from the Russian invasion? What were the odds the Ukrainian army had learned to fight so well in the years since failing to confront the Russians effectively in 2014? What were the odds that Ukrainians would prove brave patriots?
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Stevenson’s army, April 20
– WaPo has updated list of weapons headed for Ukraine.
– NYT story on same topic notes US isn’t giving longer range weapons that can hit inside Russia.
– US says no more ASAT tests. Politico has more.
– DIA releases report on “Challenges to Security in Space”
– CRS issues new report on Russian nukes.
– Just before US officials arrive, Solomon Islands sign pact with China.
– WSJ tells how US-Saudi relations have fractured.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Russia is losing the war even when it wins
The Russians have now adjusted their aggression in Ukraine. They have abandoned for now the homicidal but fruitless assault on Kyiv. Instead they are now focused on enlarging the areas they already controlled in Donbas and ensuring a land bridge to Crimea along the coast of the Sea of Azov. They also continue to bombard Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv.
This new war plan makes far more sense than the original one. The areas in question are contiguous to territory Moscow already controls. The limited objectives are commensurate with the forces Moscow has available. Russian speakers inhabit much of the coastline in question, though by now most of them have fled westward.
The Russians are gaining ground but at high cost
The Russian assault has gained some ground in the east and south. But the effort is ponderous and costly. They have lost eight generals. If the ratio of generals to troops is the same in Ukraine as in the Russian army, that likely means they have lost at least 15-20,000 troops (killed) plus wounded and exhausted. But generals are harder to kill than soldiers, so that number may be low. It is roughly consistent with NATO’s guesstimate.
The Russian gains are coming at high cost not only in manpower but also in Ukrainian infrastructure. The Russians are leveling not only power and water plants but large numbers of apartments and businesses, especially in besieged Mariupol. If you are planning to occupy territory, destroying its civilian infrastructure is not so smart. Murdering and raping the locals is also not a good idea, as they are not likely to take mistreatment lightly. But that is precisely what the Russian forces retreating from north of Kyiv did.
The strategic outcome is no longer in doubt
These tactical mistakes compound the strategic ones. Ukraine will not be a friend to Russia in the future. When the people you are liberating flee away from your army, you are doing something wrong. If all, or more likely part, of Ukraine is occupied, the population will resist. Putin doubted that Ukrainian national identity is real, but Ukrainians no longer do. They are standing up to defend their country’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. That is a big strategic loss for Russia.
Any territory the Russians occupy will remain unreconstructed, as the West won’t pay and the Russians won’t have the money. Colin Powell’s antique store dictum (“you break it, you buy it”) will saddle Moscow will an enormous burden. Russia doesn’t even have the kind of excess population required to re-populate any parts of Ukraine it occupies. China, which has both the money and the population, will be far more interested in economically penetrating the European Union than supporting a costly Russian satrapy in Donbas.
The geopolitical situation looks no better. Russian aggression has brought strengthened NATO forces to its eastern members, all of whom now understand the risks they run if Moscow succeeds in Ukraine. They are funneling arms and training to the Ukrainians. Finland and Sweden are readying membership applications for the Alliance. Russian threats against them as well as the Baltics, Poland, and other NATO members for supplying weapons to Ukraine are falling on deaf ears. Republicans in the US Congress are muting their Russophilia. Even Turkey is sympathetic with Ukraine. NATO hasn’t been this unified since the Cold War.
Russia’s interests and Putin’s are diverging
Russia needs an end to this war, sooner rather than later. It can’t do that by continuing the fight, which will prolong the agony. But Putin’s interests are not the same as Russia’s. He likely can’t survive in power if Russians conclude the war was lost or that it was a colossal mistake. Hence the massive repression Putin is exercising inside Russia, which has lost all pretence of democratic norms. Putin often says Russia is fighting Nazis in Ukraine, but his own behavior now resembles Hitler’s far more than Ukrainian President Zelensky’s.
Russian aggression in Ukraine was ill-conceived and ill-executed. But so long as Putin is in charge, it will continue. Only if there is a serious threat to his hold on power will he reconsider. President Biden’s references to Putin as a genocidal war criminal are intended to signal US readiness to support an alternative. The Russian security elite, Putin’s oligarchs, and the Russian people have however so far failed to mount a serious effort against him. But that is not to say they never will. Some day they may conclude the obvious: Russia is losing the war even when it is winning.
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Stevenson’s army, April 18
– Chicago Council poll shows continued strong support for help to Ukraine.
– AP reports GOP demands on COMPETES act.
– NYRB reviews Yovanovitch, Vindman and Hill books on Trump and Ukraine. Note well the quotes from Max Weber.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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