Tag: United States
Putin is hesitating but not yet lost
Russian President Putin has given his military orders to prepare for the invasion of Ukraine, but he is hesitating to give the green light. The French claim he has agreed to a meeting with President Biden following on a meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Blinken February 24. For the Americans, all of this is contingent on the Russians not invading Ukraine. Moscow says there are no plans for a presidential meeting.
What is going on? There are several possible explanations:
- Military preparations are not yet complete.
- Putin is not satisfied with his domestic support in Russia and Donbas.
- The Chinese warning against invastion has given him pause.
- Diplomatic efforts are promising.
- The Western threat of sanctions is deterring action.
Military preparations
I’m no military expert, but journalists report that Russian commanders have everything they need to proceed. Blood supplies and field hospitals were already in place by last week. Putin was lying when he said Russian forces were drawing down. They are now up to 150,000, enough to seize and control a piece of the country but not enough to occupy its entire territory.
I still am not inclined to believe the Russian objective is to seize Kyiv. I think they aim to make the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. A movement toward Kyiv might make the Ukrainians draw down in the south. But a serious attack on Kyiv would cause devastation that would be difficult for the Russians ever to repair, not to mention Ukrainian hostility and resistance.
Support in Russia and in Donbas
Russia’s parliament has already urged Putin to recognize the independence of the Russian proxy authorities in Donestk and Luhansk, as he has done for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The de facto authorities in Donbas have ordered an evacuation of civilians, many of whom have been getting Russian citizenship.
But they are for the most part not departing, even though the rebel military forces have ratcheted up the bombardment of Ukrainian targets to provoke a response. The popular mood in Russia does not favor full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But extending Russian control in the Donbas area would not prove highly problematic either in Russia or in the insurgent portion of Donbas.
Chinese opposition
President Xi did not give Putin the full-throated endorsement he sought for invasion of Ukraine when they met at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Then last week the Chinese Foreign Minister used the occasion of the Munich Security Conference to back Russia’s position on keeping Ukraine out of NATO but also to pull the rug out from under Putin’s invasion plans.
China favors continued diplomacy instead. Russia will desperately need China to help in sanctions-busting if the invasion proceeds. Beijing however wants to avoid further aggravation of relations with the US. Putin needs again to seek and get Chinese reassurance.
Diplomatic efforts
There is little sign that diplomatic efforts are bearing fruit. According to French President Macron, Putin has agreed to meet with Ukraine and the OSCE. But that is thin gruel.
The US has rejected Russia’s demand that Washington guarantee no NATO membership for Ukraine. Moscow has continued to insist. The Americans have tried to shift the diplomatic agenda to mutual arms and conventional force limitations. They hope Russia will view those as responsive to Moscow’s effort to roll back NATO forces from its borders. Putin however isn’t buying. He wants Russian forces right on the borders of the Baltics, Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine.
Sanctions
Sanctions are a likely factor in Putin’s hesitation. Britain is prepared to end Russia’s access to pounds and British property. The Americans are presumably ready to do likewise. For a country that depends on oil and gas exports, both normally denominated in dollars or another hard currency, that is major.
We don’t know what German Chancellor Scholz said to Putin during his visit last week to Moscow. But President Biden has repeatedly asserted that the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline (completed but not yet operational) is toast “one way or the other” if Russia invades. We don’t know what that means. Scholz likely does. He has shown no sign of disagreeing with Biden.
Bottom lines
Putin holds his cards close, but he is hesitating. I’d give sanctions and the China factor each 40% as factors in his hesitation. Support in Russia and Donbas as well as military preparations I’d each put at 10% each. The diplomatic factor is important only insofar as Blinken continues to reassure Putin that the Americans are still willing to negotiate. That gives him reason not to hurry while he gets China and sanctions-busting fixed.
Still, invasion is more likely than not. Putin is hesitating, but he is not yet lost.
Putin’s ugly war of choice
Today the de facto authorities in the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine are ordering the mass evacuation of civilians to Russia. Supposedly in response to the threat of a Ukrainian attack, this is classic self-cleansing. Its purpose is to create a free-fire zone without a friendly civilian population and to cast the adversary as an ethnic cleanser.
Putin is determined
President Putin appears determined to use force once again in Ukraine. He succeeded eight years ago in the occupation and annexation of Crimea as well as his use of Russian and proxy forces to establish rebel zones in Donbas. Why not try again? With luck, Ukrainian resistance might collapse altogether and allow Moscow to set up a puppet government in Kyiv. More likely, Russian forces will succeed in extending their area of control along the Sea of Azov, perhaps going as far as Crimea.
In the meanwhile, NATO will be reinforcing its forces in the eastern-most member states, something Russia says it doesn’t want. They will also be trying to decide on the sanctions required to respond to Russian aggression. Putin is betting the Alliance will split on that issue and reduce the sanctions to the lowest common denominator. Net result: a NATO military presence that doesn’t really threaten Russia and a falling out among Russia’s adversaries.
Europe whole and free in smithereens
Once the smoke clears, the idea of “Europe whole and free” will be in smithereens. A new curtain will have descended. It won’t be made of iron. On one side will be Lukashenko, the Russian proxies in Moldova and Georgia, Armenia and the central Asian ‘stans. On the other side will be NATO and EU members. Others will either need to choose which sphere of influence they wish to align with or reinvigorate the idea of non-alignment that Serbia and others already champion.
NATO expansion is still possible
It is anyone’s guess how many people will be killed in Putin’s effort to convince the Americans that Ukraine can’t be allowed to decide whether it wants to join NATO. Putin already knows that Ukrainian membership is impossible now and for the foreseeable future, because all of NATO’s 30 member states would need to approve. I doubt even a majority would favor Ukraine’s accession at this point.
But that doesn’t mean NATO won’t expand. Russian behavior in the Baltic and aggression in Ukraine is already well on the way to convincing Sweden and Finland that NATO membership would be a good idea. Both are well-equipped and trained. But neither has the means to defend itself on its own. The NATO door may well be open to both well-ordered and consolidated democracies.
Net results
Putin has succeeded in getting America’s attention and reasserting Russia’s claim to superpower status. The invasion may well split the Alliance on the issue of sanctions. Ukraine will be divided at best and subjugated at worst. But NATO forces will be far stronger and closer to Russia after this war than before it. Moscow will be saddled with an enormous reconstruction burden as well as sanctions.
The biggest known unknown is how Russians will react. This war will belie Putin’s claim of brotherhood with Ukrainians and undermine the Russian economy. Moscow has tried hard to hide the body bags coming back from its military ventures in Syria and Libya. But Russians are not supportive of war in Ukraine and hiding the body bags may be much harder in a ground war of these dimensions. A Russian told me long ago: “We support our czars until we don’t. Then we get rid of them quickly.” Putin’s ugly war of choice could be ugly not only for Ukraine and NATO, but also for him.
Putin still has dirty tricks up his sleeve
Russian President Putin has suggested he is withdrawing some forces from around Ukraine. No Westerner has yet confirmed this. President Biden yesterday cited a new, higher number: 150,000 troops. That is 20,000 more than previously reported in the media. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has said there was no evidence of troop withdrawal yet.
Russian plans
But even if true, Putin’s hint at troop withdrawal may betoken little. He never had enough troops surrounding Ukraine to invade and occupy the entire country. More than likely the Russian plan is to take a relatively small portion. My bet has been on a push in the south to extend the Russian area of control along the Sea of Azov as far as Ukrainian forces permit. The troops in Belarus to the north and Transnistria in the west would do just enough to prevent Ukraine from redeploying forces to counter the real offensive in the south.
It is also possible Russia will not use overt military force but rely instead, as it did in Donbas in 2014, on proxy forces backed by Russians with no overt insignia. Or Putin could use “private” security forces like the Wagner Group. This would be risky militarily, as Ukrainian forces have improved a good deal. But the domestic political backwash from losses would be lessened. It is also possible NATO member states would turn a blind eye, or at least reduce their reaction, to the use of proxy forces.
Military action is not Russia’s only option. Just keeping enhanced forces on Ukraine’s border will create uncertainty, which discourages investors and raises insurance rates. Disinformation does likewise. Moscow presumably has enough minimally credible intelligence on Ukrainian malfeasance to launch innumerable attacks on its ruling elite. Where the Russians lack information, they are good at inventing it. Moscow can also rent crowds to create disorder and sponsor terrorist attacks mounted to look like attacks on ethnic Russians. Russian hackers have penetrated Ukraine’s cyberspace, raising the likelihood of continuing attacks on critical computer capabilities.
The Western reaction
The White House has been revealing Moscow’s plans in order to preempt them. This has been an effective tactic. The National Security Council has reportedly prepared an extensive playbook on how to react to various scenarios. We should hope this includes non-military ones. Putin is good at using all the elements of national power to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors. The West has to be at least as agile, and punishing, in response. Washington has repeated ad infinitum the mantra “Europe whole and free.” It was an attractive proposition in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
But Europe whole and free isn’t going to happen anytime soon. Putin has made his choice: Russia is now an autocracy with imperial aspirations in its neighborhood. He will need to defend those aspirations as well as his own hold on power with whatever means he has available, because many Russians and most Europeans and Americans won’t be interested in helping him. Putin still has lots of dirty tricks up his sleeve.
Stevenson’s army, February 15
– WaPo reports WH bragging about its “Tiger Team” at NSC, which for months has studied scenarios and war-gamed responses to Russian actions in Ukraine. Sounds like a smart move.
– Dan Drezner grades new Indo-Pacific strategy document.
– WH calls for more competition to ensure defense industrial base.
– France is pulling troops from Mali.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Recognition can weaken Serbia’s leverage
Edward Joseph, a Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, writes:
It’s the Newtonian law of policy debate: every idea that challenges orthodoxy produces an equal and opposite reaction.
We, the co-authors of the recent SAIS-Wilson Center report, ‘From Crisis to Convergence: A Strategy to Tackle Instability at its Source’, welcome debate on our approach, which has generated at least 16 articles, interviews and two controversies, along with interest in key capitals. At the very least, it represents an original way of thinking about a region where the West has struggled for too long, despite holding the strategic advantage.
We will host a live critique of our recent SAIS-Wilson Center report – along with an assessment of just how bad the situation in the Balkans is — on-line this Tuesday, 15 February at 9:30AM ET. Sign up here.
This event will feature leading experts from: Bosnia-Herzegovina – Srecko Latal (Balkans Crossroads); Kosovo — Engjellushe Morina (ECFR); Serbia – Igor Bandovic (BCSP); Albania – Albert Rakipi (AIIS.) They will explore: ‘Balkans 2022: How Bad Can It Get? Is a Breakthrough Possible?’
The report’s co-authors — who hail from the countries most affected by the strategy, including two respected experts from Serbia and Kosovo – will respond.
One of the more thoughtful critiques of our report appeared in Dan Serwer’s Peacefare post of 19 January. To summarize, Dan supports convergence by the European states that don’t recognize Kosovo, and, critically, he acknowledges the threat from “Serbian irredentism” in the Balkans. Dan then questions the impact of convergence – even NATO membership for Kosovo – on Belgrade’s policies. Instead of altering Serbia’s “strategic calculus,” as we state, Dan believes it will “incentivize Serbia in the opposite direction.”
Anti-democratic Serbia is the problem
Dan’s post raises essential and under-examined questions: what drives Serbia’s posture in the Balkans? Why does only Serbia (and its proxies) reject the liberal Western order for the region?
Let me begin with a challenge to Peacefare readers:
How do you explain that more than three-decades after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia began, the region is not just stagnant – but going backwards, with open talk of “war” from responsible international and regional figures alike? Bear in mind that, unlike in Ukraine, the US, NATO and EU hold the strategic advantage in the Balkans.
We give our answer in the report. The Balkans is not a ‘morass’ of intractable ethno-national tensions. Instead, those ethno-national tensions – which stand in the way of the fight against corruption and the fight for rule of law and democracy – are a function of two factors: national power and strategic orientation.
And that’s the crux of the problem: the largest Western Balkans state – Serbia – has polities in four neighboring states, and is oriented towards the illiberal powers: Russia and China. In power for a decade, the Vucic regime has methodically rolled back Serbia’s weak democracy. The regime is protected within the EU by the leading European illiberal power: Hungary.
In sum, no matter how many Special Envoys are sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, fundamental reform will remain out of reach as long as this condition in Serbia continues. To put it another way, don’t expect democratic progress in BiH or its neighbors, with an anti-democratic Serbia.
Serbia’s leverage
But that only addresses Serbia’s strategic orientation. Where does the Vucic regime get the power to subvert its neighbors – and confound US and EU diplomats? Why do capable, dedicated US officials assail corruption and organized crime in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo – but are generally quiet on official corruption in Serbia? Why do US officials in Serbia repeatedly laud a regime that openly – on billboards – promotes Beijing, and backs Moscow over Ukraine as, “the political and economic leader” in the region? Why was Serbia invited to the ‘Summit for Democracy’ after US officials stated clearly that it would not be invited? Why did the EU give Serbia a pass on rule of law standards?
The source of the leverage
We believe the answer is clear: Serbia has leverage over Kosovo, and through it, over the US and EU. The source of that leverage is the four NATO non-recognizers. The best way to understand Serbian leverage is by comparison with Bulgaria and North Macedonia. As an EU member, Sofia can unilaterally block the opening of Skopje’s EU accession negotiations. Similarly, Belgrade can unilaterally block Pristina’s pathway to NATO and the EU – even though it’s not a member of either organization. The reason: the non-recognizers have, effectively, handed their proxy to Belgrade: ‘we won’t recognize Kosovo, until Serbia does.’
Kosovo cannot advance until Belgrade, with the proxy of the non-recognizers, says so. The status quo – no settlement between Pristina and Belgrade – inflicts pain on only one side. Indeed, the status quo is beneficial for the Vucic regime as it insulates it from Western scrutiny.
In short, the West is participating in Vucic’s charade. Belgrade’s main aim in the EU-led Dialogue is simply to avoid being blamed for lack of progress, so that the Vucic regime can continue the pretense of interest in making EU reforms and becoming a member. Meanwhile, the regime draws Western praise, even as Vucic – through others – promotes what they call the ‘Serb World.’
The way forward
The way forward is also clear: Western strategy should focus on eroding Serbia’s leverage, reducing the illiberal Vucic regime’s ability to project its destructive vision in the region and domestically. Rather than “incentivizing Serbia in the wrong direction,” we see precisely the opposite: reducing regime power incentivizes it to scale back its destructive aspirations and cooperate. In other words, this is about power dynamics, not incentives. EU membership has incentives ample enough to attract Serbia’s neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia. Tirana and Skopje are desperate simply to have the same right that Belgrade already enjoys and exploits.
Eroding Serbian leverage is not a binary event, i.e. either full recognition by the four NATO non-recognizers, or nothing. Instead, we see Belgrade’s obsessive bid to isolate and weaken Kosovo – evidenced in its own words and actions – as proof of its vulnerability. That’s why senior Serbian officials run nervously to Greece and Spain to shore up – as officials openly state – non-recognition of Kosovo. That explains why at a time of grave European crisis, Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic last week visited – of all places – Equatorial Guinea! – praising the country for not recognizing Kosovo. Same with the visits to dangerous countries like Iran and obscure ones like Suriname – all mainly in the name of isolating Kosovo.
Our strategy
Our strategy is entirely pragmatic. Steps towards ‘convergence’ beginning, for example, with returning Slovak and Spanish troops to KFOR, bringing Kosovo into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, aided by continuing movement from Greece, and steps by Romania as well, will have immediate impact on the regime’s posture. Greece’s role is particularly significant because Athens has its own clearly stated strategic reasons for moving toward recognition of Kosovo.
The Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are no match in this regard. A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.
Let’s finally bring the curtain down on the three-decade crisis over Yugoslavia, where it began – in Kosovo. Convergence is the way. Most current approaches, including the fight against corruption, and building a regional common market, continue under convergence — empowered by a US and EU that can finally apply the same standards across the region. Join us on Tuesday to hear how experts from the region process this argument!
Stevenson’s army, February 12
– Both US & Russia are withdrawing personnel from their Kyiv embassies. Biden & Putin are supposed to talk today. Politico says Biden told foreign leaders Feb 16 looks like invasion day.
– NYT says US disclosed possible Russian moves as part of info ops.
– Fred Kaplan sees some Russian military opposition to Putin.
-WSJ reports US moves to block Chinese base in Africa.
– In a Solomonic move, Biden splits frozen Afghan money, half to humanitarian relief, half to 9/11 victims’ families.
-I agree with Tim Noah’s article, Washington is not a swamp.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).