Tag: United States
One more Trump first
I know we are all focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but in the meanwhile the Congressional committee investigating January 6 is considering referring Donald Trump for prosecution:
This is good news, as it both nails the January 6 assault on the Capitol as criminal and also assigns accountability to the then President. That’s a first for the US Congress and a past President. Now let’s see what the Department of Justice will do with it.
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Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
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Stevenson’s army, February 26
-WH wants Ukraine supplemental.
– Administration debates arming a Ukrainian insurgency.
– Former CIA official describes such an insurgency.
– NYT sees Russian attack slowed.
– NYT sees pro-Russian sentiment online.
Good background: WaPo ticktock on Biden actions in 2 weeks before the invasion
– NYT annotates Putin war speech.
For people under 30, most of Europe [Balkans excepted] has been at peace, democratic, with freedom of movement of people and goods. That era has ended. We’re back to 19th century politics with 21st century weapons. The first sad lesson about Ukraine that comes to me is what the Indian defense minister said right after the Gulf War in 1991: “Never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons.” Ukraine surrendered theirs in return for security guarantees from the US and Russia.
On domestic politics, see this centrist Democratic critique of the party’s direction.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 25
You’ll have to follow the war news on your own. WaPo NYT & others have live updates.
Here are some pieces I found interesting:
–Background on Daleep Singh, the NSC guy on sanctions. He forecast what is happening.
– SAIS Prof Hal Brands on the ChIna-Russia connection.
– NYT background on US dealings with China about Russia.
– Chinese foreign ministry press conference on Ukraine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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First bite taken, but still hungry for more
Russian President Putin has made his move against Ukraine. He yesterday recognized the “independence” of Luhansk and Donetsk and deployed Russian forces. For now, they remain in territory already under Russian control. No one will swallow his “peacekeepers” line, which he has previously used in the occupied Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The irony of occupying a territory you’ve just recognized as independent seems lost on him.
There is another irony. Putin’s move is not welcome in Kyiv, but it relieves Ukraine of any lingering obligation to implement the Minsk 2 agreement. That would have given Luhansk and Donetsk some say-so, if not a veto, in Kyiv. But there would still have been no near-term prospect of reintegrating them with the rest of the country. If Kyiv continues on the path of serious political and economic reform, it will be clear soon enough to the remaining residents of the secessionist territory where their bread is best buttered.
Crimea, which Russia has annexed and militarized, is a separate question.
The big question is how much further Putin will go. In the best of all possible worlds, he would stop now, declaring his objective achieved. That is unlikely. An obvious next move would be to occupy parts of the secessonist provinces not already under Russian control. That would be harder, but not likely too hard. He could also take part or all of Ukraine’s southern coast, focusing first on the littoral of the Sea of Azov. That approach would be more feasible for Moscow and less deadly than a full-scale invasion and occupation of the entire country.
Full-scale invasion would be colosally stupid
Some think however that Putin is in the first stage of a full-scale invasion aimed at occupying all of Ukraine. That would be colosally stupid:
- Ukraine is a country of 44 million people, larger than Iraq or Afghanistan when the US invaded them. It is the second largest in Europe, next to Russia.
- Even if every one of the 150,000 Russian troops in the invasion force were to enter Ukraine, there would still be 300 Ukrainians for every Russian.
- Past experience suggests a force of over 650,000 would be required for a comparable “heavy” peacekeeping operation, 80,000 or so for a “light” one in which the local security forces are cooperative. In Ukraine, they won’t be.
- The direct costs would range up to $100 billion if things go well, not counting the economic impact.
- Moscow is claiming the West is weak so now is the time to strike, but there are lots of indications that the West is united and not so weak. The sanctions it imposes will be unprecedented and punishing if Russia tries to take all of Ukraine.
- Putin believes in a history of Ukraine and its relations with Russia that is at best fabricated and at worst delusional.
- It makes no sense to invade a country whose population you claim are your “brothers” or to occupy one you’ve just recognized as independent.
- Russia has been alleging Ukrainian provocations that are blatant lies.
- Moscow wants Ukraine not to join NATO, but it knows that is not in the cards for at least another decade, if ever.
- The Russian invasion threat has made NATO membership far more desirable to many Ukrainians than it once was. Removing Luhansk and Donetsk from Kyiv’s control subtracts a lot of anti-NATO people from the political equation inside Ukraine.
Moscow theater
Putin started yesterday staging a National Security Council meeting that looked more like a school room listening to his dull lecture:
Then these top officials took turns glumly lying to the press about Ukrainian provocations. Putin wrapped the day with his recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk. The Soviets were better at this, but the performance was in their tradition.
The Western reaction
Ukraine and the West will not accept the already announced partition or full-scale occupation. Yesterday, the Americans announced sanctions on the economy and secessionist authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk. That won’t frighten Putin or anyone else. Far more effective is German Chancellor Scholz’s halt to the administrative procedure needed to open the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. That will get some attention in Moscow, but it is also painful in Berlin.
The West needs to be ready to react with more vigorous and united sanctions. But we also need not hit so hard that Putin concludes we have nothing left in reserve. The European security order is at stake in Ukraine. Washington should ensure the punishment for undermining that order is not only severe but can also get worse.
Putin has taken his first bite, but he is hungry for more.
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Putin is hesitating but not yet lost
Russian President Putin has given his military orders to prepare for the invasion of Ukraine, but he is hesitating to give the green light. The French claim he has agreed to a meeting with President Biden following on a meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Blinken February 24. For the Americans, all of this is contingent on the Russians not invading Ukraine. Moscow says there are no plans for a presidential meeting.
What is going on? There are several possible explanations:
- Military preparations are not yet complete.
- Putin is not satisfied with his domestic support in Russia and Donbas.
- The Chinese warning against invastion has given him pause.
- Diplomatic efforts are promising.
- The Western threat of sanctions is deterring action.
Military preparations
I’m no military expert, but journalists report that Russian commanders have everything they need to proceed. Blood supplies and field hospitals were already in place by last week. Putin was lying when he said Russian forces were drawing down. They are now up to 150,000, enough to seize and control a piece of the country but not enough to occupy its entire territory.
I still am not inclined to believe the Russian objective is to seize Kyiv. I think they aim to make the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. A movement toward Kyiv might make the Ukrainians draw down in the south. But a serious attack on Kyiv would cause devastation that would be difficult for the Russians ever to repair, not to mention Ukrainian hostility and resistance.
Support in Russia and in Donbas
Russia’s parliament has already urged Putin to recognize the independence of the Russian proxy authorities in Donestk and Luhansk, as he has done for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The de facto authorities in Donbas have ordered an evacuation of civilians, many of whom have been getting Russian citizenship.
But they are for the most part not departing, even though the rebel military forces have ratcheted up the bombardment of Ukrainian targets to provoke a response. The popular mood in Russia does not favor full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But extending Russian control in the Donbas area would not prove highly problematic either in Russia or in the insurgent portion of Donbas.
Chinese opposition
President Xi did not give Putin the full-throated endorsement he sought for invasion of Ukraine when they met at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Then last week the Chinese Foreign Minister used the occasion of the Munich Security Conference to back Russia’s position on keeping Ukraine out of NATO but also to pull the rug out from under Putin’s invasion plans.
China favors continued diplomacy instead. Russia will desperately need China to help in sanctions-busting if the invasion proceeds. Beijing however wants to avoid further aggravation of relations with the US. Putin needs again to seek and get Chinese reassurance.
Diplomatic efforts
There is little sign that diplomatic efforts are bearing fruit. According to French President Macron, Putin has agreed to meet with Ukraine and the OSCE. But that is thin gruel.
The US has rejected Russia’s demand that Washington guarantee no NATO membership for Ukraine. Moscow has continued to insist. The Americans have tried to shift the diplomatic agenda to mutual arms and conventional force limitations. They hope Russia will view those as responsive to Moscow’s effort to roll back NATO forces from its borders. Putin however isn’t buying. He wants Russian forces right on the borders of the Baltics, Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine.
Sanctions
Sanctions are a likely factor in Putin’s hesitation. Britain is prepared to end Russia’s access to pounds and British property. The Americans are presumably ready to do likewise. For a country that depends on oil and gas exports, both normally denominated in dollars or another hard currency, that is major.
We don’t know what German Chancellor Scholz said to Putin during his visit last week to Moscow. But President Biden has repeatedly asserted that the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline (completed but not yet operational) is toast “one way or the other” if Russia invades. We don’t know what that means. Scholz likely does. He has shown no sign of disagreeing with Biden.
Bottom lines
Putin holds his cards close, but he is hesitating. I’d give sanctions and the China factor each 40% as factors in his hesitation. Support in Russia and Donbas as well as military preparations I’d each put at 10% each. The diplomatic factor is important only insofar as Blinken continues to reassure Putin that the Americans are still willing to negotiate. That gives him reason not to hurry while he gets China and sanctions-busting fixed.
Still, invasion is more likely than not. Putin is hesitating, but he is not yet lost.
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