Tag: United States
An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
Democracy doesn’t favor a serious peace
The headlines today say Hamas and Israel have reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that will
- allow exchange of hostages/prisoners,
- get Israeli troops to withdraw, and
- infuse humanitarian assistance.
All that is good.
What it is
But it is still only a ceasefire, not even a formal end to hostilities never mind a peace settlement. The ceasefire is to last seven weeks, during which negotiations on future arrangements for Gaza are to continue. As Tony Blinken put it yesterday:
The ceasefire deal itself requires the Israeli forces to pull back and then, assuming you get to a permanent ceasefire, to pull out entirely. But that’s what’s so critical about this post-conflict plan, the need to come to an agreement on its arrangements, because there has to be something in place that gives Israelis the confidence that they can pull out permanently and not have a repeat of the last, really, decade.
That is a good reminder. A ceasefire won’t last if there is no mutually enticing way out of the conflict. What might that be?
The rub
Therein lies the rub. The obvious way out would be a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. It could be run by a successor to the hapless Palestinian Authority. The current Israeli government is dead set against that. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu could accept it, which is doubtful, his coalition partners would not. A new Israeli government will be needed for any post-war settlement that appeals to most Palestinians.
But this government has been successful in doing what Israelis wanted in Gaza and Lebanon. It has diminished Hamas and all but disemboweled Hizbollah. It has also weakened Iran. Netanyahu would likely win a new election, but have no clear path to a parliamentary majority. Nor would anyone else. The pattern of indecisive Israeli elections would continue. There is no sign of a majority that favors a Palestinian state. Democracy does not favor a serious peace settlement.
Trump’s challenge
This is a big problem for the newly elected Trump Administration. It has assembled a mostly pro-Israel diplomatic team. It is difficult to picture Ambassador Huckabee bludgeoning the Israelis into accepting a Palestinian state. Trump’s threat that “all hell will break lose” absent an agreement was intended to threaten Hamas, not Israel.
Trump could turn the table and speak out for a Palestinian state. He did it at least once in his first term. But then he deferred to the Israelis:
If the Israelis and the Palestinians want one state, that’s OK with me. If they want two-state, that’s OK with me. I’m happy if they’re happy.
That is not resounding support for a Palestinian state.
The Saudi factor
It will be up to Riyadh to make it happen. Saudi Arabia wants normalization with Israel as well as a defense and nuclear agreements with the United States. It would be willing to help finance Gaza reconstruction. But it has to get a “concrete, irrevocable steps in a three to five year time horizon” to a Palestinian state in the bargain.
Israel wants normalization with the Saudis as well. Can fragmented Israeli democracy, American pro-Israel diplomats, and a Saudi autocrat combine to produce a Palestinian state? Anything is possible.
Things in the Balkans can get worse
My post yesterday on Biden’s less than sterling foreign policy legacy disappointed my Balkan fans. They thought his weak performance in their region merited attention. So here is a moment of attention. Let’s start with Trump’s first term, 2017-21.
Trump disappointed
In 2020, then President Trump signed with Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vucic separate agreements on “economic normalization.” The US Administration advertised these agreements as great achievements. They provided for highway and rail connections, financing for small and medium enterprises, entry of Kosovo into what was then labeled a “mini-Schengen” zone that included Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, mutual recognition of diplomas, prohibition of “untrusted” (read: Chinese) 5G vendors, as well as a number of other provisions that have little or nothing to do with economic normalization between Belgrade and Pristina. The other economic provisions were even more minimal, except for a promise to Belgrade of more US investment.
These agreements mostly went unimplemented. Israel recognized Kosovo and Pristina located its new embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Serbia got lots of new US investment. The most important provision, Serbia’s suspension of its anti-recognition campaign, never happened so far as I can tell.
Everyone had high expectations for Biden
People in the region, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, had high expectations for the Biden Administration in 2020. Senator Biden had been a vigorous advocate of US interventions in the Balkans. Secretary of State Blinken knew the region well. Ambassador in Belgrade Chris Hill had been deeply involved at Dayton and thereafter at Rambouillet and as ambassador in Macedonia. Derek Chollet, Counselor at State, was likewise knowledgeable.
To my surprise, they decided to turn American policy in a decidedly pro-Belgrade direction. They also decided to back Albanian Prime Minister Rama to the hilt. I knew that Biden had favored Belgrade getting candidacy for the European Union, without having met the requirements. I had opposed him on this issue while testifying in the 2000s. But I did not understand this reflected a generalized lean towards Serbia. For much of the Biden Administration, Gab Escobar, former DCM in Belgrade, led on the Balkans at State. He made creation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities his exclusive priority. That meant giving Belgrade what it wanted most while giving Pristina nothing. That was never going to work, and it didn’t.
But Biden’s people kept on leaning towards Belgrade. When Serbia kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, they said nothing meaningful. When Vucic sent rioters to Kosovo to attack NATO peacekeepers, Washington said little. When Serbia organized and equipped a terrorist attack in Kosovo, they did nothing. In Bosnia, the Biden people prioritized getting rid of a Bosniak nationalist politician. They left the much-sanctioned Serb and the equally odious Croat for another time.
What to expect now
I don’t expect better of the second Trump Administration. Jared Kushner, Trump’s Saudi-funded son-in-law, has been prospecting for investment projects in both Serbia and Albania. So far as I am aware, he hasn’t even visited Bosnia or Kosovo. You can expect Trump to do nothing that will endanger Kushner’s projects or his Saudi money. That means a continued tilt towards Belgrade and away from Pristina, though not away from Tirana. Albania and Serbia agree on many things, including the need for their presidents to stay in power without serious opposition. The Americans have been supportive under Biden. That will continue under Trump.
People in the Balkans will be watching Marco Rubio’s confirmation hearing today for any questions involving the Balkans. That could be a hint of where things are going. But I wouldn’t bet on any Balkan issues getting raised, unless someone prompts one of the Senators to do it.
Mico Vlahovic quotes outgoing Assistant Secretary James O’Brien as saying:
We do not want to it to seem that one [US political] party or the other is taking responsibility, because in America both parties believe that a strong relationship is important – both for our country and for Serbia.
That implies continuity in the appeasement of Belgrade.
It could be worse than that, if Washington returns to wanting to partition Kosovo on ethnic lines. But neither appeasement nor partition will bring peace and stability. The route to that is strengthened sovereignty for all the region’s countries. In these waning days, the Biden Administration is pushing “strategic dialogues” with both Belgrade and Pristina. That’s not the worst idea I’ve heard, but it all depends on the agendas.
A stronger American still fumbles
President Biden made a farewell appearance at the State Department yesterday. As a former Foreign Service officer, I’m of course delighted that he did this. It is especially important and timely because the Department now faces Donald Trump’s threat of loyalty tests and mass firings.
Biden’s understandably directed his remarks at justifying what his Administration has done on foreign policy. So how did he really do?
The bar was low
Certainly Biden can justifiably claim to have strengthened America’s alliances. The bar was low. Both in Europe and Asia the first Trump Administration had raised doubts. Allies could not depend on Washington’s commitment to fulfill its mutual defense obligations. Biden’s claim that compared to four years ago America is stronger because of renewed and expanded alliances is true. He is also correct in claiming he has not gone to war to make it happen.
The extraordinary strength of the American economy is an important dimension of this strength. Voters decided the election in part on the issue of inflation. But the Fed has largely tamed that and growth has been strong throughout. Manufacturing is booming, including vital semi-conductor production. Investment in non-carbon energy sources has soared. The defense industrial based is expanding.
Biden is also correct in asserting that America’s antagonists are worse off. Russia has failed to take Ukraine because of the US effort to gather support for Kyiv. Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are weaker. Only the Houthis in Yemen are arguably stronger than four years ago.
China is facing serious domestic economic and demographic challenges. But I don’t know why Biden claims it will never surpass the US. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, it already has, though obviously per capita GDP in China remains much lower.
Some claims gloss over big problems
Biden is rightly proud that there is no longer war in Afghanistan, but he glosses over the chaotic withdrawal. He also doesn’t mention the failure of the Taliban to keep its commitments.
He vaunts progress on climate change, but without acknowledging that the goal of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees centigrade will not be met.
Biden talks about infrastructure in Africa. But not about its turn away from democracy, civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the unresolved conflict in Libya.
He urges that Iran never be allowed to “fire” a nuclear weapon. That is a significant retreat from the position that Iran should never be allowed to have one.
Biden mentions the impending Hamas/Israel ceasefire. But he says nothing about Israel’s criminal conduct of the war in Gaza. Nor does he blame Israel’s right-wing government for the long delay in reaching a deal.
Biden’s legacy
At the end, Biden seeks to bequeath three priorities to Trump: artificial intelligence, climate change, and democracy. He no doubt knows that Trump isn’t going to take the advice on climate or democracy. He might on artificial intelligence, as his Silicon Valley tycoons will want him to.
Sad to say, Biden’s legacy will lie in other areas. Fearful of nuclear conflict with Russia, he failed to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defeat Russia. He was reluctant to rein in Israel for more than a year of the Gaza war. He failed to stop or reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. America is stronger than it was four years ago, but it has not always used that strength to good advantage.
The foreign policy smokescreen
As Donald Trump prepares to assume the presidency January 20, he is talking obvious nonsense about Canada, Greenland, and Panama. What is he up to?
The nonsense
The three propositions, as best I understand them, are these:
- Canada should become the 51st state;
- Denmark should sell Greenland to the United States;
- Panama should lower shipping fees through its canal or the US will take it back by military force.
None of this is happening. Nor is any of it desirable from America’s or even Trump’s own perspective.
Canadians pride themselves on their differences with the US. They include a national health system and wide social safety net. Absorbing its population of more than 40 million would tilt the American political scene definitively towards the Democrats. Nor would most US citizens want the francophone part of Canada. Absorbing even anglophone Canada would remove a buffer that shields the US from direct Arctic confrontation with China and Russia.
Denmark has already said it is not interested in selling Greenland, which has a population of only 57,000 or so. It has relatively large deposits of rare earth minerals. Those are available to the US with Greenland under Danish sovereignty. We only need pay the price. Owning Greenland would shift the burden of its defense to the US. It would also make the island a juicy target for America’s adversaries. We wouldn’t be able to limit its defense to the minimalist approach Denmark has taken.
The 1977 Panama Canal Treaty turned the Canal Zone over to Panama in 1979 and the Canal itself in 1999. A Panama-government-owned entity has run it well since. Trump has complained about high transit prices and claimed Chinese soldiers control the Canal. Prices are up due to water shortages that affect Canal operations. The claim about the Chinese is bogus, though there are Chinese companies running ports and building infrastructure in Panama.
The why
Why would a President-elect stake out objectives that are obviously not going to be reached? One reason is to gain leverage in upcoming negotiations. Trump is transactional. He figures weakening the Canadian government by pooh-poohing its prime minister will be to American advantage in coming trade negotiations. He’ll hope to get a deal for Greenland’s minerals that will exclude China. And he’ll try to get a discount for American shipping through the Panama Canal.
But there is more to this flood of bad propositions. Trump is trying to hide what is going on within his own electoral coalition. Its MAGA loyalists are in a verbal fracas with his new-found tech friends, including Elon Musk. The techies want H1B visas so they can import overseas technical talent they claim is not available in the US. Trump wants them too, as he uses them to import cheap labor for his hotels and golf clubs. But his MAGAtes see them as one more hole in the proverbial fence at the border.
There’s more. Trump is trying to distract from his blatantly unqualified presidential nominees. The worst of these, Matt Gaetz, for Attorney General, is gone. He fell victim to his own abuse of young girls. But the equally abusive and alcohol abusing Pete Hegseth is still up for Secretary of Defense. And Kash Patel, sworn to avenge what he alleges is Trump’s mistreatment, is hoping to sneak by as FBI Director. Not to mention the blatantly unqualified RFK Jr as Health and Human Services Secretary. And the Moscow-compromised Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence.
He’s succeeding
The presidential nominees and the Republican split on immigration policy are both more real than Trump’s dumb imperialist proposals. Canada is doing to remain independent, Denmark will keep Greenland, and Panama will keep the Canal. But once again he has us talking about things that don’t matter instead of the things that do. Trump isn’t really a master communicator in the sense of Ronald Reagan. But he is a master at setting the daily agenda, not only to attract but also to distract. His foreign policy smokescreen is succeeding.
Between a rock, a hard place, and the US
Syria’s Kurdish forces were once spread along Syria’s northern border with Turkey in three main concentrations. Afrin lay in the west, Kobani east of the Euphrates, and Hasakeh in the east. They have now lost control of Afrin to Turkiye and its proxies, who are threatening Minbij. Ankara wants all Kurdish forces at least 30 km from the border.

Meanwhile Syria’s de facto new leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, wants Kurdish forces brought under the Ministry of Defense. The United States has long cooperated with the Kurds in fighting the Islamic State and imprisoning its cadres.
The American side of the triangle
The Americans won’t want anything to happen that weakens that mission. But American support for the Kurds is the least certain side of this iron triangle. President Trump has long wanted the Americans out of Syria. His National Security Advisor nominee, Mike Waltz, is known as a long-time friend of the Iraqi Kurds.
He is also strongly committed to destroying the Islamic State (IS). That goal requires Kurdish cooperation. But there are few IS fighters remaining in the wild, where the Americans bomb them often. The main IS threat now is from the fighters whom the Kurds have imprisoned. If the Kurds were to release the jihadis, that would revive IS. A secondary threat is from their families, mainly concentrated in a refugee camp in the south.
The rock and the hard place
Ankara and Damascus are the more rigid sides of the triangle. Both have vital interests vis-a-vis the Kurds.
Ankara wants the Kurds off its border with Syria. Or at least diluted with some of the three million Syrian (mostly Arab) refugees Turkiye wants to return to Syria. Ankara has said it would take responsibility for the IS prisoners and their families. Damascus wants the Kurdish forces either demobilized or absorbed into the new Syrian army. It will also want the Kurdish governing institutions in the north absorbed into the Syrian state.
None of this will appeal to the Kurds. But they are weaker militarily than the Turks. And they have long accepted that their institutions, including the armed forces, should be subservient to a post-Assad state. The Americans, their main supporters, will not support a bid for independence.
Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide
The Kurds are cornered. Iraq’s Kurds have their own problems and won’t want to support Syria’s Kurds, who espouse a different governing philosophy. They even speak a different Kurdish. Iran, which has sometimes appeared supportive of Syria’s Kurds, also has its own problems. It has evacuated most of its cadres and their leadership from Syria. Kurds still control a slice of Syria’s oil resources. Turning that over to Damascus could be a bargaining chip. Iran and Iraq have halted exports of oil to Syria.
Reaching an accommodation with Ankara and Damascus will not be easy, but the Syrian Kurds have little choice. Unless Syria descends into chaos, the days of their wide autonomy will end. They would do well to offer up their armed forces in exchange for Damascus acceptance of Kurdish governing institutions. Damascus might even want them to maintain a strong police force and intelligence capability. The Kurds should also try to convince Ankara of their willingness to break ties with Kurdish rebels inside Turkiye. In exchange they could ask that Kurds return to their homes along the border.
Politics rather than force
Kurds often portray themselves as the largest ethnic group without a state. That is a dubious claim. And in any case there are no guarantees of a state based on population size. The Kurds live in four contiguous states, none of which they can call their own: Iraq, Turkiye, Syria, and Iran. They need to use their political strength and savvy to gain what they can from these non-democracies. Necessary as it has been, military force has not produced a desirable outcome.