Tag: United States
Stevenson’s army, June 20
On this new federal holiday, commemorating the announcement of the end of slavery in Texas in 1865, WaPo has one of its historical stories [Retropolis] noting that, just before Lincoln’s inauguration, Congress passed a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing the continuation of slavery in states where it existed. Lincoln supported the amendment as a way of preventing civil war. It was not ratified by enough states, but author Ben Winter wrote an intriguing novel [Underground Airlines] assuming we still had slavery in four states today.
– Germany is restarting its coal-fired plants to cope with Russian cuts in energy.
– Task & Purpose says USAF should re-think, given the Ukraine war.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Wishful thinking won’t end this war
I have a lot of respect for my SAIS colleague Chris Chivvis. He argues that Ukraine should start the reconstruction process as soon as possible (which the headline writer interpreted as “end the war” as soon as possible). To his credit, Chris admits that “…de facto acceptance of a divided Ukraine, even if not de jure, means a hostile, potentially disruptive Russia on the border.”
Rhetorically appealing
Chris’ argument is rhetorically appealing:
Ukraine wins by seizing the opportunity, while its still can, to immediately begin a massive, western-funded reconstruction effort that turbo-charges its political and economic integration into Europe, strengthens its security, and speeds it down the path toward a democratic future. Ukraine wins by demonstrating the extraordinary resilience of political and economic liberalism to the world and starting that process as soon as possible, not in five years when the country is destroyed and the world has moved on. Ukraine wins by stopping Russia from extinguishing its independence, which so far has been miraculously preserved, but remained at risk until the fighting stops. Ukraine wins by channeling the national energy that has been generated by the war into a better peace and a stronger, more prosperous nation.
Sounds great.
But it’s not realistic
If only all that were possible. The trouble is the enemy gets a vote. There will be no peace for Ukraine so long as Russia remains undefeated, an occupation power on Ukrainian territory. Moscow still controls several major ports and embargoes Ukrainian exports from the others.
If the war ends tomorrow, Moscow will use nonmilitary means to undermine Ukraine. Those will include cyber attacks, disinformation, economic manipulation, assassinations, terrorist incidents, violent demonstrations, support to organized crime and corruption, and a host of other measures I can’t yet imagine. But we have already seen all the ones I cite in the Balkans, Syria, and other places where Moscow has pretensions. Until it suffers a clear defeat, Russia will also use any letup in the Ukraine war to undermine Moldova (not a NATO member) and Poland (a NATO member. It will also raise the threat to the Baltic states as well as NATO aspirants Finland and Sweden. And it will intensify its destabilization efforts in the Balkans.
Western support will wane
I have no doubt President Zelensky would like to end the war as soon as possible. He has said as much from the first. He knows what Chris knows. The longer it goes on, the more politics in Europe and US will start to turn against Ukraine. Many of the West’s friends and enemies understand full well that democracies today find it hard to outlast autocracies. Support for Ukraine has so far held up well. But rising energy prices, more general inflation, a possible recession, and other domestic concerns will undermine support for Ukraine, which so far has held up well.
But the situation is not yet ripe
But now is not the time to throw in the towel and hope Moscow will leave Ukraine to its Western aspirations. The time to think about a negotiated end of the war is when Kiev and Moscow both think they can gain more at the negotiating table than by continuing the fight. That day has not yet come. Ending the fighting now is possible, but it won’t allow the kind of reconstruction and progress Chris wants. Wishful thinking and rhetorical appeal won’t end this war.
Stevenson’s army, June 15, afternoon edition
– Half of the people in each party now predict US will “cease to be a democracy”
– European opinion dividing over Ukraine.
– Having overestimated Russian military capabilities, US intelligence now wonders whether it understands Chinese military.
– Xi reaffirms support for Putin.Defense
– Marine Major urges rethinking US military manpower system.
– And an Air Force colonel suggests seeking air denial rather than air supremacy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Only one thing is for sure
The Congressional January 6 committee Thursday previewed its compelling case against Donald Trump. He not only incited the riot that day but helped plan multiple efforts to overthrow the constitutional order. The purpose was to enable Trump to stay in office, despite having lost the election. The committee is not mandated to assess criminal liability, but it left no doubt about Trump’s intentions and moral culpability.
Will it make a difference?
Sadly, none of this will make a difference. Trump’s supporters come in many varities, but precious few care about the facts or are open to argument. They support him no matter what. While pledging allegiance to the constitution, they have no compunction about shredding it. They know full well that there was no evidence of election fraud that would change the outcome. Their resistance to acknowledging the facts is the ultimate white privilege. The Trumpians think the people who voted for Biden, especially the minorities but also their fellow travelers, shouldn’t count, so Trump really won.
The fraud next time
The January 6 crowd was crude. The next effort to block a Democrat from the White House will be far more sophisticated. It will rely on gerrymandered state legislative and Congressional districts, secretaries of state and state legislatures in battleground states who jigger the election rules, Republican governors committed to unfree and unfair elections, and a Senate that overrepresents less populated parts of the country.
Trump won’t be on the ballot in 2024, for many reasons. His personal financial and legal troubles are overwhelming. He is physically decrepit. His candidacy would arouse a massive Democratic turnout. There are younger and more energetic pretenders ready to carry his mantle. An indictment in the middle of the campaign would be catastrophic for Republicans up and down the ticket. The big money that supports Trump will want someone else.
But Trumpism lives on
The main thing for all of Trump’s supporters is to keep his legacy alive. That means continuing his racist appeal, blocking government action on climate change, epidemics, and other public challenges, interfering with women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, blocking the advance of people of color and immigrants, stopping the teaching of real history and good literature, and lowering taxes for the wealthy. Trump is a reactionary, not a conservative. He has opposed virtually every inch of social progress in the 30 years or so prior to his election. Whoever the Republican candidate is in 2024 will need to continue his radical approach, with a cooler temperament. Read Youngkin or De Santis, or someone else of their more clever ilk.
The Democrats need unity
It is far less clear what the Democrats stand for, because their party is a big tent. Despite my personal preferences, the backlash against more liberal policies on policing is obvious, but on many Democrats still want to restrain the use of excessive force. Democrats generally favor more equity, less racial bias, stronger government action to set the rules of the economic game, and more social responsibility, but that leaves lots of room for important differences. The big tent enables a broader voter base, but it also hurts voter enthusiasm. Democrats need more unity, at least in what they oppose if not in what they favor.
The outcome is uncertain
I see lots of predictions that the Democrats will take a shellacking in 2022 in both the Senate and House races, perhaps losing control of both chambers. There is good reason to predict that outcome. It is the usual fate of incumbent presidents, current polling suggests it, Republicans have done their damndest to limit the right to vote, and relatively high inflation is making Americans blanche.
That said, it is still too early to be predicting the election outcome four months hence. A downturn in inflation, a Ukrainian victory against Russia, a real end to the epidemic, and half a dozen other factors could help the Democrats, or hurt them more. Only one thing is for sure: if you support the constitution, you shouldn’t be voting Republican.
Watch this, as I can’t get it to embed here: https://uw-media.usatoday.com/embed/video/7576089001?placement=snow-embed
Stevenson’s army, June 4
– Fred Kaplan sees a long struggle.
– In the FT, UK’s Lawrence Freedman says time is on Ukraine’s side.
– I’m more dubious, because —
-WaPo reports lower troop morale among Ukrainians.
– WaPo says Putin expects Ukraine support to weaken.
– And this from WSJ:
The problem for Kyiv—and for Western European governments proposing a cease-fire—is that Russia has seized much of the industrial heartlands of Ukraine’s east and vast tracts of its fertile agricultural land, while blocking Ukraine’s access to the sea, needed for exports.
That threatens to leave Ukraine as a barely viable state surviving on Western giving. Ukraine needs roughly $5 billion every month to cover essential government services and keep its battered economy functioning, officials in Kyiv have said, in addition to humanitarian aid and armaments.
– Estonia’s government has collapsed, in part because of Russia issues.
– Bloomberg says US is still revising National Security Strategy to account for Russian threat.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stagnation is not the worst or the best
The Balkans region is stagnating. Talks for normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina have stalled. Belgrade, after promising changes in its policy on Ukraine, is still siding with Russia. Electoral reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dead letter. Montenegro has a new caretaker government whose mandate is to prepare for elections a year hence. Bulgaria is blocking EU accession negotiations with both Macedonia and Albania.
It could be worse
The law of bicycles prevails in the Balkans. If things aren’t moving, balance is difficult and collapse more likely.
Serbia could try to copy Russia’s playbook, by claiming genocide against Serbs in northern Kosovo as justification for a military move to the Ibar River. Belgrade’s mobilization of its army in response to a spat over license plates some months ago should serve as a warning. Not to mention its substantial deployment of forces along the boundary/border with Kosovo.
Bosnia’s Serb member of the collective presidency, Milorad Dodik, could run out of the thin salami slices he has been taking to deprive Sarajevo of sovereignty and try a big move like seizing Brcko, the more or less autonomous northeastern Bosnian town that links the two wings of Republika Srpska.
The Croat nationalists in Bosnia could try to constitute their own entity and withdraw from the country’s central institutions. Unrest in Macedonia could bring down a reform-minded, pro-EU government and even precipitate interethnic conflict.
It could also be better
Sad to say, the idea of Europe “whole and free” is dying, not only in Ukraine. In the Balkans, there are countries truly committed to a liberal democratic, European future and some that aren’t. Under today’s Alexandar Vucic, Serbia is not. Nor is Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of whose ethnic nationalist political parties oppose one person/one vote. Montenegro is on the fence, due largely to russophilic, pro-Serb political parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church, both of which have gotten a lot of traction lately. Macedonia and Albania want to move in the European direction. It is Bulgarian ethnic nationalism, which denies the existence of Macedonian identity, that is creating problems.
Making things better will require a concerted European and American effort to champion liberal democracy in the Balkans. There is no reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina to have a tripartite presidency and tripartite everything else more than 25 years after the war the ethnic nationalists perpetrated on its territory. That is a constitutional, not an electoral law, issue. Montenegro needs a government that can retake the lead in pushing implementation of EU requirements. Bulgaria needs to back off its obstruction of accession talks with Macedonia and Albania. There will be plenty of opportunity before those are complete to resolve the language and identity issues.
The EU and US are aligned but not punching at their weight
To make good things happen in the Balkans has always required the US and EU to be aligned. They now are. With Trump’s silly nonsense gone, serious American and European negotiators are in charge again. The current problem is the heavy lifting required is not readily available. Europe is too divided. Five EU members don’t recognize Kosovo. One, Hungary, is sympathetic to Russian and Serbian nationalist goals. Another, Croatia, is blatantly interfering in Bosnia’s internal affairs to benefit a political party it controls.
The Americans face a steep climb to get the President and Secretary of State to pay more than lip service to Balkan issues, which fall well down the list of priorities. NATO allies Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia need some high-level pounding.
Risks are real even if not imminent
The risks are real, but not necessarily imminent. NATO is presumably alert to Serbian military moves. Dodik is on a shorter leash than at times in the past. Serbia doesn’t want him to move toward Republika Srpska independence, for fear of screwing up Belgrade’s cozy relationship with Brussels and Washington. Bosnia’s electoral law is still in force. If nationalist Croats boycott October’s vote, that will be counterproductive for them in terms of representation and might even offer an opportunity for constitutional reform, which is really what is needed. Montenegro is capable of muddling through. Macedonia and Albania could well use the delay Bulgaria has caused to prepare themselves better to meet EU requirements, especially for rule of law.
Washington and Brussels have decided to focus their immediate attention on the Bulgaria/Macedonia issues. That is understandable, as resolving (or postponing) those would enable both Macedonia and Albania to proceed with EU accession negotiations and give a boost to pro-EU forces throughout the Balkans. But it is not enough. The US and EU need to improve their own performance in exacting better diplomatic results in the Balkans across the board. I’m a professor. B in the 21st century is not a good grade.