Tag: United States
Russian ambitions are making a fight more likely
A colleague whom I respect suggests President Putin’s force mobilization on Ukraine’s border has little to do with Ukraine or Russian domestic politics. He thinks It could be Putin’s effort to reassert Russia’s claim to a seat at the “high table” with the US and China. The US looks weak in the aftermath of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Trump. So Putin wants to seize the day to re-establish Russia as indispensable to global decisionmaking.
What does this perspective suggest about ways to defuse the current situation?
The facts
President Obama suggested Russia was a middling regional power. This is in many respects numerically true. Russia has an economy about the size of Brazil’s that is wholly dependent on oil and gas exports. Its population is old and declining, both in numbers and life expectancy. Its people, who include not only Russians but lots of mistreated minorities, are mostly beyond discontent and just seeking to get by.
But Moscow’s military forces are the fifth largest on earth and increasingly modernized (especially the air force). Its nuclear weapons are equal to those of the US. It is the largest country in the world by area. It has grown a sovereign wealth fund of over $620 billion. Russia’s extensive geography places it more or less contiguous to important places: the Arctic, the European Union, the Black Sea, the Gulf, Central Asia, and China. Russia has also managed to project its reach to Venezuela, Cuba, Libya, Mali, and other places in Africa.
So Russia is not Brazil, but it is not China either.
The history
The US was not unkind to Russia after the Cold War. Washington harbored hopes Moscow would no longer relish the role of adversary but rather join the Western “world order.” Russia kept the Soviet Union’s UN Security Council permanent membership, with a veto. NATO and Russia established a Permanent Joint Council intended to end hostility between the Alliance and Moscow. Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Commitments made to the Soviets were initially maintained, until George W. Bush started dismantling them in the first decade of the twentieth century.
Moscow for much of the past decade has been on a tear. In Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine Russian forces have established de facto puppet regimes in territory where Russian speakers are the majority. Moscow used force to reclaim and annex Crimea. Russian forces have found their way not only to Armenia but also to Azerbaijan and most of the ‘stans, not to mention Belarus. Russia has threatened non-NATO members Finland and Sweden, undermined NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (all former Soviet possessions), and tried by nefarious means to block NATO membership for Macedonia and Montenegro.
Is there a way?
No wonder Washington has been seeking to reset relations with Russia. Moscow has put its price on the table. It wants American acceptance, in a legally binding document, of Russian hegemony in the former Soviet republics not yet NATO members. And it wants limits on NATO’s presence in its newer member states. This would amount to acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence, making the newer member states buffers between Russia and what we used to call Western Europe. NATO would abandon the ambition of Europe “whole and free,” at least for now.
There may be some other way. After all, the Russians knew when presenting their maximum demands that they would not be acceptable. Europe whole and free has long been out of reach. NATO could clarify that there are no current plans for accession of Ukraine, which is true. Some force limitations in eastern Europe are possible too, provided they are reciprocal. Upgrading the NATO-Russia Council is conceivable. So too is more bilateral consultation with Russia.
But Russian ambitions exceed all those moves. The odds of a fight are increasing by the day.
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Stevenson’s army, January 24
Lots of leaks following the Camp David meeting to discuss Ukraine options. Most strike me as authorized, rather than an effort by those losing the interagency debate. NYT says US might send more troops to Baltics. WaPo says US plans heavy sanctions to prevent transfer to Russia of US semiconductors and aircraft parts.
– Meanwhile, US & UK have begun withdrawals of dependents and some staff from Ukraine.
– FT suggest all the publicity has undercut effectiveness of deterrent.
– WSJ sees Russia angle in US sale of F16s to Turkey.
– NYT writer says Pakistan army wants US back in region.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 21
– WSJ says US allows Baltics to transfer arms to Ukraine.
– FT says Taliban threatens Pakistan.
– Oath Keepers were armed for insurrection.
– Fred Kaplan analyzes Biden’s Ukraine gaffe.
– NYT says US special forces bombed a dam in Syria on “no hit” list. Senior officials had denied attack.
– In FA, SAIS prof Hal Brands says US is overstretched militarily.
– More on CIA assessment of Havana Syndrome.
– China demands end to foreign FONOPs.
On the 80the anniversary of the Wannsee conference,NYT remembers. I’ve been to the place where the meeting occurred. Here are the minutes of the meeting.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 20
– NYT explains how & why White House walked back Biden statements on Ukraine at news conference.
– BTW,the CIA director made a secret visit to the region shortly before SecState Blinken’s trip there.
– After CODEL to Kyiv, Senators are planning Ukraine support legislation.
– CIA says Havaan Syndrome does not seem to come from a foreign power’s worldwide effort. CNN has one report; WaPo another.
– WH released a new directive on NSA role in DOD cybersecurity. I think WSJ exaggerates the significance. In my view, this is just the latest in an administration planned clarification of duties within government. The bigger problem, as Lawfare noted last month, is that the US now has officials with overlapped authorities and only one is legally an “officer of the United States” with real authority. This question of authorities is an important one we’ll talk more about in class.
– It’s hard to show unity when leaders are seated 20 feet apart, but Russia and Iran tried that yesterday.Look at the photo!
-Amy Zegart discusses the role of nongovernmental sources doing spying.
– A think tank studying presidential transitions has a report on the Trump/Biden change.
– Deja vu: GOP plans rerun of 1994 campaign to capture Congress.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Good on recognition but oversold on strategic impact
My colleague at SAIS and its Foreign Policy Institute, Ed Joseph, has organized an unusual group to strategize about how to deal with growing instability in the Balkans. Regional stagnation due to EU hesistancy as well as Russian and Chinese meddling threatens more than two decades of progress. The group includes scholars with origins in both Serbia and Kosovo as well as EU non-recognizing states Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.
I was not involved in preparation of their report and did not know about it until published. I’ll offer an arms-length critique of some of its more salient points.
Convergence on recognition is right
The report is right to put the emphasis on convincing non-recognizers to recognize Kosovo, with due respect to the difficulties of the process. This is the centerpiece of what they call a “convergence” strategy. They are also correct to point toward Greece as the most likely of the non-recognziers to do the right thing. So it is regrettable that the report does not include a Greek author. That said, surely the encouraging approach they suggest is preferable to a punitive one.
Irredentism is a real threat…
One of the reasons for urgency about recognition is the growing threat of irredentism. Belgrade is dreaming of a “Serbian home” that includes Serb-populated parts of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. That idea is indistguishable from Greater Serbia. That was Slobodan Milosevic’s goal in going to war in Croatia and Bosnia. (Kosovo and Montenegro were already under Serbian rule at the time.) Some in Tirana and Pristina, including the current prime ministers, like the idea of Greater Albania, which is ruled out in the Kosovo constitution.
…but legal sanctions are not an appropriate response to talk
These ethnically-motivated territorial ambitions are, as the report suggests, a prime cause of Balkan instability. But the authors make the mistake of suggesting the US legally sanction their paladins. That proposal is attracting a lot of press attention in the region, but it isn’t going to happen. Washington does not levy legal sanctions for opinions but rather for actions. US officials may limit access and even visas for foreign officials who say things Washington regards as destabilizing. But the miscreants will have to introduce legislation, organize and arm paramilitaries, or take some other tangible action to incur frozen assets or other legal sanctions.
The bigger error
That is not however the report’s biggest error. It argues that recognition and eventual NATO membership for Kosovo will change Belgrade’s “strategic calculus,” incentivize Serbia to accept the Western order for the Balkans, and deter Russia.
I doubt these propositions. Belgrade claims it is “neutral” but in fact is re-arming beyond any need to confront real military threats. Serbia is also moving towards domestic autocracy. Its politics have shifted definitively toward virulent ethnic nationalism. Its democratic opoposition is moribund. Its media are not free. Even the constitutional amendments approved last weekend are but a first step towards an independent judiciary, if implemented in good faith.
Recognition of Kosovo and its progress toward NATO will likely prevent any Serbian military intervention. But it will also incentivize Serbia further in the wrong directions. Ethnic nationalist politicians will benefit. Moscow will be ready and willing to arm Belgrade against NATO. Russia can even be relied upon to block Kosovo UN membership if Serbia were to somehow agree to it. President Putin will have a price in mind–in Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine–before surrendering his trump card.
Whole and free is a dead letter for now
Let me be clear: I like the idea of working hard for recognition by the EU non-recognizers, especially the four who are members of NATO. The Alliance needs to prepare for Kosovo accession no later than completion of its army, scheduled for 2027. But the notion that recognition or NATO membership will somehow undo Serbia’s domestic and international drift in the wrong directions is fanciful. Europe “whole and free” is a dead letter for now. So too is the Balkans “whole and free.” The region will divide because that’s the way Moscow and Belgrade want it. The only question is where the lines will be drawn.
So what do I think of the report? Good on its central thesis concerning recognition, but oversold on the strategic impact. There is no magic wand. The West needs to gird for a long struggle in the Balkans.
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It’s not only about Ukraine
Negotiations with Russia went nowhere in this first week. The US, NATO, and the OSCE failed to budge Putin from his insistence on rolling back the NATO presence in Europe and blocking forever NATO membership for Ukraine. The Russians failed to budge NATO from its insistence that the door to membership be kept open (even if both NATO and the Russians know that Ukrainian membership is not in the cards for now). The odds of war, already high, have likely gone up, not down. What now?
Unity is strength
Above all, the US and European members of NATO need to strengthen Ukraine’s military capacity. Training and equipping should continue and expand. Stefano Graziosi and James Carafano are correct to argue that
Putin fears and respects strength. He exploits weakness. Europe must cease its dithering and give him what he fears, not what he wants.
Just today the Russians apparently launched a cyberattack on Ukraine. There are also indications they are planning a false flag operation as a pretext for invasion. Europe and the US made a pretty good show this week of unity in support of Ukraine. Let’s hope that show is backed up with real weapons and training.
Russia is vulnerable
There is still much more to be done. The Russians are more active today worldwide than the Soviets, who focused less on international presence and more on the strategic standoff with the US. In some of these places, Moscow is vulnerable. Witness what happened to the Wagner proxies in Libya, where Turkish drones forced them out of Tripoli. Some of these vulnerabilities are in Russian satellites. Witness what happened in Belarus and Kazakhstan, both of which had to rely on Moscow to protect their autocrats. And there are vulnerabilities inside the Russian Federation, where the economy is stagnant. The West needs to exploit these vulnerabilities when good opportunities present themselves.
Any Russian intervention will be limited
We also need to think realistically about what Putin is likely to do. An invasion aiming at taking all of Ukraine is unlikely. The 100,000 troops Russia has already massed are not adequate. Moscow would need to increase them by fourfold or more for that purpose. Ukraine has more and far better equipped and trained forces than when Russia first invaded in 2014. Turkey has provided its cheap but effective attack drones.
Kiev has also gained popular support. This report from Kharkiv, close to the Russian border, is telling:
The Russian Army cannot expect to be welcomed in most of a country where the Soviet-imposed Holodomor famine of 1932-33 is remembered as genocidal.
Putin presumably knows this and will keep any military intervention to limited objectives commensurate with the size of his forces. One of my more knowledgeable colleagues suggests this might be the canal that supplies water from the Dnipr to Crimea, or some expansion of the insurrectionist-controlled area in Donbas.
The US will need to lead the Western reaction
That kind of limited intervention will pose a problem for the US and Europe. Should they react with the full force of the financial and technological sanctions and military assistance to Ukrainian resistance fighters that they have threatened? Even those may not be effective. Some in NATO will want to modulate downwards to match the magnitude of any limited Russian intervention. Others will argue that a disproportionate response is appropriate, to deter further offensive efforts on Russia’s part.
The US will need to play the leadership role, whatever the Russians do. The Europeans are too fragmented and compromised to reach quick decisions and implement them with rigor. President Biden has spent a year building up credibility with NATO. He will need to draw down on those credits, especially if he reverses his own decision not to continue objecting to operation of the now completed Nordstream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany. The Germans have paused their own decision on the pipeline’s operation, but high gas prices in Europe are bringing pressure to go ahead.
Of course it would be best if Moscow backed off and accepted some of the face-saving propositions NATO is offering: limits on military exercises, missile deployments, and other classic OSCE-style confidence building measures. But hope is not a policy. The Americans need to continue to keep the Europeans in line and the Russians concerned about what an invasion of Ukraine might portend, not only in Ukraine but elsewhere as well.
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