Tag: United States
Maybe smaller is better, for now
I’ve been getting questions lately about the EU-sponsored dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Will it restart in earnest? Is it just moribund or stone cold dead?
Certainly it has been unproductive. We are approaching the 10th year since the Brussels “political” agreement of 2013. A decade of stasis in the Balkans risks unraveling regional peace and stability. Just listen to Dugin:
So is there hope for progress?
The moment is not propitious. Serbia has aligned itself with Russia, not only on Ukraine, and the Serb-ruled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Moscow’s lap dog, as Dugin makes clear. The US, UK, and the European Union are preoccupied with helping the Ukrainians respond to Russian aggression. The Balkan region is way down the list of urgencies.
Besides, the 2022 and 2024 US elections will soon focus American attention on domestic issues. Everyone in the Balkans will be holding their breath to see if Donald Trump has a real chance of returning to the White House. If it looks good for him, Serbia will want to continue to pause the dialogue with Kosovo, as Trump was sympathetic to Belgrade’s territorial ambitions. If Pristina wants anything from the dialogue, it needs to get it soon.
Acknowledgement of abuses may be a non-starter
Listening to both Kosovo President Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti’s public statements, my sense is that they would both like Serbian President Vucic to acknowledge the abuses of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in the 1990s. Vucic, who served in that regime, has been unwilling, both in public and in private. He suffers from a severe case of amnesia and “bothsideism.” Kurti, who spent time reading Sartre in a Serbian prison during the 1999 war, remembers well. Neither has a domestic political constituency that yearns for an agreement.
But Vucic’s acknowledgement of the Serbian effort to ethnically cleanse Albanians from Kosovo and of the thousands of rapes by Serbian forces would open the way to improved cooperation, as exhorted in the 2010 General Assembly resolution that launched the dialogue. Kurti would need to acknowledge Albanian abuses against Serbs and Roma, even if much smaller in number. Such acknowledgements would need to be coupled with as full accounting for missing people by both governments as possible. That would clear the way for exchange of bodies and provision for appropriate memorialization in both countries.
License plates should be easier
There should be room to resolve the issue that caused a brouhaha last fall: mutual acceptance of license plates. So far negotiations for a permanent solution have failed, due to Serbia’s refusal to allow Kosovo plates to enter the country with indications of where they originate. The current practice–covering state symbols on both Kosovo and Serbian plates before allowing entry–is a modest improvement on Serbia’s prior requirement that Kosovo plates be replaced with Serbian ones, but it is still wasteful and juvenile.
Accepting license plates and Kosovo documents is not the same as recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. The five non-recognizing members of the EU accept lots of Kosovo documents and also maintain diplomatic representation in Pristina. Serbia should do likewise.
Electricity is harder
Pristina wants the Serbs in northern Kosovo to start paying for electricity, which a Kosovo entity has provided free since 1999. This is reasonable, but if Pristina insists Belgrade may supply the electricity from Serbia, further detaching the northern municipalities from Pristina’s governance, an important Serbian objective. As tens of millions of euros are at issue, this one won’t be easy to resolve on its own. A broader financial settlement may be possible.
Hedging and bandwagoning
While these issues eat away at mutual confidence, Serbia has been re-arming itself and deploying forces near and around Kosovo. Belgrade tells Washington Serbian cooperation with NATO is much deeper and more important than cooperation with Russia. But the Defense Ministry vaunts a historical maximum in defense cooperation with Russia, which has provided fighter jets and tanks as well as lots of other goodies. Vucic has increasingly aligned himself politically and militarily with Moscow and Beijing, not only on Ukraine. He claims non-alignment, but hedging is difficult in an era of geopolitical tension. He has tilted way over to the East. Dugin knows of what he speaks.
By contrast, Kosovo has no hedging option so bandwagons with NATO, which is still responsible for defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pristina’s army, which the US and UK mentor, is slated to be fully operational in 2027. It will be NATO compatible. A few of its soldiers have already deployed with the Americans. Kosovo quickly welcomed Afghan and now Ukrainian refugees, aligns solidly with sanctions on Russia, and is providing de-mining training to Ukrainians.
So the dialogue is not just between Kosovo and Serbia, but also between West and East. As Lenin put it: “show me who your friends are, and I will tell you what you are.”
Maybe smaller is better for now
The situation is not “ripe” for a big agreement. Before 2010, when the more political version was launched, the dialogue focused on small, “technical” issues like Kosovo’s international calling code, return of cultural artifacts, and mutual recognition of diplomas. Maybe it is time to go back to those–including missing persons and license plates. Another possibility is a regional negotiation of basic principles of mutual behavior, which are sorely lacking. Neither idea is as grand as “normalizing relations” or mutual recognition. But maybe smaller is better for now.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, May 10
– Politico says war has forced change in Biden trade policy.
– Atlantic article says Russia has failed to use air power in Ukraine.
– NYT says US is deeper into Ukraine war.
– China angry over changes in US website about Taiwan.
– Both US parties seen as extreme.
– Army analyst doubts US ability to fight war of attrition.
– Peter Beinart hits Biden on Iran deal.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Senator needs to go deeper
Senator Murphy of Connecticut is just back from a quick trip to the still troubled parts of the Balkans (Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pristina). He has written a literate and interesting account of the trip. Would that all Codels could do likewise.
The Bosnia mistake
That said, I think he makes serious mistakes. Jasmin Mujatovic has pointed out one on Twitter:
Very specifically, Sen. Murphy frames the scene in the Bosnian presidency as a kind of war of each against all. Clearly, not the case, as it’s Dzaferovic & Komsic attempting to hold the line vs. Dodik’s constant provocations & threats, as D’s own subsequent comments make clear. Bosnia is not a land on intractable, tribal feuds. It’s a place where a decades-long attempt to break up the country along sectarian lines by extremist actors, backed by Belgrade primarily but now also Russia, is being necessarily opposed. Let’s be clear about the politics of it.
Jasmin is also concerned that the Senator is too chummy with Serbian President Vucic.
The Kosovo mistake
The root of that chumminess is clear in the Senator’s account: Vucic often dines with Murphy when the President is in Washington. It would be hard for Murphy to have the same relationship with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti, who is Vucic’s functional equivalent in Kosovo. Kurti has not been permitted an official visit to Washington since taking office. This is because Washington blames him for the lack of progress in the dialogue with Belgrade. The Senator seems to agree with that characterization.
I don’t. The only obstacle to achieving what the Senator identifies as the main objective of the dialogue–mutual recognition by the two sovereign and independent states–is Serbia’s refusal to consider the proposition. The dialogue would just be a normal conversation between neighbors except for that.
Irredentism in the Balkans is just as bad as in Ukraine
Serbia has offered only one alternative to mutual recognition: Belgrade de jure control (either through a land swap or through an Association of Serb Municipalities with executive powers) over the Serb-majority population north of the Ibar river in Kosovo. This irredentist ambition is just as dangerous in the Balkans as Russia’s comparable ambition to control the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces of Ukraine. And Serbia’s irredentism is less well-founded. The pre-war population of the largest and most important municipalilty north of the Ibar was not majority Serb. Most Serbs in Kosovo still live south of the Ibar.
There is no sign in the Senator’s account of his visit to Belgrade that he admonished Vucic for his territorial ambitions in Kosovo or his support for Milorad Dodik’s secessionism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I hope that when he convenes his task force in the Congress, the Senator will ensure that these issues are top priority in the discussion. They should also be on the menu when he next dines with President Vucic. The Senator needs to go deeper.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Another long war in the offing
Mark Hertling, a retired lieutenant general who knows his stuff, offers on Twitter a good explanation of what is going on inside Ukraine:
Ukrainians currently outgunned, but not forever
A few weeks ago, as the “new phase” was being discussed, I suggested we should look for a couple things happening in the east and south of Ukraine. We’re very early in that new phase & there are indicators those things are happening. Let’s review what we should see. What RU has done is reinforce with lots (repeat, LOTS) of tube and rocket artillery. That is according to RU doctrine. To penetrate an enemy’s defense, RU uses mass artillery barrages all along the front. They’ve been doing that. And it is deadly.
There’s two ways to counter massive artillery strikes. 1. Get out from under it (giving up land) 2. Conduct counterfire with your own artillery after pinpointing the enemy’s guns with radar. While Ukraine’s army (UA from here out) have some Russian 152 mm cannons, and they are receiving LOTS of guns (155 mm cannons) from the US & NATO, there’s 2 problems. 1. UA is running low on 152 (Russian) ammo 2. The western guns/ammo ain’t there yet.
Yeah, yeah, I know @PentagonPresSec said the guns/radars are arriving fast, and *some* are already there. But they’re not all at the front, with the ammo, just yet. Things just don’t magically move to the front & get into the fight immediately in combat. A seque: during combat our division fielded MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protective) trucks, due to an IED threat. Trucks. Not hard to learn. Not hard to drive. No triggers to pull. It took us awhile. Fact: fielding ANY new equipment to units in combat takes time.
So there will be counterfire fights between RU and UA, but it might be awhile. So UA has to give up ground. When they do that, the RU will send in “reconnaissance in force” or RFI. Small combat units to take limited objectives in multiple places. That’s what we’re seeing now in several locations in the east & south. Lots of Russian artillery barrages against the front line, followed by smaller RU combat units attempting to seize terrain/cities/critical objectives. RU artillery is working.
The RU maneuver forces……are undermanned, not well supplied, not well led, are on ground they’re not familiar with, and they don’t do maneuver all that well. So we’re seeing RU forces temporarily take ground, then being pushed back by the smart, better led, more adaptive active defense of the UA. Finally…we’re about 7-10 days (at best) into this second phase. It will go for awhile. New forces are feeling each other out in the east. RU will initially outgun with arty, then it may become a big arty duel. But UA maneuver force will outperform the RU.
The other front
The other front is in Washington DC. There President Biden has launched a money salvo. He is asking for $33 billion more to support Ukraine. That is a lot of money, on top of $17 billion or so already spent. The Americans are also talking about using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.
These moves betoken a broadening of US objectives. Defense Secretary Austin says he wants to weaken Russia so it can’t in the future invade other countries. President Biden has labelled President Putin a genocial war criminal who should not remain in power. Secretary of State Biden is more circumspect, but it is clear that the Americans are now aiming for a clear Russian defeat and Putin’s fall from power (at the hands of his own people, Biden has clarified). These things are not happening anytime soon, so anticipate a long war and even more spending.
The Russians are also going long
The Russians have also changed their objectives. They gave up on capturing Kyiv and installing a puppet government there. Now they aim to take all of Donetsk and Luhansk in the east and the entire southern coast, most of which they already control. But they are stalled at Mykolaiv and will have a hard time swallowing a big city like Odesa, which had about one million inhabitants before the war.
The only major city they have taken so far is Mariupol, which they had to destroy to occupy. Resistance there continues. The Russians may try to use their 1500 or so troops in the Moldovan region of Transnistria to attack Ukraine from the west, but that should not be hard for the Ukrainians to counter. Russian artillery attacks on Kyiv while the UN Secretary General was visiting there signal Moscow’s determination to continue the fight, but current Russian objectives will not be achieved any time soon.
How long can Ukraine take it?
War often involves miscalculation, at least by one side or the other. Both the Americans and Russians have had to recalibrate. Only the Ukrainians have kept constant. They want to push the Russians entirely out from Ukrainian territory, but might well settle for Russian withdrawal to pre-February positions. The issue for Ukraine is how long its population can take the terrible devastation the Russians are wreaking. So far, the Ukrainians are stalwart. Another long war is in the offing.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Ukraine war creates risks and opportunities for Kosovo
I gave interviews late last week to two Kosovo outlets. Both were published in the past couple of days:
Arbnore Zhushi, Bota Sot:
Q: Do you believe that with the arrival of Christopher Hill as US Ambassador to Serbia, a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will be accelerated?
A: I might hope so, but we’ll have to wait and see. There are no signs yet that either Serbia or Kosovo s read for a “final” agreement.
Q: Seeing the Russian aggression in Ukraine, Kosovo is wanting to join the EU and NATO, how realistic are these demands?
A: They are realistic in the long-term. The right strategy is to implement the requirements of membership, then wait for the political window to open.
Q: How did you see the developments of the war in Ukraine so far?
A: Putin is losing in strategic terms even when Russian forces advance on the ground. Ukrainians will not accept Russian rule or hegemony. NATO has strengthened and unified in response to the invasion. Russia will remain under sanctions for a long time and lacks the resources needed to rebuild in Ukraine.
Q: How do you define the reaction of NATO and the West to the Russian aggression in Ukraine and do you think that enough is being done in this direction to help the Ukrainian people?
A: NATO and the West have reacted well. They need to do more, but the will seems strong.
Q: What will be the end of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, what do you think will be the scenario?
A: I hope the war in Ukraine will end with the downfall of Putin in Moscow.
Q: US President Joe Biden says Putin should leave. How close to collapse is the Russian leader actually?
A: We won’t know until the day after. There is no sign of sufficient rebellion yet in the security services, the oligarchs, or among the public.
Q: The Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti is worried that the conflict in Ukraine will affect Kosovo as well. How much of such a risk actually exists?
A: The risk is serious. If Russia succeeds in partitioning Ukraine it will encourage Serbia to once again pursue the partition of Kosovo.
Q: Serbia has not imposed sanctions on Russia for the occupation of Ukraine, how do you assess the attitude of the EU and the US towards Serbia in this case? Should Serbia be sanctioned, because it did not become an ally of the West in imposing sanctions on Russia, and its diplomacy continues to cooperate openly with Russia?
A: Serbia has chosen to side with Russia. The Americans need to recognize this and do what they can in response.
Q: Another crisis expert, Mr Bugajski, has called for talks with Serbia to be suspended because it is a party to Russia and has refused to impose sanctions on Russia. Kosovo has imposed sanctions on Russia and has adopted a resolution in the Assembly. How do you comment on this?
A: I think Kosovo should continue to talk with Serbia, mostly to avoid being blamed for failure of the Dialogue. There is little hope it will produce much under current conditions.
Q: If a Ukraine-Russia agreement is reached, which nevertheless favors Russian interests in Ukraine, such as the remaining Crimea under Russia, the recognition of a special status of the Donbas (or Luhansk and Donetsk provinces), could it complicate Kosovo’s position in the talks, and which seemed more favorable as a general war continues in Ukraine, due to the positions of Kosovo and Serbia towards the war there?
A: Let’s wait and see what the Ukrainians will agree to. My reading is that President Biden is aiming for a complete defeat of Russia in Ukraine, provided that is what the Ukrainians are willing to fight for.
Sokol Berisha, Periskopi:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is in the middle of nowhere. Do you belive that this blockade is in favour of Serbia more than in Kosovo (taking into consideration that the dialogue is crucial for Kosovo if we mention the fact the “5” EU states do not still recognize Kosovo and from the fact that Kosovo is not member of almost any important international organizations). What is your assessment regarding the importance of the dialogue?
A: The dialogue is important to Kosovo for three reasons. It puts Kosovo on an equal and symmetrical basis with Serbia. It has the potential to resolve many outstanding problems between the two countries. When it goes well it pleases the Europeans and Americans.
Q: Should the Kosovo side be more interested in the dialogue? Is Serbia benefiting from the “status quo” in this process? Although it seems like we- the people of Kosovo- are being isolated from “status qou”.
A: Serbia has played the blame game well. While offering little in the dialogue, it has convinced the EU and US that the stalemate is mostly the fault of Pristina. I thought Kosovo’s non-aggression proposal was a good way of countering that impression. Kosovo needs to come to the table with more ideas and more openness to discussion of others’ ideas. In the end, agreement will depend on whether the quid pro quo is an advantageous one. But the process is important as well.
Q: Kosovo’s isolation- without visa liberlisation and no new recognition. Is the blockade in the dialogue to be blame for this?
A: The stalemate in the dialogue doesn’t help,. But visa liberalization and new recognitions were blocked well before the current stalemate in the dialogue.
Q: The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has made it clear the Association of Serb Municipalities will not be established? According to his public statements, he has not left any other option that would lead to a final solution to the dialogue? What would be your recommendation for the Government of Kosovo for this issue?
A: I share the concern that the Association should not become an executive body or create a “Republika Srpska” inside Kosovo. But I think Pristina should look for a formula within the Constitutional Court’s parameters.
Q: Since it seems like every option in the dialogue is almost cancelled, where do you see the light at the end of the tunnel?
A: I think the problem may be a generational one. But I also think there are things to be done now that will improve the situation in the future. First and foremost are improved relations between the Serb population of Kosovo and the Pristina government, starting with implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the monastery property in Decan/Decani but going far beyond that. Vucic has given the Kosovo Serbs reason to be loyal to Belgrade. Pristina has to give them reason to be loyal to Pristina. The Serb presence in Kosovo is a vital element in its independent statehood. Any Kosovo patriot should want the rights, property, and presence of Serbs to be vigorously protected.
Q: Recently there have been some rising voices about a possible conflict in the Balkans following the war in Ukraine. Kosovo’s interior minister last week said that the police officers have been attacked in an “act of terrorism” close to the border with Serbia. Do you believe that our region can be in danger of another armed conflicted?
A: Yes, I do. Serbia is a de facto ally of Russia, with which it shares autocratic pretensions and irredentist ambitions. If Moscow is successful in Donbas, you can expect Serbia to try military force in northern Kosovo. Kosovo should be seeking, and the Americans should be transferring, Javelins and other defensive weapons to the Kosovo Security Force, so that by 2027 Kosovo will be able to defend itself without a KFOR presence.
Q: Our leaders like President Osmani and the Prime Minister Kurti are giving interviews for some prestigious news channels (such as CNN and Sky News). Ironically our doors are open for them. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kurti has not paid yet an official visit to the United States and this postponement is being looked at with great concern from the public opinion in Kosovo. What is your opinion about this?
A: Your President and Prime Minister merit being heard in the international media. They are doing a good job there. But on the question of a visit to the U.S., you’ll have to ask the Prime Minister and the Americans. I am pleased to recall that Albin spoke at Johns Hopkins, where I am a professor, many years ago, as has President Vucic. I would like to see Prime Minister Kurti back in the U.S., but such visits usually entail negotiation and conditions before they can take place.
Q: Ex-Swiss prosecutor Dick Marty, whose report was key in establishing KSC (Kosovo Specialist Chambers), has been under armed guard for nearly a year-and-a-half following death threats he believes originate from Serbia to put the blame on the Kosovars. How do you explain that this information came out recently even though it had happened some months ago? Can these claims have any impact on the overall process of Kosovo Specialist Chambers?
A: I don’t know why this news came out recently and I don’t know who is behind the death threats. Marty’s report was highly favorable to Serbia’s perspective. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers should proceed, like any respectable court, without regard to current events but focused instead on the charges and evidence before it. Its mandate should be extended to crimes committed inside Serbia, like the murder of the American Bytyqi brothers.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Clarified aims betoken longer war
Secretary of Defense Austin clarified US war aims yesterday:
We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/
Meanwhile, the Russians have clarified theirs. They want control not only of all of Donbas in eastern Ukraine but also the southern coast. That would allow them to link up with their long-standing military presence in the Transnistria region of Moldova. The pretext for the Moldova campaign is already in the works.
Ukrainian war aims have long been clear. Kyiv wants to roll the Russians back at least to their pre-February 24 control of Crimea and part of Luhansk and Donetsk. President Zelensky would no doubt like to rid Ukraine altogether of Russian troops.
These different war aims are strangely compatible. Stretched thin already, the Russians have set themselves goals that will be difficult to achieve and will attrite their remaining forces. The Americans and NATO allies are pouring supplies into the Ukrainian army in an effort to give it the resources needed to withstand the Russian offensive and to push back when the time comes.
A longer war
The result will be a longer war than Russia anticipated or Ukraine wants. The Russian army has stalled in its western push from Kherson for the better part of two months. Resistance at Mykolaiv has been stalwart. The Ukrainians have retaken most of the now ruined areas north of Kyiv that the Russians had occupied earlier in the war. In Mariupol, vital to Russian consolidation of control along the Sea of Azov, Ukrainian fighters are still making their last stand. Agreements to allow the evacuation of civilians are breaking down faster than they can be negotiated.
The question now is whether the Ukrainian army can begin to retake some areas, or at least destabilize Russian control in the south. The Russians have lost a lot of men and armor, but they remain far stronger in artillery and airpower. The Ukrainians have acquired some armor but their air defenses and artillery still remain relatively weak. Offensive guerilla operations will be far more difficult for the Ukrainians in the relatively flat and cleared areas of southern Ukraine than in the wooded and hillier north.
War has consequences
Already about one-third of the pre-war Ukrainian population of more than 41 million is displaced, 5.1 million outside the country and 7.7 million inside. Poland has received more than half the refugees. Romania, Hungary, and Moldova have received most the remainder. The vast majority of Ukrainians are fleeing west, not towards Russia or Belarus. They are voting with their feet. Political consequences in the receiving countries so far have not been dramatic. The welcome mat is still out. Relief efforts inside Ukraine are falling short of requirements.
Ukraine and Russia are major grain suppliers to world markets. Their exports will fall dramatically this year, both due to the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. This will create a price problem more than a physical supply problem. That will be felt more strongly in poorer countries that susidize bread prices, like Egypt, than in the US or other rich countries. China, a big importer, is shifting its purchases to Russia, which may help to reduce the impact on world prices.
The broader political consequences of the war are already clear. With the exception of Hungary, NATO is more unified. Western forces on NATO’s eastern flank are increasing. Finland and Sweden appear likely to join the Alliance sooner rather than later. Many countries in Africa and Asia have tried to avoid “taking sides,” but still Russia is increasingly isolated in the United Nations when it comes to discussion and voting on humanitarian issues. China has so far backed Russia, but awkwardly given its position on sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is still unclear whether Beijing is supplying the weapons Moscow has sought.
Meaningful negotiations aren’t likely
Both sides in Ukraine are hurting, but there is as yet no stalemate. It will be weeks if not months before it is clear whether one side or the other can make significant progress in the continued fighting.
Nor is there any indication of a “way out.” The war aims are compatible only if the war continues. The Ukrainians have emphasized from the first their willingness to talk. Their aims in doing so have been limited to humanitarian issues and re-establishing sovereign control of Ukrainian territory. The Russians have met with the Ukrainians repeatedly, but with delegations that don’t appear to have authority over military forces. Supposed agreements break down while President Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons if the West continues to aid Ukraine.
That threat is one the Americans have to take seriously. The only way of deterring it is to make clear that it would trigger an American response, not in Ukraine but against Russia. There is enormous peril embarking on a course that leads to mutually assured destruction, but it is the only known route to preventing nuclear war. Extension of the American nuclear umbrella to Ukraine would, ironically, make Ukraine all but a de facto member of NATO, precisely what Russia claims it wants to avoid.
RSS - Posts
