Tag: United States
Stevenson’s army, April 5
– WSJ describes some of the US planning about release of intelligence information.
-Reuters reports US blockage of Russian debt payments.
– FP writer on the options for arms control now.
– NYT reports on China’s pro-Russia propaganda.
– In WSJ Walter Russel Mead discusses “Biden’s ugly options” in Ukraine. Of course they are the West’s ugly options as well.
The first option, helping Ukraine win, is the most emotionally appealing and would certainly be the most morally justifiable and politically beneficial, but the risks and costs are high. Russia won’t accept defeat before trying every tactic, however brutal, and perhaps every weapon, however murderous. To force Russia to accept failure in Ukraine, the Biden administration would likely have to shift to a wartime mentality, perhaps including the kind of nuclear brinkmanship not seen since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. With China and Iran both committed to weakening American power by any available means, a confrontation with the revisionist powers spearheaded by Russia may prove to be the most arduous challenge faced by an American administration since the height of the Cold War.
But the other two options are also bad. A Russian victory would inflict a massive blow to American prestige and the health of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially if the West were seen as forcing Ukraine to surrender to Russian demands. Freezing the conflict is also perilous, as this would presumably leave Russia holding even more Ukrainian territory than it did following the 2014 invasions of Crimea and the Donbas. It would be hard to spin this as anything but a partial victory for Russia—and Mr. Putin would remain free to renew hostilities at a time of his choosing.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Madeleine was no madeleine
The French tarts are spongy and sweet. That would not describe Madeleine Albright. The first woman to serve as Secretary of State, in my experience she was remarkably similar in public and private. A bit stern but clear and forceful, she would push hard for her perspective on world issues.
Some liked her, some didn’t
Those who agreed with her were pleased. Ask any Albanian in Kosovo, where a bust of her stands in the center of Pristina. Those who disagreed found her flinty. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN whose second term she vetoed in the Security Council, no doubt thought her unreasonable and inflexible. She strived to be tough but fair. She mostly succeeded.
My interactions with her in recent years were limited but positive. I was in Pristina when the Kosovars dedicated her bust a few years ago. Parading in the main street with Bill Clinton, the Kosovars gave her lots of applause. But she attracted far less attention than the much taller former President, whose statue in Pristina is full-length.
I testified with her in December 2020 at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. She was as sharp and clear as always, pushing hard for democracy and human rights in the Balkans. Generous to and engaged with students, she spent an hour with my SAIS class studying relations between Belgrade and Pristina. She spent childhood years with her diplomat father in Belgrade. But because of the 1999 NATO bombing, Serbs mostly dislike her.
I also ran into her at a dentist’s office, but she was uncoiffed, so I thought it best to steer clear and avoid embarassment. I think I got that right.
Her brand
Wherever you are in the world, Madeleine’s name is instantly recognized. This is unusual. There are lots of people named Madeleine. To me, in person she was always Madame Secretary. But everyone in the State Department called her Madeleine when she wasn’t present. She was unique. She projected a clear and compelling image wherever she went. Straightforward and determined, she didn’t waffle or prevaricate. She told you what she wanted and pursued it, with skill and finesse but no hesitation. “Madeleine” was a well-defined brand.
Tony Blinken uses the same approach, though a bit more understated. After the years of Trump’s wild exaggerations and outright lies, clarity and care has returned to high-level statements on foreign policy. The hyperbole and prevarication of Trump’s incompetent Secretaries of State are gone. You may not like what the incumbent says. But you know he isn’t exaggerating and intends to be clear and compelling, not emotional and ambiguous.
This is not the unipolar moment
Madeleine was Secretary of State during the unipolar moment. The United States she adopted as her motherland could do anything it wanted in the world. The Soviet Union was gone. Russia was a basket case. China was not yet an economic powerhouse. Iran and North Korea were relatively small clouds on the horizon. That has changed, dramatically. Russia, Iran, and North Korea are serious regional challengers. China is a serious global challenger. Madeleine has left us at a difficult moment.
We would be wise however to remember what she stood for. A determined liberal democrat committed to human rights, she believed the United States had a unique role and responsibility: to defend a world order based on those rights. A refugee from the Nazis, she disdained autocrats and supported their victims. She sought a peaceful world in which freedom could thrive.
She represented the best of us. May her memory be a blessing,
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Letting Russia know the score, better late than never
President Biden has said many times that the US (and by implication NATO) will not intervene in Russia’s war against Ukraine. But what if Russia uses chemical weapons? What if Russia attacks Poland, on grounds it is helping the Ukrainians to kill Russians? If Kyiv looks as if it will fall and mass murder will ensue? What if Putin unleashes against Ukrainians the Stalinist violence he has promised against dissenters in his own population?
There are circumstances under which NATO would find it difficult to stay aloof. What kind of intervention would be appropriate?
Limited interventions have limited effectiveness
The inclination will be to limited intervention calculated to send a stern message. If chemical weapons are used, expect the US to target the launch site with cruise missiles. The Russians know that is what they should expect, so no one will be on duty at that launch site when the time comes. The same will be likely for a limited attack on a Polish facility. NATO will respond to the miscreant, hoping that a broader war can be avoided.
NATO may not respond at all if Kyiv is about to fall or repression becomes draconian, but if it does the approach will be the same. It will likely be enough to punish the perpetrators but not so much as to cause a wider war.
Putin knows this. He will be tempted to push the envelop as far as NATO allows. The Russian army is pulverizing Mariupol and Kharkiv because the response so far has been negligible. Limited interventions will have limited effectiveness.
NATO could take a different approach
The Alliance doesn’t have to behave that way. A wider war would be catastrophic for Putin too. He can barely sustain the effort in Ukraine. The Russians are shipping heavy armor from Siberia, 3000 miles away, to a war they expected would be over two weeks ago. Opening another front would strain the Russian army to the breaking point.
One NATO option is a massive air intervention calculated to destroy as much of the Russian attacking force in Ukraine as possible. The Alliance has the resources needed to secure the air space and bombard the Russian forces while the Ukrainians act in concert on the ground. Such an attack would likely require destruction of air defenses and combat aircraft inside Russia and Belarus. Hence a wider war. But it would inflict a devastating defeat on Moscow, even as it continues to deal with the consequences of Western sanctions.
A precedent we should not want to set
Russia knows NATO could do this. It is unconcerned because of the frequent declarations the Alliance won’t intervene unless one of its members is attacked. Those declarations aim to avoid escalation and the possibility of a nuclear exchange. Russia is getting a pass because it has nuclear weapons.
This is a precedent we should not want to set. Giving a pass for aggression because a state has nuclear weapons is an enormous incentive to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran won’t fail to notice. Nor will North Korea.
Pyongyang has already benefitted from the deterrence its nuclear weapons afford, even though it has not yet indulged in aggression. Why else does the world tolerate its threats against its neighbors and persistent violation of restrictions on its missile program? That tolerance also helps to keep Kim Jong-un in power. Not only Iran but also Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries will have noticed that.
Send a different signal
This week’s NATO Summit is an opportunity to send a different signal, without committing the Alliance to war. The Russians have been floating negotiating proposals that amount to Ukrainian defeat. The Alliance could make clear that it will not accept as permanent any outcome in Ukraine that leaves Russian troops within its internationally recognized territory. Or any outcome that permanently prevents Ukraine from aligning as it wants.
It also could amp up its message about Alliance capabilities, as Eliot Cohen has suggested:
They [American officials] need to say, and say repeatedly, that a Russian war with NATO would only consummate the destruction that the Russian military is suffering at this very moment.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/ukraine-united-states-nato/627052/
Last week the Americans decided to send an additional $1 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. Better late than never. The same applies to making the Russians think about whether they might trigger a war with NATO that they are bound to lose. Let them know the score.
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Stevenson’s army, March 20
– WaPo says the war is headed to stalemate.
– NYT reports administration debates over escalation.
– Kori Schake analyzes Russian incompetence.
– WSJ believes house arrest for Russian intelligence head.
– WSJnotes Russian dependence on imports.
– NYT hears from academics on dangers to US democracy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 16
– Pew shows US support for Ukraine.
– NYT reports burst of centrism in Congress.
– Biden signs bill with more aid.
– WSJ reports more aid planned.
– NYT says US military wants more operations in Kenya.
Just in time for our intelligence topic in class, an old but still relevant report on how Congress handles classified information.
Yesterday Charlie also distributed this:
Prof. Cohen has a new piece in Atlantic that criticizes US policy and comments on Ukraine.The most important paragraphs are these:
The American fear of escalation has been a repeated note throughout this conflict. But to the extent American leaders express that sentiment, or spread such notions to receptive reporters, they make matters worse, giving the Russians a psychological edge. The Russians can (and do) threaten to ratchet things up, knowing that the West will respond with increased anxiety rather than reciprocal menace. We have yet to see, for example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin telling the world what a wretched hand the Russians are playing militarily, and how superior ours is—a message he is particularly fit to deliver.
As for the nuclear question: We should not signal to the Russians that they have a trump card they can always play to stop us from doing pretty much anything. Nuclear weapons are why the United States should refrain from attacking Russia directly, not why it should fear fighting Russians in a country they invaded. Only a few years ago, the United States Air Force killed Russian Wagner mercenaries by the hundreds in Syria; American and Russian pilots tangled in the skies over Korea and possibly Vietnam. Nuclear deterrence cuts both ways, and the Russian leadership knows it. Vladimir Putin and those around him are ill-informed but not mad, and the use of nuclear weapons would threaten their very survival.
I disagree. Maybe we make the Russians feel better if we say we won’t fight a nuclear war with them, but we shouldn’t ever fight such a war. The entire world will be a more dangerous place if anyone ever uses another nuclear weapon in anger. So we should say it because it’s true and it’s right. And while our policy is sympathetic but not locked in to no first use, Russian policy is openly “escalate to deescalate.”
Eliot Cohen thinks the Russians won’t mind if we kill their people outside Russia’s borders. We would and we do. But we have tolerated sanctuaries, as painful and frustrating as they are, for geostrategic reasons. We didn’t want Russians or Chinese to fight us in Vietnam, or a nuclear-armed Pakistan to retaliate against attacks on the Taliban and its allies there.
Does this mean that we are telling the Russians that they have a trump card they can always play to stop us from doing pretty much anything? Not at all. We are telling them that we will NOT do pretty much anything to prevent their conquest of Ukraine. We will do many things, including providing weapons that Ukrainians will deploy in their own country to fight the Russians. But we will consciously limit our direct involvement because that is in our interests.
Nuclear weapons force all combatants to be especially careful. We should not be killing Russians anywhere in a deliberate and sustained policy. We have important security and humanitarian interests in Ukraine, but no vital national interest.Yes, Nuclear deterrence cuts both ways. It should deter both of us from climbing the escalation ladder for less than existential reasons.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A bad 1995 idea that is worse now
An invitation to meet with Croatian officials this week has prompted me to think once more about the Bosnian Croats. I dealt extensively with them between November 1994 and June 1996 as the State Department Special Envory for the Bosnian Federation. The Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims in American usage, but many prefer Bosniaks because it lacks religious connotation) had made their peace by then. My role was to help them implement its provisions for creating a joint Federation. In parallel, the Croat Defense Council (HVO) and the Bosnian Army (ABiH) were fighting the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), supported by Serbia. That continued until November 1995, when the war ended with the Dayton accords.
The Bosnian Croats were uninterested in a “third entity”
The Bosnian Croats were a force to be reckoned with in 1995. The Croatian Army, fresh from victories earlier in 1995, backed the HVO to the hilt. That was a major factor in the successful HVO/ABiH summer offensive against the VRS inside Bosnia. Croatia controlled the Adriatic coast, through which arms shipments to the Bosnian Army had to pass (in violation of a UN arms embargo). So when we got to Dayton, the Bosnian Croats were in excellent negotiating position.
Dick Holbrooke did not make it easy. He refused to meet at Dayton with Kresimir Zubak, the President of the Federation. But still the Bosnian Croats got an excellent deal. Zubak asked for and got a tripartite presidency (Croat/Serb/Bosniak) despite the relatively small percentage of Croats in Bosnia even before the war. They were 17.38% in the then most recent (1991) census. They are now fewer: 15.43% in 2013.
Dayton gave them one-third of what the Bosnians call “the state” in addition to their half of the Federation, which became 51% of the territory. They also held, like the Bosniaks and Serbs, various constitutionally established vetoes. A Bosnian Croat became Foreign Minister in the state government. There were lots of other goodies along the way. No wonder no Bosnian Croat at that time asked for what is now known as “the third entity,” that is a Croat sub-state like Republika Srpska.
Now things are different
That has changed. Despite favorable election rules and constitutional provisions, the ethnic nationalist Croats have not been adept. The country has even dared elect an anti-nationalist Croat to the presidency, thrice. So the Croat nationalist leader, Dragan Covic, has conducted a major campaign to change the rules in his own favor. This despite several court decisions to the contrary.
Covic does this in collaboration with Serb nationalist leader Milorad Dodik. Russian President Putin encourages them, both because he is an ethnic nationalist like them and because it causes the US and EU heartburn. Covic gets a lot of face time with weak-kneed Western diplomats desperately seeking to make progress on electoral reform.
That effort has failed, but the Croat/Serb campaign continues. Both leaderships feel threatened. They fear a civic Bosnia. Each person would then have one vote. Ethnic nationalist institutions and vetoes would be reduced or eliminated. Dodik and Covic denounce this option as leading to an Islamic state. Bosnia now has a slight Bosniak (Muslim in their terms) numerical majority.
No one should be fooled
The real threat is different. Strengthening ethnic division in Bosnia, which is what the nationalist Croats and Serbs advocate, would lead to the formation of an Islamic state. The third entity implies two others, one of which would necessarily be Muslim. It would be land-locked and barely viable. Most Bosniaks don’t want that. They are too fractious to achieve it anyway. Only Croat success in getting a third entity could make it happen.
Franjo Tudjman, the war-time father of independent Croatia, understood this. He was no liberal democrat. He collaborated despite his ethnic nationalist politics with formation of the Federation and its role in post-war Bosnia. The reason: preventing the emergence of three entities. Somehow Zagreb has forgotten that an Islamic state next door would not necessarily be a good neighbor. Too many Americans and Europeans have forgotten it too. So I hear lots of third entity talk, either explicit or implicit, especially from Croatians as well as Bosnian Croats.
It was a bad idea in 1995. We in the State Department worried then that it would become a platform for Iranian-supported terrorism in Europe, because Tehran was providing ample support to the Bosnian Army. Sunni Islamists didn’t teach us about terrorism in the US until 2001. A democratic Bosnia has no need of ethnically defined sub-national entitites. If a third entity was a bad idea in 1995, it is a worse idea now, including for Croatians and Bosnian Croats.
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